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Preface
The youth phase is one of the most crucial times 
in a person’s lifetime, in which an individual shifts 
from being a child to becoming an adult. It is the 
progression from the dependence on parents 
in livelihood matters and decision making to 
increasing independence. During this period, a 
person is exposed to experiences and information 
that help shape his/her own self-identity and 
personal beliefs and enables him/her to make 
choices and form judgments that would guide 
his/her present and future. It is also the transi-
tional phase from school to the job market and 
all it holds of challenges, future aspirations and 
endless opportunities.
In any society youth constitute the engine of 
growth and development and they are the lead-
ers of tomorrow. Today’s youth shape the future 
of the country and take on the responsibility of 
meaningfully contributing to the rebuilding of our 
nation. Recent development experiences have 
demonstrated the pivotal role that youth play in 
achieving development goals. 
Youth are considered reservoirs of strength, 
knowledge and infinite energy, hence they are 
capable of easily adapting to the rapid technolog-
ical advancements happening around the world. 
Many societies seek to utilize these pulsating 
energies in increasing employment, aggregating 
production and achieving development goals 
through providing adequate job opportunities 
and creating an enabling environment for young 
people to be creative and innovative as well as 
involving them in the decision making process. 
On the other hand, marginalizing this population 
group during this critical phase of their life may 
in turn lead to negative outcomes both at the 
personal level and for society at large. Unemploy-
ment, drug use, decadence and lack of a sense 
of citizenship and national belonging are some 
of the serious consequences of marginalizing 
youth. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to 
integrate youth in society through understanding 
their problems and assisting them in successfully 
addressing them.
The Egyptian population is exceptionally young 
with about 61% under the age of 30; and 40% 
of the population between the ages of 10 and 
29, being equally distributed among males and 
females. This population could be perceived 
as a challenge for the Egyptian government in 
providing education and health services, suit-
able housing and employment opportunities to 
accommodate the needs of this massive gener-
ation of young people. It could also be seen as a 
demographic opportunity of huge potential for 
achieving progress and prosperity for the coun-
try if those massive human resources are proper-
ly utilized and directed towards work, production 
and active participation in building this nation.
From this standpoint comes the importance 
of the Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE), 
which was first conducted in 2009. The survey 
is the first of its kind conducted on youth of ages 
between 10 and 29 and focuses on key aspects 
of their lives including education, employment, 
health, family formation, migration, reproductive 
health, social issues and civic/political participa-
tion. The second round of the survey was con-
ducted in 2014 in the wake of major transitions 
that took place in Egypt with the outbreak of two 
youth-led revolutions (January 25, 2011 and June 
30, 2013) calling for freedom, social justice and 
equality. Moreover, the Survey gains additional 
importance from the fact that it attempts to un-
xderstand changes that occurred among Egyptian 
youth over the period between the two rounds 
through targeting the same group of respon-
dents of the 2009 survey in 2014 to accurately 
document changes and progress in the status of 
these young people.
Preliminary findings of SYPE 2014 indicated 
that positive improvements have occurred in a 
number of areas compared to the 2009 round. 
A slight decrease in unemployment among this 
age group was noticeable as well as a reduc-
tion in rates of early marriage, although early 
marriage remains one of the major problems 
in our society. The gender gap in educational 
attainment has narrowed in the period between 
the two surveys. Despite political and economic 
instability between 2011–2013 youth desire 
to migrate has not changed between the two 
surveys while youth participation in social and 
political activities is on the rise.
Moreover, prevalence rates of female genital 
mutilation/cutting and sexual harassment 
appear to be declining. On the other hand, 
youth are increasingly seeing their immediate 
environment as polluted, and perceiving streets 
and public transportation as unsafe. SYPE has 
also highlighted that Egyptian youth aspire 
to improve their living conditions and to fight 
corruption and achieve freedom and democracy. 
While there is a general feeling of dissatisfaction 
with living conditions in Egypt over the last few 
years, young people expressed their optimism 
about the future.
With no doubt, the Egyptian youth have demon-
strated their huge potential and capabilities that 
need to be invested in for reforming the nation 
and contributing to its welfare and prosperity. 
This entails providing youth with the necessary 
opportunities to acquire a broad range of com-
petencies and creating a suitable environment 
that would ensure their skills development and 
political inclusion. Therefore, the Government 
of Egypt is expected to sustain their efforts in 
reaching these goals while youth are expected 
to work on strengthening their own skills and 
nurturing their innate capabilities for creativity 
and innovation.
To conclude, I would like to thank all those who 
contributed to this survey both at the Popula-
tion Council and the Central Agency for Public 
Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), for 
their efforts to complete this body of work. We 
hope the findings of this survey would assist 
in setting a roadmap to enhance the current 
situation of Egyptian youth and in delivering an 
array of related activities that would fulfill their 
aspirations and dreams for the future. We are 
hopeful that young people of Egypt will play a 
greater role in the development of our nation in 
the coming period.
DR. ASHRAF AL ARABY 
Minister of Planning, Monitoring 
and Administrative Reform
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Foreword
For decades, the Population Council has gener-
ated evidence about the lives of young people in 
Egypt. In 1997, we fielded the ground-breaking 
Adolescence and Social Change in Egypt survey, 
which interviewed more than 9,000 young people. 
In 2009, we built on that foundation with the 
Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE). Council 
interviewers spoke to a nationally representative 
sample of around 15,000 young people between 
the ages of 10 and 29 from 11,000 households—
one of the largest surveys of young people in the 
Middle East and North Africa.
The results of these studies—which offered gen-
der-disaggregated information on health, school-
ing, employment, civic engagement, and many 
other topics—were used to inform government 
policies for young people. They were also used to 
inform two of the Council’s own pioneering pro-
grams, Ishraq and Neqdar Nasharek, to empower 
girls and young women in rural Upper Egypt.
Two years after data were collected for SYPE, 
young people electrified the world by playing an 
active part in demanding ‘bread, freedom and 
social justice’ and ousting Egypt’s regime of 30 
years. The intervening years have been turbulent.
In 2014, the Council re-interviewed more than 
10,000 respondents from the original 2009 sur-
vey, a group now aged 13–35. This study offers 
a unique and valuable trove of data on the lives 
of young people in Egypt before and after the 
Revolution.
To develop effective programs and policies, gov-
ernments and organizations need solid, reliable 
data. Given the tumult and change recently 
experienced in Egypt, this is true now more than 
ever. Egypt’s population has a “youth bulge,” 
which under the right circumstances could 
propel the country economically. But, without the 
right investments in young people’s health and 
education, as well as in opportunities for pro-
ductive livelihoods, their future prospects—and 
some might even say the future of Egypt—will be 
limited.
Information on the circumstances and outlook of 
young people in Egypt is urgently needed. In this 
report, you’ll learn of young people’s struggle for 
jobs and concerns about Egypt’s economic situa-
tion, but also of their optimism about the future.
We are proud of the Population Council’s long 
history in Egypt. We look forward to continuing 
to work hand in hand to improve the lives and 
secure the wellbeing of the Egyptian people.
JULIA BUNTING, OBE 
President, Population Council
xii
Background
The 2009 Survey of Young People (SYPE) generated 
a unique source of data on the situation of youth in 
Egypt, covering a broad set of areas crucial to the 
transition to adulthood, including education, em-
ployment, migration, health, family formation, social 
issues, and civic and political participation. Given 
the unprecedented series of political changes that 
have occurred in Egypt since 2009, the Population 
Council designed and implemented the second wave 
of SYPE in 2014 in order to observe how Egyptian 
young people have been faring following this transi-
tional period. The Population Council, in partnership 
with the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and 
Statistics (CAPMAS), collected the second round of 
data for the Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE) 
in 2013/2014, which re-interviewed the same sam-
ple of young people that were interviewed in 2009.
SYPE 2009 interviewed a nationally 
representative sample of 15,029 young 
people aged 10–29 from 11,372 house-
holds. SYPE 2014 was able to interview 
10,916 (72.6%) of those same young 
people (now aged 13–35). 
This yields a nationally representative panel dataset 
for both time periods. This report uses both waves 
of SYPE, and on several occasions exploits the 
panel structure of the new SYPE data to provide a 
before-and-after picture of the economic, social, po-
litical, and health situation of young people during 
this critical time in Egypt’s history. SYPE is targeted 
to policymakers to assist them in developing evi-
dence-based policies and programs to enhance the 
potential and well-being of Egyptian youth.
The characteristics of the SYPE 2014 respondents, 
as well as key results of SYPE and relevant policy 
implications, are summarized below. 
Main characteristics of SYPE 
respondents 
Due to the high fertility rates experienced in the 
1980s, accompanied by a decline in child mortality, 
Egypt has been in a stage in its demographic transi-
tion characterized by a remarkable “youth bulge”. 
Executive Summary
IN 2009, SYPE REPORTED THAT:
• 62% of the Egyptian population was 
below the age of 29 at the time of data 
collection and almost 40% were be-
tween ages 10–29.
• Among 10–29-year-olds, the highest 
percentage of young people (44.7%) 
were in the 10–17 age group. 
FIVE YEARS LATER, RESULTS FROM 
SYPE 2014 INDICATE THAT:
• Almost 42% of the youth sample is 
now between the ages of 15 and 24, and 
16.8% of youth are now in the 30–35 
age group (which was outside the range 
of SYPE 2009.) 
• Among the young population aged 
13–35, the percent of males (51.2%) 
is slightly higher than that of females 
(48.8%). 
• The majority of young people are still 
residing in rural areas (60.7%), as was 
the case in 2009. 
• As was the case in 2009, most young 
people in 2014 reside in Lower Egypt 
(42.8%) and Upper Egypt (36.7%). 
The Urban Governorates comprise 
about 18.7% of the young population, 
while only 1.8% live in the Frontier 
Governorates.
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Key SYPE results
Health and safety 
The health module of SYPE 2014 has shown 
some improvements between 2009 and 2014 
as well as gaps that warrant prompt action. 
Overall, Egyptian youth consider themselves 
healthier in 2014 compared to 2009, with 
about half (48.4%) of respondents indicating 
that their health was either “very good” or 
“excellent,” compared to less than a third 
(29.4%) in 2009.
An overall decrease in experience of sexual harass-
ment has been noted among female youth aged 
13–29 (from 49.7% in 2009 to 42.8% in 2014). 
However, young girls 13–17 years witnessed a slight 
increase in exposure to sexual harassment (from 
46.4% in 2009 to 49.5% in 2014).
Eating habits of young people, coupled with lack 
of physical exercise, expose them to a number of 
health risks. More than half of youth aged 13–35 
(51.6%) drink carbonated beverages 1–3 times per 
week, while more than one third (35%) eat fast food 
1–3 times per week. Female engagement in daily 
physical activity is considerably lower than that of 
males (40.8% versus 67.0%). 
Knowledge of HIV/AIDS is low while stigma against 
people living with HIV is widespread. Slightly less 
than three-quarters of SYPE respondents know 
of HIV/AIDS (73.2%); slightly more than one-third 
(35%) know three to four modes of transmission, 
while fewer than one in five respondents are willing 
to interact with someone living with HIV/AIDS. 
Fewer respondents (aged 15–29) in 2014 than in 
2009 indicated that they were exposed to female 
genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) (79.5% ver-
sus 87.5%); however, more respondents in 2014 
(7.1%) refused to answer the question on their 
circumcision status. Seven out of ten male and 
female respondents plan to circumcise their future 
daughters. 
Among SYPE respondents aged 13–35, six out 
of ten know about family planning methods, with 
knowledge considerably higher among females than 
males (72% versus 52%). Current use of family 
planning among married young people is low com-
pared to the national average of 58.5% reported in 
the 2014 Egypt Demographic and Health Survey.
Education 
Primary school entry is now nearly universal. 
More than 95% of youth aged 13–18 in 2014 
had attended school. However, many youth do 
not complete the (mandatory) basic education. 
The percentage of young people completing 
preparatory school by age 16 ranges from a 
high percentage of 86.9% in Urban Lower 
Egypt to a lower percentage of 69.1% in the 
Frontier Governorates.
Although young people tend to be more educated 
compared to their parents, the education young 
people achieve is closely linked to their parents’ 
education. The chance that a young person with 
an illiterate mother attends university is 12%, while 
the chance that a young person with a university- 
educated mother attends university is 93%. 
Egypt still has a long way to go in ensuring 
high-quality education for all students. Rote mem-
orization is a more common approach to teaching 
than critical thinking. While 40.4% of students 
report teachers “always” want students to only 
memorize, just 10.5% report that teachers encour-
age students to form their own point of view and 
9.5% report that teachers encourage students to 
express their opinions.
Private lessons and other forms of supplements 
to public education are increasingly common. For 
instance, while 47.5% of those aged 30–34 in 2014 
took private lessons or support programs when 
they were in preparatory, 59.6% of those aged 
13–18 in 2014 took private lessons or support pro-
grams during preparatory.
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Employment
Labor market conditions have seriously deteri-
orated during the transitional period. Although 
the standard unemployment rate for youth 
(aged 15–29) declined from 16.1% in 2009 to 
13.3% in 2014, this drop was not associated 
with an increase in employment levels but was 
due to an increase in the percent of youth who 
became discouraged and left the labor force.
Youth labor force participation decreased slightly 
from 37.9% in 2009 to 36.6% in 2014. Even among 
the non-students group of youth aged 15-29, a sim-
ilar decline in total labor force participation was ob-
served from 51.7% in 2009 to 49.6% in 2014. Labor 
force participation declined among both non-stu-
dent males (from 86.4% in 2009 to 79.4% in 2014) 
and females (from 18.0% in 2009 to 17.8%).
A substantial share of wage-earning male and 
female youth were still engaged in informal jobs, 
with neither a contract nor social insurance bene-
fits, albeit declining from 43.5% in 2009 to 30.6% 
in 2014. This decline in informal private sector 
employment was not associated with an equivalent 
increase in the share of the government or for-
mal regular private wage work, but rather with an 
increase in the share of irregular wage work (from 
21.7% to 26.3%) and non-wage work (12.1% to 
22.8%). 
Indications of increased reliance on entrepreneur-
ship as an alternative mean of entering or staying 
in the labor market during this difficult economic 
transition was observed.  The percent of employers 
or self-employed youth increased between 2009 
and 2014 from 3.7% to 13.1% among employed men 
and from 3.2% to 5.7% among employed women.
The percent of youth reporting being unemployed 
due to the unavailability of work declined from 
69.2% in 2009 to 58.3% in 2014. However, the 
percentage of both men and women reporting 
not finding jobs that match their experience or 
qualifications increased from 8.0% in 2009 to 
13.8% in 2014. Young women in 2014 were also two 
times as likely to say that they could not find a job 
with a suitable organization. This might be due to 
the heightened sense of insecurity that followed 
January 25, 2011 and June 30, 2013.
Migration
Despite political and economic instability 
in Egypt during the transitional period, the 
rate of international migration aspirations 
amongst youth did not change much be-
tween 2009 and 2014. More than 17.2% of 
youth aged 15-29 aspired to migrate within 
the next five years in SYPE 2014, while in the 
2009 survey 18.3% of youth aged 15–29 
aspired to migrate in the future. 
Egyptian male youth aged 15-29 were three times 
more likely (25.8%) to aspire to migrate com-
pared to female youth (7.8%). Migration aspira-
tions peaked at 28.1% for the middle age group 
(18-24) of young men and were lowest for the 
youngest age group.
Male youth (15–29) from rural areas were more 
likely to aspire to migrate (28.3%) compared 
to those in urban areas (23.3%) and to those in 
informal urban housing (16.2%). Furthermore, 
the percentage of male youth (15-29) interested 
in migration was highest for university graduates 
at 30.3%, as compared to 17.2% among illiterate 
youth. 
Economic factors were the main drivers of migra-
tion among youth aged 18–29. Low income was 
the main push factor out of Egypt (44.0%). Two-
thirds of youth blamed lack of job opportunities in 
Egypt for pushing them to aspire to migrate. Bad 
living conditions in Egypt (48.9%) were another 
common push factor. Only 10.1% of youth blamed 
the political and security circumstances in Egypt 
for driving them to want to leave.
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Marriage and family formation
A large percentage of male youth marry in their 
late 20s and early 30s. In 2014, 41.4% of male 
youth aged 25–29 were married, compared 
to 74.8% of male youth aged 30–35. Still, a 
quarter of young men remain unmarried into 
their early 30s. Female youth marry at younger 
ages; 3.7% of those 15–17 were married, 32.4% 
of those aged 18–24 were married, 72.7% of 
those aged 25–29, and 84.3% of those aged 
30–35. 
Female youth in rural areas continue to face the 
greatest risk of early marriage. Among married fe-
male youth aged 30–34 in 2014, 23.0% of those in 
rural Upper Egypt had been married by age 16 and 
11.2% of those in rural Lower Egypt. 
Desired fertility has risen among both married and 
never-married youth. Never-married youth aged 
15–29 desired an average of 2.6 children in 2009, 
compared to 2.9 in 2014. Currently married youth 
of the same age desired 2.8 children in 2009 and 
3.1 in 2014.
Political and civic participation 
As documented by SYPE 2009, only 16% of 
respondents of voting age had ever voted in an 
election. Youth participation in national elec-
tions increased substantially since 2009, with 
turnout ranging from 52% to 65% in referen-
dums and elections that took place between 
2011 and 2012.
Youth participation in political activities (protesting, 
supporting protesters, strikes, participating in 
neighborhood watches, political and electoral 
organizing, etc.) was low between January 25th 
2011 and the SYPE 2014 interview, with only 7.4% 
of youth reporting engaging in the mentioned 
activities. There was a substantial gender gap in 
participation in political activities, with 13.1% of 
male respondents participating compared to 1.5% 
of female respondents.
Youth participation in volunteer activities still 
remains low. In SYPE 2009, only 2.8% of youth 
ever volunteered during the year prior to the survey 
interview. Also, in SYPE 2014, only 3.6% of youth 
reported that they had ever volunteered since the 
2009 interview. 
Youth’s internet and media use increased dramat-
ically between 2009 and 2014; in 2014, about 25% 
of youth aged 15–29 reported having ever used the 
internet, compared to 10% in 2009. 
About 71.5% of youth stated that raising living 
standards should be the top priority for the country 
in 2014, whereas 42.9% indicated that fighting cor-
ruption should be the second priority. When asked 
about the top threats facing the country, 63.2% 
of youth reported the lack of security as the first 
threat while 37.9% stated the economic crisis as 
the main second threat.
SYPE also asked youth to rate, on a scale from 1 to 
10 their feelings about their lives and the state of 
the country five years from the time of the survey. 
The results show that youth display considerable 
optimism about the future. 
Attitudes toward gender equality
Overall, gender attitudes remained highly 
conservative among Egyptian youth. As was 
the case in 2009, SYPE 2014 male respondents 
held more conservative outlooks than their 
female counterparts.
Youth have more egalitarian outlooks in the do-
mains of education and electoral politics than in 
relation to women’s access to jobs. Among youth 
aged 15–29, 56.7% supported gender equality in 
education, and among youth aged 18–35, 81.5% 
agreed with the right to vote for female family 
members, but 60.4% believed that men should 
have priority in employment opportunities when 
jobs are scarce. 
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The percentage of youth aged 15–29 who sup-
port a woman’s right to seek a divorce or khul has 
increased from 63.7% in 2009 to 71.4% in 2014. 
However, approximately two-thirds (63.7%) of 2014 
respondents aged 15–29 felt that their societies do 
not respect divorced women.
An alarming percentage of youth continued to 
justify gender-based violence in particular contexts. 
About 64.9% of SYPE 2014 respondents (aged 
15–29) believed that a man could justifiably beat 
his wife if she “talked to another man.” Almost 60% 
of respondents of this age agreed that women who 
are sexually harassed in the streets “deserve” to be 
if their clothing is “provocative.”
Conclusions and policy 
implications 
A key aim of SYPE 2014 is to update the state of 
knowledge on adolescents and youth in Egypt and 
identify issues of importance to young people in 
the country’s new political environment. SYPE 
also aims to support the development of evi-
dence-based policies and programs to ensure that 
all young people have the opportunity to reach their 
full potential. 
Taken together, the findings of the SYPE report 
indicate several key areas that deserve attention in 
order to work towards a brighter future for Egypt’s 
young people. It is clear that the difficult economic 
conditions prevailing in Egypt since 2011 have hit 
youth particularly hard. In addition to their poorer 
labor market outcomes, youth’s perceptions of the 
challenges and priorities facing their generation 
and the country show a strong preoccupation with 
ensuring a basic livelihood. Under these circum-
stances, ensuring better employment opportunities 
for youth must be a key priority in the future. 
The results of the SYPE also reiterate the finding 
from 2009 that there are subpopulations of young 
people in Egypt who are consistently more disad-
vantaged in terms of key life opportunities. Young 
people, and particularly young women, in rural 
areas suffer from poorer educational outcomes and 
increased risk of negative practices such as early 
marriage and female genital mutilation/ cutting, 
and lower levels of engagement in political and civic 
life. Young women are also constrained by the highly 
conservative gender attitudes that many youth hold 
regarding their roles both inside and outside the 
home. Although development programs can and do 
target these most disadvantaged populations, poli-
cies to promote equality of opportunity for all youth 
are a more sustainable and far-reaching means to 
change outcomes on a national scale. 
Finally, the 2014 SYPE presents one of the first 
nationally representative pictures of young people’s 
involvement with the political and social processes 
that will shape the country’s future. While there has 
been a dramatic improvement in youth’s partic-
ipation in elections, these analyses indicate that 
many youth still do not take part in other forms of 
engagement with civic life such as volunteering, 
group membership, and social discussion related 
to current events. In order for youth to contribute 
further to Egypt’s transition, measures are needed 
to foster this generation’s continued transition 
towards active citizenship. 
RANIA ROUSHDY 
SYPE Principal Investigator
MAIA SIEVERDING 
SYPE Research Consultant
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The five years that have passed since the 
Population Council’s Survey of Young People in 
Egypt of 2009 (SYPE 2009) have proved to be 
a tumultuous period for the country. The year 
2011 marked a historic year for Egyptian youth, 
as young people from around the country took 
an active role in the January 25 revolution. 
Through their activism in early 2011, Egypt’s young 
revolutionaries gained a platform to denounce their 
social and political marginalization, and demand 
their rights to freedom, justice, equality, and oppor-
tunity. This unprecedented voice for Egypt’s youth 
pointed a national spotlight on many of the chal-
lenges that were found in the 2009 SYPE, includ-
ing an educational system unresponsive to youth 
needs, difficult employment conditions, low civic 
and political engagement, and a social environment 
that denies youth access to essential information 
about their transition to adulthood. 
1.1  Egypt in the post-
revolutionary period
Since 2011, Egypt has undergone several political 
fluctuations and changes of power, with civil unrest 
and continued protests marking many events 
during the transition. Furthermore, the past four 
years have proven costly to Egypt’s economic 
well-being and the labor market. Post-revolutionary 
political instability has resulted in the widespread 
divestment of foreign-owned firms, the declining 
value of the Egyptian pound, and a looming debt 
crisis the Egyptian state is still struggling to avoid 
(Kirkpatrick and Salah Amer 2011). The tumultu-
ous climate has resulted in an enormous drop in 
revenues for particular economic sectors, such 
as tourism. Moreover, the return of large numbers 
of migrants from Libya and other countries in the 
region affected by the “Arab Spring” has also nega-
tively affected the Egyptian labor market.1 
1 The slowdown of Egypt’s economy following the 
revolution has been widely covered in domestic and 
foreign media (New York Times 2011).
This post-revolutionary economic stagnation is ex-
pected to have resulted in a steady deterioration of 
job quality and increasing employment informality, 
in the context of labor market conditions that were 
already difficult for young entrants. Such econom-
ic challenges could not come at a worse time for 
Egypt’s youth. 
Like other countries in the region, Egypt is cur-
rently experiencing a demographic “youth bulge,” 
meaning that the population of young people is 
significantly larger than other age groups. Although 
more highly educated than previous generations 
(Elbadawy 2009), this population of young people 
has struggled to achieve economic stability. Even 
prior to the 2011 uprisings, Egypt’s youth constitut-
ed an estimated 90% of the country’s unemployed 
(UNDP and INP 2010). 
It is therefore vital to question how Egypt’s youth 
are now faring in a significantly more unfavorable 
economic climate, and whether they are able to ac-
cess the professional opportunities needed to work 
toward economic independence and complete key 
life transitions such as getting married and starting 
a family. At the same time, the transitional period 
may have opened up new opportunities to youth in 
other areas of life, most notably deeper engagement 
with media, politics, and civic life. Such questions 
regarding youth employment and civic participation 
in the current tumultuous era, along with potential 
changes in the institutions and decisions that shape 
the transition to adulthood, such as health and ac-
cess to health care, quality of education, migration, 
marriage, and youth attitudes and life outlooks, are 
what this report seeks to better understand. 
1.2  Overview of SYPE 2009 and 
SYPE 2014
The 2009 Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE) 
was fielded in May 2009 and collected data on 
several key areas of interest to youth, including 
education, employment, migration, health, family 
formation, social issues, and civic and political 
participation (Population Council 2010). In order to 
observe how young people have been faring during 
the transition period in Egypt in comparison to 
2009, the Population Council designed the second 
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wave of SYPE in 2014, which re-interviewed the 
same sample of young people who were inter-
viewed in 2009. This yields a panel data set that 
spans the periods before and after the January 25, 
2011 revolution, and that is nationally representa-
tive for both time periods. This introductory chapter 
describes the SYPE sample design and implemen-
tation of the panel survey, and outlines the main 
background characteristics of young people aged 
13–35 in Egypt in 2014 in order to provide a general 
background on the profile of youth in Egypt in 2014. 
The subsequent chapters then turn to an examina-
tion of specific topics of importance to youth during 
Egypt’s transitional period. 
1.3  Survey design and 
implementation
SYPE 2009 targeted young people aged 10–29, 
thus encompassing both “youth” and “adolescents.” 
The SYPE team chose this age range in order to 
track young people throughout the complete dura-
tion of their transition to adulthood, allowing for an 
extended period to account for the phenomenon of 
delayed marriage and, in some cases, delayed tran-
sitions to productive work (Assaad and Barsoum 
2007). The SYPE 2014 survey built a panel dataset 
by going back to re-interview the same sample of 
young people (now aged 14–35) interviewed in 
SYPE 2009 in all governorates of Egypt. 
Survey sample
A brief explanation of the sampling design for 
the previous wave of SYPE is essential for under-
standing the 2014 SYPE sampling. SYPE 2009 is a 
uniquely comprehensive survey in that it is nation-
ally representative, covering all the governorates 
in Egypt including the five frontier governorates, 
and was specifically designed for a priori inclusion 
of informal urban areas, also known as slums (or 
ashwaiyyat in Arabic). The Frontier Governorates 
and informal areas are often not covered in large-
scale surveys. The sample is designed so that the 
data are not only nationally representative, but also 
representative of Egypt’s six major administra-
tive regions: the Urban Governorates, rural Upper 
Egypt, urban Upper Egypt, rural Lower Egypt, urban 
Lower Egypt, and the Frontier Governorates. 
The 2009 SYPE sample is a stratified, multi-stage 
cluster sample. Sampling was determined using pri-
mary sampling units (PSUs) drawn from the master 
sample provided by the Central Agency for Public 
Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), which was 
based on the 2006 national census. SYPE 2009 
consisted of 455 PSUs, with 239 PSUs in rural areas 
and 216 PSUs in urban areas. Rural PSUs were 
divided equally between large and small villages, in 
order to accurately represent the diversity of rural 
demographics and account for peri-urbanization. 
Informal settlements were selected from a list 
developed by the Information and Decision Support 
Center of the Egyptian Cabinet of Ministers (IDSC). 
The 2009 SYPE data collection and processing were 
conducted in collaboration with the IDSC. Out of 
the 11,372 households selected from the CAPMAS 
master sample for the 2009 SYPE sample, 20,200 
young people were eligible to participate, and the 
Kish grid technique was used to draw a sample of 
16,061 subjects from this pool of potential partici-
pants. In total, 15,029 of the sampled 16,061 young 
people were interviewed, with attrition primarily 
being due to the individual’s refusal to participate 
or unavailability during data collection periods. See 
Population Council (2010) for more details on the 
2009 SYPE sample and its sampling weights. 
SYPE 2014 sampled the same young people who 
were part of the original sample of 15,029 individ-
uals surveyed in 2009. Of the 15,029 young people 
interviewed in 2009, data collectors managed to 
By comparing the 2014 
findings to the 2009 SYPE 
data, we gain a broad view 
of the ways in which the 
state of Egypt’s young 
people has changed during 
the transitional period.
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completely interview 10,916 (72.6%) aged 13–35 
for the SYPE 2014 study.2 Every effort was made 
to track down the current contact information of 
households and/or eligible young people who had 
changed their location since the 2009 interview.3 
Attrition was mainly due to family refusal to partic-
ipate (9%) as well as the relocation of respondents 
(14%) who could not be tracked in 2014. As Figure 
1.1 shows, 60% of the interviewed individuals were 
still in their original 2009 households, while 12.6% 
were found in split households.4 Weights based on 
the probability of non-response were constructed 
to adjust the sample of the 2014 SYPE for attrition.5 
Questionnaire design
The 2014 SYPE questionnaire is based primarily 
on the 2009 survey, which was developed using 
qualitative data from focus group discussions and 
interviews with young people that determined the 
issues that were important to youth. In addition, 
the Council team consulted with different partners 
and research experts in each of the topics covered 
in the survey and completed an extensive overview 
of literature to further refine the 2009 question-
naire. In its semi-final stage, pretesting in selected 
PSUs in the Qalyubia, Cairo, and Giza governor-
ates in March of 2009 helped the team further 
refine the survey before commencing nationwide 
data collection. 
2  A few respondents reported being below age 14 at the 
time of the 2014 SYPE interview. These cases were left 
as is and included in the analysis of this report, after 
carefully checking their exact age.
3 During the SYPE 2014 data collection phase, a house-
hold was not interviewed (i.e., the household question-
naire was not filled out) if the eligible young person 
could not be located either in the original or in a split 
household.   
4 A split household is defined in this 2014 SYPE panel 
as a household that was formed due to the move of at 
least one eligible young person out of his/her original 
2009 household to form a new household after the 
2009 interview.
5  Very few cases were reported as missing due to 
migration or death of an eligible young person. These 
cases were assigned to the “household not found” 
or “individual not found” categories. However, we 
suspect that some of the households that we were 
unable to track in 2014 may also have been missing 
due to the migration or death of household members. 
For more information on the calculation of attrition 
weights see Roushdy (2015).   
The 2009 survey consisted of three question-
naires: a household questionnaire, an individual 
questionnaire focused on the respondent, and a 
community-level questionnaire.6 The household 
questionnaire assessed the demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics of the subject’s 
household, with the head of the household or an 
adult in the household interviewed for this section. 
The 2009 individual questionnaire consisted of 
six versions designed specifically for different 
age groups and genders: males aged 10–14, 
females aged 10–14, males aged 15–21, females 
aged 15–21, males aged 22–29, and females 
aged 22–29. In 2014, we decided to design one 
all-inclusive version of the questionnaire using 
skip patterns whenever needed. Individual 
questionnaires for both rounds of SYPE covered 
the following key areas: education, work, family 
formation, health, migration, and civic and 
political participation.
In late 2012 and early 2013, the Population Council 
team began updating the SYPE 2009 household 
and individual questionnaires in consultation 
6  The 2009 community-level questionnaire was used to 
assess characteristics of the subject’s local communi-
ty. This questionnaire was not administered as part of 
the 2014 SYPE due to budget constraints.
FIGURE 1.1 SYPE 2014 interview results
Interviewed in
original
household
 (60%)
Interviewed in
split household
 (12.6%)
Partially
completed
 (0.1%)
Eligible youth
refused (0.0%)
Household
refused (9.3%)
Eligible youth
not found (12.8%)
Household
not found (2.0%)
House closed, empty
or destroyed (3.0%)
Not interviewed
for other reasons
 (0.1%)
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with several partners and frequent SYPE users.7 
The result is a more comprehensive version 
of these two questionnaires. The SYPE 2014 
household questionnaire now includes additional 
information on migration, remittances, and 
household income and transfers. The SYPE 2014 
individual questionnaire also added questions 
that cover new issues emerging since the January 
25, 2011 revolution, especially in relation to the 
civic engagement module, which focuses on four 
areas: civic and political participation, community 
values, gender role attitudes, and religiosity. The 
health, violence, risk, and safety module has been 
significantly updated as well to gain a broad picture 
of how youth’s safety has changed since 2009, 
including exposure to health hazards, harassment, 
and physical violence.8
In June of 2013, a two-day pretesting of the full 
household and individual questionnaires was 
conducted. This pretesting included 60 households 
in the urban and slum areas of El-Sayeda Zeinab 
and Abdeen districts of Cairo. Pretesting helped 
the Council determine the expected duration of the 
full interview and identify problematic questions 
and misleading skip patterns in the questionnaires, 
which were then modified accordingly.
Data collection and processing
In early June 2013, the SYPE team conducted a 
week-long training for fieldworkers, and approxi-
7  In April of 2013, the Population Council team held 
several consultative meetings with experts in the 
fields covered by the different SYPE modules, SYPE 
partners and donors, and officials from relevant 
ministries to get additional feedback on the contents 
of each module of the updated version of the survey. 
These meetings significantly improved the design of 
the questionnaire.
8  In early August, the updated 2014 SYPE question-
naires were submitted to CAPMAS for legal approval, 
which was granted shortly after. Furthermore, as was 
the case in 2009, the 2014 SYPE study was approved 
by the Population Council’s Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) prior to the commencement of fieldwork. The 
IRB reviews research involving human subjects to 
ensure that participants in such fieldwork are treated 
ethically and that participation does not compromise 
the participant’s safety or well-being. This is especially 
important when a study involves minors, which is the 
case with SYPE. 
mately 115 interviewers and field supervisors par-
ticipated. The training was conducted by CAPMAS 
and monitored by the Population Council.9 Prior to 
data collection in the non-frontier governorates, the 
fieldwork staff underwent a four-day refresher train-
ing course in November of 2013. In March 2014, the 
field staff again participated in a refresher course 
before conducting fieldwork in these governorates.
The SYPE 2014 data collection was conducted 
in collaboration with CAPMAS. Fieldwork in the 
non-frontier governorates started in late 2013 and 
continued until February 2014. However, the securi-
ty situation in the frontier areas delayed research in 
the corresponding governorates. SYPE data collec-
tion in the Frontier Governorates started in March 
2014 and was completed in June 2014. 
Data collection was completed under the direct 
management of CAPMAS, which formed 18 field 
teams to conduct the SYPE. Field teams consisted 
of one supervisor, four interviewers, and one field 
editor. Two weeks after data collection began, CAP-
9 During the training, each question of the household 
and individual questionnaires was discussed in detail 
with the fieldworkers, who completed a written exam 
at the end of the training week. Based on the exam re-
sults, in addition to fieldworker’s performance during 
the training, those with unsatisfactory performance 
were excluded from the SYPE data collection team.
SYPE 2014 questionnaires 
were updated to include 
additional information on 
existing topics such as 
migration, remittances, and 
household income, and on 
new issues related to civic 
engagement, gender role 
attitudes, and religiosity.
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MAS formed office editing, callback center, coding, 
and data entry teams. The office editing team, 
which consisted of 50 experienced editors trained 
for the particular task, carefully reviewed each 
questionnaire received from the field to ensure that 
questionnaires did not contain missing or illogical 
data and that skip patterns were followed correct-
ly. Identified errors were reported to the callback 
center team, which then contacted the interviewed 
families and individuals to gather the correct infor-
mation. When the callback center team identified 
inconsistencies in the questionnaire responses and 
family responses on the phone, which happened in 
very few cases, the questionnaire was sent to the 
quality control team for further investigation. 
Once all questionnaires were reviewed, a team of 15 
CAPMAS data coders transformed all open-ended 
questions into codes.10 Finally, the reviewed and 
coded questionnaires were ready for data entry. 
Using a data entry interface designed specifically 
for SYPE 2014, the data entry team entered the 
data. The final clean data tape of the full SYPE 2014 
data was submitted to the Population Council by 
CAPMAS in late September 2014.
1.4  The profile of young people  
in 2014
The SYPE sample aged by five years in the period be-
tween the 2009 and 2014 waves of the survey, a peri-
od of time that can encompass many life changes 
for a population that is in the midst of the transition 
to adulthood. In this section we therefore update the 
profile of youth background characteristics in 2014, 
and discuss the implications of the sample aging 
for the analysis in the subsequent chapters. 
Due to the high fertility rates experienced in the 
1980s, accompanied by a decline in child mortality, 
Egypt has been experiencing a remarkable “youth 
bulge” in this stage of its demographic transition. 
Based on SYPE 2009, 62% of the Egyptian popu-
10  In this step, the team used the recent CAPMAS official 
codebooks for occupation, economic activity, educa-
tion certificate, school codes, and district of residence 
(shiakha/qism) and governorate. 
lation was below the age of 29 at the time of data 
collection and almost 40% were between the ages 
of 10 and 29. Among 10–29 year olds, the highest 
percentage of young people was in the age group 
from 10–17 in 2009 (44.7%). Having aged by five 
years between the surveys, in SYPE 2014 almost 
42% of the youth sample is now between the ages 
of 15 and 24.11 The sample has now largely aged 
out of the youngest age group from 10–14 that was 
captured in the SYPE 2009, and 16.8% of youth are 
now in the 30–35 age group that was outside the 
range of the SYPE 2009. 
This change in the distribution of young people by 
age group in 2014, as compared to 2009, certain-
ly affects the distribution of other background 
characteristics of youth that depend on age, such 
as education level and labor market participation. 
Hence, one should be careful when comparing the 
distribution of youth by such background char-
acteristics, even among the common age group 
of 15–29 in both surveys.12 The aging of the SYPE 
sample may also be associated with change in be-
havioral and attitudinal outcomes, such as uptake 
of risky health behaviors, attitudes toward gender 
roles, and youth’s relationships with their families 
and communities. Thus, outcomes must also be 
compared across the 2009 and 2014 surveys with 
caution. For this reason, throughout the report the 
authors use a variety of approaches to compare 
between the two SYPE waves. Where possible, com-
parative analyses focus on the 15–29 age group 
that is common across the two surveys, using 
the two cross-sectional waves. In other analysis, 
authors rely on the panel dimension of SYPE to ex-
amine change in outcomes among the same group 
of youth as they age, for example in terms of labor 
market or marriage transitions. 
11  See Assaad and Krafft (2015) for a detailed discus-
sion of the youth bulge aging and its labor market 
effects.
12  For example, higher percentages of male youth might 
be fulfilling military service now than in 2009, due to 
the relative increase in the percentage of youth who 
are above the age of 18 in 2014 than in 2009. This 
would in turn affect the youth labor force participation 
rate, as a relatively larger percentage of youth will be 
reported as out of labor force than in 2009.
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Table 1.1 presents the core demographic 
characteristics of the interviewed sample of youth 
in SYPE 2014. Among the young population aged 
13–35, the percentage of males (51.2%) is slightly 
higher than that of females (48.8%). In 2014, 64.8% 
of 13–35-year-olds remain never married. The 
majority of young people are still residing in rural 
areas (60.7%), as was the case in 2009. Nearly the 
same percentage of youth reside in informal urban 
areas in 2014 (9.8%) as they did in 2009 (9.5%); 
in contrast, fewer youth are now observed in urban 
areas (29.5% in 2014 vs. 31.6% in 2009). Also, as 
in 2009, most young people reside in Lower Egypt 
(42.8%) and Upper Egypt (36.7%). The Urban 
Governorates comprise about 18.7% of the young 
population, while only 1.8% live in the Frontier 
Governorates as of 2014. 
The following eight chapters of this report present 
detailed analysis and results of the SYPE data. The 
report uses both waves of SYPE, and on several 
occasions exploits the panel structure of the new 
SYPE data, to provide a before-and-after picture of 
the economic, social, political, and health situation 
of young people during this critical time period 
in Egypt’s history. A key aim of this report is to 
identify issues of importance to young people in 
the country’s new political environment in order 
to support policymakers in the development of 
evidence-based policies and programs to enhance 
the well-being of Egyptian youth and ensure that all 
young people have the opportunity to reach their 
full potential. 
TABLE 1.1  Weighted and unweighted distribution of young people by main background 
characteristics, 2014 
WEIGHTED %* WEIGHTED (N) UNWEIGHTED (N)
Gender
Male 51.2 (5,586) (5,336)
Female 48.8 (5,330) (6,102)
Age 
13–17 20.4 (2,227) (2,196)
18–24 39.5 (4,311) (4,158)
25–29 23.3 (2,539) (2,564)
30–35 16.8 (1,837) (1,998)
Marital status
Never married 64.8 (7,072) (6,313)
Ever married 35.2 (3,834) (4,593)
Region
Urban Governorates 18.7 (2,043) (2,064)
Urban Lower Egypt 11.6 (1,262) (1,217)
Rural Lower Egypt 31.2 (3,407) (3,426)
Urban Upper Egypt 8.0 (878) (639)
Rural Upper Egypt 28.7 (3,127) (2,621)
Frontier Governorates 1.8 (199) (952)
Urban–rural residence
Urban 29.5 (3,221) (3,314)
Rural 60.7 (6,623) (6,506)
Informal urban areas 9.8 (1,072) (1,099)
Total 100.0 (10,916) (10,916)
*Weighted percentage is presented throughout this report, because it reflects the actual population, while the  
unweighted percentage reflects the sample. 
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2.1  Introduction 
The revolutions of January 25 and June 30 and 
subsequent political transitions may have impacted 
young people’s health in a number of ways. Political 
instability and psychosocial stressors may have 
undermined youth livelihoods and increased their 
exposure to risk factors, thus leading to adverse 
health outcomes. On the other hand, the fact that 
recent political transitions were largely led by young 
people, and youth were recognized as the driving 
force behind those transitions, may have enhanced 
their sense of self-esteem and resilience and thus 
positively impacted the way they perceive their 
health. The 2014 SYPE provides a unique oppor-
tunity to examine change in a wide range of youth 
health indicators during Egypt’s transitional period. 
This chapter provides an overview of the situation 
of young people’s health attitudes and behaviors in 
2014 and makes comparisons with the 2009 data 
for key indicators. Overall, the 2014 health module 
included the same core questions asked of respon-
dents in 2009. Those questions inquired about the 
respondent’s general sense of well-being; access to 
health services; experience of disability and chronic 
diseases; hygienic practices such as washing hands 
and brushing teeth; perceptions of exposure to 
environmental pollution; road and transportation 
safety (including accidents and sexual harass-
ment); nutrition and dietary habits; tobacco, alco-
hol and drug use; mental and psychological health; 
and reproductive health. A few additional questions 
were added in 2014 to measure knowledge of 
different modes of transmission of HIV/AIDS, use of 
antenatal care services, and contraceptive knowl-
edge. Also, in 2014, as the cohorts of youth included 
in the SYPE sample were now older (aged 13–35), 
all participants answered all questions as there 
were no questions that were deemed inappropri-
ate or irrelevant for a specific age group. However, 
different modules were used for male and female 
participants as appropriate. 
In both 2009 and 2014, the health modules were 
built on international literature, a number of previ-
ously tested tools utilized in youth surveys else-
where, and consultations with key experts in the 
field of youth and adolescent health. Tools utilized 
in the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance (2007) and 
WHO Global School-based Student Health Survey 
(GHSH) were modified to suit the Egyptian context. 
It is also important to note that all assessments of 
health or nutritional status were based on respon-
dents’ self-reports, with no physical exams or blood 
tests undertaken. 
2.2  Access to health care
Young people’s ability to access health care when 
they need it and their health-seeking behaviors are 
important determinants of health outcomes. This 
section begins with an overview of youth access to 
and utilization of medical care. 
Usual source of medical care
Respondents aged 13–35 were asked about where 
they usually go to receive care when they are ill (see 
Table A2.1). More than a third (38.9%) of respon-
dents went to a private clinic or hospital, while more 
than one-fourth (28.2%) of respondents said that 
they do not seek care. Less than one-fifth (22.2%) 
of respondents went to a government hospital. 
There were several differences in usual source of 
medical care by background characteristics. More 
male youth (31.9%) than female youth (24.3%) 
Young people’s health attitudes and behaviors 
are central to their transition to adulthood and 
impact areas of their lives such as education, 
employment, family formation, and civic 
participation. Young people who are healthy 
are better able to successfully complete their 
education, lead productive lives, and contribute 
positively to their families, communities, and 
country. The health and development of young 
people have significant repercussions for their 
current and future well-being, as well as the 
health of their future children.
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reported not seeking health care. On the other 
hand, more female youth (43.4%) reported attend-
ing a private clinic or hospital than their male peers 
(34.6%). More than half of respondents in Frontier 
Governorates (52.4%) reported not seeking any 
medical care compared to about one-fourth of 
respondents in the Urban Governorates (27.0%). 
Similarly, more illiterate respondents (34.9%) 
reported not seeking health care when feeling sick 
than do those who could read and write or who had 
more education.  
To compare with SYPE 2009, we examined data for 
young people aged 15–29 in both surveys. Figure 
2.1 shows that more young people in 2014 did not 
seek medical care when they got ill (28.5% versus 
11.1%, respectively) while fewer young people uti-
lized public facilities (22.7% in 2014 versus 38.6% 
in 2009) or private clinics or hospitals (39.2% in 
2014 versus 45.8% in 2009). 
Of respondents aged 13–35 who stated that they 
had been to a healthcare facility, male youth made 
an average of 1.3 visits in the previous six months, 
while female youth averaged 1.8 visits in the same 
period. The number of visits increased slightly by 
age and decreased by wealth (those in the lowest 
wealth quintile averaged 1.7 visits while those in the 
highest quintile averaged 1.4 visits). Older female 
youth had slightly more visits than their younger 
peers, and ever-married young women had more 
visits than never-married women. These differences 
may reflect antenatal care or child-related visits 
among married women of childbearing age. Youth 
in the Frontier Governorates had fewer visits to 
health facilities than youth in other regions (data 
not shown). 
The majority (88.9%) of respondents aged 15–29 
who sought health care in the last six months were 
able to reach the facility in less than 30 minutes. 
Mean travel time was 22.7 minutes, ranging from 
17.5 minutes in urban Lower Egypt to 25.1 minutes 
in the Frontier Governorates. More than two-fifths 
(42.6%) of respondents reported walking to their 
usual healthcare facility. For those who did not 
walk, the average reported cost of transportation to 
reach the most commonly used healthcare facility 
was 9 Egyptian pounds (EGP). Of those who did 
not walk, 8.6% of SYPE respondents paid EGP 1 or 
less, and 83.3% paid less than EGP 10 to get to their 
usual source of care (data not shown). As of June 
2014, 1 USD = EGP 7.6.
FIGURE 2.1   Source of medical care for 
respondents aged 15–29, 2009 and 2014 (%)
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Young people’s health is affected 
by wider social, economic, and 
political circumstances, which 
may influence their access to 
resources (e.g., health services 
and financial resources), 
exposure to risk factors  
(e.g., pollutants and psychosocial 
stress), or adoption of health-
compromising behaviors  
(e.g., sedentary lifestyle and 
early marriage). 
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Treatment and medication expenses
For youth aged 13–35, the average amount of 
money spent on examination fees for medical 
care during their last visit was EGP 32.4, and the 
average amount spent on medication was EGP 
53.3 (data not shown). On average, male youth 
paid more for medication and lab tests than did 
female youth (EGP 55.4 versus 50.9 and EGP 
65.6 versus 49.6, respectively). Medical care fees 
paid by SYPE respondents were highest in the 
Urban Governorates (EGP 36.3) and lowest in the 
Frontier Governorates (EGP 25.1). Expenditures 
for medication were highest in urban Lower Egypt 
(EGP 62.1) and the Urban Governorates (EGP 61.1) 
and lowest in rural Upper Egypt (EGP 45.1) (data 
not shown). 
As expected, fees paid and expenditures for 
medication increased with greater wealth. Those  
in the lowest wealth quintile paid the smallest 
amount (EGP 25.7 on average for fees, which was 
three times higher than the EGP 9.2 spent in 2009; 
EGP 42.7 was spent on medications) and those in 
the highest wealth quintile paid the highest amount 
(EGP 41.6 on average for fees and EGP 62.3 on 
medications). As for lab tests, female youth spent 
more than male youth and SYPE respondents in 
urban areas spent more. 
Use of medications without a 
prescription
Taking medications without a prescription may 
result in inappropriate or unnecessary use of med-
ications, and may be an indication that youth are 
not seeking medical care when they need it. About 
24.2% of SYPE respondents aged 13–35 reported 
having taken a medication without a prescription in 
the two weeks prior to the survey. Prevalence rates 
were similar across gender, age, and wealth quintile. 
However, rates were substantially different by 
region; the Urban Governorates had the highest us-
age (37.3%) followed by rural Upper Egypt (24.8%) 
with urban Lower Egypt demonstrating the lowest 
usage (16.7%) (data not shown).
2.3  Self-rating of health and 
reported prevalence of chronic 
diseases and disability 
The SYPE health module asked all respondents to 
self-evaluate their current health status. Overall, 
respondents expressed feeling healthy; about half 
(48.4%) of youth indicated that their health was 
either “very good” or “excellent.” 
There was very little difference in self-perceived 
general health among respondents by gender, 
age group, or marital status. However, as wealth 
increased, the percentage of respondents who 
indicated that their health was either “very good” 
or “excellent” increased to reach 52.1% among 
respondents in the highest quintile compared to 
45.0% among respondents in the lowest quintile. 
Similarly, youth in the highest two education cat-
egories were more likely to indicate that they had 
either “very good” or “excellent” health (52.1% of 
respondents who had completed post-secondary, 
and 52.3% of respondents who had completed 
university or more) than those respondents from 
the lowest two education levels (44.3% of those 
respondents who were illiterate, and 45.6% of those 
who could only read and write) (data not shown). 
Figure 2.2 shows the self-rating of health status 
among SYPE respondents aged 15–29 in 2009 and 
2014. In 2014, a much larger proportion of respon-
dents rated their health as very good or excellent 
FIGURE 2.2  Self-rating of health status among 
SYPE respondents aged 15-29, 2009 and 2014  
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(48.4% in 2014 versus 29.4% in 2009), while fewer 
respondents rated their health as good (44.7% 
in 2014 versus 57.5% in 2009), fair (6.3% versus 
11.6%) or poor (0.6% versus 1.1%). 
Chronic disease and disability
One-fourth of SYPE respondents aged 13–35 re-
ported suffering from at least one chronic disease. 
Very few young people reported having a disabil-
ity (1.1%). Of those youth who reported having a 
chronic disease or disability, 35.0% reported that 
their disability prevented them from fulfilling their 
regular responsibilities or getting married. How-
ever, among those with a disease or disability who 
attended school, only 4.4% reported that it had 
interrupted their attendance at school. Among 
SYPE respondents who reported having an illness 
or disability, 69.4% had never worked. Among those 
who had ever worked, 5.1% had to miss days of 
work because of their condition (data not shown). 
2.4  Hygienic practices
Slightly more than one-half (54.6%) of SYPE 
respondents aged 13–35 cleaned their teeth with a 
toothbrush and toothpaste. A minority (3.3%) used 
a siwaak, a traditional branch or twig used for teeth 
cleaning. More females (58.7%) used a toothbrush 
than males (50.7%), whereas more males used a 
siwaak (4.3%) than females (2.3%). Younger re-
spondents were more likely to use a toothbrush and 
older respondents were more likely to use a siwaak. 
Toothbrush use was highest in the Urban Gover-
norates (75.9%) and urban Lower Egypt (75.8%) 
and lowest in rural Upper Egypt (29.7%) and urban 
Upper Egypt (34.0%). Toothbrush use increased 
with wealth (Figure 2.3). 
About 80.1% of SYPE respondents reported always 
(62.5%) or often (17.6%) washing their hands 
with soap after using the bathroom. As one would 
expect, rates of “always hand washing” increase 
with wealth quintile, literacy, and education. Also, 
more females than males reported washing hands 
often or always (83.0% of females versus 77.2% of 
males).
2.5  Health and the environment
SYPE respondents aged 13–35 were asked if 
they perceived any type of pollution in the area 
where they lived. About two thirds (67.7%) of 
respondents perceived the environment around 
them as polluted. Perception of pollution tends 
to increase by wealth; 72.8% those in the highest 
wealth quintile versus 62.2% those in the lowest 
wealth quintile thought that the area where they 
lived was polluted. As one would expect, those who 
lived in metropolitan urban regions were most likely 
(81.6%) to believe their surrounding environment 
to be polluted, and those living in the Frontier 
Governorates were least likely (32.0%) to perceive 
this. There were no substantial differences by 
gender or age (data not shown). 
Compared to 2009, substantially more young peo-
ple aged 15–29 in 2014 perceived their environment 
as polluted compared with 2009 (67.7% versus 
29.6%, respectively) (Figure 2.4). The percentage 
of female respondents 15–29 who perceived their 
environment as polluted more than tripled between 
2009 and 2014 (20.6% versus 68.0% respectively). 
Youth also perceived a range of other environ-
mental health risks in the area in which they lived. 
Among all SYPE respondents aged 13–35, 41.8% 
thought that the streets were dirty or there was 
garbage in the streets, 43.3% thought that the air 
FIGURE 2.3   Percentage of young people  
who brushed their teeth, by wealth quintile, 
2014
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was polluted, 40.7% thought that the water was 
polluted, 19.5% thought that there was sewage or 
sanitation pollution in their areas, 15.9% thought 
that there was noise pollution, and 9.8% believed 
that there was pollution from pesticides.
Respondents who noted that their immediate envi-
ronment was polluted were asked if this had affect-
ed their health. Among those respondents, 60.7% 
thought that the pollution affected their health. 
Slightly more respondents in the lower wealth 
quintiles thought that the pollution in their envi-
ronment affected their health (63.6% of youth in 
lowest wealth quintile compared to 58.2% of those 
in the highest wealth quintile). Those living in urban 
(64.5%) and rural (60.4%) areas were more likely to 
think that pollution affected their health than those 
living in informal urban areas (49.5%). There were 
no substantial differences by gender or age. 
When asked about the specific impact of environ-
mental pollution on their health, about two-thirds of 
respondents believed that pollution in their imme-
diate environment affected their health. Close to 
63.0% indicated that the pollution affected their 
respiratory system, while others referred to diges-
tive problems (30.3%), kidney problems (19.9%), 
eye infections (19.2%), skin rashes (16.0%), hearing 
problems (13.2%), and liver problems (12.6%). Al-
though based on self-reports, the high percentage 
of youth who perceived that their environment neg-
atively impacted their health suggests that policy 
measures to curb pollution and other environmen-
tal hazards are greatly needed. 
2.6  Exposure to risk of injury and 
violence
Risks in the use of transportation
SYPE respondents aged 13–35 were asked about 
the most common means of transportation that 
they used. Public transportation (microbus, bus, 
metro, train, taxi, toktok, truck, and cart) was the 
most widely used form (79.5%), the most popular 
being the microbus (55.9%). Private transpor-
tation (bicycle, motorcycle, private car, walking, 
other) was used by the remaining 20.5%. More 
male youth than female youth used microbuses 
(60.3% vs. 51.2%) while more female youth than 
male youth used taxis (2.5% vs. 1.2%) and toktoks 
(16.4% vs. 10.6%). Metro usage was equally dis-
tributed across gender. Walking was more common 
among younger than older respondents, whereas 
microbus usage was more common among older 
than younger respondents. 
Young people aged 13–35 were asked about the 
most serious risks they face while on the street (not 
on transportation). More than two-thirds (70.2%) 
indicated that there was at least one serious 
risk they faced on the street, including crowding 
(29.6%), fast or reckless driving (20.4%), and theft 
When asked about the 
specific impact of 
environmental pollution 
on their health, about 
two-thirds of respondents 
believed that pollution in 
their immediate environment 
affected their health. 
FIGURE 2.4   Respondents aged 15–29 who 
perceived their environment as polluted, 2009 
and 2014,  (%) 
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(9.5%). Among female respondents, 6.3% men-
tioned sexual harassment as the most serious risk 
they faced on the street.
Among SYPE respondents who most often used 
public transportation, the majority (81.6%) felt that 
there was at least one form of risk they were ex-
posed to while on transportation. Crowding was the 
risk most often mentioned (by 36.5% of those who 
ride public transportation), followed by fast and 
reckless driving (by 20.0%), theft (10.3%), pushing 
(by 6.6% of riders), aggressive drivers (1.9%), and 
not having enough time to board and exit public 
transport (by 1.3% of riders). 
Perceptions of risk on the street and on public 
transportation were compared among young peo-
ple 15–29 in 2009 and 2014. More young people in 
2014 compared to 2009 identified at least one risk 
on the street (70% versus 60%, respectively) and 
at least one risk on public transportation (82.4% 
versus 71.2%). 
Safety measures in driving or riding 
bicycles or motorcycles
The majority (90.0%) of respondents whose 
primary mode of transportation was a bicycle had 
never used a helmet. The remainder of responses 
were equally distributed between rarely (5.5%) and 
sometimes (4.5%) using a helmet. As for motorcy-
cle riders, very few (3.5%) reported using a helmet 
often or regularly. The majority (74.1%) reported 
never using a helmet, whereas 22.3% sometimes or 
rarely wear a helmet.
A small percentage (6.2%) of SYPE respondents 
aged 18–35 drove a car. (This question was only 
asked of participants over age 18.) Only two in 10 
young drivers (21.3%) reported wearing a seatbelt 
often or regularly in 2014. Seatbelt use among 
passengers was even less common with less than 
one out of 25 (3.5%) reporting regularly wearing a 
seatbelt as a passenger. 
Seatbelt use dropped among both SYPE drivers 
and passengers between 2009 and 2014. Among 
drivers aged 18–29, “regular” seatbelt use dropped 
from 45.5% in 2009 to 21.3% in 2014. Among pas-
sengers aged 13–29, regular seatbelt use dropped 
from 7.7% in 2009 to 3.5% in 2014. (Figure 2.5) 
Young people and violence
Because violence is a major risk factor for young 
people in the region (Krug et al. 2002), the survey 
included questions on incidence of and exposure 
to violence. Risks were divided into engagement 
in a physical altercation and carrying any sort of 
weapon. This chapter covers violence in general; 
exposure to violence specifically related to political 
participation is covered in Chapter 7. Less than 
one-tenth of SYPE respondents (6.2%) had been in 
a physical altercation in the past 12 months. Male 
FIGURE 2.5   Seatbelt use among drivers aged 18–29 and passengers aged 13–29 in 2009 and 2014 
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youth were four times more likely than female youth 
(9.8% vs. 2.5%) to be in a physical altercation. 
There were no substantial differences by age or 
wealth quintile (data not shown). 
A small percentage (2.6%) of SYPE respondents 
aged 13–35 carried a weapon for self-defense. 
The weapons most commonly carried were knives 
(1.5%), followed by guns (0.3%). Male youth were 
four times more likely (4.1%) to carry a weapon 
than females (1.1%). There was a clear gender 
preference in weapon choice with male youth 
preferring to carry knives and guns and female 
youth preferring to carry pins. Weapons were most 
prevalent among those who lived in rural Upper 
Egypt (3.6%), followed by urban Upper Egypt 
(3.2%). Of those who carried a weapon, 29.1% 
reported using it in the past two years. Female 
youth were more likely to report using a weapon in 
the past two years; 33.5% of females who carried a 
weapon reported using it versus 28.1% of males. 
Exposure to injury and accidents
Like violence, injury is a major health concern that 
disproportionately affects young people (Peden 
et al. 2008). The frequent exposure to injury or 
accidents is often seen as a sign of living in a risky 
environment or engaging in risky behavior. Among 
all SYPE respondents aged 13–35, 13.2% reported 
having had an injury or accident happen to them in 
the past 12 months. A small percentage (3.3%) had 
more than one incident in the previous year. The 
Urban Governorates had the highest rate of injury 
or accidents, while urban Upper Egypt and urban 
Lower Egypt had the lowest. More male youth than 
female youth reported having had an injury. Preva-
lence of injury in general was similar across age and 
wealth quintiles (data not shown).
Overall, more male youth than female youth  
reported having a deep cut, being in a collision, 
being in a car accident, or being in a fight. Car 
collisions were more common in the Urban Gover-
norates than in other areas. Female youth reported 
more burns compared to male youth. Also, burns 
were most common in the Urban Governorates 
(data not shown). 
Sexual harassment
All female respondents aged 13–35 were asked 
about their exposure to sexual harassment in  
the past six months. More than one-third of  
SYPE respondents (39.9%) were exposed to some 
form of sexual harassment in 2014. As shown in 
Table A2.2, younger respondents aged 13–17 were 
more likely to experience sexual harassment than 
older age groups. Sexual harassment was most 
likely to happen in informal urban areas (61.6%); 
it was reported at similar rates in the Urban 
Governorates (53.3%), in urban Upper Egypt 
(50.2%), and in urban Lower Egypt (50.1%).
Among female SYPE respondents aged 13–35, 
41.6% reported that someone had made a bad or 
inappropriate comment to them, 1.7% reported 
that someone had touched their private parts, 
less than 1.0% reported that someone made 
them touch his or her private parts, showed them 
a private part of his body, or that they had been 
hugged or kissed in a sexual way. None of the  
SYPE respondents reported an attempted rape 
(data not shown).
Strangers were by far the most commonly  
reported perpetrators of sexual harassment 
against young women; 40.9% of all female SYPE 
respondents (aged 13–34)—96.3% of those 
who reported being sexually harassed—had 
experienced sexual harassment from a stranger, 
3.3% from an acquaintance; a smaller percentage 
reported harassment from a family member,  
co-worker, or teacher, and none from a boss. The 
most commonly reported location for sexual 
harassment was the street: of those females aged 
15–29 who reported being sexually harassed, 
86.3% reported being harassed on the street 
(36.7% of all female SYPE respondents), 21.9% on 
transportation, 6.4% at the mall or market, 4.5% 
at school, 2.1% in an abandoned place, and 1.2% at 
home. Harassment in the workplace or parks was 
not common. 
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Only one-third (35.0%) of female SYPE respon-
dents (aged 15 –29) who had experienced sexual 
harassment told someone about their experience. 
Younger females were more likely to tell someone 
about their experience than older females: 44.2% 
of those aged 15–17 told someone, while only 
26.9% of those aged 25–29 did so. Female youth 
living in urban areas (42.7%) were more likely to 
report being sexually harassed than those in rural 
areas (32.7%) and informal urban areas (31.4%). 
Female youth in the highest wealth quintile were 
most likely (43.5%) to tell someone they were 
harassed. Of those respondents who told someone 
about being sexually harassed, 22.9% told a parent, 
14.5% told a friend, 3.2% told another relative, and 
0.2% told the police (data not shown). 
To compare the results on sexual harassment in 
2014 with those of 2009, while adjusting for aging 
of the survey population, we examined exposure 
to sexual harassment among respondents 13–29 
in the two surveys. Figure 2.6 shows an overall 
decrease in experience of sexual harassment 
among female youth 13–29 (from 49.7% in 2009 
to 42.8% in 2014). This decline from 2009 to 2014 
is most notable among respondents aged 25–29 
(from 46.4% to 33.3%) followed by those aged 
18–24 (from 54.2% to 44.8%). On the other hand, 
13–17-year-olds witnessed an increase in exposure 
to sexual harassment (from 46.4% in 2009 to 
49.5% in 2014). 
2.7  Nutrition, dietary habits, and 
physical activity 
This section examines SYPE respondents’ eating 
habits, nutritional intake of different types of food, 
as well as their perceptions of weight and daily ex-
ercise habits. Just under half of SYPE respondents 
13–35 years indicated that they ate breakfast daily 
(45.2%), followed by slightly more than a fourth 
(26.7%) reporting “often” and a smaller percentage 
(21.8%) reporting “sometimes.” Female respon-
dents were more likely than their male counterparts 
to eat breakfast on a regular basis (49.1% versus 
41.4% always ate breakfast). Respondents from 
rural areas were the most likely to report “always” 
(49.7%) compared to those from urban (39.7%) 
and informal urban (33.3%) areas. There were no 
substantial differences among age groups or wealth 
quintiles (data not shown). 
Respondents were also asked about their daily in-
take of sweets, carbonated beverages, snacks, and 
fast food, revealing that a substantial percentage of 
youth engage in some unhealthy eating habits. Ta-
ble A2.3 shows that more than half of young people 
13–35 years (51.6%) drink carbonated beverages 
1–3 times per week while 11.6% drink it more than 
three times per week. Young people who are 13–17 
years, those who live in the Urban Governorates, 
and those who belong to the highest wealth quintile 
are more likely to consume carbonated drinks more 
than three times per week. 
About one-third (35%) of young people aged 13–35 
eat fast food 1–3 times per week and nearly one-
tenth (8.4%) eat it more than 3 times per week. 
Young males, those aged under 25, and those who 
FIGURE 2.6 Exposure to sexual harassment 
among females aged 13–29, 2009 and 2014 (%)
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More than one-third of 
female SYPE respondents 
aged 13–35 were exposed 
to some form of sexual 
harassment in 2014.
18
PANEL SURVEY OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN EGYPT (SYPE) 2014
live in urban governorates or who belong to the 
highest wealth quintile were more likely to consume 
fast food (Table A2.4). 
There is a large evidence base indicating that diets 
with high salt intake, especially in lower-middle 
income and developing countries, are highly associ-
ated with increased rates of hypertension (Ibrahim 
and Dumasceno 2012). Hypertension is one of the 
main causes of cardiovascular disease, which is 
reaching epidemic percentages in the Middle East 
and North Africa, where deaths from stroke are pre-
dicted to double by 2030 (Tran, Mirzaei, and Leeder 
2007). SYPE respondents were asked about their 
salt intake and preferences for salty foods. Overall, 
32.8% of respondents indicated “yes” to the ques-
tion “do you like your food to be very salty?” Those 
in the highest wealth quintile and those in urban 
and informal urban areas were more likely to prefer 
their food very salty than other respondents. There 
were no substantial differences by age or gender 
(data not shown).
SYPE participants were asked about the type of 
bread they usually eat. Respondents from the high-
est wealth quintile were three times as likely to re-
port eating white (fino/shamy) bread (44.2%) than 
those from the lowest quintile (16.3%). Interesting-
ly, consumption of brown, subsidized bread (sub-
sidized balady) was highest amongst respondents 
in the highest wealth quintile (35.7%), compared 
to just 23.0% of those in the lowest quintile.1 This 
underscores the need to revisit the current general-
ized subsidy system. Respondents from the lowest 
wealth quintile were more likely to report eating 
bread baked at home (61.7%) than those from the 
highest (42.2%) (data not shown). 
The section on nutrition concluded with questions 
specifically for respondents who were still in school 
at any level, asking about their food intake while at 
school. Research has shown that nutrition during 
the school day, especially breakfast, is important 
for cognitive development and can impact test 
1 Bread is among the main food items included in the 
government subsidy scheme. For information on the 
subsidy scheme in Egypt see Akhter et al. (2001). 
scores and other measures of academic per-
formance (Rampersaud et al. 2005). The great 
majority (85.6%) consumed food at school; just 
under two-thirds of respondents (64.9%) indicated 
that they bought food at school, whereas a smaller 
percentage (18.9%) consumed “homemade sand-
wiches” and a very small percentage mentioned a 
“school meal” (1.9%). 
Perceptions of weight and obesity 
About three-fourths of respondents aged 13–35 
(73.4%) reported that their weight was “about the 
right weight,” followed by 12.4% responding “slight-
ly overweight” and 11.9% responding “slightly un-
derweight.” Female respondents were nearly twice 
as likely as male respondents to report their weight 
as being “slightly overweight” (16.3% compared to 
8.7%) and three times as likely to report being “very 
overweight” as male youth (1.5% compared to 
0.5%). As in 2009 SYPE, as age increased, the per-
ception of being “slightly overweight” increased as 
well, with 15.9% of those in the oldest age category 
responding as such compared to just 7.6% of those 
in the youngest. 
All SYPE respondents were asked if they were try-
ing to lose, gain, maintain, or doing nothing about 
their weight. Nearly two-thirds responded that it 
“doesn’t matter” (65.0%) followed by 23.0% who 
responded that they were trying to “stay the same 
weight.” Three times as many female youth (10.2%) 
as male youth (3.4%) wanted to “lose weight.” 
Desire to lose weight also increased as wealth in-
creased; nearly twice as many people in the highest 
wealth quintile (8.7%) wanted to lose weight as 
those in the lowest (4.5%). The same is true for res-
idence: respondents from urban residences were 
almost twice as likely to want to lose weight (9.1%) 
than those from rural (5.7%) and informal urban 
(5.9%) areas. 
Physical activity 
The survey included a series of questions ask-
ing SYPE respondents about their daily physical 
activities, including biking and walking, going to a 
gym, playing sports, or physical work on the job. 
Table A2.5 shows that nearly half (45.8%) of SYPE 
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FIGURE 2.7   Engagement in daily physical 
activity among youth aged 15–29, by gender, 
2009 and 2014 (%)
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respondents 13–35 do not engage in physical 
activities daily. Nearly twice as many young women 
(59.2%) did not exercise as men (33.0%). SYPE 
participants aged 13–17 were more likely to indicate 
daily exercise (66.8%) than the those aged 30–35 
(49.0%). Furthermore, respondents from informal 
urban areas were less likely to report participating 
in a daily physical activity (42.6%) than their urban 
(55.3%) or rural (55.6%) counterparts. Participa-
tion in a daily physical activity was not substantially 
different by wealth or education level attained.
The most common response among those who 
did engage in daily exercise was “walking/bicycling 
to work/school” (43.9%), followed by “my work 
involves a physical activity” (10.8%) and “playing 
football on the street” (9.1%). Male youth were 
much more likely to play sports in a youth center 
(7.1% of all male respondents), play football on 
the street (17.2%), or work in a job that requires 
physical activity (14.7%), compared to female youth 
(0.8%, 0.6%, and 6.8%, respectively). The most 
common response by women was “walk/bicycle to 
work/school,” to which 35.1% indicated that they 
did so on a daily basis (data not shown). 
Engagement in daily physical activity among young 
people 15–29 was compared in the two surveys. 
Figure 2.7 shows a decline in engagement in daily 
physical activity for both young men and women 
15–29 between 2009 and 2014. 
2.8  Use of tobacco, alcohol, and 
drugs 
The questions regarding smoking first asked  
about other people’s smoking habits, including 
those of family members, then about the respon-
dent’s own habits. The rationale for this sequencing 
was to get proximal data in case of reluctance to 
self-report about such sensitive issues. The same 
technique was also used to inquire about drug and 
alcohol use. 
Smoking
Among SYPE respondents aged 13–35, one-third 
(30.9%) reported having a father who smoked 
and very few (0.7%) reported that their mothers 
smoked. The majority (60.7%) reported that none 
of their siblings smoked, about one-third (35.0%) 
said that few of their older siblings smoked, and 
2.9% reported that all or most of their older sib-
lings smoked. 
Respondents were also asked whether their friends 
smoked and whether their spouses smoked. 
Responses varied by gender: 8.1% of female 
respondents had a close friend who smoked and 
21.7% had a spouse who smoked, while 74.2% 
of males reported that their friends smoked and 
1.8% that their spouses smoked. Nearly half 
(48.0%) of young married females lived with a 
smoking husband. More than one-fourth (28.0%) 
of male youth aged 13–35 reported currently 
smoking cigarettes (occasionally or regularly). 
Current smoking increased with age, from 5.6% of 
13–17-year-old males to 46.9% among 30–35-year-
olds (data not shown). 
About 7.3% of SYPE respondents have ever tried 
smoking shisha (hookah), and 2.5% said they 
smoked shisha regularly, whereas 90.2% had 
never smoked shisha. Smoking shisha regularly 
was similar by gender (2.6% for males and 2.4% 
for females), however remarkably more male youth 
(13.7%) reported trying shisha than female youth 
(0.5%). Among male youth, regular shisha smok-
ing was most prevalent in the 25–29-year-old age 
group (3.0% regularly smoke shisha—down from 
6.3% in 2009). Although more male youth (3.8%) 
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in the Frontier Governorates regularly smoked 
shisha than did males in other regions (all other 
regions are less than 2.8%), trying shisha was least 
common (6.4%) among males in Frontier Governor-
ates compared to all other regions (other regions 
ranged from 11.4% to 16.1%) (data not shown). 
Alcohol consumption and drug use
All respondents were asked if any of their friends 
had consumed alcoholic drinks, such as beer, wine, 
or spirits, in the past 12 months. About 3.5% of 
respondents (6.2% of males and 0.7% of females) 
replied that their friends had consumed alcohol. 
When asked about their own alcohol consumption, 
1.0% reported they had consumed alcohol (1.9% of 
male youth and 0.1% of female youth).
SYPE 2014 asked respondents aged 13–35 about 
their friends’ drug use, their family members’ drug 
use, and their own drug use. Overall 7.6% said their 
friends had tried drugs (14.2% of male youth and 
0.8% of female youth). Fewer respondents (3.8%) 
said that their family members had tried drugs 
overall (5.6% male and 1.9% female).
Very few (1.9%) SYPE respondents aged 13–35 said 
that they had tried drugs (3.6% of male youth and 
0.1% of female youth). Actual drug use is probably 
underreported because more respondents report-
ed that their family members had tried drugs, and 
even more reported that their friends had tried 
drugs. Among those respondents who reported 
that they had tried drugs, the most commonly used 
drug were weed (hashish) (77.7%), marijuana (ban-
go) (40.2%), and pills (20.8%).
The majority of SYPE respondents aged 13–35 
(60.8%) knew of campaigns to help people stop 
using drugs and smoking. The question about 
these campaigns was asked of both those who 
tried drugs and those who did not. Awareness of 
campaigns was slightly more common among male 
youth (63.1%) than female youth (58.0%). Respon-
dents were most aware in the Urban Governorates 
(73.6%) and least aware in urban Upper Egypt 
(49.8%). Awareness of campaigns increased with 
education and wealth. Approximately half (48.3%) 
of those who were aware of anti-drug campaigns 
thought that they were successful (data not shown). 
2.9  Mental health and social 
development
The SYPE survey utilized the Self-Reporting 
Questionnaire (SRQ-20), developed by the World 
Health Organization to screen for common mental 
disorders in low-income and developing-world set-
tings (Beusenberg and Orley 1994). The SRQ-20 is 
a group of 20 yes/no questions, and a respondent’s 
score is the total number of questions to which he 
or she answers “yes.” The tool is designed so that 
the higher the score, the more likely the respondent 
is to have a mental disorder. The cutoff value for the 
SRQ, to suggest the presence of mental disorder, 
must be validated within a population by comparing 
scores of people who have been professionally diag-
nosed with mental illness with the scores of people 
diagnosed as having no mental illness (Beusenberg 
and Orley 1994).
A literature review for published studies using the 
SRQ-20 in Egypt yielded only one study, which 
used an SRQ-20 cutoff score of 8 or more as a 
positive screen for mental disorder (Vizcarra et al. 
2004). Rahman et al. (2005) in Pakistan validated 
a cutoff score of 9 or greater. In Jordan, Daradkeh 
et al. (2006) used a cutoff point of greater than or 
equal to 7; and in Syria, Maziak et al. (2002) used 
a cutoff score of greater than or equal to 8 as a 
positive screening result for mental disorder. Thus, 
for the purposes of SYPE 2014, we used a cutoff 
score of 8.
Among the SYPE respondents, the average num-
ber of “yes” responses among the sample was 2.2 
(SD±3.2). On average, female respondents had a 
higher “yes” response rate (mean=2.7, SD±3.6) 
than male respondents (mean=1.6, SD±2.6). Re-
spondents from the lowest wealth quintile had the 
highest number of SRQ-20 responses (mean=2.5); 
this score steadily decreased as wealth increased, 
with the highest wealth group having the lowest 
SRQ-20 (mean=1.8,SD±2.9). Also, there were mod-
est differences in the SRQ-20 scores when broken 
down by residence; respondents from the Urban 
Governorates had the highest score (mean=2.8, 
SD±3.8) followed by those from rural Upper Egypt 
(mean=2.4, SD±3.3) and urban Upper Egypt 
(mean= 1.8, SD±2.5). 
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Using a cutoff of 8 or greater as indicative of 
mental disorder, 7.1% of the SYPE respondents 
showed signs of a mental disorder. Female 
respondents were three times more likely to have 
signs of a mental disorder (10.5%) than their 
male counterparts (3.9%).2 Just as the average 
SRQ-20 score decreased as wealth increased, the 
percentages of those with a score greater than or 
equal to 8 decreased greatly as wealth increased; 
9.4% of youth in the lowest quintile scored greater 
than or equal to 8, compared to 5.1% of those 
from the highest quintile. The largest percentage 
of SYPE respondents with an SRQ-20 score 
greater than or equal to 8 were from the Urban 
Governorates (12.3%) followed by those from rural 
Upper Egypt (7.8%). 
SYPE respondents were also asked whether or 
not they had a family history of mental illness. A 
total of 0.8% of respondents indicated that they 
did. A greater percentage of respondents from the 
Urban Governorates reported a family history of 
mental illness (1.9%) than their counterparts in 
rural Lower Egypt (0.7%) and rural Upper Egypt 
(0.6%), who had the second and third highest 
percentages of reported family history of mental 
illness. Among those who reported a family his-
tory, 20.8% specified their mothers, followed by 
20.5% who specified a sibling(s), and 15.7% who 
declined to specify. 
2.10  Reproductive health
The reproductive health section of the SYPE 
consisted of a series of questions concerning 
menarche and puberty, relationships with the other 
sex, and knowledge of HIV/AIDS and other sexually 
transmitted infections. Additionally, female respon-
dents were asked questions regarding exposure to 
female genital cutting, pregnancy, and childbirth. 
The module concluded with ever-married respon-
dents being asked questions regarding their contra-
ceptive knowledge and use.
2 These results should be interpreted with caution as 
some of the questions (e.g., “Do you often cry?” and 
“Are you easily frightened?”) are less likely to be 
answered affirmatively by young men.
Experience of menarche 
Nearly all female respondents had already experi-
enced the onset of menstruation (99.1%), with the 
average age of menarche reported to be 12.9 years 
(SD±1.4 years). There were no large differences in age 
at menarche when broken down by wealth quintiles 
or by region. One-third of respondents who had ex-
perienced menarche (33.7%) indicated that prior to 
menarche they did not know what menstruation was. 
This was slightly higher among rural respondents 
(37.3%) than their counterparts from urban (28.0%) 
or informal urban (27.9%) areas (Table A2.6). 
Slightly more than half of the respondents (51.3%) 
were shocked, cried, and/or were afraid at men-
arche. Nearly one-fifth (18.5%) of respondents  
were indifferent, and over one-fifth (21.5%) did not 
know what to do. When disaggregated by educa-
tion there were no major differences in reaction 
to menarche; however, there were differences by 
region. Respondents from urban Upper Egypt were 
nearly twice as likely to respond by being “shocked 
and afraid” (58.1%) than their counterparts from 
the Frontier Governorates (32.7%). Lastly, 8.6% 
of respondents reported that they were happy to 
begin menstruating.
The majority of female respondents reported that 
they use sanitary pads while menstruating (79.1%), 
followed by pieces of cloth (9.6%) and special 
towels (9.4%). When this question is examined by 
region, the responses change greatly; sanitary pad 
use is most common in urban Upper Egypt (93.4%) 
and in the Urban Governorates (85.9%) and 
decreased substantially in rural Upper Egypt and 
in the Frontier Governorates, to 72.8% and 73.4%, 
respectively. Use of pieces of cloth was highest in 
rural Upper Egypt (15.6%) followed by rural Lower 
Egypt (11.2%) and lowest in the Urban Governorates 
Slightly more than half 
of the respondents were 
shocked, cried, and/or 
were afraid at menarche.
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(3.2%). Not surprisingly, female respondents in the 
highest wealth quintile used sanitary pads the most 
(88.0%) compared to those in the lowest quintile 
(65.4%), and female respondents from the lowest 
quintile were much more likely to use pieces of cloth 
(21.0%) than those from the highest quintile (2.5%). 
Information and discussion about puberty
The SYPE 2014 included a series of questions asking 
youth about their conversations with their parents, 
or other family members, about puberty and growing 
up. These questions were asked of all SYPE respon-
dents. Just over one-third of the sample (34.2%) 
had talked with a parent about puberty (Table A2.7). 
The most salient difference among subgroups of re-
spondents was by gender; more than twice as many 
female respondents (47.5%) than male respondents 
(21.6%) had spoken with a family member about 
puberty. There were also substantial differences by 
education; 27.9% of illiterate respondents indicated 
that they had spoken with a family member about 
puberty, compared to 40.7% of those respondents 
who had a university education.
Respondents from the Frontier Governorates 
and Urban Governorates were more likely to have 
spoken with a family member (47.7% and 44.8%, 
respectively), while those in rural Upper Egypt 
were least likely to have done so (26.3%). There 
were no major differences by age group. When 
disaggregated by wealth, there was a clear increase 
in the percentage of respondents who spoke to 
their parents or family members about puberty as 
wealth increased. Just over a fourth of respondents 
from the lowest quintile (26.9%) had spoken with 
their parents about puberty, compared to 40.0% of 
those from the highest quintile. 
Figure 2.8 shows that more SYPE respondents re-
ported discussing puberty with their parents in 2014 
than in 2009. In 2014, 33.9% of 15–29-year-olds 
had spoken with family members about puberty, 
compared to 2009, when just 28.5% reported that 
they had. While the percentage of female respon-
dents who discussed puberty was almost equal in 
2009 and 2014 (49.9% and 47.6%, respectively), 
the percentage of male respondents who had talked 
with their parents about puberty increased substan-
tially from 8.1% in 2009 to 21.4% in 2014. 
The survey continued with a series of questions 
asking respondents their opinions regarding the 
appropriate age, if ever, to talk to adolescents  
about puberty. The largest percentage of respon-
dents (37.9%) believed that this discussion should 
take place at the onset of menstruation/puberty. 
The second most common response was that no 
one should talk to youth about puberty, comprising 
15.3% of respondents; more young men than wom-
en gave this answer. Furthermore, 10.5% of respon-
dents believed that this conversation is best had at 
marriage. Finally, 10.7% of the sample was unsure of 
the best age to discuss puberty (data not shown). 
Youth were also asked about their main source of 
information regarding puberty. The most commonly 
cited source of information was “friends, neigh-
bors, and/or relatives” (41.1%), followed by “family” 
(26.5%). When disaggregated by gender, 41.1% of 
female respondents indicated “family” compared to 
12.5% of male respondents. For male respondents, 
51.4% reported “friends, neighbors, and/or rela-
tives” were their main source of puberty informa-
tion. A substantial percentage of the sample (13.7%) 
reported that their main source of information was 
films and cinema. When looking at information 
sources disaggregated by education, 15.6% of those 
with university-level education reported their main 
source to be a school curriculum, by far the largest 
among all education categories (data not shown). 
Overall, 59.1% of youth indicated that the amount 
of information they received about puberty was 
FIGURE 2.8   Percentage of youth (aged 15–29) 
who discussed puberty with their parents, by 
gender, 2009 and 2014
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sufficient. Slightly fewer male than female respon-
dents believed that the information they received 
was sufficient (56.9 % versus 61.4%, respectively). 
Generally, the older a respondent was, the more 
satisfied they were with the information they 
received. Younger respondents were more likely 
to say the information was insufficient (23.2% 
of 13–17-year-olds and 40.0% of 18–24-year-
olds) than their elder counterparts (14.9% of 
30–35-year-olds). Similarly, as wealth increased, 
respondents were more likely to report that the 
information they received was sufficient; 64.9% of 
respondents from the highest quintile, compared 
to 54.5% of those from the lowest, indicated that 
the information they received on puberty was suffi-
cient (data not shown). 
Relationships with the other sex
The SYPE survey had intended to inquire directly 
about young people’s sexual relationships. Howev-
er, due to the sensitivity of the topic and at the re-
quest of local authorities, the questions were asked 
in an indirect way, i.e., to inquire about relationships 
with the other sex. 
All SYPE respondents were asked if they knew 
of girls or boys of their same age who had rela-
tionships with the opposite sex. The majority of 
respondents indicated “no” (69.1%), while 11.3% 
answered “yes,” 5.4% refused to answer, and 14.2% 
responded “I don’t know.” Males were somewhat 
more likely to report knowledge of such relation-
ships than females (14.2% versus 8.4%, respective-
ly). Also, respondents from rural Upper Egypt and 
higher wealth quintiles were more likely to report 
knowledge of such relationships. 
A substantial percentage of respondents (42.3%) 
indicated that youth in relationships usually met 
in parks, followed by cafés or restaurants (29.7%). 
Parks were the most common meeting area among 
rural respondents (47.7%) and the least for those 
from informal urban areas (26.5%), who indi-
cated that sports clubs and youth centers were 
the most common meeting areas (43.2%). SYPE 
respondents who answered that they had heard of 
relationships with the other sex (11.3%) were asked 
if they thought that the boys and girls had intimate 
relationships; 18.9% of the above respondents 
indicated “yes.” Male respondents were nearly twice 
as likely as female respondents to answer “yes” 
(23.0% vs. 11.8%). Furthermore, respondents from 
urban areas were twice as likely to respond yes 
(30.6%) as respondents from rural (14.1%) or infor-
mal urban (14.4%) areas (data not shown).
Knowledge of HIV/AIDS and other 
sexually transmitted infections
All survey respondents were asked if they had ever 
heard of sexually transmitted infections (STIs). 
Just over half of the sample (54.1%) had, with 
substantially more male respondents (59.5%) 
having heard of STIs than their female counterparts 
(48.3%). Knowledge of STIs increased with wealth, 
with a larger percentage of youth in the highest 
wealth quintile (68.3%) having heard of STIs than 
the lowest (41.3%). Respondents in the youngest 
age group (13–17) were the least likely to have 
heard of STIs (39.5%) compared to nearly equal 
knowledge among 18–24-year-olds (57.4%), 
25–29-year-olds (59.5%), and 30–35-year-olds 
(56.4%) (data not shown). 
Similar to age, knowledge increased among respon-
dents as their level of education increased. Among 
illiterate respondents, 20.3% had heard of STIs, 
compared to 79.7% of respondents in the highest 
education level. There was also a large difference in 
knowledge of STIs among respondents from urban 
areas (62.7%) and their rural (49.9%) and informal 
urban area (53.8%) counterparts. 
When those who had heard of STIs were read a list 
of STIs, the STI most identified was human immu-
nodeficiency virus (HIV) (97.3%), followed by syph-
ilis although at a much lower percentage (14.1%). 
More than four out of five respondents (82.4%) 
who had heard of STIs had heard of just one on the 
list presented (syphilis, gonorrhea, chlamydia, hu-
man papillomavirus, and human immunodeficiency 
virus), while very few respondents (1.6%) had heard 
of all five (data not shown). 
SYPE respondents who indicated that they had 
not heard of any sexually transmitted infections 
were asked, “Have you ever heard of AIDS?” Of 
those, 43.2% answered “yes.” Altogether, those 
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who indicated that they had heard of HIV or AIDS 
comprised 73.2% of the total sample. Just 59.6% 
of respondents from the youngest age group had 
heard of HIV or AIDS, compared to 76.3% of those 
in the oldest age group. Knowledge of HIV was 
highest among those in the highest wealth quintile 
(85.5%) and lowest among those in the lowest 
quintile (61.9%). Likewise, those with the least edu-
cation were least likely to have heard of HIV or AIDS 
(43.5%), with knowledge steadily increasing with 
education, reaching the maximum (92.6%) among 
youth with a university education or higher. Region-
ally, respondents from the Urban Governorates 
were most likely to know of HIV or AIDS (86.5%); 
the Frontier Governorates and urban Upper Egypt 
had the lowest and second lowest percentages 
(63.6% and 63.4%) (Table A.2.8). 
Knowledge of HIV/AIDS decreased between 2009 
and 2014. As shown in Figure 2.9, 85.5% of 2009 
SYPE respondents 15–29 had heard of HIV com-
pared to 73.6% in 2014. Knowledge decrease was 
common across both genders, although male youth 
15–29 experienced a greater decrease between 
2009 and 2014 (92.0% versus 77.3%, respectively) 
compared to female youth (78.7% versus 69.4%, 
respectively).
Respondents were asked to indicate the sources of 
information they had about HIV/AIDS. More than 
half (60.9%) indicated that they had heard of HIV/
AIDS through media, radio, or cinema, followed by 
school (12.2%) and friends (6.1%). Both male and 
female respondents were equally likely to report 
school as a source of information; however, male re-
spondents were nearly three times as likely (73.2%) 
as female respondents (26.8%) to report friends as 
a source (data not shown).
All of the respondents who indicated that they 
had heard of HIV or AIDS were asked if a series of 
eight mechanisms (of which six were correct and 
two were incorrect) could transmit the virus. The 
overwhelming majority of respondents correctly 
identified sexual relations (93.7%) as a method 
to transmit HIV. Furthermore, a large percentage 
(89.2%) of the sample correctly identified blood 
transfusion as a method of HIV transmission, as well 
as sharing of needles (79.9%). On the other hand, 
many respondents did not correctly identify vertical 
transmission from mother to child during pregnancy 
(only 32.5% indicated that this is a mechanism) or 
breastfeeding (only 24.6% indicated that this is a 
method) as modes of transmission. Nearly one-fifth 
(19.7%) of the sample that knew of HIV or AIDS cor-
rectly identified all of the methods of transmission 
(14% of the total sample). Those from the highest 
wealth quintiles were the most likely to be able to 
identify all of the mechanisms (25.9%) compared 
to those from the lowest (15.7%). A similar trend 
can be seen by education; the most highly educated 
respondents (university and above) were the most 
likely to identify all mechanisms (24.8%) compared 
to the illiterate respondents, who were least likely 
(15.9%) (data not shown). 
Some respondents incorrectly answered that cer-
tain mechanisms could transmit HIV when in fact 
they cannot. For example, 16.8% of respondents 
answered that an insect bite could transmit HIV and 
37.8% indicated that they did not know if this was a 
mode of transmission. A larger percentage (22.6%) 
indicated that sharing food with someone living 
with HIV/AIDS was a mode of transmission and 
37.5% responded that they did not know. For the 
most part, as level of education increased, respon-
dents were better able to correctly identify meth-
ods of transmitting HIV. A small percentage (2.2%) 
indicated that they had ever been tested for HIV. 
Respondents were asked about their willingness 
to interact (i.e., shake hands or ride in a car) with 
FIGURE 2.9   Percentage of youth (aged 15–29) 
who had heard of HIV/AIDS, by gender, 2009 
and 2014
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someone who is HIV-infected. This question was 
intended to gauge both their knowledge of transmis-
sion and attitudes of stigma. Less than one-fifth of 
respondents (17.1%) indicated that they would, a de-
crease from 21.1% who reported willingness in 2009 
(data not shown). Male respondents were slightly 
more likely than female respondents to respond 
affirmatively (19.8% compared to 13.8%). Respon-
dents who were illiterate were less likely to indicate 
“yes” (13.3%) than those who completed voca-
tional school, post-secondary studies, or university 
(15.0%, 20.9%, 23.3%, respectively). Respondents 
from informal urban areas were slightly more likely 
to respond “yes” (19.8%) than their rural and urban 
counterparts (17.5% and 15.4%, respectively). 
Knowledge and practice of female 
genital mutilation/cutting
Female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) is the 
practice of partial or total removal of the external 
female genitalia or other injury to the female genital 
organs for nonmedical reasons (UNICEF 2010). 
All SYPE respondents were asked if they had ever 
heard of female circumcision (khitan or tahara). 
A majority of the sample (94.0%) had heard of 
FGM/C. More female respondents (98.3%) had 
heard of FGM/C than male respondents (89.4%). 
Regionally, respondents from rural and urban 
Upper Egypt were the most likely to have heard of 
FGM/C (96.3% and 96.4%, respectively); respon-
dents from rural Lower Egypt were the least likely 
(92.0%). As age increased, knowledge of FGM/C 
increased as well; while 11.3% of 13–17-year-olds 
had not heard of FGM/C, just 2.4% of those in the 
30–35 year old age group had not heard of FGM/C 
(data not shown). 
All female respondents aged 13–35 who indicated 
that they had heard of FGM/C were asked if they 
had undergone FGM/C. Of those, 80.5% responded 
that they had, 12.6% said they had not, and 7.0% 
refused to answer. Being cut was more common 
among rural female respondents (87.9%) than their 
counterparts in informal urban (74.8%) and urban 
areas (66.3%). Respondents from rural Upper 
Egypt were the most likely to have undergone  
FGM/C (91.6%), while those from the Urban Gover-
norates were the least likely (55.6%). The preva-
lence of FGM/C decreased as education increased; 
91.0% of illiterate respondents reported being 
circumcised, compared to 71.5% of university-edu-
cated respondents (Table A2.9). 
As age increased, the percentage of respondents 
who indicated that they were cut did as well. Female 
respondents in the youngest age group (13–17) 
were the least likely to have undergone FGM/C 
(73.9%), compared to the oldest age groups 
(85.7%). Similarly, as wealth increased, respon-
dents were much less likely to report being cut. 
Those from the lowest wealth quintile were more 
likely to report having been cut (87.2%) compared 
to those in the highest wealth quintile (71.3%). 
Prevalence of FGM/C was compared among  
females aged 15–29 in both surveys. Figure 2.10 
shows that fewer SYPE respondents in this age 
group indicated in 2014 that they were cut, com-
pared to 2009 (79.5% versus 87.5%, respectively). 
However, more SYPE respondents in 2014 refused 
to answer this question. Possible reasons for this 
increase are discussed in this chapter’s conclusion.
The mean age of female respondents who reported 
that they had undergone FGM/C was 9.4 years, 
with a standard deviation of ±3.0 years. FGM/C 
was performed at the youngest age in urban Upper 
Egypt (7.0 years, ±3.2), and performed later in 
the Urban Governorates (10.2 years, ±2.4) and 
urban Lower Egypt (9.8 years, ±2.6). There was no 
difference in age at FGM/C when disaggregated 
 
FIGURE 2.10   Response of females aged 15–29 
to question on their circumcision status, 2009 
and 2014 (%) 
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by wealth quintile. These results are slightly lower, 
yet consistent with both the 2009 SYPE and 2008 
Egyptian Demographic and Health Survey, which 
reported the average age to be at 9.5 years and 10 
years, respectively.
Respondents aged 13–35 who were cut indicated 
that doctors were the main providers of the 
procedure (43.8%) followed by dayas/circumcision 
practitioners (42.6%) and nurses (11.5%). Younger 
respondents (13–17), those who live in urban 
governorates, those with a university degree and 
those who belong to the highest wealth quintile 
were more likely to be cut by a doctor than other 
groups of young women. 
Nearly two-thirds (64.5%) of all female 
respondents aged 13–35 who were cut reported 
that the practice was performed at home or at 
another house. Home or another house was 
more common in rural areas (69.5%) than urban 
(58.8%) and informal urban (52.3%) areas, 
although it was the most common place among 
all residential categories. On the other hand, 
urban respondents were far more likely to report 
a private hospital (11.5%) than their counterparts 
from rural (2.7%) and informal urban (1.0%) areas 
(data not shown). 
Attitudes toward FGM/C
SYPE respondents aged 13–35 of both genders 
who had heard of FGM/C were asked a series 
of questions to ascertain their attitudes toward 
the practice. When asked if they believed that 
the practice was necessary, over half (61.3%) 
answered that it was, compared to 21.2% who 
responded that it was not and the remaining 
17.5% unsure. Female respondents were slightly 
more likely to respond that FGM/C was necessary 
(64.6% of all female respondents compared to 
57.8% of male respondents). However, more male 
than female respondents did not know whether 
the practice was necessary (22.2% vs. 13.1%, 
respectively). While two-thirds of respondents 
from the oldest age category (66.1%) indicated 
“necessary,” we see that as age decreases, fewer 
of the younger respondents indicated the same 
(53.3%) (data not shown). 
When assessed by region, 80.6% of respondents 
from urban Upper Egypt responded “necessary,” 
compared to just 34.7% of those from the Urban 
Governorates. When disaggregated by both wealth 
and education level, several trends were noted. Over 
three-fourths of illiterate respondents responded 
that FGM/C was “necessary” (78.2%), compared to 
half (50.0%) of those who had a university educa-
tion. Likewise, over three times as many respon-
dents with a university education (32.8%) reported 
FGM/C was “unnecessary” compared to illiterate 
respondents (11.1%). Half of respondents from the 
highest wealth quintile (50.3%) reported FGM/C 
as “necessary” compared to nearly three-fourths 
of those from the lowest quintile (70.9%), although 
percentages of “I don’t know” responses by wealth 
quintiles were fairly similar. 
Attitudes of SYPE respondents aged 15–29  
were compared in the two surveys (Figure 2.11).  
In 2014, slightly fewer respondents reported  
FGM/C to be “necessary” compared to 2009 
(60.3% versus 64.0%). However, in 2014 more fe-
male than male respondents believed that FGM/C 
was necessary (63.2% versus 57.4%) while in 2009 
FIGURE 2.11   Attitudes of male and female 
respondents aged 15–29 regarding importance 
of FGM/C, 2009 and 2014 (%)
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the opposite was true (70.3% of male respondents 
versus 57.6% of female respondents). On the other 
hand, more male respondents in 2014 compared to 
2009 did not know if the practice was necessary or 
not (23.4% versus 14.1%, respectively). 
When asked why they believed that FGM/C was im-
portant, the most commonly cited reason was “cus-
toms and traditions” (56.7%) followed by “religious 
reasons” (35.0%) and “to get married” (5.3%). 
Respondents from urban and rural Upper Egypt 
were much more likely to respond “customs and 
traditions” (74.5% and 69.1%, respectively) than 
those from urban and rural Lower Egypt (41.0% 
and 41.1%, respectively). Among respondents in 
the higher wealth quintiles, “religious reasons” were 
most often cited (48.2%), whereas among those in 
the lowest, “customs and traditions” (67.3%) were 
(data not shown). 
When asked whether they intended to cut their 
daughters in the future, seven out of 10 SYPE re-
spondents answered “yes.” Fairly equal percentages 
of male (68.6%) and female (70.7%) respondents 
indicated that they intended to cut their daughters 
in the future (not shown). 
Pregnancy and childbirth 
This section of the health chapter addresses a series 
of questions related to pregnancy and childbirth. 
These questions were only asked of female SYPE 
respondents who indicated being “ever married” 
(35.1%). Among those, a large majority (87.5%) 
indicated that they had ever been pregnant. This 
number was similar across the regions of Egypt, be-
ing lowest (86.5%) in rural Lower Egypt and highest 
(91.7%) in the Urban Governorates. As expected, 
ever-married female respondents in the oldest 
age category, 30–35, had the highest percentage 
of respondents reporting ever being pregnant 
(96.1%) compared to the youngest category, 13–17 
(27.5%). Similarly, 91.4% of illiterate respondents 
reported ever being pregnant, compared to 82.3% 
of respondents from the highest education catego-
ry (university and above). Twice as many married 
female respondents from the highest wealth quintile 
reported never being pregnant (18.9%) compared 
with those from the lowest (9.0%). 
Among ever-married female respondents, 16.5% 
reported ever being pregnant before the age of 18. 
Adolescent pregnancy was more common among 
female respondents from rural areas (19.7% of 
all pregnancies were among adolescents) than 
informal urban (8.9% of all pregnancies) and urban 
(8.1%) areas. Likewise, 25.2% of pregnancies in ru-
ral Upper Egypt were among adolescents, whereas 
8.4% of all pregnancies in the Urban Governorates 
were among adolescents. A quarter of pregnancies 
among respondents from the lowest wealth quintile 
(25.2%) were among respondents under the age 
of 18; this is three times higher than the percent of 
adolescent pregnancies among respondents from 
the highest wealth quintile (8.7%). 
Among ever-married female respondents who 
indicated that they had ever been pregnant, 86.2% 
reported ever having a live birth. The average 
number of live births among ever-married fe-
male respondents aged 13–35 was 2.4 (standard 
deviation ±1.2). A small percentage (4.3%) report-
ed ever having a stillbirth; stillbirths were most 
common in rural areas (5.0% of rural respondents 
who reported ever being pregnant indicated ever 
having a stillbirth) compared to those respondents 
from urban (3.0%) or informal urban (2.5%) areas. 
Furthermore, 11.7% of the respondents who had 
ever been married and pregnant indicated that 
they had ever had an abortion, either spontaneous 
or induced. Among all women who reported ever 
being pregnant, 2.0% indicated that they ever had 
an induced abortion (data not shown). 
More than four-fifths of respondents who indicated 
that they had ever experienced pregnancy reported 
that they sought out antenatal care during their 
last pregnancy (84.2%). When examined regionally 
there are a number of differences: respondents 
from the Frontier Governorates had the lowest 
percentage of reported antenatal care attendance 
(71.6%) compared to respondents from urban 
Upper Egypt, who had the highest reported rate 
of seeking antenatal care (91.6%). As expected, 
women from the highest wealth quintiles reported 
seeking antenatal care at higher rates (88.5%) than 
those from the lowest quintile (74.1%). Likewise, 
93.0% of female respondents with a university edu-
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cation or above sought antenatal care, compared to 
74.9% of their illiterate counterparts.
A large majority of women (83.1%) indicated  
that a doctor assisted in the delivery of their last 
pregnancy. With regard to place of delivery, half  
of respondents (49.6%) gave birth at a private  
facility, followed by 33.6% who gave birth at a  
public facility while 14.6% indicated that they gave 
birth at home. 
Just under a third of respondents (32.5%) indicat-
ed that their last delivery was by cesarean section. 
This rate of cesarean section in Egypt is twice as 
high as the 10-15% that is recommended by the 
World Health Organization (World Health Organi-
zation 1985). When examined regionally, half of 
respondents from the Urban Governorates reported 
cesarean delivery (49.9%), compared to respon-
dents from rural Upper Egypt who had the lowest 
percentage (26.5%). A slight increase has been 
noted in rates of C-section among young women 
15-29 between 2009 and 2014 (32.6% versus 34%, 
respectively) (data not shown). 
Contraception
All SYPE respondents aged 13–35, regardless 
of marital status, were asked if they knew of 
family planning methods that could delay 
or prevent pregnancy. Over half (61.5%) of 
respondents indicated that they did. Over two-
thirds (71.5%) of all female respondents knew of 
such methods, whereas slightly more than half 
of male respondents reported “yes” (52.0%) 
(Table A.2.10). Knowledge was highest among 
the oldest respondents (aged 30-35: 85.0%) and 
lowest among the youngest (aged 13–17: 34.8%). 
Regionally, respondents from rural Upper Egypt 
were most likely to have heard of contraceptive 
methods (67.6%) and those from urban Upper 
Egypt the least (54.5%). When disaggregated by 
education there was little variation. There was 
a steady increase in knowledge of methods as 
wealth quintile increased, although the difference 
between the lowest quintile and the highest 
was not large (59.0% compared to 65.4%, 
respectively). Lastly, when examined by marital 
status, married youth were twice as likely to know 
family planning methods as their unmarried 
counterparts (90.2% versus 45.2%, respectively) 
(data not shown). 
The most commonly identified contraceptive 
method among all SYPE respondents aged 13–35 
was oral contraceptive pills (OCPs), which 57.1% of 
respondents knew of. Intrauterine devices (IUDs) 
were the second most identified contraceptive 
method, with 50.3% of the sample reporting that 
they know of IUDs followed by injectables (42.7%), 
subdermal implants (10.4%) and condoms 
(9.3%). Overall, female respondents had more 
knowledge of contraceptive methods than their 
male counterparts with the exception of male 
condoms (Figure 2.12).
On sources of information about contraceptives, 
the most commonly cited source of was healthcare 
providers (33.2%), followed by radio and television 
(27.5%) (data not shown). 
FIGURE 2.12   Knowledge of selected family planning methods, by gender, 2014 (%) 
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In the final section of the health module, all ever-
married SYPE respondents were asked a series of 
questions about their or their spouse’s (in the case 
of young men) contraceptive use history. Over half 
of ever-married respondents aged 13-35 (57.9%) 
reported that they (or their spouse) had ever used 
a contraceptive method(s) to prevent or delay 
pregnancy. More female respondents (63.2%) than 
male respondents (46.5%) and more respondents 
from informal urban areas (63.5%) than those in 
urban (58.5%) and rural (56.9%) areas answered 
affirmatively (data not shown). 
It is noteworthy that more respondents in 2009 
(75.0%) indicated ever use of contraception. 
However, when a panel analysis was conducted to 
compare individual responses in the two survey 
rounds, it was found that 18.0% of participants who 
answered ‘yes’ to the question in 2009 answered 
‘no’ to the same question in 2014. This discrepancy 
could be a result of inaccurate memory or misun-
derstanding of the question on either round. 
Among currently married respondents aged 13–35, 
42.6% indicated that they (or their spouse) were 
currently using a contraceptive method. Current 
use is lowest among 13–17-year-old married youth 
(10.1%) and highest among 30–35-year-olds 
(50.9%). The most commonly reported contra-
ceptive method currently used among married 
respondents was the IUD (23.2%) followed by 
OCPs (14.2%) and injectable methods (6.8%). 
Other methods (rhythm, male condoms, implants, 
and female sterilization) were altogether used by 
less than 1.0% of respondents. Participants in the 
2009 survey were not asked about current use of 
contraception. 
Married SYPE respondents who indicated that 
they were not currently using any contraceptive 
method were asked whether they (or their spouse) 
would consider using a contraceptive method in the 
future. Over half (61.7%) of the respondents indi-
cated that they would, while the remaining (38.3%) 
replied “no.” When asked to choose any number 
of reasons for this decision, the most cited reason 
was “I want to have children” (73.6%) followed by 
“medical side effects” (15.5%).
2.11  Conclusion
The health module of SYPE of 2014 has shed light on 
a number of issues that warrant policymakers’ atten-
tion and prompt action. In addition, there have been 
some notable improvements between 2009 and 
2014. Security issues have taken their toll on young 
people, as more young people in 2014 felt unsafe on 
the street and on public transportation. Decreased 
presence of police on the streets along with inade-
quate law enforcement had a negative influence on 
young people’s personal safety. Today, fewer young 
people are using seatbelts when they drive or ride a 
car and more young people are carrying weapons. 
Overall, young women aged 15–29 are still exposed 
to sexual harassment on the street and on public 
transportation in 2014, albeit in smaller numbers 
than in 2009. However, it is alarming to see that 
the youngest subset of girls (aged 13–17) have 
been increasingly exposed to sexual harassment 
compared to 2009. Besides posing a violation of 
girls’ rights, sexual harassment may lead to further 
limitation of girls’ mobility and their participation in 
public domains. 
Eating habits of young people, coupled with lack 
of physical exercise, expose them to a number of 
health risks such as diabetes, hypertension, and 
obesity. Awareness-raising campaigns are needed 
to educate young people and their parents about 
the risks of excessive consumption of carbonated 
drinks and fast food. Limited engagement of young 
girls in physical activity may be due to reduced 
sense of safety on the street along with social 
norms that discourage girls from playing sports. 
Safe spaces (e.g., special hours at youth centers) 
need to be made available to enable young girls to 
play sports without fear of sexual harassment. 
Discussion of pubertal changes by parents has 
improved between 2009 and 2014 but continues to 
be low, especially for male youth. Parents, teachers, 
healthcare providers, and religious leaders need to 
engage in more open dialog with young people to 
educate them about reproductive health matters. 
In the absence of credible sources of information, 
young people may turn to their peers, the internet, 
or mass media which may not necessarily provide 
accurate information. 
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Young people, especially women, have limited 
knowledge about HIV or its modes of transmission. 
This knowledge has even declined between 2009 
and 2014. Also, stigma associated with the disease 
is alarmingly high with less than one in five young 
people willing to interact with someone living with 
HIV. With such low levels of information and high 
stigma associated with the disease, young people 
may not be able to protect themselves, their spous-
es, or future offspring against HIV infection. 
The prevalence of FGM/C continues to raise 
concerns, despite the fact that prevalence seems 
to have slightly declined between 2009 and 2014. 
The increase in the percentage of participants who 
refused to answer the question about their circum-
cision status in 2014 warrants further investigation 
as it could suggest ambivalence about the practice 
or fear of legal implications for themselves or their 
parents. The fact that six out of 10 young people 
believe the practice is necessary calls for interven-
tions that target young people (both male and fe-
male) early enough to help them question their own 
beliefs and misconceptions before they get married 
and subject their daughters to this practice. 
Although overall awareness of family planning 
methods is reasonably high, it is less so among male 
youth, younger age groups (13-17 years) and those 
who are not married. Also, contraceptive use among 
currently married young people is relatively even 
among the older age group 30-35 years old (50.9%) 
compared to 64.6% reported in the Egypt Demo-
graphic and Health Survey 2014. This may be due to 
the fact that SYPE 2014 includes both male and fe-
male respondents while EDHS only includes female 
respondents. Raising young people’s awareness of 
the benefits of family planning for themselves, their 
families, and communities should be a priority and 
should target both male and female youth. 
SYPE 2014 has shown a number of salient health 
needs among young people in Egypt. Addressing 
those health needs requires multisectorial inter-
ventions that involve government agencies, civil 
society, religious institutions, mass media, as well 
as parents. More importantly, those interventions 
should empower young people to be able to lead 
more healthy and productive lives. 
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Education plays a key role in shaping human 
development and the opportunities that are 
available to young people. The economic and 
social development of a country is shaped 
by the educational outcomes of its youth 
population. It is important to understand the 
key challenges facing the Egyptian education 
system and the potential policy mechanisms 
for addressing these challenges. 
3.1  Introduction
Egyptian youth are guaranteed a free education 
by the constitution. With the adoption of the 
January 2014 constitution, secondary education 
is becoming mandatory (Egypt State Information 
Service 2014), whereas previously only basic 
(primary and preparatory level) education was 
mandatory. Primary through higher education are 
provided free of charge; pre-primary education 
is not publicly provided for free (UNESCO 
International Bureau of Education 2006). The  
level of national expenditure on education has  
also been mandated in the constitution, at a 
minimum of 4% of the gross national product 
(GNP), to be gradually increased in line with the 
rise in global averages (Egypt State Information 
Service 2014). 
This chapter analyzes a number of aspects of the 
educational experiences of young people in Egypt, 
relying on the 2009 and 2014 rounds of the Survey 
of Young People in Egypt (SYPE). Because the 
youth in the 2014 round of the SYPE are older (aged 
13–35), comparisons across cohorts for youth who 
have completed school are now possible using the 
2014 SYPE. 
Although increasing numbers of youth have 
attended pre-primary kindergarten programs, 
most enter the Egyptian education system at the 
primary stage. On-time entry into primary school 
occurs at age six, and primary education consists 
of six grades.1 Upon completion of primary school, 
students are expected to proceed to preparatory 
education, starting at age 12, for an additional three 
years. At the end of preparatory school and based 
on their scores during the preparatory stage, stu-
dents are tracked into either general or vocational 
secondary education. 
The lower-score, less prestigious vocational sec-
ondary track is almost always a terminal degree, 
although a few students continue to two-year 
post-secondary institutes, or even more rarely, 
four-year higher institutes or university programs 
(Krafft, Elbadawy, and Assaad 2013). The general 
secondary track entails an implicit guarantee of 
continuing to university. Both secondary programs 
generally take three years, although there are some 
five-year vocational secondary degrees. At the end 
of general secondary, test scores as well as stu-
dents’ tracks within general secondary determine 
the form and specialization of higher education that 
students can then attend. A small minority of uni-
versity graduates will also continue for post-grad-
uate studies (masters degrees or PhDs). Some 
higher education specializations within the univer-
sity are also longer than the standard four years. 
Figure 3.1 shows the potential paths students might 
follow as they enter and then progress through the 
education system.
3.2  Educational attainment and 
school completion
Because the youth who participated in SYPE 2009 
are now older, it is possible to consider not only the 
educational attainment of those youth old enough 
to have definitively left the school system, but 
also to consider how educational attainment has 
evolved over time. Figure 3.2 presents educational 
attainment for youth aged 25 and older by gen-
der, comparing those youth 25–29 (the younger 
cohort) to those aged 30–35 (the older cohort) to 
1 At the time when most SYPE respondents were 
attending primary school, it had been reduced to five 
years and is treated as such in the analyses of years 
of schooling. The sixth year of primary education has 
subsequently been restored (Shahine 2003). 
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show how education has been evolving over time. 
Illiteracy has been dropping over time, from 9% 
among male youth aged 30–35 to 7% among male 
youth aged 25–29. The level of illiteracy is much 
higher among female youth but rapid progress has 
also occurred. While 24% of 30–35 year-old female 
youth were illiterate, illiteracy dropped to 18% 
among 25–29-year-old female youth. 
The share of youth with only a primary education 
ranges from 8% to 12% depending on gender or 
age group. For both male and female youth the 
share with only a primary education has been 
decreasing over time as educational attainment has 
been rising. While 9% of female youth in both age 
groups attained a preparatory education, with no 
change across cohorts, this share has shrunk from 
8% to 5% for male youth across cohorts. Since 
general secondary is rarely terminal, few youth end-
ed up with this degree, but a rising share of youth 
have a vocational secondary degree as their final 
attainment, with 43% of male youth aged 25–29 
and 37% of female youth aged 25–29 who attained 
a vocational secondary education. A small share 
(3–5% of youth across groups) received a two-
year post-secondary degree. The fastest growing 
category is university and above; while 22% of male 
youth aged 30–35 completed a university educa-
FIGURE 3.2 Educational attainment of youth aged 25 and older, by gender and age group (%), 2014
MALES FEMALES TOTAL
Age group
 
BASIC EDUCATION SECONDARY EDUCATION HIGHER EDUCATION
Primary Preparatory Vocational Post-secondary institute 
Grades 1–6 Grades 7–9   Grades 10–12
Usually terminal
 Two-year
Higher institute
Four-year
University
Four-year
   
General
Grades 10–12
 
 
 
(Ages 6–11) (Ages 12–14) (Ages 15–17) (Ages 18+)
FIGURE 3. 1 Structure
 
of
 
the
 
Egyptian
 
education
 
system, 2014
Note: Ages in parentheses are ideal, assuming on-time entry and no grade repetition.
0 10 20 30 40 50
23.5
18.4
3.0
1.7
9.3
8.3
8.8
8.5
1.6
2.1
35.7
37.0
2.8
3.2
15.3
20.9
0 10 20 30 40 50
16.6
12.8
2.3
1.1
10.7
9.1
8.4
6.8
1.7
2.3
38.1
40.1
3.5
3.9
18.7
24.0
30–35
25–29
University
and above
Postsecondary
institute
Vocational
secondary
General secondary
Preparatory
Primary
Can read
and write
Illiterate
0 10 20 30 40 50
8.8
7.4
1.7
0.5
12.1
9.9
8.1
5.1
1.9
2.5
40.9
43.2
4.2
4.6
22.4
26.9
34
PANEL SURVEY OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN EGYPT (SYPE) 2014
tion, 27% of male youth aged 25–29 did so. Female 
youth have also seen large gains, from 15% having 
completed a university education among those 
30–35 to 21% among those aged 25–29. 
To understand progress through each stage of 
schooling, this section analyzes a generous defi-
nition of “on-time” completion; that is, completing 
primary by age 13, completing preparatory by age 
16, completing secondary by age 19, and completing 
higher education by age 23. Completion is consid-
ered to be finishing in the typical number of years, so 
as not to penalize those in longer programs while still 
assessing the common pattern. Analyses by a num-
ber of background characteristics are presented in 
Table A3.1. Differential patterns of completion by 
region evolve somewhat with education level (Figure 
3.3). Urban Lower Egypt has the highest completion 
rates, particularly in preparatory and secondary; it is 
followed by the Urban Governorates, and then urban 
Upper Egypt. The Frontier Governorates have the 
lowest primary and preparatory completion rates, 
but did slightly better than rural Upper Egypt in 
secondary completion. The largest differentials were 
in university completion. Whereas 37% of youth in 
urban Lower Egypt and 34% in Urban Governorates 
completed university, only 19% in urban Upper 
Egypt, 16% in rural Lower Egypt, 15% in the Frontier 
Governorates, and 12% of those in rural Upper Egypt 
had completed a university education by age 23. 
3.3  Intergenerational educational 
mobility
Education can play an important role in society 
by providing socioeconomic mobility. When the 
education status of parents plays little or no role in 
determining children’s outcomes, this is a sign of 
socioeconomic mobility or equality of opportunity. 
This mobility is important from both a social 
justice perspective and for incentivizing efforts 
in school. Although the expansion of educational 
opportunities has meant that many youth are more 
educated than their parents were, there remains a 
clear hierarchy when examining youth’s educational 
attainment by father’s and mother’s education 
(Figure 3.4). The analysis of intergenerational 
mobility below focuses on youth 25 years or older, 
in order to ensure that youth have obtained their 
final educational status.2
Nearly one-fourth of the youth who had illiterate 
fathers were themselves illiterate, in contrast to 
2 Among this group of youth, mother’s education was as 
follows: 73% illiterate, 5% read and write, 8% primary, 
3% preparatory, 1% general secondary, 6% vocational 
secondary or post-secondary institutes, and 4% high-
er education. Father’s education was: 54% illiterate, 
13% read and write, 10% primary, 4% preparatory, 
1% general secondary, 11% vocational secondary or 
post-secondary institutes, and 7% higher education 
(data not shown). 
FIGURE 3.3 “On-time” school completion, by region, all youth (%), 2014 
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only 6% of those whose fathers can read and write, 
and low or near zero shares of those whose fathers 
have higher levels of education. Another quarter of 
youth with illiterate fathers have some type of basic 
education. Most of the remainder (38% of the total) 
attained a vocational secondary degree, whereas 
only 8% attended university. Very few youth moved 
from the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder into 
higher education. Youth from higher rungs of the 
socioeconomic ladder are decreasingly likely to 
have lower levels of education and more likely to 
have attended higher education. When fathers have 
higher education, there is an 81% chance that their 
children also attended university or above. 
FIGURE 3.4 Educational attainment of youth aged 25 and older, according to father’s and mother’s 
education, 2014 (%)
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Intergenerational differences are even sharper 
when looking at mother’s education; more edu-
cated mothers were relatively less common, and 
even having a mother with a vocational secondary 
education raised the chances of university to two-
thirds. Around 93% of youth who have mothers 
with higher education have themselves attained 
a university education. In contrast, only 12% of 
youth with illiterate mothers attended university 
and above. In summary, although there has been 
an expansion of education, youth from families with 
higher socioeconomic status (those with educated 
parents) have very high chances of themselves re-
ceiving a university education, whereas those with 
uneducated or low educated parents have much 
lower chances, a clear sign of low socioeconomic 
mobility in Egyptian society. 
3.4  Patterns of ever attending 
school 
The primary historical challenge for the Egyptian 
education system has been getting youth to attend 
school. Although only a small minority of recent 
cohorts of youth never entered school as of 2014, 
a substantial number of young people, particularly 
young women, have never been to school. This 
section examines the trends in who attended 
school and the reasons young people report for 
not having entered school, comparing youth from 
different backgrounds. 
Who attended school and who  
missed out?
The SYPE sample of youth ages 10–29 in 2009, 
who were aged 13–35 in 2014, were born over 
the period spanning from just before 1980 to just 
before 2000. This generation of youth experienced 
a shift from a substantial minority of youth (approx-
imately 20% of females and 10% of males) who 
never entered school, to nearly universal primary 
enrollment and gender parity (data not shown).
While less than 80% of female youth born in the 
1980s ever entered school, and only around 90% 
of male youth, by the end of the 1990s school entry 
rates were above 95% and approaching 100% for 
both genders. 
Rural youth, particularly rural female youth and 
those in Upper Egypt and the Frontier Governor-
ates, were particularly likely to have never attended 
school (Figure 3.5).3 While only 3–4% of youth in 
the Urban Governorates never attended school, 
with only a small gap between male (3%) and fe-
male youth (4%), across rural areas around 7–8% 
of male youth never attended school, and there is a 
large gender gap, with 13% of female youth having 
never attended in rural Lower Egypt and 23% in 
rural Upper Egypt. The highest rates of never at-
tendance were in the Frontier Governorates, where 
10% of male youth and 26% of female youth never 
attended school (Table A3.1).
In addition to large differences by region, there are 
substantial differences in terms of the chances 
of never attending school by parent’s education. 
Essentially, having an educated mother, even one 
who can just read and write but did not complete 
any formal certificate, almost guaranteed that a 
youth attended school, with a particularly large 
difference for female youth; 10% of male youth 
with uneducated (illiterate) mothers never at-
tended school, compared to 21% of female youth. 
Having a father with at least some education also 
3 Region and place of residence are considered current 
residence, not necessarily the location where the ed-
ucational experience in question took place. Analyses 
indicate that few SYPE respondents had moved from 
where they were born, making the current location 
essentially representative of the location of individu-
als’ education experiences.
FIGURE 3.5 Youth who never attended school, 
by region and gender (%), 2014
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increased the chances of attending school (see 
Table A3.2). 
A relatively small share of recent cohorts never 
attended school, but among poorer families even 
younger youth had a moderate chance of never 
attending school. For youth under age 18, Figure 
3.6 presents the percentage of male and female 
youth in each wealth quintile that never attend-
ed school. Notably, it is the poorest male youth 
who did not attend school (9%), and this is the 
group with the largest gender gap, albeit a reverse 
gender gap (only 6% of the poorest female youth 
never attended school). Around 6% of male youth 
and 4% of female youth in the second wealth 
quintile never attended school. Rates of never 
attendance become small (1% or below) by the 
highest quintile. 
Why did some youth never attend 
school?
A variety of barriers might preclude youth from 
attending school. Both supply factors, such as the 
availability of schools, and demand factors, such as 
parents’ interest in education, could be contributing 
factors. Table 3.1 highlights (using 2009 data, 
since this was only asked in 2009) the different 
reasons youth aged 10–14 reported for having 
never attended school. This young cohort is likely to 
be most reflective of the current challenges youth 
face for not going to school. Table A3.3 presents the 
reasons by a host of background characteristics, 
including across cohorts, and some key findings of 
that table are also discussed here. The household 
being unable to afford education is the number 
one reason youth did not attend (a reason given by 
43% of those aged 10–14 in 2009). As the share of 
youth never attending education has decreased, 
this reason has increased in prevalence, as has the 
share of youth giving health as a reason. Financial 
support for the poorest families to send their 
children to school, for instance conditional cash 
transfers, might help reduce never attendance 
FIGURE 3.6 Youth under age 18 who never 
attended school, by household wealth quintile 
and gender, 2014 (%)
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TABLE 3.1 Reasons reported for never 
attending school, youth aged 10–14, 2009 (%)
Household can’t afford 42.9
Parents didn’t want 27.8
Health 19.2
I had to work 8.1
Customs and traditions 8.1
I didn’t want to learn 5.7
Father wouldn’t agree 5.2
To help with household chores 2.5
Helping family at work 2.4
School is too far 1.9
There was no school 1.0
No birth certificate 1.0
Too old  0.0
All teachers male 0.0
Marriage 0.0
Note: Does not total to 100 because multiple reasons could be 
reported by the same individual.
The inability of the 
household to afford 
education is the number 
one reason that the 
youngest out-of-school 
youth gave when asked why 
they did not attend school.
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due to financial reasons. Improving accessibility of 
schools to youth with health conditions is also of 
increasing importance. 
Parents not wanting to send children to school 
remained a barrier for 28% of the youngest youth. 
Father wouldn’t agree and “customs and traditions” 
have also been decreasing, although were still con-
tributing factors. The fourth most common reason 
was having to work, and helping the family in work 
and helping with household chores were also some-
times contributing factors. School supply is not a 
major factor; there was no school and school was 
too far were only occasionally reported to be the 
reason for nonattendance. The reason “I didn’t want 
to learn” has also fallen over time, which may reflect 
a perceived increase in the necessity or value of 
education. Marriage, age, and teacher gender were 
not stated as factors more than a few times. 
There are substantial gender differences in the  
reasons given for never attending school, with 
female youth particularly limited by parents’  
wishes and by customs and traditions. Male youth 
were more likely not to attend due to the need to 
work, not wanting to learn, or health. Cost, parental 
wishes, and the need to help at home dispropor-
tionately affect poorer youth. Youth in the bottom 
three wealth quintiles were also more likely to 
report multiple reasons, suggesting that multiple 
barriers may need to be addressed to get poorer 
youth into school. 
3.5  Youth experiences with 
literacy classes 
Youth illiteracy remains a substantial problem in 
Egypt, with two important components. First, many 
youth who never attended school are illiterate, and 
few have attended literacy courses or otherwise 
learned the basic literacy and numeracy skills that 
would open up important economic and social 
opportunities to them. Second, many youth who 
attended school for less than a primary education 
are not literate; around 50% of youth who attained 
only five years of school cannot read, 50% cannot 
write, and 40% cannot do basic math (addition or 
subtraction) (Figure 3.7). Since youth may drop out 
of school due to their struggles with the material, 
this does not necessarily mean that half of youth 
approaching the end of primary are illiterate, but 
it is a troubling sign in terms of the quality of the 
school system. 
It is also notable that only 14% of youth with no 
schooling ever attended literacy classes. Nine-
ty-two percent of youth who never attended school 
cannot read, 93% cannot write, and 70% cannot 
do basic math. The higher proficiency in basic 
math may be attributable to the fact that it is more 
likely to be picked up in every day life (i.e., selling or 
buying goods, counting objects) than are reading 
or writing. Relatively few of those who attend-
ed school but had only a few years of education 
(and are therefore likely to be illiterate) attended 
literacy classes; 10–13% of those with 2–4 years of 
school attended. This group may perceive literacy 
as more achievable, having attended a couple of 
years of school already. Table A3.4 presents the 
patterns of literacy classes and literacy outcomes 
by background characteristics. Notably, the share 
of the less educated receiving literacy classes does 
not vary substantially by region, although levels of 
illiteracy do vary. 
FIGURE 3.7 Literacy outcomes and literacy 
class attendance by years of school completed, 
for youth with less than a secondary education 
(%), 2014
Note: Based on years attended, taking into account that some 
youth attended five-year primary and some youth attended 
six-year primary.
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Among youth who did attend literacy classes, 
many remain illiterate. Additional analyses demon-
strated that around half (51%) of those who 
attained less than a secondary education and ever 
attended literacy classes can read, and half (49%) 
can write. Around two-thirds (65%) can do basic 
arithmetic. It is important to keep in mind that 
some of the youth who attended literacy classes 
likely picked up some of their skills outside of 
literacy classes. Therefore, that only half of those 
who attend literacy classes were literate suggests 
that less than half of youth who attended literacy 
classes in fact became literate as a result of the 
classes (data not shown). 
3.6  When do students exit 
school?
Once they have entered the education system, 
male and female youth showed relatively similar 
progress through years of schooling. Figure 3.8 
shows the proportion of youth remaining in school 
at each year among those who ever entered.4 
The youth who did not remain in school may have 
exited because they have dropped out, failed out 
during a particular year or level, or completed the 
course of their schooling (for instance, stopping 
after completing a vocational secondary degree). 
Male youth were slightly more likely to continue 
to secondary (around eight years)5 than female 
youth, but female youth catch up in continuing 
to higher education after 11 years of schooling, 
and were actually slightly more likely to pursue 
post-graduate studies. 
Not only has entry into school been improving 
over time, but persistence in school has improved 
(i.e., the dropout rate has decreased). Figure 3.9a 
4 Because there are a number of current students in the 
SYPE data, survival analysis methods were used to 
account for the “right-censored” current students, so 
as to not count their current attainment as final, but to 
take into account that they have advanced at least to 
their current level. 
5  In order to have the ends of levels at the same point 
for those who attended both five- and six-year prima-
ry, primary is always treated as five years for those 
who continued beyond that point. 
FIGURE 3.8 Proportion of students remaining 
in school, according to years in school, by 
gender, 2014
Note: Estimated using Kaplan-Meier method to account 
for right censoring (current students).
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shows persistence in school by birth cohort. From 
the oldest generation (born in 1978–82) to the 
youngest (born in 1993–99) there have been clear 
improvements, but it is also clear that students 
continue to drop out at each year of basic and 
secondary education, as well as during transitions 
from one stage to the next. There has also been 
very little change in continuing to secondary 
education among the past few cohorts, and most 
of the decline in basic education drop out occurred 
in the primary stage. The chances of continuing 
to higher education have, however, been steadily 
increasing over time, with around 40% of those 
who went to school continuing for some form of 
higher education. 
Depending on where they lived, youth who attend-
ed school faced different chances of continuing to 
higher levels of education (Figure 3.9b). Not only 
did youth in rural Upper Egypt face a lower chance 
of ever entering school, among those who did 
attend school more dropped out both during the 
course of a stage, and more stopped rather than 
continuing to the next level of schooling. Youth in 
urban Lower Egypt had the greatest persistence in 
school at every level, although the Urban Gover-
norates catch up somewhat in the share—nearly 
50% of those who enter school—continuing to 
higher education. 
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The largest differences in the chances of dropping 
out come from comparing youth in terms of their 
father’s education (Figure 3.9c). Youth with edu-
cated fathers, particularly those with higher- or 
secondary-educated fathers, were highly unlikely to 
drop out through at least the end of secondary, and 
a majority continued for higher education. Those 
with illiterate fathers were the most likely to drop 
out at the end of each level, and were also, unlike 
those with fathers with higher education, likely to 
drop out in intervening years. Having a father who 
can simply read and write but has no formal certif-
icate was associated with a substantial decrease 
in the chances of drop out. Overall, youth face very 
different chances of progressing through the school 
system or dropping out depending on their father’s 
education, which likely represents their families’ 
socioeconomic status and the parental resources 
that can support education. 
Students in the SYPE sample who were no 
longer in school were asked why they left school. 
Selected (more common) reasons are broken 
down by background characteristics in Table A3.5. 
Notably, the most common reason given was 
having finished with one’s studies (70%). This was 
followed by not wanting to finish (13%), school 
fees (5%), having to work (4%), and not doing well 
in school (3%). Those who left having attended at 
most primary or preparatory were unlikely to state 
that they had finished their studies. School fees, 
having to work, not wanting to finish school, and 
not doing well in school particularly contributed to 
those dropping out early. 
3.7  Who are the youth currently 
in school?
A number of the analyses in the following section 
(and throughout the remainder of the chapter) 
rely on the samples of youth who were currently in 
school at the time of the SYPE survey. This section 
briefly summarizes the distribution of current stu-
dents in the SYPE sample. Detailed information is 
available in Table A3.6. Overall, 27% of youth in the 
2014 sample were current students. 
FIGURE 3.9 Proportion of students remaining 
in school, according to years in school, by cohort, 
region, and father’s education, 2014
Note: Estimated using Kaplan-Meier method to account for 
right censoring (current students).
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Table 3.2 shows the distribution of levels by 
gender. Around 18–19% of youth who were current 
students were in preparatory. Although half of 
both male and female students were in secondary, 
male students were more likely to be in vocational 
secondary (31%) than female youth (24%). In 
contrast 22% of male current students were in 
general secondary and 28% of female current 
students in general secondary. This was in fact 
driven by a larger share of vocational secondary 
students being male and general secondary 
students being female, and suggests that in the 
future female youth might exceed male youth in 
their share of university students. 
3.8  Struggles in school
This section examines two key issues within the 
education system that are likely to be important 
for the success of students, and that are indicators 
of the success of the school system in providing a 
quality education. First, absenteeism, or missing 
one or more days of school, and the reasons for 
absences are investigated. When students miss 
school, they learn less and may be unable to 
catch up to lost material, putting their educational 
progress at risk. Students may also decide to be 
absent if they perceive school not to be worthwhile. 
Second, this section examines repetition during 
the course of schooling. Students repeat a grade 
when they are unable to master the year’s material, 
which is symptomatic of quality and inefficiency 
problems in the school system. 
Absenteeism
Overall, 61% of students were absent one or more 
days during the semester. The average number 
of days absent (among students who were ab-
sent) was 9. Table A3.7 presents the percentage 
of students absent, the mean days absent, and 
reasons for absence by background character-
istics.6 Illness was the most common reason for 
absence (52%). The second most common reason 
for absence was that students do not perceive 
benefit from school (28%), followed by studying 
(22%), working or helping with the family (7%), 
and helping with housework (6%). These reasons, 
along with private tutoring during the school day 
(5%), demonstrate that absence is driven by 
low (perceived) value of attending school. When 
students miss school to study outside of school, 
this suggests that the value of education in school 
is subpar. Family reasons and distance to school 
contributed to some absences, but problems at 
6 Absenteeism levels should be taken with caution 
due to the different timing when the SYPE 2014 was 
administered in each region as highlighted in Chapter 
1 of this report. However, as shown in Table A3.7, varia-
tions by region of residence do not seem to be caused 
by the timing of data collection. Although SYPE was 
administered in the Frontier Governorates near the 
end of the 2014 school year, young people living in 
these governorates were slightly less likely to report 
being absent. The frequency of reporting absenteeism 
is actually lower in these governorates than in the Ur-
ban Governorates where the survey was first adminis-
tered (early to midway through the 2014 school year).
TABLE 3.2 Distribution of current students by 
education level and gender (%), 2014
 MALE FEMALE
Current primary 0.6 0.2
Preparatory 18.7 18.4
General secondary 21.8 28.4
Vocational secondary 31.0 23.9
Post-secondary institute 1.8 2.0
University and above 26.2 27.1
Total 100.0 100.0
Forty percent of students 
said that their teachers 
always want students to 
memorize information; only 
11% said they are always 
encouraged to form their 
own point of view.
42
PANEL SURVEY OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN EGYPT (SYPE) 2014
school were only rarely reasons for absence. Not 
benefiting from school was a particularly common 
reason at the secondary level, while studying and 
especially private tutoring were particularly prev-
alent at the general secondary level, when high-
stakes exams determine the track of university 
into which students can place.
Grade repetition
Grade repetition is common in Egypt, particularly 
at the preparatory and university levels. While  
3% of those who attended school reported 
repeating in primary and 6% during preparatory, 
this dropped to 4% in secondary before rising to 
7% at the university level (rates and breakdown  
by background characteristics are shown in  
Table A3.8). There were differential rates of 
repetition by gender. Male youth were more likely 
to repeat than female youth, and this difference 
increased throughout the schooling system. 
Although female youth have historically had less 
access to school, they have greater success in 
progressing through the schooling system. Rural 
youth and those with less educated parents were 
particularly likely to repeat, suggesting that these 
groups struggled to succeed in school and may 
require additional support. 
3.9  School quality
School quality is a complex and multi-dimensional 
concept; there are a variety of ways to measure 
school quality, such as in terms of inputs (such as 
class sizes), outcomes (such as learning or test 
scores), or opinions (youth satisfaction with their 
schooling). This section examines just a few mea-
sures of the many possible dimensions of quality. 
First, student opinions about their school experi-
ences are examined, and second, school facility 
quality (as reported by students) is examined. 
Student opinions about educational 
experiences
Youth who had ever been to school (or were 
current students) were asked their opinions about 
a number of different statements, in terms of 
whether the statement, in the youth’s opinion, 
occurred never, sometimes, or always in their 
school. The results show a variation in student 
opinions. For instance, only 22% of students 
believed the rules were applied equally to all, 
and 25% thought this was never true. A similar 
distribution occurred for equal treatment of boys 
and girls. Only 24% of youth said that teachers 
never used corporal punishment (Figure 3.10). 
By far the strongest opinions were on the topic of 
memorization; 40% of students said that teachers 
always want students to memorize information, 
and only 13% said this was never true. Rote mem-
orization has been identified as a serious problem 
with education quality (and the productivity of 
education in the labor market) in the region (World 
Bank 2008, 2013). Critical thinking was not en-
couraged. Only 11% of students said students are 
always encouraged to form their own point of view, 
and 31% said this was never the case. Overall, as 
well as negative experiences such as unequal treat-
ment of students and use of corporal punishment, 
students’ opinions suggest that rote memorization 
is the norm and critical thinking is rare. Students 
who dropped out before entering preparatory 
school had more negative opinions about their 
school experiences than those who stayed longer 
in school. Comparisons with student opinions in 
2009 suggest that these issues have been per-
sistent challenges in the education system. 
School facilities
Current students were also asked a number of 
questions about school facilities. One important 
measure is the use of multiple shifts (a morning 
shift and an afternoon shift, for instance), which 
is likely to contribute to less learning (a shorter 
school day) as well as to indicate overcrowding. 
All youth who ever attended a level were asked 
whether their school operated in shifts. Additional-
ly, current students were asked about the physical 
conditions of their school facilities. Table A3.9 pres-
ents these indicators by a number of background 
characteristics. In Figure 3.11, these outcomes 
are presented by place of residence. Geographic 
differences were substantial, and likely indicate 
unequal investments or upkeep of schools across 
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FIGURE 3.11 School facility quality measures by place of residence, 2014 (%)
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FIGURE 3.10 Opinions of students who ever attended school about school experiences, 2014 (%)
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different areas of Egypt. Multiple shift schools at 
the primary stage were most common in urban 
areas, followed by rural areas and informal urban 
areas. At the preparatory and secondary stages, 
these problems were most common in rural areas, 
followed by urban and then informal urban areas. 
Problems with physical facilities were also common, 
and comparisons with 2009 responses show that 
there has been little improvement in the facilities 
students experience. (Comparisons were undertak-
en by school level to ensure that the composition of 
students did not drive results). If anything, students 
reported that physical facilities were in worse condi-
tion in 2014. In 2014, 36% of students reported that 
seats are broken, 27% reported crowding of seats 
and benches, 24% reported inadequate lighting, 
27% reported that the board is in poor condition or 
illegible, 32% reported broken windows, and 22% 
reported inadequate ventilation. 
Although these findings suggest that a substantial 
share (but not a majority) of facilities were in a poor 
state, there were substantial differences in the state 
of facilities by place of residence. Problems with 
seating were most prevalent in rural areas, while 
inadequate lighting, illegible boards, and broken 
windows were most prevalent in informal urban 
areas, where 35–40% of students reported these 
problems. Urban areas had better facilities, with 
the lowest rates of problems reported. Compar-
ing 2009 and 2014, along with little improvement 
occurring in the facilities students experience, 
disparities have widened among urban areas, rural 
areas, and informal urban areas. 
3.10  Tutoring and family help 
during school
The quantity and quality of education received in 
the classroom ought to be sufficient for students to 
succeed or excel in school. However, in Egypt, this 
may not be the case. Private and group tutoring 
are common, and may be a key component of good 
performance on high-stakes exams. This tutoring 
is expensive and, when undertaken by teachers, 
creates an incentive problem for educators, who 
may not adequately cover material in class in order 
to earn extra income providing tutoring (Assaad 
and Krafft, 2015; Elbadawy et al. 2009; Ille 2015). 
In the face of inadequate school quality, families 
may also help children with schoolwork, which can 
potentially contribute to inequality because the 
amount of help is dependent on the resources and 
education of parents. 
Private and group tutoring
In Egypt, there are two types of tutoring: private 
lessons and support (help) groups or programs. Fig-
ure 3.12 presents the percentage of youth who took 
private lessons, support programs in school, and 
FIGURE 3.12 Students’ use of private lessons 
and support programs, by level, ages <18 and 
30+, 2014 (%),
Note: Based on youth who ever attended the level  
indicated.
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support programs out of school, or none of these, at 
each level of school. Note that some students took 
multiple forms of private tutoring. Breakdowns by 
a number of characteristics are reported in Table 
A3.10. The figure compares youth age 18 and under 
to those age 30 and above to get a sense of trends 
in private tutoring over time. The prevalence of pri-
vate tutoring was higher, and the share of youth with 
no help was lower, at every level among the younger 
age group. Use of private lessons during prima-
ry has risen from 16% to 25%. Preparatory-level 
private lessons have risen from 31% to 41%, and 
secondary lessons from 32% to 42%. At the same 
time, support programs have remained relatively 
flat overall, with support programs out of school 
having grown, particularly at the preparatory and 
secondary levels, while those in school have fallen. 
The use of private lessons is closely linked to 
families’ socioeconomic background. Youth with 
more educated parents were more likely to receive 
tutoring. Wealthier students were more likely to 
receive tutoring, particularly private tutoring, and 
have higher expenditures when they do (Figure 3.13, 
further breakdown in Table A3.11). While only 25% of 
current students from the poorest quintile received 
private tutoring and 10% received group tutoring, 
50% of current students from the highest quintile 
received private tutoring and 17% group tutoring. 
The average monthly cost of tutoring for those who 
did receive it was doubled for the highest quintile 
compared to the poorest, with the wealthiest having 
spent on average 414 EGP per month on private 
tutoring and 248 EGP per month on group tutoring. 
Among students taking private tutoring, 54% took 
lessons with a school teacher. The primary reason 
stated for doing so was that the teacher was a good 
teacher (74%), followed by this being the teacher 
the student knows (15%), preferring to take tutor-
ing with the teacher who writes the exam (7%), the 
teacher imposing it (3%), or other reasons (1%) 
(data not shown). Although incentive problems in 
terms of teachers not providing adequate educa-
tion within school may be an issue, students did not 
usually perceive themselves as coerced into taking 
tutoring with their teachers. It is important to note 
that students may not be willing to report coercion 
even if they experience it.
FIGURE 3.13 Use and average monthly cost of 
private and group tutoring for current students 
in secondary or below, by wealth quintile, 2014
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Family help
Students’ chances of receiving help from their 
families also rise with their families’ wealth (and 
education), compounding the disadvantages faced 
by students from less wealthy families. Figure 
3.14 shows the proportion of youth who received 
help with school work from family, and, of those, 
the (possibly multiple) sources of help (further 
breakdown in Table A3.12). While just 7% of youth 
from the poorest families received help with school 
work, 26% of youth from the richest families did so. 
Those receiving help were increasingly likely to re-
ceive assistance from their mother or father with in-
creasing wealth, but poorer students who received 
help were more likely to get help from older siblings 
or other sources, which may reflect the fact that 
their parents were less likely to be educated and 
therefore able to provide help with schoolwork. 
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Early childhood care and education
Early childhood is the most important phase for 
human development. When children attend early 
childhood care or education (ECCE), it can help 
them do better in subsequent schooling and earn 
higher wages later in life (UNESCO 2006). ECCE 
can also help reduce the achievement gaps between 
children in the lowest and highest wealth quintiles, 
and inequality in later outcomes (Checchi and van 
de Werfhorst 2014; Jung and Hasan 2014).However, 
in Egypt, although ECCE has expanded over time, 
from 16% of those now age 30 and above to 35% of 
those youth now under 18, it is the children living in 
Urban Governorates who most likely attended ECCE 
(Table A3.13). Figure 3.15 shows the percentage of 
children who attended each type of ECCE (children 
could attend multiple types, or might attend none), 
by region and by mother’s education. Approximately 
58% of youth attended ECCE in the Urban Gover-
norates, with 32% attending nursery and 28% at-
tending kindergarten. In contrast, just 31% of youth 
in urban Lower Egypt attended ECCE, and 20% or 
less in all other regions.7 Additionally, only 5–14% of 
youth attended kindergartens outside of the Urban 
Governorates, which may be related to differential 
public (as well as private) supply (El-Kogali and 
Krafft 2015; World Bank 2002).
7 In the 2014 round, youth who never went to school 
were not asked about their ECCE. Evidence from the 
2009 round indicates that very few youth who never 
went to school attended ECCE (Krafft 2015).
FIGURE 3.14 Among current students in secondary school, those who received help with 
schoolwork and the source of that help, by wealth quintile, 2014 (%)
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It is primarily the children of educated parents (who 
are likely also wealthier) who attended ECCE. While 
only 12% of youth with illiterate mothers attend-
ed ECCE (7% in nurseries, 4% in kindergartens), 
69% of those with mothers with higher education 
attended ECCE, with 21% going to nurseries and 
51% to kindergartens. This unequal preparation for 
school—including unequal public investments—
is sure to contribute to subsequent inequality 
throughout the education system. 
Vocational secondary education
A vocational secondary degree is the most common 
educational attainment among youth, with more 
than a third of youth (39%) having attained this 
degree (Figure 3.2). The characteristics of vocation-
al secondary education are therefore of particular 
importance to youth and the Egyptian economy. Vo-
cational secondary education is the track to which 
lower-scoring students are relegated after the 
preparatory level. It has historically expanded in line 
with the supply of students rather than the demand 
for skills. Furthermore, the training, despite being 
named as vocational, does not necessarily provide 
students with skills that are relevant or up-to-date 
for the labor market (Krafft 2013; UNDP and Insti-
tute of National Planning 2010; World Bank 2007). 
Figure 3.16 describes the specializations of youth 
who attended vocational secondary, and also their 
experiences during vocational secondary, compar-
ing age groups (and thus trends over time). Further 
breakdowns are presented in Table A3.14. 
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There has been little change over time in the 
specializations of youth within vocational 
secondary, with 46% of all attendees specialized in 
the industrial track, 40% in the commercial track, 
11% in the agricultural track, and 3% in other 
tracks (including nursing and tourism). The lack of 
change in the distribution of specializations may 
indicate that the training supplied by vocational 
secondary is not responsive to labor demand. 
There has also been very little change across 
cohorts in whether students experience hands-
on training, with 48% of all age groups having 
experienced hands on training. The reported 
labor-market relevance of the hands-on training 
that youth receive has increased over time; among 
those 30 and above 47% of youth receiving hands-
A vocational secondary degree 
is the most common degree 
obtained by youth in Egypt. 
Improvements in vocational 
secondary education are 
necessary to increase the 
labor market relevance of this 
type of education.
FIGURE 3.15 Attendance in early childhood 
care and education, by region and mother’s 
education, 2014 (%)
Notes: “Attended other” accounted for 1% or less. 
Based on all youth, but assuming that those who never 
went to school did not attend ECCE. Children could attend 
multiple types of ECCE. 
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TABLE 3.3 Characteristics of and youth’s 
experiences with higher education (%), 2014
Attended institution in same city where  
family lives 66.4
Had a choice in which institution to attend 53.6
Professor discussed topics related to field 43.4
Professor discussed career options 37.2
Professor was respectful with students 68.4
Institution offered job-skills or  
employment workshops related to field 36.4
Felt that higher education prepared them  
for the labor market 81.4
Note: Based on youth who ever attended higher education.
on experience reported that it was relevant, rising 
to 63% of youth under 18 reporting the same. 
However, it may be that younger youth have not 
had jobs yet and are optimistic but uninformed 
as to the labor market relevance of their training. 
The Egyptian program to enhance vocational 
training has expanded somewhat over time as well, 
from 16% of those 30 and above to 20% of those 
under 18. Overall, there have been at best small 
improvements in the labor-market relevance of 
vocational secondary education over time. 
Higher education
Around one-fifth of Egyptian youth age 25 and 
older have a higher education degree (Figure 
3.2). This section examines a number of issues 
specific to higher education in Egypt. Ideally, 
higher education would help support a knowledge 
economy and develop skilled workers prepared 
for the labor market. Table 3.3 shows the 
characteristics of and youth’s experiences with 
higher education. Notably, 66% of youth attended 
higher education in the same city as their family 
(61% of male youth and 72% of female youth), 
suggesting that access to higher education was 
often linked to city of residence. Youth may have 
limited geographic choices, and also may not be 
able to choose their institution due to their test 
scores; only 54% of youth chose their institution, 
whereas the rest were limited by their test scores. 
Within higher education, students’ experiences 
were mixed. Less than half (43%) reported that 
professors engage students in discussions of topics 
related to the material. Only one-third reported 
that professors discuss career options (37%) or 
that institutions offer job-skills or employment 
workshops relevant to their field (36%). Professors 
were described as respectful with students by two-
thirds (68%) of students. Despite the mixed quality 
of experiences in school, most students (81%) 
believed that higher education prepared them for 
the labor market. 
3.11  Conclusion
Egypt has made enormous progress over the 
past several decades in ensuring that youth enter 
school. Primary entry is now nearly universal, al-
though there remains a small group of mainly poor 
youth from less educated families who still do not 
enter school. Increasingly, the challenge for Egypt 
is going to be ensuring that children succeed and 
learn in school. 
The findings of this chapter suggest that Egypt 
has a long way to go before ensuring a high-quality 
education for all children. Problems with pedagogy, 
which emphasizes rote memorization rather than 
critical thinking, are one key quality issue. The rel-
evance of education to the labor market is limited, 
with particular problems in vocational secondary 
education. The state of physical facilities is also a 
quality issue in Egypt. These and other factors likely 
contribute to Egypt’s poor performance on interna-
tional competitiveness assessments; for instance, 
in survey of business professionals, the country 
ranked 141 out of 144 in terms of the quality of 
basic education (Schwab 2014). The low quality of 
education in schools may contribute to the need for 
additional tutoring and family help, factors which 
also contribute to the many unequal opportunities 
different youth face in school. 
Ideally, the education system is an institution that 
provides students with equal chances for success. 
However, youth have both different experiences 
in the education system and different educational 
outcomes depending on circumstances beyond 
their control. Youth face unequal chances for 
school access and success depending on their 
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backgrounds; gender, region of residence, 
parental education, and household resources 
all shape the educational experiences of youth. 
Parents’ education is strongly predicative of their 
children’s outcomes, limiting the role of education 
in socioeconomic mobility. Thus, the education 
system, which ideally provides equal opportunities 
for all youth, is falling short of this goal. 
A number of reforms might help address the 
challenges facing the Egyptian education system. 
Bringing additional resources into the education 
system may help, but the resources need to be 
carefully deployed. The mandate of the January 
2014 constitution that education spending be 
4% of gross national product (GNP) (Egypt State 
Information Service 2014) provides a unique 
opportunity to craft a number of carefully targeted 
initiatives. For instance, there is very unequal ac-
cess to kindergartens, and government investment 
in pre-primary education could help children enter 
school on more equal footing, as well as be better 
able to succeed and persist in school (Krafft 2015). 
The substantial problems with pedagogy in the 
schools, as demonstrated directly by students’ 
reports of rote memorization and little critical 
thinking, as well as indirectly by absenteeism 
in order to study or due to not benefiting from 
school, are more challenging to redress. These 
problems are tied into a system of high-stakes 
testing, and revamping testing to better value 
critical thinking and other broadly applicable 
skills rather than a certain set of facts might 
help address both the quality of pedagogy and 
some of the issues related to private tutoring and 
inequality. Initiating such a change will also require 
retraining of current teachers and changing how 
future teachers are trained. 
The future of Egypt’s young people, and the social 
and economic development of the country as a 
whole, depend on expanding on Egypt’s successes 
within education, and also addressing the large 
number of challenges, particularly in terms of 
quality and inequality, that persist within the 
school system. 
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The difficult labor market conditions  
following the January 25, 2011 revolution in 
Egypt have been widely documented in the 
media, but there are limited data to measure 
the actual impact of post-revolutionary 
economic conditions on young people. It is 
vital to document the short-term adjustments 
of the Egyptian labor market at this critical 
time and their implications for youth labor 
market outcomes. 
This chapter uses the updated SYPE employment 
module to provide a detailed analysis of the 
impact of post-revolutionary economic shocks 
on the employment and unemployment situation 
of youth in Egypt, as well as how the revolution 
has affected job regularity and formality status 
among young workers. We focus on the market 
definition of the labor force, which encompasses 
all individuals engaged in economic activity for the 
purposes of market exchange or who are seeking 
such work. We also use the standard International 
Labour Office (ILO) definition of unemployment, 
which defines as unemployed all those who have 
not worked or been attached to a job during the 
week prior to the survey interview, who were 
willing and available for work, and were actively 
searching for work.
4.2  Labor force participation
According to the SYPE 2014 results, the overall 
labor force participation of youth aged 15–29 
decreased slightly from 37.9% in 2009 to 36.6% 
in 2014. We find a slightly smaller percentage of 
male youth (61.4% in 2009 vs. 57.8% in 2014) now 
participating in the labor force, whereas the rate 
among female youth remains similar to the 2009 
figure (13.4% in 2009 vs. 13.3 in 2014). Total labor 
force participation was only slightly higher among 
the full 2014 sample of SYPE respondents of work-
ing age (15–35), at 40%. Also, slightly higher levels 
were observed for both male (63.7%) and female 
youth (14.9%) when including young people aged 
30–35 in the overall labor force participation rate 
(data not shown). 
Since many youth are still studying, below we focus 
on the group of young people who had completed 
their education by 2014. Surprisingly, a similar 
decline in total labor force participation was also 
observed among nonstudents aged 15–29 (from 
51.7% in 2009 to 49.6% in 2014). Labor force par-
ticipation declined from 86.4% in 2009 to 79.4% 
in 2014 among nonstudent male youth, and stayed 
around the 2009 level (18%) among nonstudent 
female youth in 2014. 
4.1  Introduction
Historical international evidence has shown that 
several factors may determine the labor market 
effects of an economic downturn. Among those 
factors are the magnitude of the economic con-
traction, the role of existing labor market institu-
tions, and the nature of the policy response (Verick 
2010). Gender- and age-specific consequences 
of economic shocks might also be observed for 
women and youth, particularly in poor countries. 
During a recession, women may be simultaneously 
observed to increase their labor force participation 
(the added-worker effect) or to withdraw from 
the labor force (the discouraged-worker effect). 
The added-worker effect is often observed among 
middle-aged, married, and less educated women 
from poor households, who enter the labor force 
to maintain household income. The discour-
aged-worker effect primarily occurs among young, 
highly educated, single women working in the 
service sector (World Bank 2009; Roushdy and 
Gadallah 2012).1
1 For instance, during the Latin America debt crisis 
of the early 1980s and late 1990s, women’s labor 
force participation increased in Peru, Costa Rica, and 
Argentina (see Cerutti 2000; Francke 1992; Leslie, 
Lycette, and Buvinic 1988). However, during the 1997 
financial crisis in South Korea, young women working 
in clerical and service sectors were observed with-
drawing from the labor market more than men (see 
Kim and Voos 2007). 
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Nonstudent youth labor force participation rates 
for 2009 and 2014 are shown in Table 4.1. The 
decline in male labor force participation was 
cutting across all education levels, except among 
general secondary school graduates. In contrast, 
female labor force participation increased among 
illiterates, and primary, general secondary, and 
post-secondary school graduates. In 2014, 
male participation was highest among primary 
and preparatory school graduates, and lowest 
among those with university education and the 
illiterate group. For female youth, participation 
was highest among post-secondary school and 
university graduates and lowest among those with 
preparatory education and the illiterate group. 
As expected, the observed decline in young 
men’s labor force participation was driven by the 
never-married population. Never-married male 
youth experienced about an 11 percentage point 
decline in their labor force participation (from 
85.6% in 2009 to 75.0% in 2014), compared to a 
0.2 percentage point increase (from 95.1% in 2009 
to 95.3% in 2014) among their married peers. For 
women, labor force participation declined slightly 
among both the never-married and married groups 
between 2009 and 2014. As is often highlighted 
in literature on the Egyptian labor market, 
married women’s labor force participation is still 
substantially lower than that of never-married 
women (Assaad and El-Hamidi 2009).
The positive relationship between household wealth 
and nonstudent youth labor force participation 
seen in 2009 was also observed in 2014, for both 
male and female youth (Figure 4.1). Whereas the 
2014 drop in young men’s economic activity held 
across all wealth quintiles, young women in both 
the lowest and the second wealth quintiles experi-
enced an increase in their labor force participation 
of about 2 percentage points from 2009 to 2014 
(from 11.9% and 13.6% in 2009 to 14.0% and 16.3% 
in 2014, respectively). This may be an added-worker 
effect which is often observed among women from 
poor households who enter the labor market during 
Among nonstudents, male labor 
force participation decreased 
across most education levels 
(except for general secondary 
school graduates), while female 
participation increased among 
illiterates, primary, general 
secondary, and post-secondary 
school graduates.
TABLE 4.1 Nonstudent labor force participation, by education level and gender, 2009 and 2014 (%)
 2009 2014
 AGED 15–29 AGED 15–29 AGED 15–35
 MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL
 Education level 
Illiterate 76.1 7.1 22.4 76.1 8.7 32.1 80.2 9.3 31.7
Can read and write* — — — 91.7 3.8 38.3 94.7 9.0 40.5
Primary  89.3 9.9 54.1 84.9 12.7 54.2 87.5 13.5 55.4
Preparatory  85.9 9.9 49.3 83.1 9.6 40.2 85.5 9.2 41.3
General secondary 71.9 4.3 36.7 78.4 10.9 45.1 80.5 9.9 45.8
Vocational secondary 86.8 17.7 54.5 78.2 15.3 50.8 81.1 16.6 52.2
Post-secondary institute 90.5 35.1 64.9 78.5 43.3 63.8 83.1 41.7 65.7
University and above 87.5 46.7 67.6 77.9 40.8 60.7 83.1 43.5 65.0
Total 86.4 18.0 51.7 79.4 17.8 49.6 82.8 18.8 51.1
(N) (3,260) (4,580) (7,840) (2,739) (3,278) (6,017) (3,527) (4,478) (8,005)
* For 2009, rates among nonstudents for this category not included due to small sample size.
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economic downturns to sustain household income; 
this added-worker effect was also observed in the 
Egyptian labor market during the global financial 
crisis (see Roushdy and Gadallah 2012). 
Furthermore, there was regional variation in the 
changes seen in the nonstudent youth labor force 
participation rate during the 2009–2014 period. 
In 2009, the female labor force participation rate 
(aged 15–29) was strikingly low in rural Upper 
Egypt (7.1%) and in the Frontier Governorates 
(9.9%). However, in 2014 female activity almost 
doubled in rural Upper Egypt, reaching 13.5%. 
Female labor force participation also increased 
in the Urban Governorates and the Frontier 
Governorates, but the other regions experienced 
a decline in female labor force participation rates 
from 2009 to 2014. As Figure 4.1 illustrates, female 
labor force participation is now the lowest in the 
Frontier Governorates (11.6%) followed by rural 
(13.5%) and urban Upper Egypt (13.7%). Female 
youth are still most likely to be economically active 
in the metropolitan governorates. The decline in 
the male youth participation rate (aged 15–29) 
was prevalent across all regions of Egypt, with the 
largest decline witnessed in urban Lower Egypt. 
Male participation is now lowest in urban Lower 
Egypt and urban Upper Egypt, at 75.3% and  
76.6%, respectively.
Overall, young people aged 15–29 living in urban 
Lower Egypt, who completed their education, 
experienced the largest decline in their youth labor 
force participation rate (from 55.5% in 2009 to 
45.6% in 2014), while rural Upper Egypt enjoyed 
an almost 5 percentage point increase in its youth 
activity rate (from 41.3% to 45.7%), which was 
mainly driven by the increase in female labor 
force participation in this region (data not shown). 
This increase might be due to the substantial 
development efforts directed toward employability 
projects for young people, and particularly for 
female youth, in rural Upper Egypt directly after the 
January 25, 2011 revolution.
FIGURE 4.1 Nonstudent labor force participation rate according to wealth quintile and region, by 
gender, 2009 and 2014 (%)
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FIGURE 4.2 Labor force participation rate 
among all youth and nonstudent youth, by age 
and gender, 2009 and 2014 (%)
In order to control for the change in the age distri-
bution of youth between the two waves of SYPE, 
we present labor force participation by single year 
of age among all youth and nonstudent youth in 
2009 and 2014 (Figure 4.2). As is clear from the 
third panel of the figure, the decline in labor force 
participation among both the nonstudent group 
and all youth (aged 15–29) in 2014 appears to be 
mainly due to the substantial decline in the partic-
ipation rate of the younger cohorts of youth aged 
16–22. Similar trends are observed for the labor 
force participation rate using the broad definition of 
unemployment, which includes the discouraged un-
employed in the labor force. Male youth labor force 
participation declined across all cohorts, while fe-
male youth participation was more stable between 
2009 and 2014. The figure also shows that, based 
on the SYPE 2014 data, male labor force participa-
tion started converging with its 2009 levels by age 
25. Also, surprisingly, female participation appeared 
to increase slightly after age 30 as compared to 
younger ages. 
The decline in labor force participation observed in 
2014, especially among young men and even among 
those who are no longer in school, indicates that 
youth are increasingly withdrawing into inactivity.  
To understand why this is happening, in Table 4.2  
we present the reasons mentioned by nonstudents 
TABLE 4.2 Nonstudent youth aged 15–29 who reported reasons for not wanting to work, by gender, 
2009 and 2014 (%)
  2009 2014
MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL
Reasons for not wanting to work
Housewife/taking care of the household  0.0  92.9  82.9  2.7  61.9  50.5
Does not want to work*  12.3  3.5  4.4  3.0  3.0  3.0
Temporarily disabled  7.4  0.2  1.0  3.0  0.1  0.7
Permanently disabled  12.5  0.8  2.1  3.4  0.5  1.0
On unpaid leave for at least one year  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0
Planning to travel/work abroad or immigrate  2.2  0.0  0.2  1.2  0.0  0.3
No appropriate job opportunity*  30.0  2.0  5.1  42.9  15.9  21.1
Parent/spouse refusal  —  —  —  2.0  16.5  13.7
Other  35.3  0.6  4.4  42.0  1.6  9.4
(N) (289) (3,667) (3,956) (482) (2,628) (3,110)
*In SYPE 2014, more reasons for not wanting or not being available to work were listed in the questionnaires than in 2009. To facil-
itate comparability between the survey waves, the following reasons were grouped together in the 2014 columns: In the “Does not 
want to work” category,“religious reasons,” “social norms,” “do not need to work as family is well off,” “none of my friends work,” 
and “work is not fun” were included. For the “No appropriate job opportunity” category: “could not find the right job opportunity,” 
“I have no appropriate skills to find a job,” “I know I wouldn’t find a good job,” “I know I won’t find a government job,” and “no job 
with appropriate pay.” were included. Finally, for the “Other” category, “military service” and “health problems” were included.
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for not wanting to work (and therefore not even 
looking for work) in 2009 and 2014.2 
Although the percentage of young people who 
reported not wanting to work had declined from 
4.4% in 2009 to 3.0% in 2014, the percentage 
increased fourfold (from 5.1% to 21.1%) for nonstu-
dents who indicated that they were no longer willing 
to work because 1) type of job they aspire to no 
longer exists or 2) an appropriate job opportunity 
is unavailable3. Among male youth, the percentage 
of those who reported not wanting to work due to 
the unavailability of an appropriate job opportunity 
increased from 30.0% in 2009 to 42.9% in 2014. 
This percentage grew even more for female youth, 
from 2.0% in 2009 to 15.9% in 2014. The percent-
age of male youth reporting other reasons, includ-
ing military service, also increased in 2014 (42.0%) 
compared to 2009 (35.3%). Hence, this provides 
some evidence that the observed decline in labor 
force participation is primarily due to young people 
becoming discouraged about finding the “right” job 
opportunity following the January 25, 2011 revolu-
tion and the subsequent economic downturn.
Table 4.2 also provides evidence that culture  
and patriarchal norms still represent important 
barriers to female labor market participation, with 
about 16.5% of young women mentioning that 
they do not want to work due to their parents’ or 
spouse’s refusal. 
4.3  Employment structure
SYPE recorded the employment rate, job 
characteristics, and working conditions of young 
people who were employed in 2009 and 2014. 
2 When including the full group of youth aged 15–29, 
whether currently studying or not, a similar trend in 
the reported reasons for not wanting to work is ob-
served. However, about 45% of young people reported 
“being a full-time student” as the main reason for not 
wanting to work in both SYPE waves. Among young 
men, the percentage of those who reported this reason 
decreased from 79.9% in 2009 to 66.8% in 2014. In 
contrast, more women reported not wanting to work 
because of being full-time student in 2014 (33%) than 
in 2009 (29.6%) (data not shown).
3 It is important to note that this is different from the 
discouraged unemployed. We will return to that con-
cept in Section 4.4.
Alarmingly, the employment-to-population ratio4 
appeared to be declining for young people (aged 
15–29) at the time of the 2009 SYPE: while the 
2006 Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) 
recorded an employment rate of 57.0% for male 
youth and 14.1% for female youth aged 15–29, the 
2009 SYPE recorded employment rates of 54.0% 
among males and just 9.4% among females in the 
same age group. According to the 2014 SYPE, this 
negative trend has continued even further, with 
the overall youth employment rate for ages 15–29 
at 31.7% (declining from 32.2% in 2009), which 
represents a decline in the employment rate for 
both male (52.4%) and female youth (9.0%). The 
total employment rate among the full 2014 sample 
of SYPE respondents of working age (15–35) is 
only slightly higher (35.2%). Among this group, 
the female employment rate is still low, at 10.5% 
compared to 58.6% for males (Table A4.1).
Gender differences in type of 
employment 
Among young people (aged 15–29) with jobs, we find 
that the observed increase in nonwage work in 2014 
was primarily due to the sharp increase in the share 
of unpaid family work among female youth, from 
6.6% in 2009 to 21.0% in 2014 (Table 4.3). This rapid 
increase in female nonwage work might be due to 
the added-worker effect highlighted above. It might 
also be due to the above-mentioned expansion 
post-January 25 of employability projects for youth, 
particularly for female youth in rural Upper Egypt, 
who often take up unpaid family work and household 
micro-enterprises to sustain household income.
The percentage of male and female youth who were 
employers or self-employed increased between 
2009 and 2014, to 13.1% of employed males and 
5.7% of females (from 3.7% and 3.2%, respectively, 
in 2009). These findings may indicate that more 
youth have started turning to entrepreneurship as 
a means of entering or staying in the labor market 
4 Employment rate or employment-to-population ratio 
is the ratio of currently employed youth in a given age 
group to the total youth population in the same age 
group. This measure is different from the labor force 
participation rate, which is the ratio between em-
ployed plus unemployed youth in a given age group to 
the total population of youth in the same age group.
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during this difficult economy. We will return to this 
point in the section on entrepreneurship below. 
Similar to 2009, young women were more likely 
to be working for the government than their male 
counterparts. Nevertheless, a substantial decline 
(about 8.1 percentage points) in the percentage of 
young women (aged 15–29) working in the public 
sector has been observed since 2009.5 Finally, the 
small percentage of male youth working in formal 
regular wage jobs in the private sector (8.1%) in 
2009 got even smaller in 2014 (6.1%); the percent-
age of young women in this type of work declined 
between the two waves of the SYPE (12.3% in 2009 
versus 10.9% in 2014). 
Change in employment structure 
Working young people aged 15–29 experienced a 
notable decline in their prospects of wage work in 
2014 as compared to the 2009 figures; correspond-
ingly, participation in nonwage work almost doubled 
between the two waves of SYPE. More specifically, 
only 77.2% of employed youth aged 15–29 worked 
for a wage in 2014 as compared to 87.9% in 2009 
5 This may be a cohort effect, meaning that government 
jobs continue to become less available to new labor 
market entrants. Public sector jobs have declined since 
the early 1990s, when the Economic Reform Structural 
and Adjustment Program was adopted. This reform 
curbed new employment opportunities in the public 
sector and initiated the privatization of existing public 
enterprises (see Wahba and Mokhtar 2002).
(a 10.7 percentage point decline), whereas 22.8% 
were nonwage workers in 2014 compared to only 
12.1% in 2009 (Table 4.3). 
A substantial drop in the percentage of young work-
ers engaged in informal regular wage employment 
in the private sector was also observed. Overall, this 
share of youth employment decreased by almost 
13 percentage points from 43.5% in 2009 to 30.6% 
in 2014. Nevertheless, a significant percentage 
of wage-earning male and female youth were still 
engaged in informal labor, with neither a contract 
nor social insurance benefits. The notable decline 
in youth’s participation in regular informal private 
sector employment from 2009 to 2014 was not 
associated with an equivalent increase in the share 
of government or formal regular private wage work, 
but rather with an increase in the share of irreg-
ular wage work and nonwage work. The share of 
young people working in the formal private sector 
decreased from 8.7% to 6.8% and in the public 
sector (government and state owned enterprises) 
from 13.9% to 13.6%, between 2009 and 2014. In 
contrast, the share of irregular wage employment, 
which is not only informal but also highly unstable, 
went up by about 4.6 percentage points (from 
21.7% in 2009 to 26.3% in 2014).6 
6 Similar employment trends were also found by Assaad 
and Krafft (2015), particularly the increase in irregular 
wage work, using the 2006 and 2012 Egypt Labor 
Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) data.
TABLE 4.3 Distribution of employed youth, by gender and type of employment, 2009 and 2014
 2009 2014
 AGED 15–29 AGED 15–29 AGED 15–35
TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL
 Wage work
Public 10.0 37.6 13.9 11.1 29.5 13.6 13.4 35.4 16.6
Formal private regular wage  8.1 12.3 8.7 6.1 10.9 6.8 7.4 10.2 7.8
Informal private regular wage 45.2 33.4 43.5 31.3 26.2 30.6 29.5 21.5 28.3
Irregular wage 24.2 6.9 21.7 29.3 6.9 26.3 27.2 6.1 24.1
Total 87.5 90.2 87.9 77.8 73.4 77.2 77.4 73.3 76.8
 Nonwage work
Unpaid family worker 8.8 6.6 8.5 9.1 21.0 10.7 7.3 18.6 9.0
Employer 1.2 0.5 1.1 6.4 2.2 5.9 7.6 2.2 6.8
Self-employed 2.5 2.7 2.5 6.7 3.5 6.2 7.6 6.0 7.4
Total 12.5 9.8 12.1 22.2 26.6 22.8 22.6 26.8 23.2
(N) (2,626) (550) (3,176) (2,075) (362) (2,437) (2,803) (547) (3,350)
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Employment sectors
Figure 4.3 shows the sector of economic activity for 
those young men and women aged 15–29 in 2009 
and 2014 who were employed. As in 2009, the field 
of public services (including public administration, 
education, and healthcare, etc.) was most common 
for employed female youth in 2014; over one-third 
(35.0%) of working young women were engaged in 
these forms of economic activity, as compared to only 
5.2% of male youth. The economic activities most 
common for employed male youth included: whole-
sale, hotels and restaurants (20.0%), agriculture, 
hunting and fishing (19.9%), manufacturing, mining 
and electricity (19.5%) and construction (19.1%).
As expected, given the increase in the share of 
young female unpaid family workers in 2014 relative 
to 2009, the share of young women working in 
the agriculture, hunting, and fishing sector went 
up from 11.8% in 2009 to 19.8% in 2014 (an 8 
percentage point increase). These sectors and 
public services were the only two sectors that 
experienced an increase in the share of young 
working women. As for young men, the sectors 
that experienced an increasing share were the 
wholesale, hotels and restaurants, construction, 
and public services sectors. The economic activity 
of all working age respondents in the 2014 SYPE 
(15–35) is also presented in Figure 4.3. A similar 
structure of economic activity was observed among 
this full sample.
Job characteristics
As Table 4.4 shows, the percentage of employed 
youth in Egypt who hold a contract increased to 
19.9% in 2014, up from around 16.4% in 2009. Both 
FIGURE 4.3 Sectors of economic activity among youth, by gender, 2009 and 2014
YOUTH AGED 15–29 YOUTH AGED 15–29 YOUTH AGED 15–35
2009 2014
Although young men and 
women were equally likely 
to hold permanent jobs in 
2009, the percentage of men 
holding such jobs declined by 
almost 11 percentage points 
in 2014 and increased by 
about 12 percentage points 
among young women.
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young men and women became more likely to hold 
a contract in 2014 (16.9% for men vs. 39.3% for 
women) than in 2009 (13.5% for men vs. 33.8% for 
women). Nevertheless, young working women were 
still more likely to have a contract with their employer 
than their male peers in 2014. Two-thirds of both male 
and female public sector workers have contracts; 
however, young women (16.2%) were more than 
twice as likely to have a contract in the private sector 
as young men (7.2%) in 2014 (data not shown).
Similarly, the percentage of young workers covered 
by social insurance increased from 15.6% in 2009 
to 18.5% in 2014 (see Roushdy and Selwaness 2014 
for a description of the Egyptian social insurance 
system and how long it takes for young people to 
gain access to it.) Young working women not only 
kept their advantage in terms of having access to 
social insurance relative to young men, but the per-
centage of covered female youth workers increased 
by about 5.3 percentage points (from 30.5% in 
2009 to 36.8% in 2014), compared to a 2.3 per-
centage point increase among young men (from 
13.1% in 2009 to 15.4% in 2014). As has often been 
highlighted in the literature (Assaad and Barsoum 
2007), this gender difference in the prevalence of 
both contracts and social insurance coverage is 
mainly due to the fact that women often either ac-
cept formal jobs or withdraw from the labor market 
(i.e., stay out of the labor force). 
In terms of job stability, although young men and 
women were equally likely to hold permanent jobs 
in 2009, the percentage of men holding such jobs 
declined by almost 11 percentage points in 2014 
and increased by about 12 percentage points 
among young women. In contrast, the percentage 
of young men holding casual (31.7%) and seasonal 
(4.4%) jobs substantially increased in 2014. During 
the transition period, young men also became 
more likely to work part-time (working less than 
40 hours a week) in 2014 (21.6%) than in 2009 
(16.7%). Among young people working part-time in 
2014, 23.9% mentioned that they were involuntarily 
working less than 40 hours due to the unavailability 
of full-time jobs or because they could not find work 
the rest of the day, compared to 18.9% in 2009. The 
percentage of involuntary part-time workers (or vis-
ibly under-employed youth) increased from 22.5% 
to 28.4% among young men, while it decreased 
TABLE 4.4 Job characteristics of employed youth aged 15–29, by gender, 2009 and 2014
2009 2014
MALE FEMALE ALL YOUTH MALE FEMALE ALL YOUTH
Formal job characteristics
Contract 13.5 33.8 16.4 16.9 39.3 19.9
Social insurance 13.1 30.5 15.6 15.4 36.8 18.5
Job stability
Permanent 53.6 56.5 54.1 42.9 68.1 46.3
Full time 83.3 58.5 79.6 78.4 57.9 74.4
Part time 16.7 41.5 20.4 21.6 42.1 25.6
Temporary 19.8 34.6 21.9 21.0 20.0 20.9
Seasonal 1.5 3.2 1.8 4.4 3.7 4.3
Casual 25.0 5.7 22.3 31.7 8.2 28.6
Work requires special skill 50.6 42.2 49.4 30.8 21.8 29.5
Where did you learn that skill?
Formal education 11.1 34.6 14.0 9.2 39.1 12.2
Vocational training 26.3 45.0 28.6 13.0 23.0 14.0
Apprenticeship 43.9 5.6 39.2 45.2 10.7 41.8
On the job training 3.3 1.1 3.0 19.9 15.7 19.4
Family/self-trained 11.5 6.8 11.0 11.9 11.4 11.9
Others 3.9 6.9 4.3 0.9 0.0 0.8
(N) (2,626) (550) (3,176) (2,085) (362) (2,447)
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from 4.4% to 2.0% among young women between 
2009 and 2014 (data not shown).
Hence, this provides evidence that the job stability 
of young men seems to be deteriorating in 2014 as 
compared to 2009, a trend characterized by lower 
access to permanent jobs, accompanied by a grow-
ing presence in seasonal, casual, and involuntary 
part-time permanent jobs.7 
In addition to job stability and formality status, 
SYPE asked young people several questions related 
to whether their job required a special skill and 
where they learned that skill. Table 4.4 shows that 
the share of young people whose job required 
special skills substantially declined in 2014 among 
both men and women, yet men were still more 
likely to be engaged in a job that required a skill 
than women. Among men, as of 2014, the two main 
channels through which they learned their job skill 
were an apprenticeship (45.2%) and the on-the-job 
training (19.9%). This marks a change as compared 
to their situation in 2009, when vocational training 
played a larger role in providing young men with 
needed job skills (26.3%), as compared to 2014 
(13.0%). 
Training channels differed for young women, 
who reported that their trainings were primarily 
received through the education system (39.1%) or 
vocational training (23.0%) in 2014. Nevertheless, 
similar to men, the percentage of women reporting 
receiving skills through vocational training declined 
by half between 2009 and 2014. In contrast, the 
percentage of young people who learned their job 
skill on-the-job substantially increased from 3.0% 
in 2009 to almost 20.0% in 2014. This substantial 
increase was observed among both men and 
women. This may be an indication that the culture 
of providing on-the-job training has started to 
expand among employers in Egypt to substitute for 
7  These results are in accordance with the increase in 
visible underemployment found by Assaad and Krafft 
(2015), which increased from 2.2% in 2006 to 6.7% in 
2012 among the full working age population (15–64). 
SYPE revealed that visible underemployment among 
youth as a share of the standard labor force increased 
from 4.9% in 2009 to 7.0% in 2014. 
the weak training provided to young people during 
formal education.8 
Working conditions
Table A4.2 presents additional characteristics 
of employed youths’ working conditions. As in 
2009, youth of both genders were more likely to 
complain of maltreatment and harassment in 
the private than in the public sector. However, it 
is interesting to note that there is no substantial 
gender difference in the experience of harsh 
treatment by supervisors in either the public or 
private sector. Surprisingly, male youth were more 
likely to report annoyances and harassment than 
females. In contrast, female youth were more 
likely to report harassment during commuting 
time. This might be due to young women feeling 
less comfortable reporting harassment in their 
own workplaces, which is different from reporting 
harassment in public spaces such as on the street 
or transportation. As mentioned in the SYPE 
2009 report (Population Council 2010), it might 
also be due to males understanding the term 
“harassment” differently than females. They might 
have thought it meant fighting or arguing or part of 
bad treatment at work.9 
Both male and female youth were more likely to 
complain about long working hours, exhaustive 
workload, and hazardous work conditions in the 
private than in the public sector. Also, similar to 
2009, the majority of young men and women still 
complained about their salary, particularly among 
those working in the private sector.
8 This change may be the by-product of the long-term 
efforts of the government and several local and inter-
national development agencies that aimed to provide 
solutions to the very well-known skill-mismatch prob-
lem of the Egyptian labor market among educated 
youth (see Assaad and Roushdy 2007). Many of these 
efforts focused on providing on-the-job-training for 
young people, through partnering with employers, 
particularly for youth with vocational education level. 
Yet, further impact evaluation research is needed to 
appropriately validate the effects of such efforts.
9 This section focuses on experience of harassment 
only as it relates to youth’s employment conditions. 
For more information on the experience of harass-
ment among all female youth, see Chapter 2.
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4.4  Unemployment
Using the standard market definition of unemploy-
ment, we find that the youth (aged 15–29) unem-
ployment rate has declined from 16.1% in 2009 
to about 13.3% in 2014. This was mainly due to 
the decline of the male youth unemployment rate 
from 12.9% to 9.3% during the five-year period. 
In contrast, the female youth unemployment rate 
increased from 31.3% to 32.3% in 2014. However, 
this decline in unemployment is not associated with 
an increase in the employment rate among males, 
but was rather due to the increase in the percent-
age of men who became discouraged and left the 
labor force. Similarly, the increase in the female 
unemployment rates concurs with the previously 
discussed increase in female labor force participa-
tion. 
The broad unemployment rate (including both 
the discouraged unemployed youth who are not 
actively searching for a job and the youth actively 
searching) also declined from 21.6% in 2009 to 
20.2% in 2014. The broad unemployment rate 
increased among females from 41.8% in 2009 to 
45.6% in 2014; however, it declined from 16.8% to 
13.8% among males. Since the observed decline 
in the standard unemployment rate among young 
men was more substantial than the decline in their 
broad unemployment rate, this indicates that more 
young men have become discouraged and stopped 
searching for employment since 2009. Hence, not 
only did young men withdraw to inactivity more 
frequently in 2014 than in 2009, but also those who 
were still available to work increasingly tended to 
cease looking for jobs.
Examining standard unemployment by age shows 
the difficulty that youth, and particularly female 
youth above the age of 18, face in finding gainful 
employment. Most of youth in this group are first-
time labor market entrants. As Figure 4.4 shows, 
male unemployment increases with age among the 
youngest youth, peaking at about 15% by age 22, 
and then drops and remains below 5% by age 28. In 
contrast, female unemployment increases dramat-
ically after age 19 and remains above 35% until age 
26. At this point, the female unemployment rate 
starts declining, parallel to the time when many 
young women leave the labor force due to marriage 
and childbearing. 
Figure 4.5 shows that unemployment remained  
a serious problem for educated youth. As in 2009, 
the unemployment rate was highest among those 
who completed studies at a post-secondary insti-
tute, as well as youth with a university education or 
higher. Similar trends are observed among the full 
SYPE 2014 sample aged 15–35 (Table A4.1).
Reasons for unemployment 
Although unavailability of work during the seven 
days before the SYPE interview still played a major 
factor in driving youth unemployment, both young 
men and women reported this reason less frequent-
FIGURE 4.4 Youth unemployment rates, by 
single year of age and gender, 2009 and 2014
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FIGURE 4.5  Unemployment by education level (standard definition), young people aged 15–29, 
2009 and 2014
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FIGURE 4.6 Self-reported reasons for being unemployed, unemployed youth aged 15–29 (broad 
definition), 2009 and 2014 (%) 
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ly in 2014 than in 2009 (Figure 4.6). Furthermore, 
young women were no longer more likely to give 
this reason than men; on the contrary, only 54.8% 
of young women reported not working due to the 
unavailability of work, compared to 61.0% of young 
men in 2014. In contrast, the percentage of both 
men and women reporting not finding jobs that 
match their experience or qualifications increased 
substantially between 2009 and 2014. Young wom-
en in 2014 were nearly two times as likely as they 
were in 2009 to say that they could not find a job 
with a suitable organization. This might be due to 
the heightened sense of insecurity that followed the 
January 25, 2011 and June 30, 2013 events.
Table 4.5 focuses only on unemployed youth who 
were not searching for a job. Slightly less than half 
of discouraged unemployed youth (47.2%) said that 
their main reason for not searching for a job was 
that they believed there were no jobs (compared to 
around a quarter in 2009). Contrary to the pattern 
for unemployed youth overall, among this discour-
aged unemployed group, young women remained 
more likely to report lack of jobs than their male 
peers (52.0% versus 42.6%, respectively). How-
ever, the percentage of discouraged male youth 
reporting this reason more than doubled in 2014 
(42.6%) as compared to 2009 (17.3%). In addition, 
between 2009 and 2014, the percentage of discour-
aged unemployed who said that they were tired of 
looking for a job decreased among men from 30.1% 
to 24.0%, and from 9.8% to 7.7% among women. 
Searching for employment 
Unemployed young people’s methods of jobs 
search have changed between 2009 and 2014. Table 
A4.3 shows the percentage of youth who reported 
using a given search method among unemployed 
youth according to the broad market definition. 
In 2009, asking friends and relatives came out on 
top of search methods, whereas the second most 
frequently mentioned method was sending job 
applications or inquiring at job location. In 2014, 
asking friends and relatives still remained the most 
commonly used search method, albeit the percent-
age of youth using this search method declined 
among young men and increased among young 
women. The most commonly cited search method 
in 2014 was registration in government offices: 
28.9% of young men and 31.2% of young women 
used this method. This marks an important differ-
ence with respect to 2009, when the percentage of 
The percentage of 
unemployed youth who 
reported registering in private 
employment offices almost 
tripled from 2009 to 2014.
TABLE 4.5 Self-reported reasons for not searching for a job among discouraged unemployed youth 
aged 15–29, 2009 and 2014 (%)
  2009 2014
  MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL
Believe that there are no jobs 17.3 34.9 25.5 42.6 52.0 47.2
Tired of looking for jobs 30.1 9.8 20.7 24.0 7.7 16.0
Employers prefer males to females in hiring 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.6 0.3
Do not know an effective way to look for a job 21.3 17.7 19.7 5.6 8.5 7.0
Waiting for Ministry of Manpower hiring 0.8 3.7 2.1 0.7 0.0 0.4
No government jobs — — — 4.2 7.4 5.7
I do not have the required skill/ training 0.0 1.9 0.9 4.0 0.9 2.5
No suitable jobs 10.2 12.4 11.2 7.2 3.7 5.5
Lack of connections 5.1 1.9 3.6 — — —
Others 15.2 17.0 16.1 11.7 19.3 15.4
Number of discouraged unemployed youth (121) (136) (257) (106) (117) (223)
— = option not available in survey year.
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unemployed registered in government offices was 
only 9.4% of male youth and 20.5% of female youth. 
This is likely due to an announcement made by the 
first Minister of Finance after the January 25 revo-
lution stating that government hiring would begin. 
Nearly eight million applications were mailed to the 
Ministry of Finance following the announcement. It 
is also interesting to note that the percentage of un-
employed youth who reported registering in private 
employment offices almost tripled in 2014 for both 
males (23.8%) and females (15.0%), compared to 
2009 (7.6% and 6.2%, respectively). 
4.5  Employment transitions 
In order to further analyze the employment situa-
tion of Egypt’s youth, and in particular the decline 
in their unemployment and labor force participation 
rates, the transitions between different employ-
ment statuses from 2009 to 2014 are measured 
among youth who were aged 15–29 in 2009 (Table 
4.6). In order to investigate all of the possible 
transitions, employment status is grouped into 12 
categories: wage work in the public sector, regular 
formal wage work in the private sector, regular 
informal wage work in the private sector, irregular 
wage work, employer, self-employed, unpaid family 
work, unemployed actively searching for a job, 
unemployed not searching for a job (discouraged 
unemployed), student out of labor force, nonstu-
dent out of labor force, and permanently disabled 
(also called out of manpower, which includes youth 
older than 15 who reported not wanting to work due 
to being permanently disabled).
As expected, the most stable category was the 
public sector, with around 67.4% of young public 
sector employees in 2009 retaining their jobs in 
2014. Also, 75.8% of those who were not studying 
and out of labor force remained in this status, 
indicating that the majority of those who were not 
willing to work in 2009 did not change this prefer-
ence in 2014. Many of these youth are young wom-
en who reported being housewives in both years, 
as shown in Table 4.2. All other statuses, including 
unpaid family work, nonwage work (employers and 
self-employed), irregular wage work, and regular 
informal and formal wage work in the private sec-
tor, were quite unstable. Among these less stable 
employment statuses, self-employed and unpaid 
family work were the most two volatile between 
2009 and 2014. 
TABLE 4.6 Transitions between employment statuses, from 2009 to 2014, among youth aged 15–29 in 2009 (%)
2014 STATUS
2009 STATUS
Public 
sector
Regular 
formal 
private
Regular 
informal 
private
Irregular 
wage
Em- 
ployer
Self- 
em-
ployed
Unpaid 
family 
worker
Student 
out of 
labor 
force
Nonstu-
dent out 
of labor 
force
Active 
unem-
ployed
Discour-
aged 
unem-
ployed
Out of 
man-
power Total
Public sector 67.4 3.4 4.1 3.5 4.1 1.1 0.4 1.5 8.8 3.8 2.0 0.0 100.0
Regular formal private 18.1 29.2 18.5 5.6 8.7 2.0 1.1 2.9 7.6 3.8 1.7 0.7 100.0
Regular informal private 6.4 6.2 30.9 19.2 7.1 7.8 1.8 1.2 12.8 4.6 1.9 0.3 100.0
Irregular wage 7.1 4.0 20.5 28.8 7.3 8.6 4.6 1.6 11.9 2.9 2.6 0.2 100.0
Employer 3.7 10.2 27.2 13.6 26.9 4.5 4.1 0.0 4.4 5.6 0.0 0.0 100.0
Self-employed 10.5 3.6 12.4 21.6 6.8 13.6 3.8 2.9 18.5 1.6 4.8 0.0 100.0
Unpaid family worker 4.0 2.9 16.3 20.2 8.4 9.7 12.3 2.6 12.6 6.6 4.3 0.0 100.0
Student out of labor force 4.2 3.1 7.8 6.0 1.8 1.3 2.9 25.0 33.2 9.3 5.3 0.2 100.0
Nonstudent out of labor 
force
2.3 0.7 3.4 3.9 1.1 1.6 3.0 0.5 75.8 4.1 3.4 0.2 100.0
Active unemployed 10.4 7.0 19.0 10.4 3.0 4.6 2.5 0.8 27.8 9.4 4.2 0.8 100.0
Discouraged unemployed 4.4 3.7 16.0 18.6 5.0 3.6 4.2 1.3 31.6 8.9 2.7 0.2 100.0
Out of manpower 8.6 0.0 2.8 1.3 5.7 0.0 10.1 0.0 32.4 3.3 0.0 35.7 100.0
 Total 7.5 3.7 11.8 9.9 3.5 3.4 3.1 7.7 39.3 6.0 3.6 0.5 100
(N) (583) (261) (816) (600) (248) (250) (222) (556) (3,482) (434) (277) (26) (7,755)
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Only 25.0% of youth who were students and out 
of the labor force in 2009 remained in this status 
in 2014. However, instead of making a successful 
school-to-work transition, an unexpectedly large 
share (33.2%) of youth who were out of this status 
in 2014 transitioned into inactivity (nonstudent out 
of labor force). Only 27.1% of this group of 2009 
students were working, and 14.6% were unem-
ployed, in 2014. These figures are even more alarm-
ing if we focus only on the 75.0% of 2009 students 
who were no longer students in 2014. Among this 
latter group, which was mostly comprised of new 
labor market entrants, only 9.7% managed to find 
a job in the public (5.6%) or private (4.1%) formal 
sector in 2014, while 18.4% were employed in the in-
formal regular (10.4%) or irregular (8.0%) sectors, 
4.1% became either employers or self-employed 
workers and 3.9% were unpaid family workers in 
2014 (numbers not shown in table). In contrast, 
almost half of them (44.2%) were not in the labor 
force, 7.1% were discouraged unemployed and 
12.4% were active unemployed. 
Another alarming finding is that 31.6% and 27.8% 
of discouraged unemployed and active unemployed 
in 2009, respectively, lost hope and became inac-
tive (nonstudent out of labor force). Additionally, a 
large share of the self-employed in 2009 (18.5%) 
became nonstudent out of labor force in 2014. In 
contrast, only a little more than half of discouraged 
and active unemployed youth, respectively, were 
working in 2014, most of whom ended up in the 
informal private regular or irregular wage sectors. 
Among the active (discouraged) unemployed, only 
10.4% (4.4%) got a public sector job and 7.0% 
(3.7%) got a formal private sector job, while 29.4% 
(34.6%) got an informal regular or irregular job and 
10.1% (12.8%) were nonwage workers. Similarly, 
the self-employed youth in 2009 were more likely 
to move to irregular (21.6%) and regular informal 
work (12.4%), than to the public (10.5%) and formal 
private (3.6%) sectors.
Employers in 2009 were most likely to shift to 
regular informal private sector wage employment 
(27.2%) by 2014, followed by irregular wage work 
(13.6%), while 10.2% moved to the formal private 
sector and 3.7% to the public sector. Important 
shares of those who were regular but informal 
wage workers in the private sector in 2009 tran-
sitioned into irregular wage work (19.2%) and 
nonwage work (16.7%), compared to only 6.4% 
transitioning to the public sector and 6.2% to the 
formal private sector. 
Furthermore, less than 30% of youth who were em-
ployed in the formal regular private sector in 2009 
retained this status in 2014, while more than a third 
of this group of youth moved to the informal private 
sector (24.1%) and nonwage work (11.8%). Yet, it 
is interesting to see that about 18.1% of this group 
transitioned into the public sector in 2014, as well 
as fewer than 6% transitioned to unemployment 
status and only 7.6% to out of the labor force. 
Hence, the decline in youth labor force participa-
tion in 2014 was driven by important shares of the 
2009 active unemployed, discouraged unemployed, 
students out of the labor force, and self-employed 
youth transitioning to inactivity during the last five 
years. Also, very few youth managed to transition 
from the informal wage and nonwage sectors to the 
public or formal private sectors between the two 
SYPE surveys. 
4.6  Entrepreneurship
Given the tough labor market conditions prevailing 
in Egypt after the January 25, 2011 revolution, it 
is important to investigate whether young people 
considered creating employment opportunities 
for themselves through entrepreneurship during 
this period. The stated preference of young people 
aged 15–29 for establishing their own business, as 
opposed to being employed in a wage job, declined 
to 37.2% in 2014 from 53.6% in 2009. Also, the 
percentage of youth who actually tried to establish 
their own business declined from 15.5% in 2009 to 
about 9.3% of the total youth population in 2014. 
The drop in the quest for entrepreneurship was 
more substantial among young males (23.0% in 
2009 vs. 13.2% in 2014) than among young females 
(7.7% in 2009 vs. 5.0% in 2014). In contrast, the 
percentage of youth who in fact started their own 
business—the employers and the self-employed—
increased from 1.2% in 2009 to 4.0% in 2014 (data 
not shown). 
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The reasons why youth who actually started their 
own business were interested in being entrepre-
neurs were similar between 2014 and 2009 (Figure 
4.7). As a matter of fact, a large proportion of young 
entrepreneurs in 2014 (42.8%) said they were 
motivated by the greater independence provid-
ed by self-employment activities. While female 
youth were more likely than male youth to report 
their inability to find a wage job as one of the main 
reasons behind their entrepreneurial activities in 
2009 (39.9% versus 34.4% of males), this pattern 
was reversed in 2014. About 37.2% of male youth 
reported this reason, compared to 29.2% among 
female youth. 
In terms of the barriers to entrepreneurship, in 
2014 lack of counseling and advice, followed by 
lack of financial services, represented the two 
most common challenges that young male entre-
preneurs reported facing when starting their own 
businesses (Table 4.7). More specifically, around 
26.5% of young male employers and self-employed 
reported that counseling and advice were the main 
problem they faced when starting-up their estab-
lishment, compared to only 10.0% in 2009. The 
second most common challenge given by male 
entrepreneurs was financial services (17.1%). This 
marked a change vis-à-vis the 2009 situation, when 
the lack of financial and credit services was the top 
challenge that young entrepreneurs faced (31.2%). 
As for female entrepreneurs, their major constraint 
remained the lack of business information (19.9%), 
as was found in 2009 (24.7%). The lack of financial 
services was the next most commonly mentioned 
constraint among young female entrepreneurs in 
2014 (14.8%). 
As for the source of funds used by young people 
who tried to establish their own business, 
savings—whether personal or family-based—
were the most common financial resource used 
in 2014. More specifically, 47.8% and 50.5% of 
male entrepreneurs relied on personal saving and 
family-based savings, respectively, to finance their 
business. Fewer women than men used personal 
savings (40.0%), while they were as likely as men to 
rely on family savings (50.6%). As for loans, young 
entrepreneurs had access to family loans (19.8%) 
in 2014, yet they did not rely on other types of loans, 
such as micro-loans or banking loans. The need to 
develop adequate and supportive financial services 
to promote business start-up among young people 
is still one of the important areas of opportunity to 
address youth employability challenges in Egypt 
(see Sieverding 2012) (data  
not shown). 
FIGURE 4.7 Self-reported reasons for being 
entrepreneurs, among those who started their 
own business, youth aged 15–29 (%)
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4.7  Conclusion 
This chapter uses the rich data provided by the 
panel SYPE of 2009 and 2014 to update the state 
of knowledge on youth labor market outcomes in 
Egypt after the January 25, 2011 revolution. The re-
sults show that youth labor market conditions have 
deteriorated during the revolutionary era. 
A quick investigation of the unemployment rate 
alone may lead to a faulty conclusion regarding 
youth well-being in the labor market in the 
aftermath of the January 25 revolution. A careful 
examination of other labor market indicators 
demonstrates that youth labor market outcomes 
have in fact seriously worsened since 2009. 
The decline in the unemployment rate was not 
associated with an increase in employment 
opportunities, but was rather due to the increase in 
the percentage of youth who became discouraged 
and left the labor force. 
Young women and men (aged 15–29) both experi-
enced a decline in their employment-to-population 
ratio between 2009 and 2014 (from 9.4% to 9.0% 
and from 54.0% to 52.4%, respectively). Also, the 
share of employment in the government and in 
formal and informal regular wage jobs in the private 
sector has declined. This seems to have led many 
youth to shift to irregular wage jobs, which is the 
most vulnerable form of employment.
On the positive side, traces of increased reliance 
on entrepreneurship as an alternative means of 
entering or staying in the labor market during this 
difficult economic transition was observed. The 
percentage of employers or self-employed youth 
increased between 2009 and 2014 from 3.7% to 
13.1% among employed men and from 3.2% to 
5.7% among employed women. However, 37.2% of 
male youth and 29.2% of female youth reported 
their inability to find a wage job as one of the main 
reasons behind their entrepreneurial activities.
Furthermore, the percentage of youth reporting 
being unemployed due to the unavailability of work 
declined from 69.2% in 2009 to 58.3% in 2014. 
However, the percentage of both men and women 
reporting not finding jobs that match their experi-
ence or qualifications increased from 8.0% in 2009 
TABLE 4.7 Self-reported barriers to entrepreneurship, among those who started their own business, 
young people aged 15–29, 2009 and 2014 (%) 
 MALE FEMALE TOTAL
 2009 2014 2009 2014 2009 2014
Business information 12.2 13.2 24.7 19.9 14.9 14.0
Marketing services 16.3 13.4 11.9 12.5 15.4 13.3
Financial services 31.2 17.1 21.0 14.8 29.0 16.9
Accounting 1.7 2.2 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.9
Legal services 5.7 0.5 0.0 5.0 4.5 1.0
Counseling/advice 10.0 26.5 9.2 10.2 9.8 24.6
Business training 1.9 0.6 5.7 9.8 2.7 1.7
Skills training 0.9 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.7 4.6
Access to technology 2.3 1.2 0.0 0.0 1.8 1.1
Product development 2.1 3.0 6.3 6.1 3.0 3.4
Access to utilities 3.7 2.3 0.0 0.0 2.9 2.0
Single ownership, better to find a partner  8.1  — 8.7  — 8.2 —
Nothing — 10.8  — 9.1 —  10.4
Other 1.1 6.6 12.1 13.0 3.5 7.4
(N) (91) (117) (31) (19) (122) (136)
— = Response option was not available in survey year.
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to 13.8% in 2014. Young women in 2014 were also 
two times as likely as they were in 2009 to say that 
they could not find a job with a suitable organiza-
tion. This might be due to the heightened sense of 
insecurity that followed January 25, 2011 and June 
30, 2013.
The observed decline in youth labor force partici-
pation in 2014 was driven by important shares of 
the 2009 students out of the labor force (33.2%), 
active unemployed (27.8%), and discouraged 
unemployed (31.6%) youth transitioning into 
inactivity rather than to employment during the 
last five years.
This chapter provides evidence that labor market 
adjustments during economic downturns must be 
depicted beyond unemployment levels (Assaad 
and Krafft 2015). The increase in the percentage 
of discouraged youth and the harder transition to 
formal wage work provide compelling evidence of 
the more precarious working conditions that the 
young generations are facing following the Egyp-
tian revolution.
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Migration continues to be an important issue 
for policymakers because of the economic, 
social, and cultural implications of large 
movements of people across international 
borders. Measuring young people’s intentions 
to emigrate from Egypt is especially important 
because intentions are informative about 
the potential determinants and patterns of 
emigration.
The collection of detailed, nationally representative 
data on migration intentions in the Survey of Young 
People in Egypt (SYPE 2009) provided researchers 
with a unique opportunity to study potential migra-
tion and the intention to migrate among Egyptian 
youth. Five years later, data collected from SYPE 
2014 allows researchers to examine the changes in 
patterns and trends relative to 2009. In addition, it 
explores whether the January 25, 2011 revolution 
affected the international migration aspirations of 
youth in Egypt. 
Youth’s social networks are a key factor in the devel-
opment of their migration aspirations; additionally, 
being a discouraged unemployed person has a pos-
itive effect on migration intentions, and wealthier 
persons were much more likely to choose Western 
countries as their preferred destination (Elbadawy 
2010). In a study of job satisfaction and potential 
among Egyptian youth, Abdel Fattah (2012) found 
that migrant networks and the belief that seeking 
a job abroad will be the main solution to their prob-
lems (especially marriage) were the main factors 
driving migration aspirations. Another variable 
that significantly affected the probability of being 
a potential migrant was the need to continue in a 
job as well as being satisfied in the current job. On 
the other hand, Elbadawy, Said, and Wahba (2013) 
examined the reverse causality between migration 
intentions and investment in education.
The International Organization for Migration con-
ducted a survey on migration intentions in 2011 
following the January 25 revolution (IOM 2011). A 
total of 22,978 contacts were made, but of these 
only 1,417 successful interviews of young Egyptians 
between 15 and 29 years old in 17 governorates were 
eventually conducted between March and April 2011. 
The survey revealed that 750 of the youth aspired 
to migrate. It is not clear whether the sample or the 
timing of the survey was the reason behind this high 
rate of migration aspirations, given that previous 
surveys such as the push–pull factors in Europe 
(2000) or the SYPE (2009) suggested the migration 
aspiration rate among youth to be about 20%.
It is important, however, to realize that migration 
intentions do not necessarily translate to actual 
migration as legal hurdles and financial constraints, 
5.1  Introduction
International migration has been a key feature of 
the Egyptian economy since the 1970s. According 
to the 2006 census, 3.9 million Egyptians were 
living abroad (CAPMAS 2009). In 2013, CAPMAS 
estimated the number of Egyptian migrants to be 
around 8 million (Sabry 2012). Furthermore, find-
ings from the recent Egypt Labor Market Panel Sur-
vey (2012) highlight the importance of international 
migration as a backbone of the Egyptian economy; 
indeed, about 15% of Egyptian households had a re-
turnee or a current migrant in 2012 (Wahba 2015). 
Although there is extensive literature on factors 
that influence individual migration decisions, 
in most of those studies the determinants of 
migration examined are based on samples of 
individuals who have already migrated. Rarely do 
data exist on individuals before migration. Thus, 
some studies focus on migration intentions rather 
than actual migration in order to understand the 
factors behind potential migration. A few studies 
have focused on migration intentions in Egypt. For 
example, Zohry (2006) studied migration intentions 
to Europe of just over 1,550 males aged 18–40 
in high migration prevalence areas in Cairo and 
Alexandria, and in four governorates in Lower Egypt 
and two in Upper Egypt. Van Dalen et al. (2005) 
used data from a multicountry study investigating 
the determinants and mechanisms of international 
migration to the European Union. However, both 
Zohry (2006) and van Dalen et al. (2005) only 
focused on Europe, whereas much Egyptian 
migration is to other Arab countries. 
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among other barriers, reduce the opportunities 
and ability of potential migrants to realize their 
aspirations (see, for example, Constant and Massey 
2002). Yet, migration intentions are still important 
in enabling us to understand the potential determi-
nants of migration.
5.2  Youth migration aspirations 
in 2014
Long-term migration aspirations
Overall, 17.2% of youth aged 15–29 in 2014 aspired 
to migrate within the next five years, referred to here-
after as long-term aspirations. On the other hand, 
short-term aspirations were, not surprisingly, lower 
at 8.9% since they were based on current migration 
intentions at the time of the survey in 2014. In 2009, 
18.3% of youth aged 15–29 aspired to migrate. 
However, it has to be noted that there was no time 
limit on intentions in the 2009 survey and hence the 
answers could have been referring to immediate, 
short-term, or long-term migration aspirations.1 
Examining the correlates of long-term (five-year) 
migration intentions, the same patterns are ob-
served for the total sample of youth (aged 13–35) 
and those aged 15–29 (see Table A5.1). It is obvious 
that in 2014 Egyptian male youth (15–29) tended to 
be three times more likely to aspire to migrate than 
female youth: 25.8% of male youth had intentions 
to migrate, compared to 7.8% of female youth. Un-
like in 2009, aspirations to migrate did not decrease 
with age, in particular for male youth. In fact the 
1 The question on aspiring to migrate was slightly dif-
ferent in each SYPE wave. In SYPE 2009, the question 
was “do you aspire to migrate to any country…?” 
without referring to a time period, while in 2014 the 
question was changed to “do you aspire to migrate 
now to any country…?”Also, an additional question on 
migration was included in 2014 SYPE: “What’s your 
chance (in %) of traveling within the next 5 years?” 
This question is useful in understanding long-term 
aspirations, as well as the potential likelihood of mi-
grating within the next five years. However, the full set 
of questions related to migration destination and push 
and pull factors were only asked of those who replied 
that they aspire to migrate now. 
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FIGURE 5.1 Long-term migration aspirations 
among youth aged 13–35, in 2009 and 2014 (%)
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AGES
relationship between age and aspirations was an 
inverted U-shape (see Figure 5.1). Migration aspi-
rations peaked for 18–24-year-olds. For male youth 
aged 15–29, migration aspirations peaked at 28.1% 
for the middle age group and were lowest for the 
youngest age group. This was different from 2009, 
when migration aspirations declined with age. Also, 
unlike in 2009, unmarried male youth (15–29) were 
no longer more likely to want to migrate (25.5%) 
than married male youth (26.8%). 
Male youth aged 15–29 from rural areas were 
slightly more likely to aspire to migrate (28.3%) 
compared to those in urban areas (23.3%). Howev-
er, male youth residing in informal urban areas were 
the least likely to aspire to migrate (16.2%), which is 
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a change from 2009 when that group was the most 
likely to aspire to migrate. The opposite is true for 
female youth aged 15–29 in 2014, as those residing 
in rural areas were the least likely to aspire to mi-
grate and those in informal housing had the highest 
rate of migration aspirations within urban areas.
Migration aspirations among youth increased 
with educational attainment. The percentage of 
15–29-year-old male youth interested in migration 
was highest for university graduates, at 30.3%, 
while for females secondary and university grad-
uates had similar rates of aspirations (15.6%). On 
the whole, the patterns of migration aspirations by 
education were similar to those of 2009. 
On the other hand, a striking difference between 
2009 and 2014 is that in 2014, there was a clear 
increase in aspiration prevalence as wealth rose, 
which was not the case in 2009, when there was no 
clear positive association between wealth and mi-
gration aspirations. Furthermore, the rate of migra-
tion aspirations among students (15–29) in 2014 
was 17%, compared to 22% in 2009. Surprisingly, 
the intention to migrate among the unemployed 
(15–29) had not changed significantly (27% in 2014 
and 29% in 2009).
Short-term migration aspirations
Looking at the characteristics of those who aspired 
to migrate in the short run, several more interesting 
patterns emerge. Given that aspirations to migrate 
here refer to the intention to migrate immediately, 
not surprisingly the rate of aspirations is lower, at 
8.9% (see Table A5.2). The migration intention rate 
among male youth aged 15–29 was 13.2% while 
among female youth it was 4.1%. Furthermore, 
aspirations to migrate to the West were only 1.5%, 
while aspirations to migrate to the Arab countries 
were 7.1% among 15–29-year-old youth. It is worth 
noting that data from SYPE 2009 revealed a similar 
pattern of migration aspirations: 14.3% of youth 
aspired to migrate to an Arab country, compared 
to 3.9% who chose a Western country. In both sur-
veys, preference for Arab countries was four times 
higher than for Western countries (SYPE 2009).
Patterns observed in the case of short-term aspi-
rations are similar to those seen for long-term as-
pirations in terms of age, education, marital status, 
wealth, and employment status for both the 15–29 
(Tables A5.2 and A5.3) and 13–35 (Table A5.4 and 
A5.5) youth populations. However, examining the 
pattern by destination indicates several interesting 
differences. Among male youth, although migra-
tion aspirations to Arab countries increased with 
age, aspirations to Western countries decreased 
with age, though the sample size is too small to 
confidently claim this decline with age in migration 
aspirations to Western countries is significant (see 
In 2014, a clear increase 
was seen in the prevalence 
of migration aspirations 
among youth from wealthier 
families, which was not 
the case in 2009 when 
there was no clear positive 
association between wealth 
and migration aspiration.
FIGURE 5.2 Desired migration destinations 
(Arab versus Western countries) among males 
aged 15–29, by age and marital status, 2014 (%)
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Figure 5.2). Similarly, married male youth indicated 
higher aspirations to migrate to Arab countries than 
never-married ones, the opposite of the pattern 
observed for migration aspirations to Western 
countries and also of patterns in 2009. Finally, male 
youths’ aspirations to migrate to the West rose 
steadily with wealth, but not aspirations to migrate 
to Arab countries. 
Desired destinations for short-term 
migration aspirations in 2014
Trends in preferred migration destinations among 
youth (aged 15–29) aspiring to migrate in the short-
term varied between rural and urban youth, as well 
as between genders. Figure 5.3 shows the preferred 
destination by urban–rural residence (15–29). 
Interestingly, 87.5% of aspiring migrant youth aged 
15–29 chose Arab countries, while 12.5% indicated 
aspirations to migrate to Western countries. More-
over, about 38.7% of youth (15–29) in both urban 
and rural areas aspired to migrate to Saudi Arabia, 
while those in urban areas were twice as likely to as-
pire to migrate to Europe or to Australia/Canada/
USA, compared to those in rural areas. 
Figure 5.3 also shows the preferred migration 
destinations by gender. Saudi Arabia was the most 
popular destination among aspiring migrant youth, 
but a higher percentage of female youth (31.8%) 
aspired to migrate to Western countries, compared 
to 13.5% among male youth aged 15–29. Similar 
patterns were observed for the total sample of 
youth aged 13–35 (see Table A5.6).
Reasons for youth migration aspirations
Most youth (93.0%) who aspired to migrate said 
they would like to do so only temporarily. Indeed, the 
mean duration of intended stay abroad was 5 years. 
This is consistent with the majority of youth aspiring 
to migrate to Arab countries, where migration is typ-
ically temporary in nature, see e.g., Wahba (2015). 
Table 5.1 summarizes the main reasons behind 
youth’s (aged 18–29) migration aspirations by 
gender and residence; multiple answers were 
permitted. Low income was the main push factor 
out of Egypt (73.7%): 44.0% believed income in 
Egypt was lower than abroad, and 29.7% wanted 
to migrate to earn more money. Two-thirds of 
youth blamed lack of job opportunities in Egypt 
for pushing them to aspire to migrate. Bad living 
conditions in Egypt (48.9%) were another common 
push factor. Only 10.1% of youth blamed the 
political and security circumstances in Egypt for 
driving them to want to leave.
The pull factors were a mirror picture, with 72.3% 
saying that higher income abroad was driving their 
migration aspirations. Saving for marriage was 
another reason behind the intention to migrate. 
Overall, for male youth economic reasons were 
much stronger as both push and pull factors than 
political reasons or investment in human capital 
FIGURE 5.3 Desired destinations for 
migration, among youth aged 15–29, according 
to urban–rural residence and gender, 2014 (%)
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(studying abroad or improving one’s knowledge). 
On the other hand, for female youth, economic 
reasons were not as prominent as for males. Again, 
those aged 13–35 had similar patterns to the 
18–29-year-olds (Table A5.7).
Almost half of the youth blamed bad living condi-
tions for their desire to migrate. Figure 5.4 provides 
further insights into the quality of life in Egypt as a 
push factor in the emergence of migration plans. 
Household water shortages were positively cor-
related with youth’s desire to migrate. Similarly, 
those who found it difficult to enjoy daily activities 
and those who were unable to play a useful part in 
life had higher migration aspirations.2 Also, those 
2 These questions are part of the Self-Reporting Ques-
tionnaire (SRQ-20) developed by the World Health 
Organization to screen for common mental disorders. 
For more information see Chapter 2. 
TABLE 5.1 Reasons given for wanting to migrate, among respondents (aged 18–29) who aspired to migrate in 
2014, by gender and urban/rural residence (%)
 MALE FEMALE TOTAL
 URBAN RURAL TOTAL URBAN RURAL TOTAL URBAN RURAL TOTAL
Push factors         
No job opportunities available in Egypt 67.1 71.5 69.9 44.8 49.9 47.5 62.0 68.0 65.6
Income in Egypt is lower than abroad 43.9 48.7 46.9 34.3 29.1 31.6 41.7 45.5 44.0
Bad living conditions in Egypt 49.4 51.0 50.4 47.2 37.7 42.2 48.9 48.9 48.9
To escape family pressures and troubles 3.0 3.0 3.0 13.1 4.7 8.7 5.4 3.3 4.1
Accompany family 0.0 1.1 0.7 8.5 11.7 10.2 2.0 2.8 2.5
To help my family 14.6 20.8 18.5 11.1 9.7 10.3 13.8 19.0 17.0
Don’t know 0.8 0.3 0.5 1.4 2.5 2.0 0.9 0.7 0.8
No opportunities to gain information and  
  experience 7.4 0.7 3.2 26.6 12.4 19.2 11.9 2.6 6.2
To earn money 32.7 32.8 32.7 19.4 14.5 16.8 29.6 29.8 29.7
Political and security circumstances in Egypt 10.7 8.6 9.4 15.7 10.8 13.1 11.9 9.0 10.1
Other 1.0 0.0 0.4 10.5 4.9 7.6 3.2 0.8 1.7
Pull factors         
I want to see other countries 7.0 7.6 7.3 24.6 14.6 19.4 11.1 8.7 9.6
I want to live abroad 9.1 5.9 7.1 13.1 10.3 11.6 10.1 6.6 7.9
I have relatives/friends there 4.8 5.3 5.1 12.7 9.6 11.1 6.6 6.0 6.3
I have a job offer there 5.6 4.9 5.1 7.7 0.0 3.7 6.1 4.1 4.9
I can study there 6.5 1.7 3.5 29.9 19.5 24.5 11.9 4.6 7.5
Higher income abroad than in Egypt 74.1 77.4 76.2 57.2 54.7 55.9 70.2 73.7 72.3
To save money for marriage 47.4 51.5 50.0 7.9 6.4 7.1 38.2 44.2 41.8
To improve my knowledge 12.9 2.3 6.2 34.2 21.0 27.3 17.8 5.4 10.2
Family reunion 2.6 1.0 1.6 6.3 10.2 8.3 3.4 2.5 2.9
Other 0.6 1.8 1.3 3.0 2.7 2.9 1.2 1.9 1.6
(N) (169) (288) (458) (51) (56) (107) (221) (344) (565) 
Note: Multiple answers allowed.
who were most uncertain about the future were the 
ones who had the highest rates of aspirations to 
migrate. Thus, overall, life dissatisfaction seems to 
be another driver of migration aspirations among 
youth aged 18–29. Data for the larger age range of 
13–35 are shown in Table A5.8. 
Sources of information and social 
networks 
Another important catalyst in migration, and 
perhaps in turning aspirations into actual migration, 
is the role played by social networks (friends 
and family). Table 5.2 reports youth’s sources of 
information on the destinations they aspired to 
migrate to. Indeed, 41% of youth (aged 18–29) 
reported receiving information from relatives 
abroad (18.9%) or friends (21.9%) abroad. Aspiring 
youth (37.2%) also had relatives or friends in Egypt 
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FIGURE 5.4 Attitudes of respondents aged 18–29 about their quality of life in Egypt, according to 
short- or long-term migration aspirations, 2014 (%)
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TABLE 5.2 Sources of information on migration destinations, among youth aged 18–29, 2014 (%)
 ARAB COUNTRIES WESTERN COUNTRIES ANY DESTINATION
RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM URBAN RURAL TOTAL URBAN RURAL TOTAL URBAN RURAL TOTAL
Relatives abroad 16.9 20.8 19.4 12.9 21.3 16.7 16.2 20.6 18.9
Relatives in Egypt 19.9 14.8 16.6 7.8 4.1 6.1 17.0 13.8 15.0
Egyptian friends abroad 19.5 25.0 23.0 16.2 19.7 17.8 18.4 24.1 21.9
Friends in Egypt 21.7 23.4 22.8 10.9 24.8 17.1 20.4 23.3 22.2
Internet 6.4 1.6 3.4 29.9 17.7 24.4 10.9 3.6 6.5
Governments 0.0 0.7 0.5 na na na 0.0 0.6 0.4
General reading 4.0 3.7 3.8 6.8 6.7 6.7 4.5 4.1 4.3
Media (TV, radio, newspapers) 10.6 8.2 9.1 14.0 5.8 10.3 11.4 8.3 9.5
Embassies/consulates 0.4 0.3 0.3 na na na 0.3 0.2 0.3
Other 0.6 1.6 1.3 1.5 0.0 0.8 0.9 1.4 1.2
(N) (168) (299) (467) (48) (39) (87) (221) (344) (565)
Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No
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Total (N = 6,716)
Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No
0
10
20
30
40
50
34.5
5.7
20.3
26
8.3
17.7
31.9
9.3
22.5
36.1
6.7
19.1
26.5
8.1
18.0
33.1
10.8
20.4
26.7
7.5
17.9
40.8
11.1
23.7
26.4
7.6
17.7
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who were sources of information, some of whom 
might be return migrants. Not surprisingly, age did 
not change the pattern of the sources of information 
on destinations (Table A5.9 shows data for youth 
aged 13–35). Overall, as found in previous studies, 
official sources such as governments and embassies 
or consulates provided very little information to 
aspiring migrants. However, an interesting difference 
emerged between 2009 and 2014, as Table 5.3 
shows that the percentage of urban youth using the 
internet for getting information on their destinations 
has increased substantially. 
With regard to the types of people that youth 
expected they would need to rely upon when trying 
to migrate (Table 5.4), social networks, consisting 
of both friends and relatives at home and abroad, 
were found to be the main channels. Only 2.8% 
of youth (aged 18–29) reported that migration 
brokers—agents who help in migration and job 
finding—would help them. Similar patterns are 
observed for youth (aged 13–35) in terms of 
reliance on social networks to help in the migration 
process (Table A5.10).
To sum up, the most important push factors 
for youth to migrate were lack of employment 
opportunities and poor living conditions, while 
the most important pull factor was higher 
wages abroad than in Egypt. The majority of 
youth sought information about their preferred 
migration destination from their family and 
friends who were living abroad. Saudi Arabia 
remained the most popular destination. To a large 
extent these patterns were similar to what was 
found by the IOM in 2011. The main difference is 
that the prevalence of migration aspirations was 
much smaller than in the IOM Survey or SYPE 
2009, an issue we will examine next.
5.3  Changes in migration 
intentions: 2009 and 2014
This section investigates the changes in migration 
aspiration trends between 2009 and 2014. We use 
the panel aspect of the SYPE data, where we focus 
first on those youth (aged 15–29) who aspired to 
migrate in 2009 and check whether in 2014 they 
had changed their long-term migration plans.
TABLE 5.3 Sources of information on all 
migration destinations among 18–29-year-olds, 
2009 and 2014 (%)
 URBAN RURAL TOTAL 
 2009 2014 2009 2014 2009 2014
Friends/relatives 73.2 72.0 84.9 81.7 79.9 78.0
Internet 3.8 10.9 1.8 3.6 2.7 6.5
Governments 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.4
General readings 2.8 4.5 1.9 4.1 2.3 4.3
Media (TV, radio,  
newspapers) 19.6 11.4 10.7 8.3 14.5 9.5
Other 0.3 1.2 0.4 1.6 0.3 1.5
(N) (523) (221) (699) (344) (1222) (565)
TABLE 5.4 Sources of expected help in 
migrating, among 18–29-year-olds, 2014 (%)
 ARAB  WESTERN ANY DES- 
 COUNTRIES COUNTRIES TINATION
Relatives abroad 27.2 27.2 27.2
Relatives in Egypt 48.4 56.9 49.6
Egyptian friends  
  abroad 10.8 9.1 10.5
Friends in Egypt 6.7 4.9 6.4
Migration brokers 3.2 na 2.8
Other 3.8 2.0 3.5
(N) (203) (38) (241)
The most important push 
factors for youth to migrate 
were lack of employment 
opportunities and poor living 
conditions, while the most 
important pull factor was higher 
wages abroad than in Egypt. 
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Table 5.5 shows the number and percentage of 
youth by aspiration status in 2009 and 2014, where 
aspirations in 2014 refer to long-term intentions to 
migrate and those not tracked (missing) in 2014 are 
also included. Only 18.2% of youth who aspired to 
migrate in 2009 still aspired to migrate in the long 
run in 2014. At the same time, 9.8% of the youth 
who did not want to migrate in 2009 changed their 
mind and wanted to migrate by 2014. However, it 
is worth noting that 31.6% of those who aspired 
to migrate in 2009 were not tracked in 2014, but 
at the same time a similar percentage (28.8%) of 
the youth who did not aspire to migrate in 2009 
were missing in 2014. This suggests that it was 
unlikely that those missing in 2014 were missing 
due to having already migrated. Indeed, the SYPE 
questionnaire has information on members of the 
household who migrated and returned between 
2009 and 2014: only 26 of the youth who aspired 
to migrate in 2009 did in fact migrate for six 
continuous months and return between 2009 and 
2014. Moreover, 178 households in 2014 had current 
migrants, but we do not know whether those 
current migrants were aspirers in 2009. It is also 
possible that households migrated in their entirety, 
though those are potentially a small number. Only 
nine households were not tracked in 2014 because 
they moved overseas.
Table 5.5 also shows that the percentage of youth 
who aspired to migrate to the West in 2009 and 
were missing in 2014 was higher than the percent-
age of youth who aspired to migrate to Arab coun-
tries (35.7% compared to 30.7%). Yet it is import-
ant to note that the number of those who aspired to 
migrate to the West was rather small. 
Furthermore, in order to check the change in 
migration plans, we examine those who aspired to 
migrate in 2009 and aspired to migrate in the short-
term in 2014. Not surprisingly, when we consider 
short-term migration plans, only 10.3% of the 
youth who aspired to migrate in 2009 still wanted 
to migrate in the short-run in 2014, as seen in Table 
A5.11. Overall, this evidence suggests that it would 
TABLE 5.5 Panel analysis: Respondents’ long-term intention to migrate, measured in 2009 and 
again in 2014*, by gender (%)
 DID NOT HAVE 
 LONG-TERM HAD LONG-TERM MISSING 
 ASPIRATIONS IN 2014 ASPIRATIONS IN 2014 IN 2014 (N)
Total
Aspired to migrate in 2009 50.2 18.2 31.6 (1,746)
Did not aspire to migrate in 2009 61.5 9.8 28.8 (9,095)
(N) (6,469) (1,204) (3,168) (10,841)
► Wanted to go to an Arab country in 2009 51.3 18.0 30.7 (1,344)
► Wanted to go to a Western country in 2009 45.5 19.4 35.7 (387)
Male  
Aspired to migrate in 2009 49.2 21.4 29.4 (1,352)
Did not aspire to migrate in 2009 54.3 17.7 28.1 (3,464)
(N) (2,545) (901) (1,370) (4,816)
► Wanted to go to an Arab country in 2009 50.6 20.8 28.6 (1,071)
► Wanted to go to a Western country in 2009 54.2 7.0 38.8 (273)
Female  
Aspired to migrate in 2009 53.8 7.1 39.1 (394)
Did not aspire to migrate in 2009 65.9 4.9 29.2 (5,631)
(N) (3,924) (303) (1,798) (6,025)
► Wanted to go to an Arab country in 2009 43.1 24.1 32.9 (274)
► Wanted to go to a Western country in 2009 51.3 8.0 40.7 (113)
* Among youth who were between the ages of 15 and 29 when they were first interviewed in 2009.   
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who planned to migrate within the next five years, 
and on the short-term aspirers who were con-
templating migration in 2014. Similar patterns are 
observed for youth 13-35 (Table A5.12). Overall, the 
revolution seemed to have had a marginal impact 
on young Egyptians’ migration intentions. About 
91.2% of youth aged 18-29 said that the revolution 
had nothing to do with their migration intentions. 
The remainder were split almost equally between 
those who were more in favor of migration after the 
revolution and those who were no longer thinking 
about migration because of the revolution.
Among those male youth who had long-term plans 
to migrate, 20.7% changed their mind in favor of 
migration after the revolution and only 5.5% of 
male youth long-term aspirers were thinking less 
about migrating. On the other hand, of those youth 
who were short-term aspirers, 31.9% attributed the 
change in their thinking in favor of migration to the 
revolution. 
Table 5.6 focuses on the short-term migration 
aspirers and shows that 41.9% of youth aged 18-29 
years old who aspired to migrate started thinking 
about migration after the revolution. Furthermore, 
be unlikely that the number of nontracked youth 
and the change in migration intentions between 
2009 and 2014 are due to actual migration.
5.4  The January 25, 2011 
revolution and migration 
intentions
This section explores whether the January 25, 2011 
revolution in Egypt affected young people’s mi-
gration aspirations. Although one might speculate 
that the political instability and marked economic 
slowdown would push youth to consider migrating, 
the rest of the Arab region has also experienced 
political turbulence, including Libya, which was 
a popular destination for Egyptian migrants, and 
this might have discouraged potential migrants. 
At the same time, the global economic downturn 
has affected Western economies and their attrac-
tiveness, given the high unemployment rates and 
economic austerity. 
In the 2014 SYPE, all youth were asked whether 
the January 25 revolution affected their migration 
plans. Figure 5.5 shows the impact of the revolution 
on youth (aged 18-29), on the long-term aspirers 
FIGURE 5.5 Responses to the question “Has the revolution changed your decision with respect to 
migration?”, youth aged 18–29, 2014 (%)
   
Total (N) for all youth = 6,710; (N) for long-term = 1,129; (N) for short-term = 563. 
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5.5  Conclusion
This chapter examines migration aspirations 
among Egyptian youth during and after the polit-
ical changes Egypt has experienced since 2011. 
The rate of migration aspirations among youth did 
not change much between 2009 and 2014 when 
looking at youth aspiring to migrate within the next 
five years. When looking at short-term migration 
plans among youth, unsurprisingly, the percentage 
of aspiring migrants in 2014 was about half that of 
long-term aspirers. Youth were asked in particular 
whether the January 25, 2011 revolution sparked 
their migration plans or aspirations, but it appears 
that the revolution only had a marginal positive 
impact on youth’s aspirations to migrate. It is pos-
sible that those who felt strongly about the political 
and economic situation after 2011 have already 
migrated and we are not able to observe them in 
2014. However, it is also possible that given that 
other Arab countries, such as in Libya, were going 
through political instability and the global economic 
downturn during the same period, migration aspi-
rations have been dampened. The IOM survey con-
ducted after January 25, 2011 also found that the 
revolution did not seem to have directly influenced 
the decision of Egyptian youth to migrate. 
In terms of patterns of migration aspirations, males 
and the more educated tended to have higher 
aspiration rates. Despite the political instability in 
Egypt, economic factors were the main drivers of 
migration. Again, similar results were found by the 
IOM (2011) in terms of job and income loss acting 
as primary push factors for youth who reported in-
tentions to migrate after the revolution. In addition, 
social networks (family and friends) continued to 
play a prominent role in providing information on 
migration and help in migrating.
It is important to note that most migration aspira-
tions do not materialize. Indeed, actual migration 
depends on many factors: personal, financial 
constraints, migration policies, and opportunities. 
According to a recent study by Docquier et al. 
(2014), based on 138 countries, one in five educat-
ed potential migrants becomes an actual migrant, 
and only one out of 20 less educated potential 
TABLE 5.6 The impact of the revolution on 
youth with short-term plans to migrate, youth 
aged 18–29, 2014 (%)*
 MALE FEMALE TOTAL
When did you start  
thinking about migration?  
Before the revolution 57.5 60.7 58.1
After the revolution 42.5 39.4 41.9
(N) 458 107 565
Have you taken any steps  
to migrate or is it just an idea?   
Yes, I have started to take  
   steps 10.7 7.0 10.0
No, I have not yet started to  
  take steps 31.3 19.4 29.1
It is just an idea  57.9 73.7 60.9
Has anyone influenced your  
decision to migrate?   
Yes 18.8 21.7 19.4
No 81.2 78.3 80.6
Who has most influenced  
your decision?   
My father abroad 7.3 6.9 7.2
My mother abroad 0.0 2.6 0.6
Other relatives abroad 31.1 11.5 26.9
Egyptian friends abroad 38.4 32.4 37.1
My father in Egypt 6.6 5.8 6.4
My mother in Egypt 0.9 0.0 0.7
Other relatives in Egypt 2.7 13.6 5.0
Friends in Egypt 10.3 11.7 10.6
Foreign spouse 0.6 11.5 2.9
Migration brokers 0.9 0.0 0.7
Current/ex local employer 1.2 0.0 0.9
An educational institution 0.0 4.1 0.9
(N) (83) (23) (106)
 *Only youth who aspired to migrate.   
10.0% started taking steps to migrate; 10.7% 
among males and 7.0% among females. For 80.6% 
of these youth, no one influenced their intention 
to migrate but for the remaining 19.4%, relatives 
and friends abroad had been influential in chang-
ing youths’ migration plans. For the full sample of 
youth (13-35) a slightly higher percentage (82.3%) 
reported that no one had influenced their intention 
to migrate (see Table A5.13).
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migrants actually migrates. Nonetheless, migration 
aspirations are useful in understanding the deter-
minants of migration. 
A few points are worth highlighting from a policy 
perspective. First, although migration intentions 
are informative in explaining the determinants 
and possibly the patterns of migration, they are 
not accurate in predicting actual emigration rates. 
In order to solicit more concrete information on 
migration intentions, it would be useful to find out 
whether intentions are accompanied by any actions 
to realize such intentions, such as acquiring a pass-
port, saving, or looking for a job abroad. Second, 
economic factors are the most important push 
factor for Egyptian youth despite the recent polit-
ical turmoil. Finally, despite the lack of increase in 
migration aspirations among youth between 2009 
and 2014, international migration remains a dream 
of many young male youth in Egypt.
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Entry into marriage is a key aspect of the 
transition to adulthood, and an important 
marker of adult status in Egyptian society. In 
some regions, young people are waiting longer 
to get married for various reasons. Despite 
this trend, some female youth in Egypt remain 
at risk of early marriage and the numerous 
negative outcomes that are associated with 
entering adulthood too early.
6.1  Introduction
Marriage delay among young people, due in part 
to the high cost of marriage, has been identified 
as part of the phenomenon of “waithood,” or 
stalled transitions to adulthood, in Egypt as well 
as elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa 
(Dhillon and Yousef 2009; Singerman 2007). Yet 
at the same time that marriage delay has received 
increasing attention, there are subpopulations of 
female youth in Egypt who remain at risk of early 
marriage (Brady et al. 2007; Lee-Rife et al. 2012). 
In this chapter, we update the description of young 
Egyptians’ transition into marriage provided by 
SYPE 2009, addressing which types of youth enter 
marriage when, as well as a variety of characteris-
tics of young people’s marriages. 
The aging of the SYPE sample between 2009 and 
2014 allows for a broader look at youth’s transitions 
into marriage, as a larger percentage of the sam-
pled youth have now married. Because marriage is 
a state that most young people enter into only once 
and do not exit (rates of divorce and separation 
among this young population are very low), many 
of the youth marriages that we observe in 2014 
were the same marriages we observed in 2009. In 
order to differentiate between these marriages and 
the youth who have married since the last SYPE 
wave, we use the longitudinal dimension of SYPE 
to construct a variable reflecting year of marriage. 
This variable for marriage cohort identifies the 
youth who were married between the two SYPE 
rounds (2010–2014), so that they can be compared 
with youth who married during a similar period 
of time prior to the 2009 wave (marriage years 
2005–2009), and youth who married 10 years or 
more prior to the survey (marriage years 2004 or 
earlier). Analysis by marriage cohort is thus a key 
means by which we examine trends in the transition 
into marriage. 
6.2  Marital status among Egyptian 
youth, 2009 and 2014
Table 6.1 shows that in 2014 37.8% of female youth 
and 15.1% of male youth aged 15–29 were married 
(and 1.0% and 0.2% of young women and men 
were previously married, respectively). Breaking 
down the percentage of married youth by gender 
and age group indicates that the marriage rate for 
young men aged 24 and below has been low since 
2009, with 6.7% of young men aged 18–24 married 
and none of the male youth aged 15–17. Marriage 
rates for young men increased substantially in 
their late 20s, with 41.4% of young men in the age 
group 25–29 being currently married. These figures 
were similar to those found for youth aged 15–29 
in the 2009 SYPE. However, the aging of the SYPE 
sample from 2009 to 2014 allows for an additional 
examination of trends in youth entry into marriage 
at later ages; for 30–35-year-olds, the percentage 
of men who were currently married in 2014 rose to 
74.8% (with fewer than 1.0% previously married). 
In sum, three quarters of young men appear to 
enter into marriage in the decade between 25 and 
35 years of age, but an additional quarter of young 
men remained unmarried as of age 35. 
Compared to the large percentage of young men 
who marry in their late 20s, young women tend to 
marry earlier: 32.4% of female youth aged 18–24 
and 72.7% of those aged 25–29 were married, and 
another 1.7% had been previously married. This 
represents a drop in marriage prevalence of about 
3.0 and 6.0 percentage points, respectively, from 
the same age groups of young women in 2009. Cor-
responding with their generally younger transition 
into marriage, the increase in marriage prevalence 
among the 30–35-year-old age group in 2014 was 
not as sharp for young women (at 84.3% currently 
married and 3.8% previously married) as for young 
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Compared to a large 
proportion of young men 
who marry in their late 20s, 
young women tend to marry 
earlier: 32.4% of female 
youth aged 18–24 and 72.7% 
aged 25–29 were married in 
2014, and another 1.7% had 
been previously married.
men, relative to the 25–29 age group. This also in-
dicates that a smaller percentage of young women 
than young men (about 12.0%) remain never-mar-
ried in their early 30s. 
In 2014, 0.3% of male youth and 1.5% of female 
youth had been but were not currently married, con-
stituting 1.0% of the ever-married male and 3.2% 
of the ever-married female youth in the sample. 
Additionally, 1.6% of currently married male youth 
and 1.3% of currently married female youth were 
in their second marriage. Due to the small number 
of previously married youth in the sample (22 male 
and 43 female), the remainder of the chapter drops 
these youth from the analysis, focusing only on cur-
rently and never-married youth, as was done in the 
analysis of SYPE 2009 (Population Council 2010). 
Composition of recently married youth
Using the two SYPE waves, we can examine the 
characteristics of youth who got married between 
2009 and 2014, which gives an indication of which 
youth were more likely to marry during this period. 
Nearly half (46.7%) of married youth in 2014 were 
newly married in the second SYPE wave, i.e. they 
had married between 2010 and 2014. An additional 
29.0% were married between 2005 and 2009 (the 
time of the first SYPE wave), and 24.3% had been 
married since 2004 or earlier (data not shown). 
TABLE 6.1 Marital status of youth surveyed, by gender and age group, 2009 and 2014 (%)
 2009 2014
 NEVER CURRENTLY PREVIOUSLY NEVER CURRENTLY PREVIOUSLY
 MARRIED MARRIED MARRIED MARRIED MARRIED MARRIED
Males      
Ages 15–17 100.0 0.0 0.0 99.8 0.0 0.0
18–24 95.1 4.9 0.0 93.2 6.7 0.1
25–29 58.2 41.5 0.3 58.1 41.4 0.6
30–35 — — — 24.4 74.8 0.8
Total aged 15–29 86.8 13.1 0.1 84.7 15.1 0.2
Total aged 15–35 — — — 73.2 24.0 0.3
Females      
Ages 15–17 97.7 2.3 0.0 95.8 3.7 0.3
18–24 63.7 35.2 1.1 66.7 32.4 0.9
25–29 18.8 78.7 2.5 25.6 72.7 1.7
30–35 — — — 11.9 84.3 3.8
Total 15–29 58.5 40.2 1.3 61.2 37.8 1.0
Total 15–35 — — — 50.3 45.1 1.5
All youth     
Total aged 15–29 73.0 26.4 0.7 73.4 26.0 0.6
Total aged 15–35 — — — 62.0 34.3 0.9
(N) Ages 15–29 (7,438) (3,460) (78) (5,789) (2,775) (53)
(N) Ages 15–35 — — — (6,017) (4,507) (92) 
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TABLE 6.2 Characteristics of youth married 
between 2010 and 2014, by age, education, and 
wealth quintile, 2009 (%)
 MALE FEMALE TOTAL
Age group   
10–14 0.8 15.2 8.3
15–17 4.2 26.2 15.7
18–24 60.4 51.5 55.7
25–29 34.7 7.1 20.3
Education level
Illiterate 4.1 9.4 6.9
Can read and write 0.0 3.1 1.6
Primary 11.4 21.6 16.7
Preparatory 14.7 23.4 19.3
General secondary 9.3 11.3 10.3
Vocational secondary 38.6 21.6 29.7
Post-secondary institute 3.9 1.5 2.6
University and above  18.1 8.1 12.9
Wealth quintile
Lowest 21.5 25.3 23.5
Second 20.9 22.7 21.8
Middle 25.8 26.3 26.1
Fourth 18.4 15.0 16.6
Highest 13.4 10.7 12.0
 Total  47.8 52.2 100.0
 (N) (835) (1,250) (2,085)
As shown in Table 6.2, 55.7% of youth who married 
between the SYPE waves were in the age group 
18–24 in 2009. A substantial percentage (26.2%) 
of female youth who married were in the age group 
15 – 17 in 2009, whereas almost all of the other 
male youth who married (34.7%) were in the age 
group 25 – 29 in 2009. In terms of education, 
the percentage of recently married youth who 
had low educational attainment—mainly primary 
and preparatory education—was higher than the 
percentage of youth who have these levels as their 
final attainment (Chapter 3). This suggests that, 
particularly among young women, earlier exit from 
school is associated with the likelihood of marriage. 
A large percentage of youth who married also had 
vocational secondary education, which is likely 
related to the large percentage of youth who have 
this as their final educational attainment (Chapter 
3). Interestingly, the percentage of male youth 
who married who had a university education was 
higher than that of female youth, which may be 
related to men’s later average ages at marriage. 
Finally, among both male and female youth, a larger 
percentage of those who married between 2010 
and 2014 were in the lower wealth quintiles (which 
by definition contain 20.0% of the overall sample). 
This is likely related to the higher educational at-
tainment of wealthier youth, and therefore delay of 
marriage among this population. 
6.3  Age at marriage and early 
marriage 
SYPE 2014 asked youth their opinions on the 
ideal marriage age for men and women, revealing 
substantial gender differences. (This question on 
ideal marriage age was not asked in SYPE 2009.) 
The large majority of youth (79.2%) said that the 
ideal age at marriage for a young woman was 
between 18 and 24 (Figure 6.1). Whereas 5.5% 
said that the ideal marriage age for females was 
younger than 18, only 9.8% gave an age between 25 
and 29. Youth opinion on the ideal age at marriage 
for young men was much more varied, with 30.5% 
answering “between ages 18 and 24” and just 
over half answering “between ages 25 and 29. An 
additional 11.3% thought the ideal age at marriage 
for men was 30 or older, but less than 1.0% gave an 
age below age 18. 
Actual median ages at marriage among the SYPE 
sample in 2014 generally accorded with these ideals 
(for the full set of background characteristics see 
Table A6.1). In order to examine median age at mar-
FIGURE 6.1 Perceived ideal age at marriage 
among youth aged 13–35 (%) 
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riage, we restricted the analysis to youth aged 25 
and older, as estimates for younger youth are likely 
to be biased downward. Still, even at these older 
ages, it is important to note that some youth remain 
unmarried. Among married youth aged 25–29 in 
2014, male youth had married at a median age of 
25 and female youth at age 20. Among youth aged 
30–35, the median age at marriage was no different 
for females but increased to 26 among male youth, 
reflecting the fact that a much larger percentage of 
male youth remained unmarried at older ages. 
Focusing on youth aged 30–35 in 2014, median 
ages at marriage were lowest for female youth 
in rural areas, with female youth in rural Upper 
Egypt marrying the youngest at a median age of 
19 (Table 6.3). Less educated youth also tend to 
marry younger, although the relationship between 
education and age at marriage is clearer for young 
women. The most notable pattern among young 
men is that those with a university education or 
above tend to marry later than youth of all other 
educational attainments, at a median age of 28 
years. Among female youth, those with less than a 
vocational secondary education had median ages 
at marriage below 20. For those with a tertiary 
education, however, median age at marriage rose to 
23. Median age at marriage rose consistently with 
wealth for both young men and women, which likely 
reflects that wealthier youth are more likely to have 
higher educational attainments (Chapter 3), par-
ticularly as we would expect that wealthier youth 
are likely more able to cover the costs of marriage 
(data not shown). On the other hand, it is possible 
that wealth correlates with material expectations 
for marriage (see Section 6.7). Unemployed male 
youth had a higher median age at marriage (29) 
than their peers who were employed (26), which 
may similarly be related to the difficulty of saving 
for marriage without a job. Turning to marriage co-
hort, as we might expect, youth who were married 
in earlier years were much younger than youth who 
married in the few years prior to the survey. Male 
youth who were married by 2004 had a median age 
at marriage of 21, compared to 29 years among 
male youth who married between 2010 and 2014. 
Among female youth, the median age at marriage 
for those married before 2004, from 2005–2009 
and 2010–2014 increased steadily from 19 to 23 to 
28 years, respectively. 
Early marriage has been widely shown to be 
detrimental to young women’s health and socio-
economic outcomes (Lee-Rife et al. 2012). As 
suggested by these patterns in median age at 
marriage, early marriage in Egypt is concentrated 
among female youth in certain regions. In Table 6.4, 
we compare the percentage of married youth aged 
25–29 in 2009 and 2014 who were married before 
certain ages.1 Whereas marriage rates before the 
1 The percentage of youth married before a certain age 
is cumulative. For example, the percentage married 
before age 16 includes those who were married before 
age 15, etc. We restrict this analysis to the older age 
groups in order to avoid censoring. 
TABLE 6.3 Median age at marriage among 
youth aged 30–35, by selected background 
characteristics, 2014
 MALE FEMALE TOTAL
Region
Urban Governorates 27 21 24
Urban Lower Egypt 26 21 23
Rural Lower Egypt 26 20 22
Urban Upper Egypt 25 21 23
Rural Upper Egypt 25 19 21
Frontier Governorates 25 21 23
Education level
Illiterate 24 19 20
Can read and write 24 18 18
Primary 25 19 21
Preparatory 22 18 20
General secondary 26 19 24
Vocational secondary 25 20 22
Post-secondary institute 26 23 24
University and above 28 23 26
Employment status
Employed 26 20 25
Unemployed 29 21 23
Out of labor force 25 20 20
Marriage cohort
2010–2014 29 28 29
2005–2009 25 23 24
Before 2004 21 19 19
Total 26 20 22
(N) (646) (1,085) (1,731)
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legal age of 18 were negligible (0.1% or less) among 
married male youth in 2014, 1.7% of married fe-
male youth aged 25–29 in 2014 had been married 
before age 15, 4.2% before age 16, and 21.1% be-
fore age 18 (the legal age of marriage in Egypt). As 
compared to married youth aged 25–29 in 2009, 
this represented a decline in the prevalence of early 
marriage among young women. This was particu-
larly true for marriage before age 16, which halved 
from 8.3% of married female youth aged 25–29 in 
2009 to 4.2% in 2014.2 
Breaking down these rates of early marriage by 
background characteristics furthermore shows a 
strong concentration of early marriage among girls 
in rural areas, and particularly rural Upper Egypt, 
as was also the case in 2009. As shown in Figure 
6.2, among married female youth aged 25–29 in 
2014, 33.3% of those residing in rural Upper Egypt 
were married before age 18, compared to just under 
10% of those in the Urban Governorates and urban 
Lower Egypt. However, comparison with 2009 
again shows that the prevalence of early marriage 
declined in all regions except urban Upper Egypt. 
The largest declines in the percentage of young 
women who were married before 18 between 2009 
and 2014 were seen in rural Lower Egypt and the 
Frontier Governorates, which are also the regions in 
which early marriage is most prevalent. 
2 There is some possibility of increased misreporting 
of actual marriage age, as the legal age of marriage 
for women was changed from 16 years to 18 years in 
2008. If SYPE respondents became more aware of 
this change as time progressed, they may have been 
more reluctant to report having married prior to the 
new legal age. 
In addition to these regional trends, about half of 
female youth aged 25–29 (45.7%) in 2014 who  
had been married before age 18 were illiterate (data 
not shown), which is disproportionately large com-
pared to the percentage of female youth in these 
age groups who are illiterate (Chapter 3). This corre-
sponds to the concentration of early married female 
youth in rural areas, where educational attainment 
tends to be lower, but also highlights the protective 
effects of education in terms of marriage; female 
youth who marry tend to withdraw from school, and 
conversely, those who stay in school may be less 
likely to marry (Brady et al. 2007). 
6.4  Characteristics of youth 
marriages
The characteristics of young people’s marriages 
may have important implications for the dynamics 
of their relationship. This is particularly true for 
young women, as marriage to a relative, co-res-
idence with in-laws, and large age gaps between 
women and their husbands may all be associated 
with lower female autonomy. Relying on the new 
cohort of marriages established between the two 
TABLE 6.4 Percentage of married youth aged 
25–29 who reported being married at an early 
age, 2009 and 2014
 MALES FEMALES
 2009 2014 2009 2014
Married  
before age:
15 0.1 0.1 3.6 1.7
16 0.1 0.1 8.3 4.2
18 1.9 0.7 23.9 21.1
20 7.8 2.6 48.2 45.6
FIGURE 6.2 Percentage of married female 
youth aged 25–29 who were married before age 
18, by region, 2009 and 2014 (%)
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SYPE waves, this section examines trends in these 
factors in young people’s marriages. 
Consanguinity, or marriage to a relative, has been 
declining over time among youth of both genders. 
Overall, 27.4% of married youth in 2014 were mar-
ried to a relative, down from 33.9% of those married 
in 2009. This corresponds with the decrease in 
consanguinity among more recent marriages: 
Among youth married before 2004, 33.2% of males 
and 30.4% of females reported being married to a 
relative. In contrast, among youth married between 
2010 and 2014, only 24.2% of males and 25.6% of 
females were in a consanguineous marriage (data 
not shown). Among youth aged 15–29, 46.4% of 
consanguineous marriages in 2014 were to first 
cousins, compared to 59.2% in 2009, and did not 
vary by gender (data not shown).
Consanguinity is most common among early- 
marrying girls, as 35.1% of girls married before 
age 18 and 33.3% of girls married before age 16 in 
2014 were married to a relative (data not shown). 
By region, consanguinity is most prevalent in Upper 
Egypt and the Frontier Governorates; in the latter, 
42.5% of all marriages are consanguineous (Figure 
6.3; Table A6.2 in the Appendix). Consanguinity is 
also most common in rural areas, where almost 
one-third of marriages are consanguineous. More 
highly educated youth are less likely to marry a rela-
tive, with 16.8% of those who completed a university 
degree in consanguineous marriages as compared 
to 32.2% of those who were illiterate in 2014. Youth 
in lower wealth quintiles were similarly more likely 
to marry a relative. Finally, although consanguine-
ous marriage remains quite common among young 
people, it has become less common among more 
recent youth marriages; 24.9% of youth married be-
tween 2010 and 2014 married a relative, compared 
to 30.8% of those married before 2004. However, 
it is important to note that this may be due to the 
aging of the SYPE sample, as youth who married 
young were more likely to marry a relative. 
In the marriages of young people as of 2014, the 
husband was, on average, 5.2 years older than the 
wife; the median husband–wife age gap was five 
years among young married women and 4 years 
among young married men. In over 30% of mar-
riages, the husband was 6 to 10 years older than 
the wife, and the husband was 11 or more years 
older than the wife in 9.4% of marriages (Table 
6.5). Such large spousal age gaps were more fre-
quent in the marriages of young women, as more 
than 13.0% of young women compared to less than 
3.0% of young men were married to husbands 
or wives who are at least 11 years older. As with 
consanguinity, large spousal age gaps were more 
common among girls who married young; 22.5% of 
girls married by age 16 had husbands aged 11 years 
older or more, and 20.7% of girls married by age 18. 
By region, the largest spousal age gaps were found 
in rural areas in both Lower and Upper Egypt, which 
FIGURE 6.3 Prevalence of consanguineous 
marriages, by region and gender, 2014 (%)
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TABLE 6.5 Reported age gap between 
husbands and wives, among youth aged 13–35, 
2014 (%) 
 %
Husband is 1–5 years older than wife 47.7
Husband is 6–10 years older than wife 32.5
Husband is 11 or more years older than wife 9.4
No age gap 5.9
Wife is older than husband 4.5
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is also where young marriage is most common for 
female youth (data not shown). 
The SYPE data show that marriage in Egypt is tradi-
tionally patrilocal. Whereas 32.1% of married male 
youth reported that they lived with their own family 
upon marriage, only 2.4% of female youth did so 
(Table A6.3). Comparable percentages of mar-
ried youth lived with their spouse’s family; 32.2% 
of females and 11.7% of males. The majority of 
married youth—56.0% of male youth and 64.9% of 
female youth—lived independently upon marriage. 
The youngest married youth, particularly males, 
were more likely to live with their families than were 
older married youth; 34.8% of married males aged 
18–24 lived with their own families upon marriage 
compared to 28.3% of 30–35-year-olds. Rural 
youth were also more likely than urban youth to live 
with the spouse’s family upon marriage, whereas 
youth living in informal urban areas were most likely 
to live in an independent house upon marriage. 
Youth with higher educational attainment and 
from higher wealth quintiles were more likely to 
live independently, which is unsurprising given that 
socioeconomic status is associated with the ability 
to afford separate housing. Just over two-thirds 
(67.8%) of male youth in the highest wealth quintile 
and 80.1% of female youth lived independently 
upon marriage. 
6.5  Meeting and choosing a 
spouse
Marriage matching among youth mostly takes 
place through social networks rather than in 
institutional settings (Table A6.4). Among married 
youth, 42.7% met their spouse through personal 
(friends and acquaintances) networks, and 53.5% 
through broader social (relatives and neighbors) 
networks. As shown in Figure 6.4, 46.7% of 
FIGURE 6.4 How married youth aged 13–35 met their spouse, by education level, 2014 (%)
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* “Other” accounted for less than 2% of responses for all education levels except for “can read and write” (2.4%).
Rural youth were also more 
likely than urban youth to 
live with the spouse’s family 
after marriage, whereas youth 
living in informal urban areas 
were most likely to live in an 
independent house.
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university-educated youth reported meeting their 
spouse through personal networks, compared to 
39.3% of illiterate youth. Personal networks were 
more commonly reported by higher-educated, 
wealthier, and urban young people as the means 
through which they met their spouses, as 
compared to relatives, which were a more common 
means among less-educated, poorer, and rural 
young people, particularly in Upper Egypt and the 
Frontier Governorates. 
When SYPE respondents were asked who made 
the final decision about their marriage, 32.1% of 
married youth said that they made the decision 
themselves, 38.7% made the decision jointly with 
parents, and 29.2% said someone else alone 
made the decision for them (Table A6.5). Female 
youth were much more likely to report having no 
say over their marriage; 14.2% of young married 
men, compared to 37.4% of young married women 
said that somebody else alone decided about 
their marriage for them (Table 6.6). Younger youth 
were also more likely to have had someone decide 
about their marriage for them; whereas 39.2% 
of married youth aged 13–17 (nearly all of whom 
are young women) had no say in their marriage 
decision, this was the case for 25.5% of married 
youth aged 30–35. Less educated and poorer 
youth were also less likely to have had a say in their 
marriage decision. 
6.6  Quality of youth’s marital 
relationships 
SYPE 2014 also included an expanded set of ques-
tions about the quality of youth’s marital relation-
ships that can provide additional insight into family 
life and personal autonomy among young people. 
Overall among married youth aged 13–35, 53.7% 
agreed that they had a free and independent mar-
ital relationship, and an additional 22.3% strongly 
agreed (full set of responses in Table A6.6). Howev-
er, agreement with this statement varied substan-
tially by level of education, region of residence, and 
wealth. For example, whereas 32.1% of youth with a 
university education or above strongly agreed that 
they were free and independent in their marriage, 
only 15.1% of illiterate youth said so. Youth with 
lower educational attainments were more likely to 
be neutral in their response to this question.
Youth were also asked to respond to a series 
of negative statements about their marital 
relationship. When posed the statement, “My 
spouse does not respect me,” 81.6% of youth 
disagreed or strongly disagreed, with disagreement 
more prevalent in urban areas (Table A6.7). Just 
over 22% of youth in the Frontiers Governorates 
and 17.4% of those in informal urban areas were 
neutral with regard to this statement. When posed 
the stronger statement, “My spouse treats me 
harshly,” 81.0% of youth disagreed or strongly 
disagreed with this statement, and only 5.5% 
agreed or strongly agreed. Disagreement was 
lowest among the youngest married youth aged 
13–17, at 66.5%, compared to about 80–82% 
among all other age groups. Disagreement was also 
lower among the least educated and poorest youth. 
Married youth aged 13–35 were also asked about 
their communication with their spouses on a num-
ber of topics (Table A6.8). Whereas 73.9% of youth 
discussed their future plans with their spouses 
“often” or “daily”, a smaller percentage of couples 
(69.4%) talk about their work or study problems 
with their spouses. A greater percentage of youth 
(83.4%) communicated with their spouses about 
how things were going in their daily life, and a sim-
ilar percentage (80.6%) discussed their current or 
future children. Only 66.3% of married youth said 
that they discussed their marital sexual relations 
with their spouses, suggesting that this may be a 
sensitive subject even among couples. 
Interestingly, male youth were consistently 2 to 8 
percentage points more likely to report discussing 
TABLE 6.6 Degree of youth (aged 13–35) 
involvement in their final decision to marry, by 
gender, 2014 (%)
 MALES FEMALES
Youth made the decision him/herself 54.1 20.2
Someone else made the decision 14.2 37.4
Parents and youth made the
decision jointly 31.7 42.4
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all of these topics with their spouse than were 
female youth (Figure 6.5). Older, more educated, 
and wealthier youth also reported more frequent 
marital communication. Young people residing 
in informal urban areas were also more likely to 
report frequent marital communication; there was 
at least a 7 percentage-point gap between informal 
and urban or rural areas for each of the five marital 
communication topics. 
6.7  Cost of marriage 
The high cost of marriage in Egypt is a topic of 
frequent popular discussion, and has been linked to 
increasing age at marriage and stalled transitions 
to adulthood (Singerman 2007; Dhillon and Yousef 
2009). Young people in Egypt are expected to es-
tablish an independent home or unit within a family 
home upon marriage. The SYPE 2009, as well as oth-
er studies, has shown that about two-thirds of the 
costs of establishing the joint residence for the new 
couple and celebrating the marriage typically fall on 
the groom’s side, with the other third falling on the 
bride’s side. As in 2009, the SYPE 2014 collected 
data from married youth on the main categories of 
marriage expenditures, except for housing. These 
included the costs of furniture, appliances, first 
stock of food and other goods for the new residence, 
the bride’s trousseau (gihaz), and the celebrations 
(typically including an engagement party as well as 
a wedding). In addition, respondents were asked 
about the value of the shabka, or the jewelery pre-
sented to the bride. 
Comparing trends in the value of the shabka and 
total cost of marriage across marriage cohorts 
can give a sense of change in marriage costs 
over time, although these must be interpreted 
with some caution because, as discussed above, 
youth who married later were typically older and 
more educated. These factors likely contributed 
to the fact that the total reported value of the 
shabka among youth who married between 2010 
and 2014 was just under 7,000 EGP, compared to 
about 5,000 EGP among youth who married from 
2005–2009, and 4,000 EGP among youth who 
married prior to 20043 (Figure 6.6). 
However, it is also possible that the devaluation 
of the pound during Egypt’s transitional period 
affected the price paid for the shabka, or that 
expenditures are in fact rising in real terms. 
As expected, the total value of the shabka also 
increased with wealth quintile, from about 4,300 
LE among the youth in the lowest wealth quintile 
to 7,500 among those in the highest. The value 
of the shabka also generally increased with 
education, but, in contrast, decreased with age, at 
over 7,300 LE among those aged 13–17 compared 
to under 5,000 LE among those aged 30 and 
above (see Table A6.9). 
Similar to trends in the value of the shabka, the 
total cost of marriage (excluding housing and the 
shabka) increased among more recent youth mar-
riages, from about 25,000 LE among those married 
prior to 2004 to nearly 40,000 LE among those 
married from 2010–2014. The increase in total cost 
of marriage by wealth quintiles was also sharper 
than the increase in the value of the shabka, which 
may reflect greater variation in youth’s material 
expectations for their new dwelling. The cost of 
marriage for youth with a university education or 
above was also more than double that for illiter-
3 These shabka values have not been adjusted for 
inflation.
FIGURE 6.5 Youth reporting frequent 
discussions with their spouse on a variety of 
topics, by gender, 2014 (%)
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ate youth (Table A6.9). This corresponds with the 
finding above that educated and wealthier youth 
are more likely to live independently upon marriage, 
and therefore to spend more on establishing a 
separate residence. 
Perceived barriers to marriage
Given the substantial burden that saving for 
marriage represents for young people in Egypt, 
SYPE also asked respondents about their 
perceptions of the problems facing youth trying 
FIGURE 6.7 Youth’s perceptions of the 
problems they face in trying to marry, youth 
aged 15–29, 2009 and 2014 (%)
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to marry. As shown in Figure 6.7, in 2014 youth 
(aged 15–29) were more likely to perceive a range 
of factors to be problems as compared to 2009. 
Although the percentage mentioning housing 
was nearly the same across both survey years, 
at about 70%, in 2014 youth were more likely 
to perceive other components of the cost of 
marriage as a problem. They were also more likely 
to say that youth “want everything,” or that their 
material expectations for marriage are too high. 
In terms of employment, which is particularly 
important to young men’s ability to save for 
marriage and demonstrate marriageability, 
substantially larger percentages of youth cited 
problems in 2014. For example, whereas 10.4% 
of youth in 2009 said that the instability of jobs 
is a problem for youth trying to marry, by 2014 
this had risen to 25.0% of youth. This may reflect 
the declining labor market conditions for youth 
during the transitional period, as discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
 
FIGURE 6.6 Mean reported cost of bride’s 
shabka and total marriage cost, youth aged 
13–35, by wealth quintile and marriage cohort, 
2014
 
Note: As of June 2014, the exchange rate was: 1 USD = 7.6 
EGP.
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Potential solutions to marriage barriers
Youth’s greater concern with problems facing 
young people trying to marry in 2014 was matched 
by a greater percentage who agreed that different 
potential solutions were options for addressing 
these problems. Notably, the percentage of youth 
suggesting greater financial support from both 
the bride’s and the groom’s family increased from 
2009 to 2014, from 16.6% to 31.4% for the bride’s 
family and from 24.4% to 42.5% for the groom’s 
family (Figure 6.8). The already high percentage 
of youth who thought that the government should 
provide support for marriage also increased 
further, from 59.5% to 64.5%. The percentage 
of youth suggesting means of reducing marriage 
costs, namely doing without some things and living 
with family, also increased. 
6.8  Desired number of children
Finally, as in 2009, SYPE asked all youth what they 
thought the ideal number of children is for a couple 
to have. Surprisingly, the results show a universal 
increase in desired number of children among 
youth as compared to 2009. Among never-married 
youth aged 15–29, the average desired number 
of children increased from 2.6 in 2009 to 2.9 in 
2014, and among married youth of the same age it 
increased from 2.8 children to 3.1 (3.2 among youth 
aged 13–35 in 2014). As shown in Figure 6.9, this 
FIGURE 6.9 Desired number (mean) of 
children among married and unmarried youth 
aged 15–29, by gender, 2009 and 2014
Increases in desired fertility 
for both males and females 
were consistent across 
wealth quintiles. This trend 
in desired fertility could have 
important implications for 
future fertility rates.
FIGURE 6.8 Youth’s indications of possible 
solutions to the problems they face in trying  
to marry, youth aged 15–29, 2009 and 2014 
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increase held across both genders regardless of 
marital status. 
The increase in desired number of children also 
held across all wealth quintiles, educational levels, 
and regions of residence (Table A6.10). Among 
married youth aged 15–29, the largest increase 
in desired fertility was seen in urban Upper Egypt 
(from 2.9 to 3.5 children), whereas the Frontiers 
Governorates was the only region in which 
desired fertility remained unchanged. Among 
never-married youth, desired fertility increased 
by 0.5 children in both rural and urban Upper 
Egypt. Increases in desired fertility were quite 
consistent across wealth quintiles, at 0.3–0.4 
children among married youth, and around 0.1 
children for never-married youth in most quintiles. 
This trend in desired fertility could have important 
implications for future fertility rates.
6.9  Conclusion 
The 2014 Panel Survey of Young People in Egypt 
allows for a broad look at Egyptian youth’s 
transition into marriage, as the SYPE sample has 
now aged and a larger percentage of respondents 
have married. The analysis in this chapter reveals 
that the transition to marriage looks quite different 
for different subpopulations of Egyptian youth, 
with implications for the policies and programs 
that could help ensure that youth experience a 
timely and successful transition to marriage when 
and to whom they choose. 
On one hand, young women in Egypt remain at risk 
of early marriage, particularly in rural areas and 
in Upper Egypt. Although the prevalence of early 
marriage appears to be declining among younger 
cohorts of women, substantial percentages still 
marry before the legal age of 18. In addition, 
over a third of married young women report 
that they had no say in their decision to marry. 
There is therefore a need for continued programs 
to prevent early marriage, and to ensure the 
protection of young women’s right to decide when 
they marry and to whom. 
At the same time, there is a population of more 
educated youth, and particularly young men, who 
experience a comparatively late transition into 
marriage. Young men’s transition into marriage 
is more concentrated than young women’s, 
with a large majority marrying during their late 
20s and early 30s. Still, a quarter of young men 
aged 30–35 remain unmarried. Given the social 
significance of marriage as a marker of adulthood 
in Egypt, this raises the question of whether young 
men (and thus their potential spouses) remain 
unmarried not by choice but due to constraining 
factors. One such factor may be the high cost of 
marriage, which appears to be increasing even 
further among recent marriages (or among the 
subgroups of youth who are marrying later). 
That youth have increasingly felt the pressure 
of marriage costs under the difficult economic 
conditions prevailing during Egypt’s transitional 
period is demonstrated by the higher percentage 
of youth reporting that young people face 
problems in trying to marry as compared to 2009. 
Measures to make marriage financially accessible 
to young people may thus be key to ensuring their 
successful transition to adulthood. 
Finally, the number of children that youth wish 
to have has increased almost universally across 
gender, marital status, and other background 
characteristics since 2009. This finding agrees 
with the finding of lower contraceptive use among 
currently married youth (Chapter 2), but requires 
further investigation in order to understand some 
of the mechanisms that may be causing youth to 
want larger families than in 2009. If this increase 
in desired fertility proves to be a long-term trend, 
it has significant implications for a variety of 
national development indicators (see, e.g. Krafft 
and Assaad 2014), and points to the need for 
youth to have better access to education and 
information on family planning. 
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7.1  Introduction
The central role of youth in sparking the January 
25 revolution was particularly compelling given the 
low rates of youth participation in political groups, 
voting, and volunteerism prior to this time. In 
2009, the first round of the SYPE found youth to be 
politically apathetic and disengaged. Only 16% of all 
youth age 18–29 had voted in a previous election, 
and less than 1% belonged to a political party. Less 
than 5% of Egyptian young people age 15–29 were 
members of a group or organization in 2009, and 
fewer than 3% reported having participated in 
volunteer activities, mainly providing assistance to 
the poor (Population Council 2010). 
As few nationally representative data have been 
available on youth’s involvement in the January 25 
revolution and subsequent events, the apparent 
dramatic shift from apathy to activism led to 
pressing questions about the current state of civic 
and political participation among youth: What were 
the actual participation rates of youth in revolution-
related activism and who participated? For what 
reasons did many young people choose not to 
participate in the political events that started with 
the January 25, 2011 movement? Which youth 
were more or less likely to vote in the elections and 
referendums held during Egypt’s transition? SYPE 
2014 presents a unique opportunity to answer 
these questions on the national level, and to 
present a new portrait of youth activism and civic 
engagement during Egypt’s transition. 
Due to the wealth of data that SYPE collected 
on this topic, in this chapter we focus on youth 
participation in political events and processes, 
namely protests and other street-based activism, 
political organizing, and voting behavior. In the 
subsequent chapter we turn to volunteerism and 
participation in social groups, as well as youth’s 
social and political opinions about a range of 
current events and issues. 
Due to the multitude of changes that have 
occurred in the political arena since 2009, the 
SYPE 2014 civic engagement module substantially 
revised the series of questions related to civic 
participation, including participation in volunteer 
work, organizational membership, affiliation with 
political parties, and participation in elections. A 
new set of questions about participation in the 
events between January 25, 2011 and June 30, 
2013 was also included in order to capture the 
extent and types of involvement among youth 
of different backgrounds. The set of questions 
asked in SYPE 2009 regarding media use was 
also updated, to attempt to measure the extent to 
which youth used media as vehicles to advance a 
political cause or as tools to remain informed and 
engaged citizens.
7.2  Youth participation in political 
activism since January 2011
Since the events of January 25, 2011, Egypt has 
witnessed an enormous change in the ways in 
which citizens claim their political rights and 
express their grievances. An analysis of which 
groups of youth actually participated in protests, 
and how they engaged in the tumultuous political 
processes of the past three years, is necessary 
in order to shed more light on the dynamics 
of this transitional period. The 2014 SYPE 
asked respondents about their participation in 
protests, activities to support protesters, strikes, 
neighborhood watches (legan shaabeya), and 
any violent forms of resistance since the onset 
of the January 25 revolution. Youth were also 
asked whether they had participated in any form 
of political or electoral organizing, including 
participating in or donating money to political 
On January 25, 2011, protesters began an  
18-day struggle against the Mubarak regime  
that brought new attention to Egyptian youth  
in the media, society, and politics. Young people 
have been widely viewed as a catalyst of the 
revolution through their public activism in virtu-
al and physical spaces. They used social media, 
street protests, neighborhood protection com-
mittees, social services for demonstrators, and 
creative forms of artistic expression to express 
their grievances and call for change. 
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parties, signing petitions, contacting politicians, or 
participating in electoral campaigns.1 
Surprisingly, we find that participation in such ac-
tivities among SYPE respondents was low, with only 
7.4% of youth reporting that they had participated 
in any of the above-mentioned events since January 
25 (Figure 7.1). Due to the low percentage of youth 
reporting participation in any of the types of political 
organizing, we aggregated all of these types into one 
measure; still, only 1.2% of youth reported participa-
tion in any type of political organizing. Just over 6% 
of youth reported participating in a neighborhood 
watch, which was the most common form of partici-
pation. Contrasting the picture painted by extensive 
media coverage, only 1.3% of youth reported par-
ticipating in a protest at any point from January 25, 
2011 through the time of the survey. (See Table A7.1 
for the full set of participation patterns.)
There was some overlap between youth who took 
part in these different forms of activity, although 
the majority did not participate in more than one 
type of activity. About a quarter of youth who had 
participated in a protest also reported participat-
1 SYPE 2014 respondents who did not answer all ques-
tions in the series about participation in revolutionary 
activities, networks’ participation in the revolution, 
personal exposure to violence, and participation in 
elections are dropped from these respective analyses. 
Otherwise, we would be making the assumption that 
nonresponse is equivalent to a “no,” which is likely to 
be misleading, particularly for activities that youth 
may have been reluctant to report. 
ing in political organizing and vice versa. Although 
nearly half of youth who participated in a protest 
also participated in a neighborhood watch, because 
the latter group was larger, 90% of those who 
joined a neighborhood watch reported that they 
did not protest. As fewer than 1% of youth reported 
participating in activities to help protesters, strikes, 
or events involving violence, we do not present any 
further results on these types of activism alone due 
to the small sample size. 
Understanding the socioeconomic makeup of 
those who participated in the protests can help 
reveal what dominated the agendas of those 
who participated. As shown in Figure 7.1, there 
was a substantial gender gap in participation 
in revolutionary activities, with 13.1% of male 
respondents participating compared to 1.5% 
of female respondents. This gender gap was 
somewhat expected due to the social, economic, 
The 2014 Panel Survey of 
Young People in Egypt provides 
a unique opportunity to 
present a new portrait of youth 
activism and civic engagement 
during Egypt’s transition.
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FIGURE 7.1 Youth participation in revolutionary activity since January 2011, by gender and age, 2014 (%)
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political, and security factors that may bar 
women from fully participating in the public 
sphere, particularly in open street protests 
and similar events, but stands in contrast to 
the extensive media discussion about female 
youth’s participation in protests and other events. 
Disaggregated by gender, 11.8% of male youth 
report being part of neighborhood watches, 
which were organized during the 18 days of the 
2011 revolution to protect homes from baltagiyya 
(“thugs”) who took advantage of the security 
vacuum, compared to less than half a percent of 
female youth. The highest rate of female youth 
participation in any single activity was protesting 
(0.9%), followed by political organizing (0.5%), 
but these numbers were still lower than the 
participation rates of male youth in the same 
activities (at 1.7% and 1.9%, respectively). 
Along with difference in participation rates by 
gender, involvement in revolutionary activity varied 
greatly by residence; 13.9% of youth from the 
Urban Governorates participated in any form of ac-
tivity, compared to lows of 2.6% in the Frontier Gov-
ernorates and rural Upper Egypt and 2.1% in urban 
Upper Egypt (Figure 7.2). The type of revolutionary 
activity youth participated in also varied slightly de-
pending on area of residence. While youth involve-
ment in neighborhood watches was most common 
in urban areas (9.3%), it was least common in 
informal urban settlements (3.5%). Involvement 
in protests also varied slightly by residence: 3.0% 
of urban-based youth reported participating in 
demonstrations, compared to 0.6% of rural-based 
youth and almost 1% of youth living in informal ar-
eas. These patterns are expected since protests, as 
well as the violence that motivated neighborhood 
watches to form, were concentrated in Cairo and 
other major urban areas. 
A positive correlation exists between youth’s ed-
ucation level and the likelihood of participating in 
some form of political activism. Illiterate youth were 
the least active, with a participation rate of 2.6%, 
compared to those who received university and 
graduate level education who reported the highest 
participation rate of 12.2% (Figure 7.3). This pattern 
may reflect a variety of factors, including network 
effects among youth with similar characteristics, 
the concentration of protests around universities, 
or the fact that urban populations, among whom 
participation rates were higher, tend to be better 
educated (see Chapter 3). Similarly, there was a 
positive relationship between household wealth 
and political activism; 10.7% of young people in the 
highest wealth quintile participated in revolution-
ary activity, as opposed to 3.8% of those from the 
lowest wealth quintile. The relationship between 
wealth and participation held across all types of 
participation measured. For example, 2.3% of youth 
from the highest wealth quintile participated in 
protests, and 1.4% from the fourth quintile, com-
pared to only 0.3% from the lowest wealth quintile. 
That there was greater participation from the youth 
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in the highest wealth quintiles in the January 25 
revolution may indicate that these participants 
understood the revolution as a struggle for civil and 
political freedoms and not simply as one of eco-
nomic grievances.
Unemployed youth were more likely to participate 
in protests (2.5%) than employed youth (1.7%), 
which may be a result of these youth having more 
free time, but may also reflect greater disillusion-
ment or dissatisfaction with their life circumstanc-
es. A similar pattern held for political organizing, 
helping protesters and, interestingly, participating 
in strikes, even though these youth reported not 
having a job. Youth who were out of the labor force 
had much lower rates of participation in all types of 
activities, likely because this group is predominant-
ly composed of female youth. However, likely due 
to the occurrence of protests at universities since 
January 25, 2011, youth who were out of the labor 
force but in school reported a somewhat higher 
participation rate in revolutionary activity (7.0%). 
7.3  Participation of youth’s social 
networks
The consistently low participation rates reported 
by the generation termed the “youth of the revo-
lution” are quite surprising, and raise the question 
of whether youth may have underreported their 
participation in revolutionary activity due to the 
politically sensitive climate characterizing the 
period during which SYPE 2014 data was collected 
from late July 2013 through early 2014. This period 
included crackdowns on certain political parties, 
as well as the passage of a restrictive protest law 
in November 2013. Even though respondents were 
repeatedly reminded of their anonymity, they may 
have been hesitant to self-report their activism 
during this period of uncertainty. 
What leads us to suspect that youth underreported 
their revolutionary activism is the higher rates of 
participation that respondents reported for other 
people in their lives. SYPE 2014 asked youth to rate 
the frequency of their parents’, closest sibling’s, 
and closest friend’s participation in organizing 
or other “indirect” forms of activism (such as 
participating in night watches), or direct forms 
of activism such as strikes.2 Whereas youth’s 
self-reported involvement in any of these types of 
revolutionary activity is low, respondents indicated 
higher rates of participation for all of these groups 
of family members and friends (Figure 7.4, full 
set of characteristics in Table A7.2). For example, 
2 For young people’s networks, SYPE defined organiza-
tional types of activism as activities such as partici-
pating in a political party, donating money to a political 
organization, or signing a petition. Night watches and 
protests were classified as “indirect” or supportive ac-
tivism. Examples of “direct” activism included joining 
sit-ins or strikes.
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whereas only 13.1% of male respondents self-
reported their own participation in any form 
of revolutionary activity, 28.7% of male youth 
reported their closest friends, 17.6% their siblings, 
and 14.5% their fathers as having participated in 
some form of revolutionary activity. Of all their 
social networks, male respondents reported only 
their mothers, with a participation rate of 6.2%, 
as being less active than themselves. There was a 
smaller but still notable gap between male youth’s 
reporting of their networks’ participation in direct 
forms of activism and their own participation in 
protests (1.7%); for example, 14.9% reported that 
their friends participated in direct activism, 3.3% 
their fathers, and 2.7% their mothers (Table A7.2). 
As for female respondents, although only 1.5% had 
reported themselves as participating in any form 
of activity, they indicated that their fathers (10.1%), 
mothers (5.4%), siblings (12.5%), and friends 
(13.0%) had all been more active than themselves. 
They similarly reported that their networks were 
more active than themselves in both indirect 
and direct forms of activism. The fact that youth, 
across background characteristics, consistently 
reported higher participation rates among their 
networks—including their mothers, despite the 
gender norms that restrict women’s participa-
tion—strongly suggests underreporting of youth’s 
own participation. Interestingly, the reported par-
ticipation of youth’s networks in rural Lower Egypt 
and the Frontier Governorates is also particularly 
high (Table A7.2). 
These data also show strong network effects in 
terms of participation. In other words, youth who 
participated in revolutionary activity were more 
likely to report that their friends and family also 
participated. For example, whereas less than 10% 
of inactive youth report their fathers as having 
participated in some form of revolutionary activity, 
this increases to 45% of youth who participated 
in political organizing and 36% of those who 
participated in a protest (Figure 7.5). Reported 
participation among the friends and siblings of 
youth who themselves participated is even higher. 
Interestingly, youth who protested reported that 
their parents were mainly involved in indirect 
forms of activity, whereas rates of participation in 
direct activity among their friends and siblings was 
substantially higher than among those of youth 
who did not protest.
FIGURE 7.4 Youth’s reports of their own 
and their networks’ participation in any 
revolutionary activity, by gender, 2014 (%)
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FIGURE 7.5 Youth’s reports of their networks’ 
participation in various revolutionary activities, 
by youth’s own participation level, 2014 (%) 
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7.4  Reasons for nonparticipation
Despite the possibility that respondents underre-
ported their political activism, many youth also said 
that they chose not to participate in revolutionary 
activities or were barred from being politically 
active by their families. As shown in Figure 7.6, 
29.1% of youth reported that they did not partici-
pate in any revolutionary activity because they were 
confused about what was happening and could not 
decide if it was right or wrong to participate. Just 
under 19% of respondents indicated that they were 
not against the former regime and had no interest 
in participating in the uprising to undermine it, sug-
gesting diversity in youth’s opinion on the need for 
the January 25 revolution. About 16% of nonpartici-
pants did not join because they felt that their partic-
ipation would not make a difference in changing the 
turn of events, and 14.5% gave other reasons. 
Finally, despite the fact that youth reported higher 
rates of participation among some types of family 
members than they did for themselves, 27.4% of re-
spondents said that their mother or father prohib-
ited them from participating in the events. Younger 
youth, as might be expected, were more likely to 
report that they did not participate due to parents’ 
opposition (Table A7.3). Youth in higher wealth 
quintiles were also more likely to give this reason, 
and less likely to report “other” as their reason for 
nonparticipation. 
The main reasons youth reported for not partici-
pating also varied depending on where they were 
located. Whereas 42.4% of nonparticipants from 
the Urban Governorates blamed their parents for 
their lack of participation, only 18.4% from rural 
Upper Egypt cited this reason. This difference may 
be due to the higher level of revolutionary activity 
in the Urban Governorates, thus warranting greater 
opposition from parents. It could also be that youth 
in the Urban Governorates were more interested in 
participating than their peers elsewhere, so paren-
tal opposition was their main reason for nonpartic-
ipation as opposed to other factors. Fairly similar 
percentages of youth across the different regions 
did not participate because they felt they would not 
make a difference, ranging from about 13% to 17%. 
However, youth from Upper Egypt and rural Lower 
Egypt were more likely to say that they did not 
participate because they were not against the prior 
regime, reaching 25.4% among youth from urban 
Upper Egypt. 
7.5  Media use for information on 
the January 25 revolution
Awareness of current events and social, economic, 
or political issues facing a country can be strongly 
influenced by the media. However, the democra-
tization of media with the spread of the Internet, 
and the growing popularity of new forms of social 
media, have also provided for more decentralized 
FIGURE 7.6 Youth’s reasons for nonparticipation in revolutionary activity, by region , 2014 (%)
Note: Multiple answers allowed.
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forums for Egyptians to share information and 
debate political events. There has been a particular 
focus on the role played by social media in help-
ing instigate and organize the uprisings that have 
taken place across the Middle East and North Africa 
since the Arab Spring. Thus, understanding how 
youth use media is crucial when attempting to draw 
conclusions about the factors and mechanisms 
that produced the January 25 revolution and other 
moments of political mobilization. 
In 2009, SYPE asked young people about the 
frequency of their use of different media to obtain 
news and information, and found low usage. Over 
70% of youth aged 15–29 reported that they never 
used any form of media as a source of news, and 
fewer than 10% had ever used the Internet. Yet 
SYPE indicates that youth’s internet and media 
use increased dramatically from 2009 to 2014; 
in 2014, a quarter of youth aged 15–29 (25.1%) 
reported having ever used the internet (23.4% of 
all youth). Also, about 80% of youth reported that 
at least one type of media was important or very 
important to them for getting information about 
the January 25 revolution (data not shown). 
SYPE 2014 asked youth to rank the importance of 
different sources of information to them regarding 
the January 25 revolution on a scale of 1 to 10. On 
average, youth rated television as the most import-
ant source with an 8.2 rating (Table 7.1). Radio and 
newspapers both received a 4.7 rating, news shared 
through the Internet and Facebook were rated 4.5 
and 4.4, respectively, and Twitter 3.9. The workplace 
was also rated at 3.9, and family and friends at 5.6, 
indicating that, with regards to the revolution, word-
of-mouth was an important source of information 
for youth in addition to media. 
There was little variation by socioeconomic or 
demographic background characteristics in youth’s 
ratings of the importance of different sources of 
information on January 25. However, as shown in 
Table 7.1, youth who participated in revolutionary 
activities had different patterns of media usage, and 
gave higher importance ratings to a wider variety 
of information sources. Youth who participated in 
political organizing or protests were more likely 
to report internet news and social media such as 
Facebook and Twitter as sources of information. For 
example, protesters and political organizers rated 
Facebook’s importance at 7.1 and 6.9, respectively. 
Youth who participated in political organizing rated 
radio, newspapers, and word-of-mouth sources 
such as family and work higher than both youth 
overall and protesters did. 
7.6  Experience of violence 
Egypt has suffered through the most intense 
political unrest in its recent history in the four years 
since the January 25, 2011 revolution, leading Egyp-
tians to be exposed to new levels of violence both 
in the media and potentially in person. Although 
the impact that this unrest may have on youth is 
unknown, a first step is to measure youth’s direct 
Results from SYPE indicate 
that internet use among youth 
increased dramatically in the 
five years between surveys, 
jumping from less than 10% in 
2009 to 25% in 2014.
TABLE 7.1 Youth’s rating (mean) of the 
importance of different media sources of 
information about January 25, by participation 
in revolutionary activities (scale of 1 to 10)
 ALL  POLITICAL PRO- 
SOURCE YOUTH ORGANIZERS TESTERS
TV 8.2 8.1 7.3
Friends/family 5.6 7.5 6.6
Newspaper 4.7 6.1 4.9
Radio 4.7 5.4 4.1
Internet news 4.5 7.1 6.4
Facebook 4.4 6.9 7.1
Twitter 3.9 5.7 5.5
Work 3.9 5.9 4.6
Pamphlets 3.5 4.9 4.0
Meetings 3.3 4.8 3.9
Text message 3.3 4.4 3.8
Email 3.3 4.5 4.3
103
YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL EVENTS FROM JANUARY 2011–JUNE 2013
and indirect exposure to violence during Egypt’s 
transition. As shown in Table 7.2, the SYPE results 
indicate that nearly all youth witnessed violence on 
TV during the period from the start of the January 
25, 2011 revolution to the time of the survey; 98.5% 
of all respondents reported witnessing violence on 
television at least once during this time. Just under 
one-third reported seeing violence on social media 
during the same period. Male youth, youth in the 
middle age ranges (13–29-year-olds), urban youth, 
and youth with post-secondary education were 
more likely to report having witnessed violence on 
social media. 
Youth were also asked whether they had seen 
someone injured or killed in person during the peri-
od from the start of the January 25, 2011 revolution 
to the time of the survey. Overall, 18.3% reported 
having seen someone injured and 7.2% having seen 
someone killed. However, the frequency with which 
youth witnessed violence in these forms varied sub-
stantially; nearly all youth who had seen violence on 
TV said that they saw this “many times” or “a few 
times,” and the majority of youth reported seeing 
violence on TV. Of those who witnessed violence in 
person, slightly over half also said that they saw this 
“many times” or “a few times.” Of those youth who 
reported seeing someone killed in person, over half 
said they saw this just once and the rest more fre-
quently. Again, male youth, youth in the middle age 
groups, and those with post-secondary education 
TABLE 7.2 Youth exposure to violence perpetrated against others, January 25, 2011 to time of the 
survey, by background characteristics and participation in revolutionary activity, 2014 (%)
ON TV SOCIAL MEDIA
SAW SOMEONE 
INJURED IN PERSON
SAW SOMEONE 
KILLED IN PERSON
Gender
Male 98.4 37.6 24.0 9.6
Female 98.5 24.5 12.3 4.7
Age group
13–17 98.8 32.1 14.9 5.2
18–24 98.4 34.8 20.0 8.4
25–29 98.3 29.6 18.9 7.7
30–35 98.3 24.0 17.3 6.0
Region
Urban Governorates 99.1 54.9 32.5 9.0
Urban Lower Egypt 99.0 37.3 22.7 10.9
Rural Lower Egypt 97.3 29.9 17.7 7.7
Urban Upper Egypt 98.5 23.5 6.8 4.0
Rural Upper Egypt 99.1 16.7 10.3 4.0
Frontier Governorates 98.2 33.4 29.5 20.8
Education level
Illiterate 96.6 8.7 7.7 3.3
Can read and write 99.1 17.4 10.7 1.9
Primary 98.5 15.0 14.8 6.2
Preparatory 99.1 20.2 13.9 4.8
General secondary 98.5 45.9 18.4 7.0
Vocational secondary 98.4 24.5 17.3 7.0
Post-secondary institute 99.5 46.5 30.9 11.8
University and above 98.7 60.4 27.7 11.0
Youth participation in revolution
No participation 98.3 28.4 16.9 6.7
Any participation 99.9 65.8 35.9 13.1
Political organizing 100.0 78.5 53.9 21.7
Neighborhood watch 99.9 63.7 33.6 13.1
Protest 100.0 80.9 62.1 22.8
Total 98.5 31.2 18.3 7.2
(N) (10,890) (10, 889) (10,890) (10,888)
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were more likely to report seeing either of these 
forms of violence. 
Youth reports of having witnessed violence in 
person also varied by region (Table 7.2). Youth in 
the Frontier Governorates witnessed the highest 
level of violence, with 29.5% reporting that they had 
seen someone injured and 20.8% reporting that 
they had seen someone killed. This high rate may 
be explained by the increasing activity of militants 
in the Sinai Peninsula since the January 25 revolu-
tion. Youth in the Urban Governorates and urban 
Lower Egypt also witnessed relatively high rates of 
violence. Youth in rural Upper Egypt were least likely 
to report having personally witnessed violence, with 
10.3% having seen someone injured and 4.0% had 
seen someone killed. 
Similar to the low reported rates of participation 
in protests and other events, and somewhat in 
contrast to the results presented above, few youth 
reported that they had ever been directly exposed 
to violence on the streets, whether since January 
25, 2011 or before the revolution. As shown in Table 
7.3, 5.0% of youth report having ever been the 
victim of a form of violence. The most common 
among these, verbal abuse, was experienced by 
3.4% of youth, whereas 1.7% of all youth reported 
being exposed to tear gas, 1.0% said they had been 
hit or kicked, and 0.8% said that they had a family 
member or friend injured. Fewer than half a percent 
of youth reported being exposed to other forms 
of violence, including being shot at, detained, or 
having a friend or family member killed, so we did 
not disaggregate these numbers further due to the 
small sample sizes. 
Direct exposure to all reported types of violence was 
higher among males than among females, although 
exposure to different types of violence was more 
common in different regions. Overall, youth in the 
Urban Governorates were most likely to report expo-
sure to any violence, at 7.9%. As expected, however, 
youth who participated in any form of revolutionary 
activity, including political organizing or a neighbor-
hood watch, were substantially more likely to report 
exposure to all kinds of violence than youth who had 
not participated in any form of activity. 
The types of violence that youth were exposed to 
before and after the January 25 revolution appear 
to be quite different. Whereas only 38.6% of youth 
who reported verbal abuse said that this had hap-
pened since the start of the revolution, and 22.3% 
of those who reported being kicked or hit, nearly all 
of the youth who were exposed to tear gassing or 
saw a friend or family member injured reported that 
this occurred since the revolution. Youth were also 
much more likely to report that the latter forms of 
violence were perpetrated by a state force, whether 
the police, military, or other agency. 
These low reports of direct exposure to street 
violence should also be taken with caution, as they 
provide additional evidence that youth may have 
underreported their participation in revolution-
ary activities in SYPE. For example, the fact that 
98.5% of youth exposed to tear gas reported that 
this occurred since the revolution suggests that 
these youth were likely gassed during a protest. 
Although it is possible that youth were exposed 
to tear gas while simply observing a protest, the 
fact that 73% of the youth who reported being 
gassed said that they had not participated in any 
protests may also point to underreporting of their 
participation in revolutionary activity. Furthermore, 
the high percentage of youth who report having 
seen someone killed or injured in person, relative 
to the rates of self-reported participation, seems 
inconsistent. The large discrepancy between these 
reported figures suggests that these youth may in 
fact have been at protests or other events where 
they witnessed violence.
7.7  Perceptions of January 25, 
2011 and June 30, 2013 
Two regime changes have occurred in Egypt over 
the past four years that were not brought about 
by elections: the ousting of long-term President 
Hosni Mubarak after the 18 days of 2011, and the 
deposing of President Muhammad Morsi in the 
summer of 2013. To better understand how youth 
felt about these historical events, SYPE 2014 
attempted to assess youth’s perceptions of the 
goals of both January 25, 2011 and June 30, 2013, 
as well as whether or not they supported the event. 
It is important to remember that youth’s responses 
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were shaped by the events that followed both of 
these regime changes, which included political 
instability and an economic downturn. Youth’s 
understandings of and support for January 25, 2011 
and June 30, 2013  with the hindsight of two years 
and several months, respectively, may therefore be 
different from responses they would have given at 
the time of these events. 
SYPE 2014 asked to what degree the goals of the 
January 25 and June 30 events were clear to them. 
Whereas 37.4% of youth found the goals of the 
January 25 “very clear”, a higher percentage, 43.2%, 
found the goals of June 30 “very clear” (Figure 
7.7). For each of these events, over 40% of youth 
said that they found the goals “somewhat clear,” 
indicating a fairly high degree of confusion among 
youth as to what both movements were about. 
Only 17.2% of youth found the goals of January 25 
unclear, compared to 14.2% of youth who found the 
goals of June 30 unclear. Youth in the higher wealth 
quintiles generally tended to report greater clarity 
on the goals of both events compared to their 
peers in lower quintiles (Table A7.4); however, this 
relationship may be driven by education, as more 
educated youth also tended to report greater clarity 
on the goals. Youth from the Frontier Governorates 
generally reported lower levels of clarity on the 
goals of both events. Male youth were more likely 
to report that they were “very clear” on the goals of 
both January 25 and June 30 compared to female 
youth, who were more likely than male youth to 
report that they were “very unclear” about the goals 
of both events.
TABLE 7.3 Youth aged 13–35 reporting having been the victim of violence, by selected background 
characteristics, participation in revolutionary activity, and when violence occurred, 2014 (%)
 ANY FORM OF VIOLENCE
VERBAL 
ABUSE
HIT OR 
KICKED
TEAR 
GASSED
FAMILY MEMBER OR 
FRIEND INJURED
Gender 
Male 7.3 4.8 1.6 2.6 1.3
Female 2.6 1.9 0.4 0.7 0.2
Age group
13–17 4.5 3.7 1.1 1.0 0.3
18–24 5.5 3.5 1.1 2.0 0.7
25–29 5.4 3.6 1.2 1.8 1.2
30–35 3.8 2.2 0.5 1.6 0.8
Region
Urban Governorates 7.9 3.1 0.7 5.2 2.1
Urban Lower Egypt 1.9 1.0 0.5 1.1 0.3
Rural Lower Egypt 3.9 3.0 0.7 0.9 0.4
Urban Upper Egypt 6.0 4.7 0.8 1.5 0.3
Rural Upper Egypt 5.4 4.6 1.8 0.6 0.4
Frontier Governorates 4.1 1.2 0.4 0.6 3.0
Youth participation in revolution
No participation 3.3 2.8 0.8 0.4 0.3
Any participation 25.7 10.6 3.4 17.1 6.0
Political organizing 38.3 13.3 2.4 26.1 13.4
Neighborhood watch 24.5 9.8 3.6 17.3 5.6
Protest 41.0 13.6 5.0 35.4 5.1
Total 5.0 3.4 1.0 1.7 0.8
(N) (10,890) (10,890) (10,798) (10,721) (10,792)
(N who responded “yes”) (500) (322) (92) (169) (98)
Experienced this form of violence  
after January 25, 2011
N/A 38.6 22.3 98.1 96.5
This form of violence was perpetrated  
by state forces (police, military, etc.)
N/A 8.2 9.2 68.4 58.5
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7.8  Youth participation in 
elections and referendums
Under the Mubarak regime, the National Dem-
ocratic Party maintained an effective monopoly 
on political power, and elections were tightly 
controlled. In this context, youth participation 
in elections was low, as documented by SYPE 
2009, which found that only 16% of respondents 
of voting age had ever voted in an election. With 
the opening of the political process after January 
25, millions of Egyptians were eager to vote and 
the media reported much higher turnout rates 
for the elections and referendums that occurred 
from 2011 through 2012. SYPE 2014 allows us to 
calculate for the first time youth’s self-reported 
turnout for these elections, and examine variation 
in turnout rates across different groups of young 
people. 
Youth were asked whether they voted in six rounds 
of elections or referendums in SYPE 2014. The 
first was the constitutional referendum held in 
March 2011, under the Supreme Council of Armed 
Forces, which set the stage for parliamentary and 
presidential elections to replace the transitional 
government. Parliamentary elections were held 
in two rounds at the end of 2011, although these 
candidates were later to be dismissed in June 2012 
by the Supreme Constitutional Court, which ruled 
that the election was unconstitutional. In May 
2012, the first round of the presidential election 
was held, which resulted in a second runoff round 
in June 2012 that brought Muhammad Morsi to 
power. Under former President Morsi, a second 
constitutional referendum was then held in 2012. 
SYPE 2014 was conducted before the latest 
presidential elections in May 2014 that brought the 
current President, Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, to power, so 
data on youth participation in this last election are 
not available. 
Figure 7.8 presents self-reported turnout for the 
2011 and 2012 constitutional referendums, parlia-
mentary, and presidential elections, for youth aged 
20 and older. Although the legal voting age in Egypt 
is 18, because SYPE reported on elections and ref-
erendums taking place one to two years prior to the 
survey, many of the younger youth were ineligible 
to vote at the time of the election. In order to focus 
on turnout and reasons for not voting among youth 
who were eligible across the elections reported, we 
therefore drop these youngest cohorts of 18- and 
19-year-olds. Self-reported turnout rates for youth 
by all background characteristics and revolutionary 
activity are presented in Table A7.5. 
FIGURE 7.7 Youth’s reported degree of clarity on the goals of January 25, 2011 and June 30, 2013, by 
education level, 2014 (%) 
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Youth participation in national elections increased 
substantially since 2009, with turnout ranging 
from 52% to 65%. As expected, youth turnout was 
highest for the presidential elections, with 65.1% 
voting in the first round and 61.5% in the second 
round. Youth participation was higher than the 
reported overall voter turnout rates of 46% and 
52%, respectively, for these two elections (Carter 
Center 2012). Youth turnout was the lowest in the 
two constitutional referendums, both around 53%. 
For the 2011 and 2012 referendums, this mirrored 
the low overall turnout of 41% and 32% respective-
ly, but, as demonstrated by these figures, was still 
higher than turnout rates for the general population 
(Sabry 2012).
Youth voting behavior since the January 25, 2011 
revolution varies by a number of background char-
acteristics. Female youth consistently had a turnout 
rate of about 10 percentage points lower than male 
youth. Turnout also differed by region; voter turnout 
was generally lowest among eligible youth in urban 
and rural Upper Egypt, followed by the Frontier 
Governorates. Turnout was highest in urban Lower 
Egypt, followed by the Urban Governorates. For 
example, in the 2012 constitutional referendum, 
70.1% of youth in urban Lower Egypt voted, com-
pared to 40.3% in rural Upper Egypt, and 45.9% in 
urban Upper Egypt.
Turnout was consistently around 6–9 percentage 
points higher among youth aged 30 and older com-
pared to those aged 20–24, with youth aged 25–29 
falling in the middle. Correspondingly, married youth 
consistently participated more than their unmar-
ried peers in all referendums and elections. Even 
though the government often announced public 
holidays during elections to encourage participa-
tion, employment status also seems to affect voting 
levels, with unemployed youth consistently voting 
at a higher rate than employed youth. Public-sector 
wage employees consistently had higher turnout 
rates than private wage and self-employed work-
ers, with nonwage workers consistently having the 
lowest turnout rates. These patterns may be driven 
by the educational composition of different types 
FIGURE 7.8 Youth’s self-reported turnout in referendums and elections from 2011–2012, by gender 
and wealth quintile, 2014 (%)
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of workers, as increasing education and wealth 
show similar associations with higher turnout rates. 
Whereas between 28–41% of illiterate youth turned 
out for each election, the turnout rate among youth 
with postsecondary education ranged from 65–
80%, or nearly double the rate of the least educated 
youth. Similarly, voter turnout rates increase with 
wealth quintile—in Round 1 of the 2012 presidential 
elections, 50.4% of youth in the lowest wealth quin-
tile participated in elections compared to 74.7% of 
youth from the highest wealth quintile (Figure 7.8). 
The turnout results also demonstrate that youth’s 
revolutionary activity was associated with their likeli-
hood of voting, as we might expect. Across all of the 
elections and referendums, youth who did not par-
ticipate in any revolutionary activity were less likely 
to have voted than youth who participated in any 
form of revolutionary activity. For example, 50.5% 
of youth who did not participate in any revolutionary 
activity voted in the 2011 constitution referendum, 
whereas 79.8% of youth who reported having partic-
ipated in some form of revolutionary activity voted. 
Finally, youth’s support of the January 25 and June 
30 events were also associated with their turnout 
rates. Those who reported that they supported Jan-
uary 25 consistently turned out at rates of about 20 
percentage points higher than youth who reported 
that they did not support January 25. Similarly, high-
er degrees of support for the events of June 30 were 
consistently associated with higher turnout rates. 
These findings suggest that youth who were unhap-
py with the direction of Egypt’s transition may have 
been less likely to engage in the political process and 
exercise their right to vote.
Since these results suggest that there were sub-
populations of youth who have been less enfran-
chised by the political processes following the 
January 25 revolution, we conducted an additional 
analysis of the consistency of youth’s turnout 
across the six elections and referendums. As shown 
in Table 7.4, 29.3% of youth reported that they 
did not vote in any of these six elections, whereas 
41.4% reported that they voted in all six (results 
by the full set of background characteristics are 
presented in Table A7.6), reflecting considerable di-
versity in youth involvement in the political process. 
The patterns of nonparticipation in any elections 
were consistent with youths’ self-reported turnout 
rates, and suggest some concerning findings re-
garding the disenfranchisement of certain groups of 
youth. In particular, 35.2% of female youth reported 
that they never voted compared to 23.8% of male 
youth, suggesting that young women were consid-
erably less involved in the electoral process. This is 
consistent with the finding that a sizable percentage 
of youth in some regions do not support women 
voting (Chapter 9), and suggests that gender norms 
may have been a barrier to young women’s political 
participation at the voting booth as well as in the 
streets. On the other hand, as discussed below, fe-
Youth participation in national 
elections increased substantially 
since 2009, with turnout 
ranging from 52% to 65%.
TABLE 7.4 Youth who report never and always 
voting from 2011–2012, by selected background 
characteristics, 2014 (%)
 NEVER  ALWAYS  
 VOTED  VOTED
Gender  
Male 23.8 45.4
Female 35.2 37.1
Region  
Urban Governorates 26.5 45.5
Urban Lower Egypt 14.8 59.9
Rural Lower Egypt 26.8 42.4
Urban Upper Egypt 32.4 37.3
Rural Upper Egypt 38.9 30.9
Frontier Governorates 34.0 38.2
Education level  
Illiterate 54.7 20.6
Can read and write 31.5 31.2
Primary 37.4 31.5
Preparatory 38.3 32.2
General secondary 32.4 37.5
Vocational secondary 26.9 40.8
Post-secondary institute 17.8 54.3
University and above  16.6 57.5
Total 29.3 41.4
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male youth were also more likely to report that they 
did not vote because they “don’t care.”
Youth in Upper Egypt and the Frontier Governorates 
were also more likely to report that they never voted, 
as were the less educated. Whereas over half of illit-
erate youth reported that they had never voted, only 
17% of youth with a post-secondary education had 
never voted. Poorer youth were also less engaged 
with the political process, with 42% in the lowest 
wealth quintile reporting that they had never voted 
compared to 21% of those in the highest wealth 
quintile. Similar to the results on turnout, youth who 
participated in revolutionary activities and those 
who supported January 25 and June 30 were less 
likely to say that they had never voted. 
Youth who did not vote in the elections and referen-
dums were also asked why they chose not to (Fig-
ure 7.9; full results by background characteristics 
and revolutionary activity found in Table A7.7). Re-
sponses suggest that nonparticipating youth were 
either apathetic about or dissatisfied with the politi-
cal process. For the 2011 constitutional referendum, 
2011 parliamentary elections, and 2012 presidential 
election, between 62% and 70% of those who did 
not vote said that they did not participate in the 
election because they “don’t care.” Another 23–29% 
said that they refused to participate in a particular 
election, with the 2011 constitutional referendum at 
the lower end of this range and the 2012 presidential 
election at the higher end. Only about 3% of youth 
who did not vote in each election reported that this 
was due to lack of a voter card, and 3–5% cited other 
reasons for not voting. Female youth and poorer and 
less educated youth were generally more likely to 
report that they did not vote because they don’t care, 
whereas more educated youth and those in higher 
wealth quintiles were more likely to say that they had 
refused to participate. 
Finally, SYPE asked youth whether they intend to 
vote in the next election (Table A7.6). It is important 
to note that at the time the survey was administered, 
it was unclear what that election would be. Youth 
responses display a high degree of openness to and 
interest in further participation in the political pro-
cess, with only 6.1% saying that they did not intend to 
vote compared to 47.3% who said that they did intend 
to vote. At the same time, there was considerable 
ambivalence among youth regarding their potential 
electoral choices, with a nearly equal percentage of 
youth (46.6%) saying that they would “maybe” vote in 
the next election. A more recent poll conducted prior 
to the parliamentary elections scheduled for March 
2015, which were later delayed, suggests even more 
strongly that youth overall are still interested in con-
tinuing to formally participate in the political process. 
In mid-January 2015, the Egyptian Center for Public 
Opinion Research (Baseera) polled the public on their 
political views; 79% said they intend to participate, 
including 72% of youth aged 18–29 (Osman 2015).
7.9  Conclusion
Since the January 25, 2011 revolution, Egypt has ex-
perienced a tumultuous transition, including a series 
of power shifts, and waves of civil unrest and protests. 
With these events, Egypt has also witnessed an enor-
mous change in the ways in which youth claim their 
political rights, express their citizenship, and call for 
change, transforming the channels through which the 
government and the country’s youth interact. Since 
FIGURE 7.9 Reasons for not voting in the 2012 
presidential election, by gender and wealth 
quintile, 2014 (%) 
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the January 25 revolution, national discourse has also 
shifted to praise the “youth of the revolution” and to 
stress the importance of investing in the needs and 
aspirations of youth and creating the space for them 
to politically engage. 
The data from SYPE 2014 present a more complex 
picture regarding youth participation in the tran-
sitional process that began on January 25, 2011 
than we might expect based on media and social 
discourse. Self-reported participation in revolution-
ary activities was low among youth, and much of 
this activity was participation in the less political 
neighborhood watches as opposed to protests or 
political organizing. At the same time, the fact that 
respondents indicated higher rates of participation 
for family members and friends suggests that the 
political climate at the time of the survey may have 
prevented respondents from fully reporting their 
political behavior, raising concerns about freedom of 
expression that we will return to in the next chapter. 
Two areas in which the SYPE data did show substan-
tial change were in youth’s use of media and par-
ticipation in elections. Use of media to obtain news 
increased dramatically among youth from 2009 to 
2014, as did ever-use of the internet. Although the 
majority of youth rely on TV for their news, youth who 
were politically active were more likely to use social 
media tools to inform, mobilize, and create communi-
ties more than other youth. Youth participation in na-
tional elections has also increased substantially since 
2009. These findings suggest an increase in youth 
involvement with current events and the formal polit-
ical process, even though self-reported participation 
in revolutionary activities was lower than expected. 
However, the SYPE results also raise concerns that 
there are sub-populations of youth who have been 
less enfranchised by the political processes that 
began with the January 25 revolution. Female youth, 
those less educated, and poorer youth were consis-
tently less likely to report participation in revolution-
ary activities and in electoral processes, suggesting 
that these groups of youth face barriers to political 
engagement. Participation is also concentrated in 
urban areas in northern Egypt, with youth from rural 
Upper Egypt and the Frontier Governorates reporting 
lower rates of participation in political events and 
processes. Encouraging the participation of these 
groups of youth in the political process is key to gen-
erating a truly democratic transition. 
Finally, SYPE results suggest a greater diversity of 
opinion among youth about the January 25 revolution 
and subsequent events than might be expected based 
on media reports. A substantial percentage of youth 
reported that they did not participate in the events of 
January 25 because they were confused about the 
goals or were not against the old regime, results that 
are consistent with the fact that a quarter of youth 
said that they did not support the January 25 revolu-
tion. Youth opinion about the events of June 30, 2013 
was even more split, with higher percentages of youth 
expressing lack of clarity about the goals and mixed 
support of the events. Furthermore, lack of interest in 
elections was the most commonly cited reason for not 
voting among youth, suggesting that confusion over 
or opposition to the events taking place on Egypt’s 
streets may lead youth to avoid the formal political 
processes that accompanied the transition. In the 
subsequent chapter, we turn to youth’s assessments 
of the state of Egypt and their own lives in order to fur-
ther explore how this diversity of opinion may affect 
young people’s hope for the future and engagement in 
activities to improve their communities and country. 
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Young people’s opinions about Egypt’s 
transition—and their interest in taking part 
in national development during this critical 
period—affect their outlooks toward the 
future and their involvement with their 
peers, communities, and country. At the 
same time, young people’s perceptions of 
how Egypt’s transition has affected their 
lives may have important implications for 
this generation’s transition to adulthood.
8.1  Introduction
Young people’s active engagement in social and 
political change will be key to the success of Egypt’s 
transition. It is therefore important to examine 
their responses to the January 25 revolution and 
subsequent events, in terms of opinions, attitudes, 
and actions, in order to better understand how to 
encourage their civic engagement.
In this chapter, we examine young people’s 
opinions on social, economic, and political issues 
facing Egypt during its transition, and the extent 
to which they are active in trying to bring about 
change in their communities and the country more 
broadly. Although the majority of the questions in 
the civic engagement module of SYPE 2014 were 
new and based on events that occurred after SYPE 
2009 was conducted, there are some questions 
that allow us to compare youth civic engagement 
and perceptions of social values across the two 
survey rounds. 
We examine young people’s opinions about what 
the priorities for the country should be at this point 
in time, including the importance of continuing the 
January 25 revolutionary movement, and the most 
important issues and threats facing Egypt today. 
We look at youth confidence in politicians and in 
their own ability to effect political change, We also 
capture youth’s assessment of the three most 
recent Egyptian regimes on a variety of indicators 
related to democracy, development, and the rule of 
law. We discuss youth participation in political and 
volunteer activities since the 2009 SYPE, including 
their understanding of the definition of volun-
teerism, their participation in social groups, and 
reasons for joining those groups. 
8.2  Youth opinion on priorities 
and threats facing the 
country
Nearly three years after January 25, 2011, youth’s 
assessments of the revolutionary movement’s suc-
cess and its continued importance for Egypt were 
quite mixed. As shown in Figure 8.1, nearly half of 
youth agreed or strongly agreed with the statement 
that Egypt “needed reform, but not the January 25 
revolution.” At the same time, youth by and large did 
not think that January 25 had achieved the reforms 
that Egypt needed, with only 23% agreeing with 
this statement. In addition, whereas over half of the 
youth agreed that the January 25 revolution was ur-
gent when it began, and an additional 30% said that 
they were neutral on this point, youth opinion on 
the continued urgency of the revolution in 2013 was 
FIGURE 8.1 Youth opinion on the urgency and 
success of the January 25 revolution, 2014 (%)
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more mixed. Nearly a quarter of youth disagreed 
that the January 25 movement remained urgent in 
2014, compared to only 13% who disagreed that the 
revolution was urgent when it began. These findings 
suggest that while youth were—and the majority 
continued to be—eager to see reform in Egypt, in 
the aftermath of the economic and political chaos 
post-January 25, 2011, many were unsure as to 
whether the revolution was an effective means of 
generating that change. 
In contrast to their mixed opinions on the contin-
ued importance of the revolution as a solution to 
Egypt’s problems, youth opinion on the two main 
priorities for the country in 2014 was quite unified 
and varied little by background characteristics. An 
overwhelming 71.5% of respondents stated that 
raising living standards was the top priority for the 
country (Figure 8.2), likely reflecting the impact of 
Egypt’s worsening economic situation in the after-
math of the revolution. As indicated in Chapter 4, 
youth labor market conditions have in fact seriously 
deteriorated since the January 25 revolution, and 
youth continue to be the most disadvantaged group 
in the Egyptian labor market in terms of unemploy-
ment rates, earnings, and job security and stability 
(Assaad and Krafft 2015). Under these conditions, 
economic concerns have clearly eclipsed political 
ones in terms of the improvements youth would like 
to see in the country; an additional 9.6% of youth 
ranked improving education and healthcare as the 
top priority, which is also linked to the priority of im-
proving living standards and securing basic needs. 
Nine percent of youth ranked fighting corruption as 
the top priority for the country, and 42.9% ranked 
this as the second priority. However, only 5.7% 
believed improving democracy and human rights 
was the top priority for improving the state of the 
country, and 8.3% that it was the second priori-
ty. This suggests that youth’s political concerns 
over Egypt’s transition are focused on equality of 
opportunity and the need to reduce the private use 
of public resources, which again ties back to the 
overwhelming concern for improving livelihoods. 
That prioritization of democracy and basic human 
rights trailed far behind these other issues is con-
cerning in terms of what it suggests about youth 
willingness to put pressure on the government to 
protect their freedoms and independence during 
this period of transition. 
Finally, increasing the influence of religion on politics 
and the law was by far the lowest priority among 
youth, with 0.7% ranking it as a top priority while 
only 2.9% ranked it as the second. As we discuss in 
the following section, this confirms a general pattern 
in the SYPE data suggesting that Egyptian youth, 
particularly in the immediate aftermath of former 
President Morsi’s turbulent year in power, show 
skepticism toward a political role for religion.
Given youth’s focus on raising living standards as 
the top priority for Egypt, we also analyze questions 
that asked youth to assess a series of statements 
on economic policies. On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 
FIGURE 8.2 Youth opinion on the top two 
priorities for the country, 2014 (%)
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being “income should be more equal” and 10 “we 
need large income differences as economic incen-
tives,” youth on average placed themselves at 4.0, 
more in favor of income equality. Youth also placed 
greater responsibility on the government to provide 
for the population (1) than for people to take more 
responsibility to provide for themselves (10), on 
average rating themselves a 3.7 on this scale. Cor-
respondingly, youth also leaned toward the opinion 
that the government should tax the rich to redis-
tribute income. When comparing the statements 
that private ownership of business and industry 
should be increased (1) with the view that govern-
ment ownership should be increased (10), youth 
again leaned toward public ownership of industries, 
at 5.8. Taken together, these statements indicate 
that youth favor a strong role for government in 
the economy, which was previously the situation in 
Egypt prior to the adoption of the Economic Reform 
and Structural Adjustment program in the early 
1990s (Assaad 1997). 
Youth opinion on the top two threats facing the 
country similarly reflects a strong preoccupation 
with daily quality of life (Figure 8.3). A large majority 
of youth (63.2%) reported lack of security as the 
main threat facing the country, demonstrating a 
high sense of vulnerability to the insecurity in the 
country since January 25. Another 19.6% of youth 
rated economic crisis as the main threat to the 
country and 38% named this the second most im-
portant threat, consistent with youth identification 
of issues related to improving living standards as 
the main priority for the country. 
The influence of misleading or biased media on 
national affairs or public opinion (8.2%), and on-
going protests (5.1%) were considered by a small 
percentage of youth to be the top threat facing the 
country. Polarization (0.7%), violence by protesters 
(1.1%), the continued existence of remnants of the 
Mubarak regime (1.1%), and foreign intervention 
in Egypt’s affairs (1.0%) were not generally con-
sidered to be the important threat to the country. 
However, the danger of continuing protests (21.7%) 
ranked above the lack of security (12.6%) as the 
second greatest threat. Violence by protesters 
(8.1%), misleading or biased media (7.3%), and the 
risk of foreign intervention in Egypt (6.6%) were 
also somewhat more commonly mentioned as the 
second greatest threat to the country. Youth viewed 
the polarization of Egyptian society as the least 
important threat facing the country overall. 
8.3  Opinions on politics and 
political activism
Along with measuring youth participation in political 
organizing and electoral processes, SYPE 2014 
assessed youth’s degree of confidence that they 
themselves, politicians, political parties, and social 
movements could bring about change in national 
affairs. The results indicate that youth had little faith 
in the effectiveness of politicians and their ability 
to deliver on their campaign promises; 36.3% of 
youth agreed and 43.9% strongly agreed that most 
politicians make a lot of promises, but do not actu-
ally deliver, whereas only 3.6% disagreed and 0.8% 
strongly disagreed with this statement (Figure 8.4). 
However, a majority of youth did believe that polit-
ical parties have the ability to influence citizens to 
vote: about 65% agreed with this statement, where-
FIGURE 8.3 Youth opinion on the top two 
threats facing the country, 2014 (%)
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as about 10% disagreed. Youth’s perspective that 
political parties have the ability to change voting 
behavior is likely influenced by the opening of the 
political space since January 25 and the creation of 
a number of new parties, and may be related to the 
dramatic increase in youth participation in national 
elections noted in Chapter 7. It is not clear, howev-
er, whether youth viewed this influence of political 
parties positively or negatively. 
To assess youth’s confidence in their own ability 
to become catalysts of change, SYPE 2014 asked 
whether they felt that their political participation 
could impact public policy. Just over a third of 
youth agreed that their participation could have an 
impact, and 19.8% strongly agreed with this state-
ment. Another third of youth were neutral on this 
point, but fewer than 15% disagreed or strongly 
disagreed. These results suggest that youth are 
generally positive toward their own capacity to 
effect political change. This may be reflected in the 
higher voter turnout rates observed among youth 
in 2014 compared to 2009, but is somewhat sur-
prising given the low rates of actual engagement in 
political organizing found in the previous chapter. 
A larger percentage of youth also believed in the 
ability of national and international movements to 
influence the country’s affairs. When asked if they 
agreed with the statement that when Egyptians 
unite they could have a great impact on public poli-
cy, just over 70% agreed or strongly agreed, where-
as fewer than 7% disagreed. A similar percentage of 
youth believed in the impact of international move-
ments on international policies. These findings 
suggest that the increasing interconnectedness 
of citizens through media, and the cross-national 
influence of the Arab Spring, may have influenced 
youth opinion on the political efficacy of global 
movements. In combination with youth people’s 
general distrust of politicians, these responses also 
suggest that youth place greater faith in grass-
roots-based movements and their ability to change 
national and international politics than they place in 
the political establishment. Given the success of the 
January 25 movement in achieving regime change 
in Egypt, this may not be surprising, despite youth’s 
uncertainty over whether January 25 succeeded in 
achieving its more broad-based goals. 
8.4  Assessment of recent 
regimes
On a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being very bad and 5 
being excellent, SYPE also asked youth to assess 
the three most recent Egyptian regimes on a variety 
of indicators related to democracy, development, 
and the rule of law. The three regimes were the 
pre-January 25 regime under former President 
Mubarak, the regime during the year prior to SYPE 
under former President Morsi (June 2012 to June 
2013), and the present regime at the time of the 
SYPE data collection. During that period, The Su-
preme Council of Armed Forces, led by Abdel Fatah 
El-Sisi, announced that Adli Mansour, the head of 
the Supreme Constitutional Court, would be leading 
a transitional government until presidential elec-
tions. President El-Sisi was officially appointed as 
the country’s president on June 8, 2014 following 
those elections. Thus, even though the interim gov-
FIGURE 8.4 Youth opinion on politicians and 
the ability to effect political change, 2014 (%)
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ernment that led the transitional period is closely 
associated with President Sisi, youth’s assess-
ments were of the interim government and may 
have changed under the elected government.
Figure 8.5 shows that, in terms of freedom of 
expression, youth rated the current government the 
highest (2.9) followed by the Morsi regime (2.2), 
and then the Mubarak regime with the lowest level 
of freedom of expression (2.0). The pattern for free-
dom to join a political party was similar. Youth on 
average also rated the current regime (2.7) better 
than the previous regimes in providing the space for 
“ordinary people” to have an influence on govern-
ment. Youth believed that they had slightly greater 
influence on the government during Morsi’s regime 
(2.0) than Mubarak’s (1.8). 
In terms of corruption and rule of law, the current 
regime also outperformed the other regimes in 
terms of keeping corruption under control (2.8). 
Youth perceived Mubarak’s and Morsi’s regimes to 
be very similar in terms of corruption (2.0 and 1.9, 
respectively). The present regime was also rated 
higher in terms of no unlawful arrest, at 2.7, whereas 
the Morsi and Mubarak regimes were again rated 
nearly the same, at 2.1 and 2.0, respectively. Youth 
were also asked to rate to what extent they thought 
courts were free from political influence. Whereas 
the present regime was rated at 2.8, the Mubarak 
regime, at 2.3, outperformed the Morsi regime on 
this indicator.
Turning to security and the economy, the two issues 
that youth perceived to be the most important for 
Egypt at the time of the survey, the present regime 
at the time of SYPE was also rated the highest. 
However, on both indicators the Mubarak regime 
clearly came out ahead of the Morsi regime, with 
youth rating Mubarak’s regime 2.5 in terms of 
prioritizing preventing crime and maintaining order 
compared to 1.9 for Morsi’s regime. Youth also 
thought that the previous regime under Morsi per-
formed worse economically (1.8) than the pre-Jan-
uary 25 government (2.3), while the present regime 
was given a slightly higher rating (2.5).
Based on these patterns, it is clear that youth 
believed that in the early days the transitional 
government was performing better than previous 
regimes. Although youth indicated that there was 
consistently more space for freedom of expression 
and political affiliation in regimes after the January 
25 revolution, on factors related to security, the 
economy, and corruption they perceived a worsen-
ing situation under former President Morsi com-
pared to Mubarak, before the situation improved 
under the transitional government. It is important 
to keep in mind, however, that youth generally gave 
low ratings to all three regimes, with no regime 
receiving an average rating higher than 3.0 out of 
5.0 on any measure. This indicates that youth are 
still dissatisfied with their government on a range of 
issues, and are looking for a more open regime with 
robust national policies. 
FIGURE 8.5 Youth assessment of three 
past regimes, on a scale of 1 (very bad) to 5 
(excellent), 2014 (mean)
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8.5  Assessment of values in 
Egyptian society
To understand how to increase youth engagement 
in national development and civic life, it is also 
crucial to understand their opinions on social 
affairs. In this section, we therefore turn to youth 
evaluations, on a scale of 1 to 10, of the existence 
of certain values in Egyptian society (Table 
8.1). On average, youth ranked the importance 
of becoming financially well-off as the most 
prevalent value in society, with a 6.8 rating out of 
10. Youth also felt that Egyptian society values the 
importance of becoming well educated, which was 
given a 6.4 rating. Both of these values suggest an 
emphasis on securing a stable future, which may 
reflect the situation of economic insecurity that 
youth seemed to feel. A sense of responsibility 
(6.0), religious faith (5.9), and the value of 
hard work (5.7) were also perceived to be quite 
prevalent in society. 
In terms of tolerance, respondents rated the 
value of “tolerance for others” at 5.7 and religious 
tolerance at 5.4. Youth believed that the tolerance 
toward opposing political views was lower, with 
a rating of 4.5. We examine the issue of political 
discussion and openness to others’ political opin-
ions in greater detail in Section 8.8. Along with the 
lower level of political tolerance, youth also felt that 
transparency in transitions (4.5) and the rule of 
law (5.0), both indications of a positive transitional 
path to democracy, were values that were not as 
apparent in Egyptian society. Variation in percep-
tions of these values was quite minor across most 
background characteristics. The greatest variation 
was across region, but exceeded one point on the 
scale in only a few cases. 
Fairness in the functioning of institutions and 
the distribution of opportunity and reward are 
also important indicators of social values; youth 
perspectives on these topics were captured 
in SYPE through several questions related to 
corruption, bribery, and wasta (nepotism). The 
last line of Table 8.1 shows youth’s rating of the 
level of corruption in public institutions, which 
at 7.3 was higher than their average rating of the 
presence of any of the values discussed above. In 
terms of direct experience with corruption, 18.4% 
of youth reported having seen a bribe paid during 
the past year. 
Youth also perceive wasta, or the use of personal 
connections to obtain jobs or favors, to be quite 
common in Egyptian society. Fifty-five percent of 
youth said that jobs are obtained by wasta “to a 
large extent,” and an additional 30% said that jobs 
are obtained by wasta “sometimes.” Only 2% of 
youth said that jobs are not obtained by wasta, and 
Results indicate that youth 
are still dissatisfied with their 
government on a range of 
issues, and are looking for 
a more open regime with 
robust national policies. 
TABLE 8.1 Youth assessments of the presence 
of specific values in Egyptian society, on a scale 
of 1 (absent) to 10 (present), 2014
 MEAN RATING
Importance of wealth 6.8
Importance of education 6.4
Sense of responsibility 6.0
Religious faith 5.9
Tolerance of others 5.7
Hard work 5.7
Independence 5.5
Religious tolerance 5.4
Helping community 5.3
Rule of law 5.0
Financial thrift 4.9
Transparency in transitions 4.5
Political tolerance 4.5
Existence of corruption 7.3
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the remaining 12% said that they did not know. In 
personal experience, 28.7% of youth reported hav-
ing witnessed the use of wasta during the past year 
alone (data not shown). 
Perhaps due to their perceptions of the high levels 
of corruption in society and relatively lower levels 
of certain social values, youth also expressed low 
levels of generalized trust. When asked whether, 
generally speaking, most people can be trusted, 
only 21.3% said yes, whereas 78.6% of youth said 
that one must be very careful in dealing with other 
people. Youth in urban areas were more likely to be 
wary of dealing with other people (84%) compared 
to those in rural areas (78%) and informal areas 
(70%), but variation on other background charac-
teristics, including gender and age, was minimal 
(data not shown). 
Despite the low level of trust, youth overall were 
more trusting of society in 2014 than in 2009. 
Whereas in 2009, 90.3% of youth said that one 
must be very careful in dealing with other people, 
in 2014 78.6% said that one must be careful. 
This trend toward increased generalized trust 
is particularly interesting given the increase in 
instability in Egypt during this period. Similarly, 
the ratings of the comparable group of youth 
aged 15–29 across SYPE 2009 and 2014 show, 
on average, a very slight improvement in the 
perception that positive social values are found in 
society (Table 8.2).
8.6  The role of religion in politics, 
law, and personal life
With the rise and fall of the Morsi regime and the 
rewriting of the Constitution in 2012 and again in 
2014, there has been intense social debate over the 
role of religion in Egypt’s political affairs. To gain 
a better understanding of youth opinion on this 
subject, SYPE 2014 asked respondents a series of 
questions related to what the role of religion should 
be in the political and public sphere. When asked 
whether they agreed with the statement that men 
of religion should not influence how people decide 
about political matters, 36.7% of youth agreed and 
36.2% strongly agreed, whereas only 11% disagreed 
or strongly disagreed (Figure 8.6). An overwhelming 
70% of youth also agreed that mosques and 
churches should not be used to influence people’s 
political decisions, whereas only 10% disagreed. 
These findings indicate that the majority of youth 
disapprove of religious personalities or institutions 
aiming to influence their followers’ political 
opinions.
TABLE 8.2 Assessments of youth aged 15–29 
of the presence of specific values in society, 
on a scale of 1 (very low) to 10 (pervasive), 
comparison between 2009 and 2014 (mean)
 2009 2014
Sense of responsibility 5.8 6.0
Hard work 5.7 5.7
Tolerance of others 5.7 5.7
Religious faith 5.8 5.9
Independence 5.3 5.4
Financial thrift 4.9 4.9
FIGURE 8.6 Youth opinion on the role of 
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On the other hand, youth held mixed opinions on 
whether it would be better for Egypt if more people 
with strong religious beliefs held public office. Just 
under half of youth disagreed with this statement, 
30.7% were neutral and about 25% agreed. Youth 
opinion on the statement that men of religion 
should be able to influence government decisions 
was similar, although a larger percentage of youth 
disagreed with this statement. These results are in 
contrast to those of a similar question asked by Gal-
lup in 2011, shortly after the January 25 revolution. 
In that poll, 69% of Egyptians said that religious 
leaders should advise those in authority on writing 
national legislation, 14% said they should have full 
authority in writing national legislation, and only 9% 
said religious leaders should not have any authority 
at all (8% either refused the question or said they 
did not know) (Gallup 2011). 
Although the Gallup poll was conducted among 
Egyptians aged 15 years and older and is not 
directly comparable with SYPE, this rather sharp 
difference suggests that public opinion may have 
become more resistant toward the engagement of 
religious leaders in governmental decisions during 
the transitional period. These indications that the 
majority of youth do not support a strong role for 
religion in political and socioeconomic life are also 
particularly interesting in light of the fact that Al-
Azhar, considered by many Muslims worldwide to 
be the highest authority in Sunni Islamic thought 
and Islamic jurisprudence, as well as the Coptic 
Church, has traditionally had influence over public 
policies that intersect with religious matters, such 
as personal status law. 
In order to compare with youth’s view of the role 
of religion in political and public life, we next turn 
to a series of questions about religion in young 
people’s personal lives. In 2009, when SYPE asked 
youth if they viewed themselves as religious, 
regardless of whether they attend religious classes, 
the vast majority (85.5%) of young people aged 
15–29 identified themselves as religious; 2.7% 
identified themselves as very religious, and 11.8% 
said they were not religious. In 2014, when asked 
the same question, a slightly greater proportion of 
youth aged 15–29 (88.1%) viewed themselves as 
religious, 4.8% viewed themselves as very religious, 
and a lower percentage (7.0%) reported that they 
were not religious. 
When asked how often they went to mosque or 
church in 2009, about two-thirds of youth reported 
attending more than once a day. In 2014, the ques-
tion was changed to ask about the frequency of 
prayer regardless of attending a house of worship, 
but nevertheless suggested similar adherence to 
daily prayers, with 73.0% of youth saying that they 
prayed daily “always” or “most of the time.” The 
increase from 2009 is likely attributable at least in 
part to the change in wording, as many youth may 
pray at home. Only 6.4% of youth said that they 
rarely or never prayed daily (data not shown). 
In order to assess youth reliance on religious media, 
SYPE 2014 asked if they watch or listen to religious 
programs on the radio or television. Youth practice 
was quite mixed; 11.4% never listened to religious 
media, 57.2% rarely or sometimes listened, 17.8% 
listened most of the time, and the remaining 12.8% 
always listened to religious programs. As for study-
ing religious texts, youth seem to be less frequent 
in their practice—6.4% reported that they never 
read the Bible or Quran, 60.0% rarely or sometimes 
read their respective texts, 17.0% read most of the 
time, and 15.8% always. In addition, 82.4% of youth 
reported always fasting during Ramadan or Lent. 
Thus, youth’s general view that religious leaders 
and institutions should not have a strong role in po-
litical life seems unlikely to be related to any change 
in their self-reported personal religiosity, as the 
majority perceive themselves to be religious and 
practice their faith quite regularly (data not shown).
8.7  Optimism about the future
Youth’s assessments of the state of the country 
following the January 25 revolution and the sub-
sequent events may affect their sense of hope not 
only for Egypt’s future, but also for their own lives. 
SYPE asked youth to rate, on a scale from 1 (worst) 
to 10 (best), their feelings about their lives and the 
state of the country during four periods in time. As 
shown in Figure 8.7, trends in the two are closely 
related. On average, youth rate both their own lives 
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(5.0) and the state of the country (4.7) as having 
been better prior to the revolution than after. They 
rated the worst period for both themselves and the 
country to be from January 25, 2011 to June 30, 
2013, at lows of 4.2 and 4.0, respectively. Although 
both indicators increased to 4.8 for the period after 
June 30, 2013, it is notable that, on average, youth 
still found their own lives to have been better prior 
to the revolution. These ratings may be affected 
by youth concerns with lack of security and poor 
economic conditions following the revolution, as 
highlighted in the sections above. Youth do display 
considerable optimism about the future, however, 
as their predictions for their own lives five years 
from the time of the survey averaged 6.1, and for 
the state of the country 6.4. Despite their concerns 
over conditions during Egypt’s transitional period, 
youth do therefore appear to have hope that the 
country will emerge from this period with better 
prospects for the country as a whole. 
Although they expressed optimism about the 
trajectory of their own lives and the state of Egypt 
in five years, youth also said that the events of the 
revolution would negatively affect their own futures. 
When posed the statement “the events following 
the revolution will negatively affect my future,” 
28.0% of youth strongly agreed, 33.7% agreed 
and another 29.0% were neutral. Fewer than 10% 
of youth disagreed or strongly disagreed with the 
statement. Youth in the Urban Governorates and in-
formal urban areas were particularly likely to agree 
that the events following the revolution would affect 
them negatively, as were youth with post-secondary 
education and wealthier youth. Interestingly, youth 
who had participated in revolutionary activities 
were the most likely to say that the events would 
negatively affect their futures, with 75.2% agreeing 
or strongly agreeing. This may reflect the direct 
consequences of exposure to violence or political 
targeting of youth who played an active role in the 
revolution, or these youth may be more pessimistic 
and feel that the revolution has not achieved its 
goals (data not shown).
These somewhat contradictory findings on youth 
optimism about the future and their sense that the 
revolution would negatively affect the future may be 
explained in part by the fact that youth expressed 
a fairly high degree of uncertainty about the future. 
On a scale from 1 (very certain) to 10 (very uncer-
tain), youth overall rated their level of certainty 
about their future lives at 7.0. Male youth expressed 
slightly lower levels of certainty (7.1) than female 
youth (6.9), and youth in the Urban and Frontier 
Governorates were somewhat less certain about 
their futures (7.3 and 7.2, respectively) than other 
youth. Youth from urban Upper Egypt expressed the 
greatest level of certainty about their future, at 6.5, 
whereas youth from the other regions all expressed 
levels of certainty around 7.0 (data not shown). 
Certainty about the future was negatively correlat-
ed with education, with university-educated youth 
expressing the lowest certainty (7.1) and illiterate 
youth the highest (6.6), which may reflect youth’s 
perceptions of the opportunities open to them. 
Wealth was also generally correlated with certainty, 
although the relationship was not as clear. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, unemployed youth (7.4) also ex-
pressed greater uncertainty about the future than 
youth who were employed (7.1) or out of the labor 
force (6.9). Youth who had participated in any rev-
olutionary activity since January 25 also expressed 
greater uncertainty (7.5) than those who had not 
participated (7.0) (data not shown). 
FIGURE 8.7 Youth assessment of the state of 
their own lives and the country during different 
periods, on a scale of 1 (worst) to 10 (best), 
2014 (mean)
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8.8  Participation in volunteering 
and social groups
Following the 18 days of the January 25 revolution, 
there was widespread media coverage of youth 
engaging in activities to improve their communities 
and environment, leading to a common impression 
that youth participation in volunteering and orga-
nized social groups increased from the low levels 
prior to the revolution. Table 8.1, however, suggests 
that youth participation in voluntary activities still 
remained low, with only 3.6% of youth reporting 
that they had ever volunteered since participating 
in SYPE 2009. SYPE asked youth about volunteer-
ing in charitable, educational, community develop-
ment, fundraising, and other volunteer activities. 
Due to the low overall rates of volunteering, we do 
not disaggregate by the type of activity.1 
1 SYPE 2014 respondents who did not answer all 
questions in the series about volunteering and group 
membership are dropped from these respective analy-
ses. Otherwise, we would be making the assumption 
that nonresponse is equivalent to a “no,” which is likely 
to be misleading, particularly for activities that youth 
may have been reluctant to report. 
Table 8.3 breaks down the percentage of youth vol-
unteering by the period during which they reported 
volunteering (rates by the full set of background 
characteristics are presented in A8.1). Volunteer 
rates for the period from SYPE 2009 to January 
25, 2011 were actually slightly higher, at 3.0%, than 
rates for the year following January 25 (2.7%) and 
the second year of the revolution (2.8%), which was 
the same rate youth reported for the year prior to 
SYPE 2009. Furthermore, many of the youth who 
reported volunteering did so consistently across 
the three periods. In other words, there appears to 
be a small percentage of youth who are committed 
to volunteering regularly whereas the large majority 
of youth never participated in voluntary activities in 
any of the periods measured. This finding contrasts 
sharply with the perception of a surge of volun-
teer activity among youth in the months following 
January 25. 
Youth who participated in volunteer activity—char-
itable, educational, community development, and 
other activities—also appear to have some over-
lap with the small group of youth who reported 
participating in revolutionary activities, which here 
are defined as political organizing or activities that 
took place on the streets such as protests (see 
TABLE 8.3 Youth who reported that they volunteered, by gender and participation in revolutionary 
activity, SYPE 2009 and 2014 (%)
 
VOLUNTEER RATES  
(YOUTH AGED 13–35)
VOLUNTEER RATES 
(YOUTH AGED 15–29)
 
April 
2009– 
January 
25, 2011
In the 
year 
following 
January 
25, 2011
From Janu-
ary 25, 2012 
to the time 
of 
the survey
Ever 
volun-
teered 
since 
SYPE 
2009
Ever 
volunteered 
2009–2014
Volun-
teered in 
year prior 
to SYPE 
2009
Gender
Male 3.8 3.5 3.6 4.5 4.5 4.3
Female 2.2 1.8 1.9 2.4 2.7 1.3
Youth participation in revolution
No participation 2.0 1.7 1.8 2.4
Any participation 14.6 14.0 14.3 16.5
Political organizing 29.3 30.7 33.0 34.4
Neighborhood watch 14.4 13.9 14.0 16.3
Protest 17.3 17.5 18.8 19.3
Total 3.0 2.7 2.8 3.5 3.6 2.8
(N) (8,844) (8,844) (8,844) (8,844) (7,011) (10,976)
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Chapter 7). The rate of volunteerism among youth 
who reported partaking in revolutionary activity was 
16.5%, compared to 2.4% among nonparticipants. 
Youth who participated in political organizing were 
particularly likely to report volunteering (34.4%), 
which suggests that some of these volunteer 
activities may have been organized by their political 
groups or parties. 
There was a gender gap in volunteer activity among 
all SYPE 2014 youth aged 13–35, as with partici-
pation in the revolution, with 4.5% of male youth 
reporting having ever volunteered since the time 
of SYPE 2009 compared to 2.4% of female youth. 
Youth with higher educational attainment were 
more likely to have volunteered, with up to 7.1% 
of youth with tertiary education reporting having 
volunteered. Volunteer rates among youth with less 
than a preparatory education were less than 1.0% 
(Table A8.1). Volunteering similarly increased with 
wealth, and, like participation in the revolution, was 
higher among unemployed youth (6.1%) than those 
with employment (4.4%) or who were out of the 
labor force (2.7%) , likely reflecting the greater time 
available to these youth to engage in such activities. 
Rates of volunteering among the 15–29 age group, 
which is the group directly comparable with SYPE 
2009, are overall very similar. 
In order to explore further the surprisingly low 
rates of volunteering among Egyptian youth 
following the revolution, we turn to the questions 
in SYPE about what volunteering means, and 
youth perceptions about why their peers may or 
may not participate (data not shown). According 
to the United Nations, volunteering is defined as 
“contributions that individuals make as nonprofit, 
nonwage, and noncareer action for the well-being 
of their neighbors, and society as large”—a defini-
tion that is rather broad and encompasses many 
forms of collective action (United Nations 1999). 
When asked about the best definition for volun-
teering, youth largely associated the concept with 
charitable activity, with 57.6% saying that volun-
teering meant “providing assistance for the poor 
and marginalized.” Fourteen percent of youth said 
that volunteering meant “bringing people together 
and building solidarity,” and 13% believed it meant 
“helping people to develop their skills.” Only 6% 
of youth identified “empowering individuals and 
communities” or “encouraging active citizenship” 
as the best definition for volunteering. 
Youth who themselves participated in volunteer ac-
tivities were more likely to identify bringing people 
together (22%) and encouraging active citizenship 
(12%) as the best definition of volunteering as op-
posed to youth who did not volunteer (13% and 5%, 
respectively), suggesting that participation in volun-
teer activities is associated with an understanding 
of volunteerism as extending beyond charity. 
Although SYPE did not ask youth who had volun-
teered since 2009 why they did so, SYPE did ask 
all respondents why they think youth participate in 
volunteer activities (multiple answers were possi-
ble). Differences in these responses between youth 
who had and had not volunteered similarly suggest 
that youth who volunteer are more likely to see 
volunteerism as a form of active citizenship. Where-
as 20% of youth who had never volunteered saw 
“being an active citizen or having a role in society” 
as a reason why youth participate in volunteer-
ism, 39% of volunteers cited this as a motivation. 
Volunteers were also more likely to see this form of 
engagement as a means of gaining work experience 
(35%) compared to nonvolunteers (23%), as well 
as to enhance their personal development (12% 
compared to 3%). They were also more likely to 
cite supporting world peace and development as a 
motivation (27% compared to 12%). However, non-
volunteers were more likely to cite helping others 
(62%) as a motivation to volunteer as opposed to 
youth volunteers (57%) (data not shown). 
SYPE also asked all youth why they thought youth 
would choose not to volunteer (multiple answers 
were possible). The most common reasons were 
related to economic pressures, with half of youth 
citing “no spare time” to volunteer and 47% 
believing that youth were busy “searching for 
money.” Seventeen percent cited lack of security 
as a reason and 23% believed that youth were 
being discouraged by their family. Poor or little 
information about volunteering was seen as a 
less important factor, with a “negative view of 
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volunteer work” seen as a potential reason by 12% 
of youth, lack of opportunities to volunteer by 
13% and “never been asked to volunteer” by 14%. 
Youth opinions on what might encourage youth to 
volunteer (multiple responses possible) matched 
with the reasons they had cited for the lack of 
participation; 56% mentioned having more spare 
time and 58% mentioned having more money 
(data not shown).
Another form of engagement in civic life is partic-
ipation in formal associations or clubs, whether 
or not these have an explicit social or political 
agenda. Interestingly, youth indicated higher rates 
of youth membership in social or political groups in 
2009, at 4.9%, than the 2.8% found in 2014 (2.9% 
among youth aged 15–29; Table 8.4). However, 
this may be due in part to the fact that the list of 
prompts used in the 2009 survey was different 
from that used in 2014, and named more types of 
groups individually.2 
SYPE 2014 asked youth whether they were a 
member of any community of cultural associations, 
NGOs, sports clubs, unions or syndicates, 
political parties or movements, or unregistered 
informal groups. As shown in Table 8.4, only 2.8% 
responded that they were; 2.1% of youth were 
members of one of these types of groups and 
0.7% were members of two or more groups. Of the 
different types of associations or groups, sports 
clubs were by far the most common, with 1.9% 
of youth reporting membership in such a club 
compared to less than 1% for all of the other types 
of associations (rates by the full set of background 
characteristics are presented in Table A8.2). As 
with volunteering, group membership was more 
common among male youth, and more educated 
and wealthier youth. 
2 The same list of groups was used in both survey years, 
but in 2009 each type of group was provided as a sepa-
rate survey item whereas in 2014 youth were prompted 
with five overall categories (community or cultural 
associations, sports clubs, unions/syndicates, political 
organizations, and unregistered informal groups), which 
had the individual group types listed as examples.
Likewise, group membership was substantially 
more common among youth who participated in 
revolutionary activity (20.8%) compared to youth 
who did not participate (1.4%). The particularly 
high rates of group membership among youth 
who participated in political organizing (37.4%) 
is likely related to the inclusion of political parties 
in the list of associations SYPE asked about. 
However, the percentage of youth who reported 
being a member of a political party or association 
(0.3%) was lower than the percentage reporting 
participation in political organizing in Chapter 7 
(1.3%). This may indicate that not all youth who 
participated in organizing consider themselves a 
formal member of a group, or that there was also 
underreporting of participation in political parties 
and other formal political associations. In general, 
these results confirm that citizens who participate 
TABLE 8.4 Youth participation in groups 
and associations, by period and background 
characteristics, 2009 and 2014 (%)
YOUTH 
AGED 
13–35 
IN 
2014
YOUTH 
AGED 
15–29 
IN 
2014
YOUTH 
AGED 
15–29 
IN 2009
Gender
Male 4.1 4.2 6.6
Female 1.5 1.5 3.2
Education
Illiterate 0.0 0.0 0.5
Can read and write 0.0 0.0 10.9
Primary 1.0 1.1 3.4
Preparatory 1.3 0.8 4.4
General secondary 6.5 6.5 11.9
Vocational secondary 1.4 1.5 2.0
Post-secondary institute 4.5 4.7 3.2
University and above 7.0 6.8 13.0
Youth participation in  
revolution
No participation 1.4 1.4 —
Any participation 20.8 21.1 —
Political organizing 37.4 36.8 —
Neighborhood watch 19.3 19.6 —
Protest 35.0 36.7 —
Total 2.8 2.9 4.9
(N) (10,861) (8,579) (10,976)
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in one area of civic engagement are more likely to 
get involved in another.
SYPE also asked youth who reported being mem-
bers of a group or association why they chose to 
participate in that group. These reasons varied by 
the type of organization, with “to help others” most 
commonly cited for charitable and community 
groups (41%), “play sports” for sports clubs (52%), 
“to cope with a problem” for unions/syndicates 
(32%), “to achieve the goals of the revolution” for 
the few youth reporting membership in a political 
party or group (47%), and “to help others” for the 
similarly small number of youth engaged in other 
types of groups (48%) (data not shown). 
8.9  Participation in social debate
Another indication of youth responses to the events 
following January 25, 2011 is their engagement 
in public debate about the political, social, and 
economic issues facing the country. Youth percep-
tions of their own level of engagement with current 
events, in different ways, are captured in Figure 
8.8. Youth, on average, expressed a higher degree 
of confidence in their understanding of important 
political issues in the country than of how laws and 
policies are made. Just over 30% of youth agreed or 
strongly agreed that they had a good understand-
ing of political issues, whereas only 13.7% of youth 
agreed that they understand how laws are made 
and 2.9% strongly agreed. Nearly half of youth did 
not feel that they know how laws and policies are 
formed in the country. Youth responses to state-
ments on their active engagement with current 
events also show fairly low levels of engagement, 
with only 16.0% agreeing that they have been a 
leader among their peers when solving problems 
in the community and 12.7% saying that they have 
participated in a group of youth working on an issue 
that they care about. Nevertheless, these rates are 
higher than those found for participation in revo-
lutionary activity, volunteering, or social groups, 
suggesting that youth perceive themselves to be 
engaged in their communities in less formal ways. 
Along with their generally low confidence in their 
understanding of current politics and policy issues, 
and despite the perception that public debate sur-
rounding politics has expanded during this conten-
tious period, many youth do not appear to discuss 
politics frequently. Those who do report engaging 
in political debate primarily discuss politics with 
their friends, with just over 50% of youth saying 
that they discuss politics with their friends at least 
“sometimes” (Figure 8.9). About 42% of youth 
reported discussing politics at least sometimes 
with their siblings, whereas youth were less likely to 
speak about politics with their mother or father. 
The majority of youth (62.2%) reported that they 
never speak with other acquaintances about 
politics, suggesting some caution about discussing 
politics with anyone other than close friends and 
family. This is borne out by youth opinion on the 
degree to which engaging in political debate can 
sway their or others’ opinions. Forty-three percent 
of youth responded that they “avoid talking about 
politics because no one will ever be convinced of 
another’s opinion,” and an additional 25% said that 
they would listen to another person but not express 
their own opinion. Only 16% said that they would try 
to convince someone else of their opinion, and 11% 
FIGURE 8.8 Youth assessment of their 
own engagement with current events and 
community development, 2014 (%)
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FIGURE 8.9 Frequency of youth’s discussion of 
current events or politics with particular people, 
2014 (%)
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that they were themselves willing to be convinced 
by another’s opinion (data not shown). 
8.10  Conclusion 
Civic participation is essential for youth to make a 
successful transition to meaningful adult roles in 
which they can participate fully in society and con-
tribute to community and national development. 
Following the January 25, 2011 movement, there 
is a perception that Egyptians now have a great-
er sense of duty to be civically engaged and help 
change the direction of their nation. This chapter 
attempted to provide a deeper understanding of 
the dynamics surrounding youth civic engagement 
in this politically uncertain climate, and of how their 
engagement has taken shape in this period com-
pared to the very low levels of civic engagement 
found in 2009. 
The SYPE results demonstrate that youth believed 
that the January 25 revolution movement was 
needed when it began. However, given the econom-
ic, social, and political instability they have faced 
since 2011, they have mixed feelings on whether 
the movement is still urgent or is the most effective 
method to bring about reform. By contrast, in terms 
of what needs to change in Egypt, youth were quite 
unified on the priorities for the country moving 
forward, and the top priority was economic stability 
and improving the standard of living. Youth concern 
over economic conditions appears to have crowded 
out other issues such as ensuring democracy and 
human rights, and many youth confess to having 
low levels of understanding of how the political and 
legal systems function, despite the many reforms 
that have been debated and implemented during 
this period. 
Furthermore, despite the perception that youth, 
with a renewed sense of patriotism and duty to help 
reform the country, have been more active in vol-
unteering since the revolution, the SYPE data show 
that this is not in fact the case. Youth participation 
in volunteering has remained unchanged since 
2009, and their participation in social groups has 
actually declined. Furthermore, youth who partici-
pate in one area of civic engagement are more likely 
to get involved in other forms—including partici-
pation in revolutionary activities—suggesting that 
there is a small population of civically active youth 
and a much larger population who do not partici-
pate in any forms of civic engagement. Additionally, 
youth reported in SYPE that in fact they do not 
discuss politics frequently, and when they do, they 
discuss with their friends and their siblings. The 
majority of youth reported that they never speak 
with other acquaintances about politics, which is 
perhaps attributable to the fact that many youth 
perceive the political environment to be polarized 
and express low levels of overall social trust. 
Low levels of civic participation reflect a strong dis-
connect between what youth believe will generate 
change in Egypt and their own actions, which is of 
126
PANEL SURVEY OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN EGYPT (SYPE) 2014
great concern for Egypt’s transition. In terms of the 
actors and strategies that youth believe can bring 
about reform, they have little faith in politicians to 
deliver on their promises of progress. Youth per-
ceive high levels of corruption in society and rela-
tively lower levels of certain social values, including 
the values of transparency and tolerance that are 
key to Egypt’s current transition. In addition, youth 
expressed a high level of dissatisfaction with all 
three recent regimes’ performance on a variety of 
economic, political, and security issues. In contrast, 
around half of the respondents agreed or strongly 
agreed that they themselves have the ability to 
make an impact on public policy, which is surprising 
given their low rates of actual engagement in revo-
lutionary activity reported in the previous chapter 
as well as the low rates of volunteerism and group 
membership found in this chapter. 
One hopeful finding is that youth display consider-
able optimism about the future, and expect both 
their own lives and the state of the country to be 
better five years from the time of the survey than 
they were before the January 25 revolution. How-
ever, in order to achieve this positive vision, youth 
participation in political and social debate and 
events must be fostered. As political and gover-
nance structures are reformed during this transi-
tional period, the government and civil society must 
provide ways for the voices of youth to be mean-
ingfully heard, their needs addressed, and to create 
spaces for them to contribute and help address the 
country’s challenges.
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Society’s attitudes about gender and gender 
roles have a direct impact on many spheres 
of life, including how household duties are 
assigned, how decisions are made, and how 
power in relationships is balanced. These 
attitudes also affect a woman’s right to seek 
divorce, her access to institutions such as 
schools, the labor market, and electoral 
politics, and her risk of experiencing gender-
based violence. 
9.1  Introduction
Because of the important effect that gender atti-
tudes have on the lives of young people, the 2009 
SYPE measured Egyptian youth’s attitudes toward 
gender roles and dynamics. The outcomes indicat-
ed that young Egyptians aged 15–29 maintained 
notably conservative attitudes, with young men 
proving more conservative than women and with 
attitudes varying considerably by region. While 
the 2009 data illustrated the positive association 
between educational attainment and youth out-
looks on gender equality, the results also captured 
alarming degrees of acceptance of gender-based 
violence and domestic abuse, even among female 
respondents (El Kogali, Krafft, and Sieverding 
2011). To assess whether outlooks have changed 
since 2009, we explore the 2014 SYPE results 
related to youth perspectives on gender roles and 
gender equality.
The 2014 questionnaire included the same 
questions related to gender as the 2009 
questionnaire, with two notable modifications. 
Firstly, in light of the augmented importance of 
voter participation in elections and constitutional 
referendums since January 25, 2011, the 2014 
SYPE collected data on youth outlooks regarding 
women voting. Second, for several of the metrics 
explored in this chapter—including those related 
to gender and access to education, household 
dynamics, and sexual harassment—the question 
design was modified in 2014. In the 2009 survey, 
respondents were given the options of “agree,” 
“disagree,” and “don’t know” to indicate their 
views on these topics. In order to capture a 
broader variation in youth opinions, the 2014 
questionnaire used a 5-point Likert scale instead; 
respondents could therefore chose “strongly 
agree,” “agree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” 
“disagree,” or “strongly disagree” to the same 
statements designed to capture gender attitudes 
among the SYPE sample. One should be careful 
when comparing the results of this scale to 2009 
outcomes. There is a considerable difference 
between respondents indicating that they “don’t 
know” (in 2009) and respondents stating that they 
“neither agree nor disagree”(in 2014). 
Assessing the 2009 and 2014 results, we suspect 
that some of those who disagreed or agreed in 
2009 would have selected “neither agree nor 
disagree” had they been given the option. This 
suggests that youth may be unsure where they 
stand on certain points related to gender norms 
and gender equality and that their opinions may 
become more defined later in life. The expanded 
scale used to measure these questions in 2014 
has captured more of these dynamics. On several 
occasions, this chapter aggregates “strongly agree” 
and “agree” into one value label, and we do the 
same for the “strongly disagree” and “disagree” 
responses, to facilitate interpretation. 
We restrict the comparative analysis in this chapter 
to gender attitudes that did not undergo such 
questionnaire modification. Also, our analysis 
primarily focuses on 2014 respondents aged 
15–29—which allows for accurate comparison 
to 2009 outcomes when appropriate—but at 
times incorporates a sub-sample aged 13–35, to 
capture variation by age. The SYPE 2009 and 2014 
outcomes are all provided in the Appendix, which 
covers SYPE respondents aged 15–29 in 2009 and 
2014, as well as respondents aged 13–35 in 2014.1 
1 The one exception to the age groups outlined above 
pertains to voting rights. The 2014 SYPE asked only 
youth aged 18 and older about their views of women 
voting because 18 is the legal voting age in Egypt. 
Thus, we report outcomes in the Appendix for respon-
dents aged 18–29 and aged 18–35. 
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9.2  Access to education, 
employment, and electoral 
politics
Educating female vs. male youth
To observe how young Egyptians perceive gender 
equality in education, respondents in both SYPE 
waves (2009 and 2014) were asked to indicate if 
they believed that educating boys is more import-
ant than educating girls. The complete table of 
outcomes is included in Table A9.1. Among 2014 re-
spondents aged 15–29, over half (56.7%) disagreed 
with the idea that educating boys is more important 
than educating girls, while 27.8% believed that the 
education of male youth is in fact more important 
and 15.5% were undecided (Figure 9.1). As was 
the case in 2009, we observe notable variation 
by gender; 67.2% of female respondents (aged 
15–29) were supportive of equal rights to education 
regardless of gender, compared to 47.1% of male 
respondents in 2014. 
The 2014 data suggest that there is a positive 
correlation between educational attainment and 
youth support of equal access to education for 
girls and boys (Table A9.1). Young people with no 
education proved the least supportive; among illit-
erate respondents aged 15–29, 36.6% believed that 
educating boys is more important than educating 
girls while 41.8% disagreed. By contrast, youth with 
tertiary attainment proved the most supportive. 
Observing youth aged 15–29, we find that 63.8% 
of those with a post-secondary degree and 67.3% 
of those with university attainment believed that 
educating girls is as important as educating boys. 
Attitudes about the importance of educating girls 
in relation to boys also varied by region. The 2014 
responses indicate that young people residing in 
the Frontier and Urban Governorates held the most 
conservative views about gender and education, as 
41.0% of respondents in the Frontier Governorates 
and 37.3% in the Urban Governorates believed that 
educating boys is more important than educating 
girls. On the other hand, respondents in urban and 
rural Lower Egypt demonstrated the strongest sup-
port of equal rights to education in 2014; we find that 
60.5% of rural-based and 63.6% of urban-based 
respondents in Lower Egypt (aged 15–29) were 
supportive of equal access to education.
FIGURE 9.1 Agreement of youth aged 15–29 with the statement, “educating boys is more important 
than educating girls,” by gender and wealth quintile, 2014 (%)
The SYPE data suggest 
that there is a positive 
correlation between 
educational attainment and 
Egyptian youth’s support of 
equal access to education 
for girls and boys.
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As was the case in 2009, the 2014 results suggest 
that as household wealth increases, support for 
a girl’s right to education increases (Figure 9.1). 
Observing respondents aged 15–29, we find that 
youth from the lowest wealth quintile held the most 
conservative views, with 46.8% of respondents 
demonstrating their support of gender equality 
in access to education and 34.8% agreeing that 
educating boys is more important than educating 
girls. We observe rising support of equality in 
education with each increase in wealth quintile and 
find that among respondents in the highest wealth 
quintile, 65.5% of youth supported equal access to 
education. This was nearly 20 percentage points 
higher than their counterparts in the lowest quintile.
Job priority
Both waves of the SYPE asked respondents to 
indicate if they believed that men should get jobs 
over women when professional opportunities are 
scarce (for all outcomes, see Table A9.2).2 Among 
respondents aged 15–29 in the 2014 SYPE, 60.4% 
2 This question used the Likert 5-point scale in 2014. 
Unlike other gender attitudes questions, respon-
dents had the option to “agree,” “disagree,” or choose 
“neither (agree nor disagree)” in 2009. Although 
respondents had the “neither” option in the 2009 
questionnaire, we should still be cautious when di-
rectly comparing the 2009 and 2014 statistics due to 
differences in question design (3-point scale in 2009 
versus 5-point scale in 2014) and different question 
placement in the two surveys.
supported male job priority, 20.6% disagreed, 
and 19.0% were undecided. As demonstrated by 
Figure 9.2, female respondents were more likely to 
advocate for equal access to work than their male 
counterparts in both SYPE waves. Nevertheless, 
we find that the majority of male (68.1%) and 
female (52.1%) respondents supported male job 
priority in 2014. 
While youth support of male job priority was high at 
all education levels, SYPE respondents with higher 
educational attainment were more supportive of 
equal access to job opportunities in 2014 (Table 
A9.2). Observing the 15–29-year-old group, we find 
that respondents with general secondary attain-
ment were the most likely to support equal access 
to work regardless of gender (31.9%) followed by 
those with university attainment (28.0%). By con-
trast, only 12.7% of illiterate youth supported equal 
access to employment in 2014.
We additionally observe some variation in youth 
outlooks by region and residence. Young people 
(aged 15–29) in rural areas were considerably 
less supportive of gender equality in access to 
work than those residing in informal areas; 18.1% 
of rural respondents and 30.7% of respondents 
in informal areas indicated their support of equal 
access to jobs in 2014 (Figure 9.2). Regionally, we 
find that respondents (aged 15–29) in rural Lower 
Egypt (16.4%) and the Frontier Governorates 
(15.4%) were the least likely to support equal 
FIGURE 9.2 Agreement of youth aged 15–29 with the statement, “when job opportunities are 
scarce, priority must go to men over women,” by gender and residence, 2014 (%)
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access to professional opportunities. Unlike their 
rural counterparts, respondents from urban 
Lower Egypt were the most supportive, with just 
over one-quarter (26.6%) demonstrating their 
support of equal access to job opportunities 
regardless of gender. 
The right to vote
The updated civic participation module of the 2014 
SYPE asked respondents aged 18 and older if they 
believed that the women in their families should be 
allowed to participate in elections (full set of out-
comes in Table A9.3). The large majority of young 
people (81.5%) aged 18–35 supported the right of 
female family members to vote. Support of women 
voting was high among both male (81.9%) and 
female (81.1%) SYPE respondents (aged 18–35).
As shown in Figure 9.3, the majority of youth at each 
education level supported women voting, but there 
was some variation by educational attainment. Illiter-
ate youth (aged 18–35) proved the least supportive 
of women voting, with 68.6% agreeing with the right 
of female relatives to participate in elections and 
referendums. This was approximately 20 percentage 
points lower than youth with tertiary degrees (88.8% 
of respondents with post-secondary and 89.9% of 
respondents with university attainment) or with 
general secondary school attainment (85.3%).
 With regard to region and residence, young people 
(aged 18–35) living in informal areas were the most 
supportive of women voting (90.5%), followed by 
urban areas (83.4%), while the percentage of young 
people supporting a woman’s right to vote was low-
est in rural areas (79.3%) (Table A9.3). While still 
in the majority, youth (aged 18–35) in the Frontier 
Governorates and rural Upper Egypt were the least 
supportive of women voting, with 70.7% and 73.8% 
of young people agreeing with the right of their 
female family members’ to vote in these regions, 
respectively. This was considerably lower than in 
urban Lower Egypt, where 89.6% of respondents 
expressed their support of women voting in 2014. 
There also appeared to be a positive relationship 
between household wealth and youth support of 
women voting. Those (aged 18–35) from the lowest 
wealth quintile appeared notably more conser-
vative than other wealth quintiles on this point, 
with 69.9% agreeing and 30.1% disagreeing with 
a woman’s right to participate in elections and 
referendums. Among the other wealth quintiles, 
support of a woman’s right to vote exceeded 80% 
of respondents. We observe the most liberal views 
among youth in the highest wealth quintile, among 
whom 88.7% (aged 18–35) agreed with the right of 
female family members to vote. 
FIGURE 9.3 Responses of youth aged 18–35 
to the question, “Do you agree that female 
family members should vote in elections and 
referendums?”, by education level and region, 
2014 (%)
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9.3  Household dynamics
Authority and obedience among siblings
To better examine gendered household dynamics, 
both waves of the SYPE asked respondents to 
indicate whether they believed that a girl was ob-
ligated to obey her brother even if he was younger 
than she. All outcomes are provided in Table A9.4. 
As was the case in 2009, SYPE 2014 respondents 
(aged 15–29) demonstrated conservative re-
sponses to this question, with nearly two-thirds 
(60.6%) of youth agreeing with these household 
gender norms and only 12.9% of youth disagreeing. 
Additionally, one-quarter (26.4%) of respondents 
were on the fence, neither agreeing nor disagree-
ing with inequality of authority among siblings. As 
is demonstrated by Figure 9.4, male respondents 
were more likely to support a brother’s authority 
over his sisters than their female counterparts; over 
two-thirds (67.5%) of male respondents indicated 
this in the 2014 SYPE, compared to approximately 
one-half (53.1%) of female respondents. 
While support of a brother’s authority over his 
sisters was high regardless of residence, youth 
residing in informal areas proved the most likely to 
support gender equality in this context, with 21.3% 
of respondents (aged 15–29) rejecting the notion 
that a girl must obey her younger brother, com-
pared to 13.8% of urban and 11.2% of rural youth. 
Respondents in rural Upper Egypt held the most 
conservative views, with only 10.3% disagreeing 
and over two-thirds (67.8%) agreeing with male su-
periority in between-sibling authority. By contrast, 
the largest percent of youth disagreed with this 
statement in the Urban Governorates and urban 
Lower Egypt, where 16.5% and 15.9% of respon-
dents (aged 15–29) disagreed with a brother’s 
authority over his siblings, respectively. 
Outlooks remained conservative regardless of 
educational attainment, though we do find that 
respondents with the lowest levels of education 
were the least likely to support equality among 
siblings, which was also the case in 2009. Among 
SYPE 2014 respondents aged 15–29, only 9.7% of 
illiterate youth and 9.0% of youth with a primary 
education disagreed with a brother’s authority over 
his sisters even if he is younger. At the other end 
of the educational spectrum, 18.4% of SYPE 2014 
respondents with university attainment disagreed 
with such household inequality among siblings. 
Nevertheless, the majority of youth at all educa-
tion levels supported a brother’s authority over his 
sisters regardless of the brother’s age.
Conservative outlooks on household inequality 
among siblings cut across all wealth quintiles as well, 
though there did appear to be a relationship between 
household wealth and youth outlooks on this topic. 
While 68.5% of respondents aged 15–29 in the low-
est wealth quintile supported a brother’s authority 
over his sisters, we find that 60.8% of respondents 
FIGURE 9.4 Agreement of youth aged 15–29 with the statement, “A girl must obey her brother, even if he 
is younger” by gender and region, 2014 (%)
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in the middle quintile and 55.6% of respondents in 
the highest wealth quintile were in agreement.
Gender and household duties
To further understand youth perspectives on 
gender norms within the family, the 2009 and 
2014 SYPE questionnaires asked respondents if 
they felt that boys should contribute to household 
chores as much as girls. All outcomes are included 
in Table A9.5. Among respondents aged 15–29, 
over one-quarter (27.8%) of respondents agreed 
that boys and girls should contribute to household 
chores equally, 41.9% disagreed, and 30.3% neither 
agreed nor disagreed. As was observed in 2009, fe-
male respondents proved considerably more likely 
to agree that boys and girls should contribute to 
chores equally: 36.1% of female respondents (aged 
15–29) indicated this in 2014, compared to 20.3% 
of male respondents (Figure 9.5).
Observing outcomes by residence, we notice that 
among respondents aged 15–29, those living in 
informal areas were considerably more likely to 
support equal chores for girls and boys than their 
rural counterparts; 40.5% of youth living in informal 
areas agreed that boys should contribute to chores 
as much as girls do, compared to 31.6% of respon-
dents in urban areas and 24.0% in rural areas. This 
differs from the 2009 outcomes, when there was 
little variation by residence. However, the 2014 re-
sults on youth perspectives of gendered household 
duties were consistent with the outcomes regard-
ing authority among siblings, where we similarly 
observed more egalitarian outlooks among youth in 
informal areas and more conservative views among 
rural young people.
Regionally, once again rural Upper Egypt and the 
Frontiers Governorates held the most conservative 
views. Youth (aged 15–29) living in rural Upper 
Egypt and the Frontier Governorates were the least 
supportive of boys and girls contributing to house-
hold chores equally, with only 20.4% of respon-
dents in the Frontiers and 22.4% of respondents in 
rural Upper Egypt agreeing that boys should help 
with chores as much as girls. By contrast, respon-
dents living in the Urban Governorates were the 
most supportive, with 36.7% agreeing with equal 
chores for girls and boys. This is not surprising in 
light of the outcomes noted above, i.e. the highest 
disagreement of a brother’s authority over his sis-
ters in the Urban Governorates in 2014.
Youth (aged 15–29) attitudes about gender and 
household responsibilities varied by educational 
level, but there did not appear to be a consistent 
correlation between level of schooling and support 
for boys contributing to chores (Figure 9.5). In 
2014, only 21.0% of illiterate respondents, 25.1% of 
respondents with primary education, and 25.6% of 
respondents with vocational secondary attainment 
FIGURE 9.5 Youth (aged 15–29) agreement with the statement, “Boys should help with household chores as 
much as girls do”, by gender and education level, 2014 (%)
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agreed with boys’ equal participation in household 
tasks. Conversely, we observe the highest support 
of equal household responsibilities for boys and 
girls among those with general secondary and uni-
versity attainment, with 34.2% of respondents who 
completed the general secondary track and 32.9% 
of university degree-holding respondents agreeing 
that boys and girls should contribute to household 
chores equally.
Financial decision making between 
spouses
To evaluate youth perceptions of household deci-
sion making authority between spouses, both waves 
of the SYPE asked respondents to indicate whether 
they thought that the husband exclusively should 
decide on how money is spent (See Table A9.6). 
Overall, nearly half (47.4%) of 2014 youth aged 
15–29 agreed, while a smaller percentage (23.9%) 
disagreed. Over one-quarter (28.7%) of youth were 
undecided. Figure 9.6 provides outcomes by gender 
for 2014. We find that male youth (55.2%) were 
considerably more likely than female youth (38.9%) 
to believe that financial decision making should be 
solely in the hands of the husband. 
In 2014, we find the strongest support for male con-
trol over household spending in rural Upper Egypt, 
where 55.1% of respondents (aged 15–29) agreed 
with the statement and only 20.5% of respondents 
disagreed. We observe less conservative views in 
Lower Egypt regarding a husband’s control over 
household finances, with 43.3% of urban and 41.7% 
of rural youth in this region in agreement, while ap-
proximately one-quarter (24.7% in urban areas and 
24.5% in rural areas) expressed their disagreement. 
We observe considerable variation but no clear 
correlation between educational attainment and 
views on household financial decision making. 
Illiterate youth (aged 15–29) maintained the most 
conservative outlooks, with over half (54.3%) 
agreeing that financial decision making should be 
exclusively the role of the male household head. 
Inversely, youth agreement was lowest among 
those with general secondary and university at-
tainment, at 41.0% and 38.1%, respectively. While 
this might suggest that there is a positive relation-
FIGURE 9.6 Agreement of youth aged 15–29 with the statement, “only the husband should decide 
how household money is spent”, by gender and employment status, 2014 (%)
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ship between schooling and youth perspectives on 
equal financial decision making authority between 
spouses, we also observe conservative views 
among those with higher levels of attainment. No-
tably, 50.7% of youth aged 15–29 with vocational 
secondary and 49.3% with post-secondary attain-
ment agreed that only the husband should decide 
how household money is spent. It also appears 
that there was a relationship between youth atti-
tudes about household financial decision making 
and socioeconomic status. Over half (54.5%) of 
youth from the lowest wealth quintile agreed with 
a husband’s control over household spending. 
Conversely, 40.2% of those in the highest quintile 
were in agreement.
Analyzing this variable by employment status, it 
appears that for 2014 respondents aged 15–29, 
employed youth (54.7%) were more likely to sup-
port a husband’s control over financial decision-
making than unemployed youth (48.9%) or young 
people out of the labor force (43.7%). When we 
disaggregate by gender (Figure 9.6), we find that 
unemployed male respondents aged 15–29 were 
slightly more likely to support male domination 
over household financial decisionmaking than 
those out of the labor force or employed. Con-
versely, unemployed females (aged 15–29) proved 
slightly less likely to agree that husbands should 
control household spending, compared to their 
female counterparts who were out of the labor 
force or employed. 
Obtaining permission from spouse
The final SYPE indicator that assessed youth 
attitudes toward household dynamics concerned 
the question of whether a woman must obtain 
permission from her husband “before doing any-
thing” (see Table A9.7). As was the case in 2009, 
we find that exceptionally high percentages of 
youth agree with this. Among respondents aged 
15–29 in 2014, 76.3% were in agreement, while 
a rather small percentage (6.0%) disagreed and 
approximately 17.7% were undecided. Observing 
outcomes by gender (Figure 9.7), male respon-
dents (78.8%) were slightly more likely than 
female respondents (73.6%) to agree, but youth 
support of the idea that a woman must obtain her 
husband’s permission before “doing anything” 
was high regardless of gender.
There was slight variation in outlooks by education-
al attainment, but there was no clear correlation 
between schooling and perspectives on this matter. 
In fact, youth (aged 15–29) with post-secondary 
attainment demonstrated the most conserva-
tive views, with 81.3% agreeing that a wife must 
have her spouse’s permission for any activity. We 
additionally observe conservative outlooks among 
those with preparatory education (79.6%) and pri-
mary education (78.6%). While university-educated 
youth were the least likely to agree that a woman 
must have her husband’s permission before “doing 
anything”, we still find that the majority (71.7%) 
were in agreement.
Analyzing the 2014 outcomes by residence, we 
observe the most conservative views in urban 
and rural areas (77.1% and 77.5% respectively) 
but less conservative outlooks among youth 
in informal areas (66.4%). Observing youth 
attitudes by region, we find that agreement was 
highest in rural Upper Egypt, where 82.2% of 
youth respondents supported the idea that a 
woman must obtain her husband’s permission 
before “doing anything.” Agreement was lower in 
urban Lower Egypt (70.6%) and in the Frontier 
Governorates (71.6%).
FIGURE 9.7 Agreement of youth aged 15–29 
with the statement, “a woman must obtain 
permission from her spouse before doing 
anything”, by gender, 2014 (%)
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Observing 2014 youth outlooks on the need for 
spousal permission by wealth, we also find that 
strong agreement cuts across all wealth quintiles, 
and there does appear to be a weak relationship 
between wealth and youth outlooks on this mat-
ter. Those from the lowest wealth quintile were 
most likely to be in favor (80.8%), and we find that 
respondent agreement with inequality between 
spouses slowly declines as we move to higher 
wealth quintiles. Despite this apparent correlation, 
youth agreement was still very high among the 
second highest and highest quintiles, at 74.6% and 
75.7%, respectively.
9.4  Divorce
Women’s right to ask for divorce
The 2009 and 2014 SYPE questionnaires allow 
us to compare youth outlooks on a woman’s right 
to separate from her husband through divorce or 
khul.3 Outcomes by all background characteristics 
are provided in Table A9.8. Overall, the majority of 
2014 respondents aged 15–29 (71.4%) supported a 
woman’s right to separate from her husband. Youth 
support has increased since 2009, when agree-
ment among SYPE respondents was measured at 
63.7% among those aged 15–29. As was the case 
in 2009, female respondents (81.0%) proved more 
likely to support a woman’s right to divorce than 
male respondents (62.5%) in 2014 (Figure 9.8). 
Similar to the 2009 outcomes, wealthier young 
people were more likely to support a woman’s right 
to divorce than young people from lower wealth 
quintiles. Over three-quarters (77.8%) of respon-
dents (aged 15–29) from the highest wealth quintile 
agreed with a woman’s right to divorce, compared 
to 65.6% of youth from the lowest quintile. Youth 
support of a woman’s right to divorce grew among 
youth in all wealth quintiles between the 2009 and 
2014 wave of the SYPE.
3  Amendments to personal status laws passed in Jan-
uary 2000 interpret khul as the following: a woman 
has the right to separate from her husband, regardless 
of the circumstance, as long as she “renounces her 
dower and all her financial rights” (Sonneveld 2004). 
Attitudes about a woman’s right to divorce varied 
by educational level: 61.2% of illiterate youth 
(aged 15–29) supported a woman’s right to 
divorce, and with each step upward in educational 
attainment, we find increasing percentages of 
youth in support. Among those with university  
attainment, the large majority (78.1%) were in 
favor in 2014. Comparing the 2009 and 2014  
SYPE rounds, we find growing support for a 
woman’s right to separate from her husband at 
all educational levels except among youth with 
post-secondary education. 
FIGURE 9.8 Responses of youth aged 15–35 
to the question, “do you think a woman has the 
right to ask for a separation (divorce or khul?), 
by gender (2009 and 2014) and marital status 
(2014), (%)
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Observing 2014 outcomes by marital status, we 
find that ever-married youth were more likely 
to be in favor of a woman’s right to divorce than 
never-married youth. Among 2014 respondents 
aged 15–35,4 we find that 69.5% of never-married 
respondents supported a women’s right to pursue 
divorce while three quarters (75.0%) of ever-mar-
ried respondents agreed that women should be 
allowed to request divorce. As Figure 9.8 illustrates, 
ever-married female youth were as likely to support 
a woman’s right to divorce as their never-married 
counterparts, while we observe slightly higher 
support among the ever-married males than their 
never-married counterparts.
Regionally, we find that young people (aged 
15–29) from the Frontier Governorates (56.5%) 
and urban Upper Egypt (65.9%) were the least 
likely to support a woman’s right to divorce in 
2014, while support was highest in the Urban 
Governorates (73.8%). It is important to note here 
that youth support of this right has grown consid-
erably in rural Upper Egypt, an area of the country 
often characterized by conservative norms. While 
support increased in all regions between the two 
survey waves, it jumped from 59.5% of respon-
dents (aged 15–29) in rural Upper Egypt in 2009 
to nearly three-quarters (72.7%) of respondents 
in 2014.
Circumstances in which divorce is 
justified 
The SYPE also asked youth to indicate circum-
stances in which women and men have the right 
to pursue divorce. For married women, SYPE 
respondents aged 15-29 most frequently supported 
the following reasons: if a wife hates her husband 
(78.1%), if her husband marries another woman 
(74.8%), if her spouse beats her regularly (71.4%), 
4  We observe trends among the 2014 respondents aged 
15–35 in order to capture in our analysis older youth 
who are more likely to be married. Outcomes for SYPE 
ever-married and never-married respondents aged 
15–29 in both the 2009 and 2014 survey rounds are 
also included in Table A9.8.
and if her husband “knows”5 another woman 
(69.4%). While respondents perceived frequent 
domestic violence as grounds for divorce, only a 
minority (21.8%) of 2014 respondents aged 15–29 
believed that a woman has the right to seek divorce 
after the first time she is beaten by her husband 
(see Table A9.9). 
Comparing 2009 and 2014 responses, we notice 
that while youth support of a woman’s right to 
seek divorce has remained consistent for many 
of the circumstances addressed, the percentage 
of respondents (aged 15–29) who believed that 
a woman is justified in divorcing her husband 
if he does not adequately provide for her and 
her children dropped from nearly half (47.2%) 
of respondents in 2009 to 36.4% in 2014. The 
percentage of respondents who believed that it is 
appropriate for a wife to separate from her husband 
if he “tries to take her money” also declined 
between the two survey waves (from 60.3% in 
2009 to 52.9% in 2014).
Table A9.10 provides youth perspectives on the cir-
cumstances in which a man has the right to divorce 
his wife, as reported by SYPE respondents. In 2014, 
the most widely supported reason for a man to seek 
divorce among respondents aged 15–29 was if his 
wife “knew” another man (91.0%) or if he hates his 
wife (71.2%). These trends were similar to the 2009 
responses, though we note a small decline in youth 
support of a man divorcing his wife if he hates her 
(from 79.6% in 2009 to 71.2% in 2014) or if she 
does not take care of the children (from 45.6% in 
2009 to 38.7% in 2014).
Comparing 2014 outlooks on the circumstances 
in which men as opposed to women can justifiably 
pursue divorce, we notice equivalent expectations 
for husbands and wives in some cases but some 
evidence of double standards. For example, 
5 The direct translation from the SYPE questionnaire is 
“if he knows another one (woman).” In this context, 
“knowing” another woman is not explicitly sexual, 
though it may likely be interpreted as such by 
respondents. 
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nearly three-quarters of SYPE 2014 respondents 
aged 15–29 agreed that a wife or a husband can 
justifiably pursue divorce if he/she hates his/her 
spouse. We see similarly equivalent expectations 
pertaining to the circumstances in which a 
spouse suffers from sexual dysfunction or cannot 
have children.
Expectations vary more when we focus on the 
circumstance in which a spouse “knows” another 
(Figure 9.9). Overall, the majority of youth consid-
ered this grounds for divorce for both husbands 
and wives, but it is worth noting that while roughly 
three- quarters (69.4%) believed that a man’s 
“knowing” another woman is a justifiable reason 
for his wife to divorce him, 9 out of 10 respondents 
stated that a wife’s “knowing” another was grounds 
for her husband divorcing her. 
Public perceptions of divorced women
The SYPE 2014 results suggest that divorced 
women are still not seen positively in Egyptian 
society (Table A9.11). Among 2014 respondents 
aged 15–29, 63.7% (62.9% of male and 64.6% 
of female respondents) indicated that they do 
not think that society sees divorced women 
respectfully. These results are quite similar to 
2009, when 67.1% of respondents (65.8% of 
males and 68.6% of females) stated that they 
did not believe society perceived divorced female 
with respect.
FIGURE 9.9 Agreement of youth aged 15–29 
with a husband’s or wife’s decision to pursue 
divorce if his/her spouse “knows” another, by 
gender, 2014 (%)
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FIGURE 9.10 Responses of youth aged 15–29 to 
the question: “Do you think that society perceives 
divorced women respectfully?”, by region and 
education, 2014 (%)
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We observe some variation by years of school-
ing (Figure 9.10). Young people (aged 15–29) 
with university (57.2%) and general secondary 
(60.2%) attainment proved less likely to believe 
that divorced females are not socially respected. 
Conversely, illiterate respondents (70.3%) and 
respondents with primary education (69.5%) 
were more likely to state that their societies do not 
respect divorced women.
Disaggregating 2014 responses by wealth quintile, 
we note slight but not drastic variation in outlooks. 
Respondents in the higher wealth quintiles were 
slightly less likely to believe that divorced women 
are disrespected by society, with 59.2% of respon-
dents (aged 15–29) in the highest and 61.5% of 
those in the second highest quintiles disagreeing 
with the question. Respondents from the middle 
(68.2%) and lowest (65.9%) wealth quintiles 
proved more likely to believe that society disre-
spects divorced females. 
In terms of residence, we find that youth who live 
in informal areas were the most likely to believe 
that society perceives divorced female negatively; 
75.9% of youth (aged 15–29) living in informal 
areas indicated this, compared to 61.0% of 
youth in urban and 63.1% in rural areas. We also 
observe variation by region. Youth (aged 15–29) 
in the Frontier Governorates (77.1%) and urban 
Lower Egypt (70.9%) were the most likely to 
report that their society is not respectful toward 
divorced females. On the other hand, young 
people in the Urban Governorates were the least 
likely to report that society disrespected divorced 
females, with nearly one-half (57.3%) aged 15–29 
saying this in 2014. 
Interestingly we find that a smaller percentage of 
youth in rural Upper Egypt believed that society is 
disrespectful toward divorced women, with 62.4% 
of 2014 respondents aged 15–29 agreeing with 
this sentiment. This is surprising, as the SYPE 
data also suggested that young people living in 
these areas were the least supportive of divorce 
(as discussed in the previous section).
9.5  Gender-based violence
Wife battery
The SYPE 2009 and 2014 questionnaires asked 
respondents to indicate the contexts in which 
they feel it is justifiable for a husband to beat his 
wife. Table A9.12 provides the results overall and 
by gender for both SYPE waves. Similar to 2009 
outcomes, the most commonly supported reason 
for wife battery reported by 2014 respondents 
(aged 15–29) was if a man’s wife “talked” to 
another man; 64.9% of respondents considered 
this justifiable grounds for a husband to physically 
assault his spouse. While alarmingly high, 
respondent support of wife battery in this context 
has declined since 2009, when 74.0% of SYPE 
respondents aged 15–29 considered a wife “talking 
to other men” as a justifiable reason for a husband 
to beat her.
Comparing the results from the 2009 and 2014 
surveys, we notice that youth support of wife 
battery has declined for other circumstances as 
well. For example, one-quarter (25.5%) of 2009 
respondents (aged 15–29) agreed that a man could 
beat his wife if she argued with him. In 2014, this 
figure dropped to 18.9% of respondents of this age. 
Similarly, while one-third (33.0%) of 2009 SYPE 
respondents (aged 15–29) agreed that wife battery 
While still alarmingly high, 
the percentage of Egyptian 
youth who felt that a man 
was justified in beating his 
wife if she “talked to another 
man” declined from 74% in 
2009 to 65% in 2014.
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was justified if the wife wasted her husband’s mon-
ey, less than one-quarter (22.8%) of respondents 
supported this in 2014. 
As was the case in 2009, young men were more 
likely to approve of wife battery in each circum-
stance than young women in 2014. For example, 
while 13.9% of 2014 female respondents aged 
15–29 believed that a man has the right to beat his 
wife if she argues with him, nearly twice as many 
male respondents (23.4%) saw this is a justifiable 
reason. Similarly, while 58.4% of 2014 female 
respondents aged 15–29 thought that a man could 
beat his wife if she “talked” to other men, 70.9% of 
male respondents agreed with this statement.
Sexual harassment
The SYPE questionnaires asked respondents 
if they agreed or disagreed with the statement 
that women who dress “provocatively” in public 
spaces deserve to be harassed.6 (The full set 
of outcomes are provided in Table A9.13). We 
find that the majority of respondents aged 
6  This question utilized the Likert 5-point scale in 2014. 
In 2009, respondents only had the option to “agree,” 
“disagree,” or indicate that they “don’t know.”
15–29 (59.4%) agreed with this statement while 
one-quarter (25.6%) disagreed with it. Figure 
9.11 provides the 2014 outcomes by gender 
and region. The results are not surprising: male 
respondents (62.3%) were more likely to argue 
that women dressed “provocatively” in the 
streets “deserve” to be harassed than female 
respondents (56.3%); nevertheless, over one-half 
of female respondents aged 15–29 agreed with 
the statement in 2014. 
In terms of location youth residing in informal areas 
were the least likely to agree that sexual harass-
ment is justified due to a woman’s attire; nearly 
one-half (48.2%) of respondents aged 15–29 in 
these areas were in disagreement with the state-
ment in 2014. These perspectives on sexual harass-
ment from informal areas were quite different from 
those of young people in urban areas (where only 
29.3% disagreed) and in rural areas (where only 
20.4% disagreed). 
Observing outcomes by region, we find that 
young people in rural Upper Egypt indicated that 
they were the most likely to agree that sexual 
harassment is justified by attire, with 70.3% of 
respondents aged 15–29 indicating this in 2014. 
Conversely, youth in urban Lower Egypt were 
FIGURE 9.11 Responses of youth aged 15–29 to the question, “do you believe that women who are 
harassed in the streets deserve to be if they are dressed provocatively?” by gender and region, 2014 
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the least likely to agree that women were to be 
blamed for the harassment they experience in the 
streets; over one-third (37.5%) of respondents 
aged 15–29 in this region disagreed that women 
dressing provocatively in public spaces “deserved” 
to be harassed. 
There was some variation in youth (aged 15–29) 
outlooks when we disaggregated by educational 
attainment, but we do not find a clear correlation 
between schooling and youth perspectives 
on sexual harassment. Those with university 
attainment were the least likely to blame the victim 
of sexual harassment because of her “provocative” 
attire, though one-half (50.9%) did agree with the 
statement in 2014. By contrast, respondents who 
are illiterate (65.1%), possessed a primary school 
education (65.6%) or preparatory attainment 
(62.1%) proved more likely to blame the victim 
of sexual harassment in public places and agree 
that a woman “deserved” harassment if dressed 
“provocatively.” 
9.6  Conclusion
Gender attitudes among Egyptian youth remained 
highly conservative for nearly all of the indicators 
examined in this chapter. Our analysis highlighted 
numerous cases where, despite some variation 
by demographic characteristics, conservative 
gender attitudes among youth cut across regions, 
residence, wealth quintiles, and education levels. 
As was the case in 2009, male youth held more 
conservative outlooks than female youth and, in 
many instances, higher educational attainment 
appeared to lead to more egalitarian views 
regarding gender roles and rights. Youth gender 
attitudes varied considerably by location, and 
we frequently find that young people residing 
in informal or urban areas have the most liberal 
outlooks, whereas their rural counterparts hold 
more conservative views. Regionally, young people 
in the Frontier Governorates and rural Upper 
Egypt continued to maintain highly conservative 
perspectives on gender, while Egyptian youth 
in rural Lower Egypt often proved more open to 
gender equality. 
The conservatism of youth attitudes toward 
gender roles varied across the broad domains 
examined in this chapter. In the social, economic 
and political sphere, youth gender attitudes were 
somewhat varied. While the majority of SYPE 
respondents supported women voting, and while 
over half of respondents supported equal rights 
to education, outlooks on the labor market were 
quite different, with the majority of respondents 
supporting male job priority. Although support 
for gender equality has positive implications for 
women’s political participation, it demonstrates 
that programs to support gender-equitable 
attitudes toward education and the labor market 
are still needed, and suggests that the value of 
women’s participation in the labor market in 
particular is underappreciated by many youth. 
We find that respondents’ support of gender 
inequality in the household remained high, as the 
majority of young people continued to support 
male sibling authority over sisters, a male spouse’s 
full control over household spending, and a wife’s 
need to seek spousal approval before “doing 
anything”. Household duties proved additionally 
gendered, with large percentages of SYPE 
respondents rejecting the idea that boys and girls 
should contribute equally to household chores. 
This finding indicates that attitudes toward gender 
equality in the home lag even behind those toward 
gender equality in the public sphere, which has 
negative implications for women’s autonomy. 
Similar to 2009 outcomes, many Egyptian youth 
also continued to demonstrate support for 
domestic violence in particular contexts, and the 
majority of Egyptian young people still considered 
sexual harassment the victim’s fault. These 
alarming findings highlight the need for broad-
based campaigns against gender-based violence 
both inside and outside the home.
On a positive note, our analysis additionally 
highlighted growing support of a woman’s right 
to ask for divorce, with a large majority of young 
people now supporting this in 2014. This may 
be related to legal changes in Egypt as well as 
changes in social norms. Nevertheless, according 
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to SYPE youth, divorced women continue to face 
social marginalization in Egyptian communities, 
demonstrating the need for further progress in 
terms of acceptance of divorce. Finally, although 
views remained conservative overall, the five-point 
Likert scale captured the considerable uncertainty 
that many Egyptian youth feel over questions of 
gender roles and rights. These outlooks may evolve 
and become more defined as respondents come of 
age, though it remains to be seen whether those on 
the fence will gravitate toward gender equality or 
will develop more conservative outlooks.
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TABLE A2.1	 		Usual	source	of	medical	care	by	background	characteristics,	among	youth	aged	
13–35,	2014,	(%)
HEALTH  
INSURANCE
PUBLIC  
FACILITIES PHARMACY
PRIVATE 
FACILITIES OTHER
DON’T GO 
ANYWHERE TOTAL
Gender
Male 5.1 20.5 6.0 34.6 2.0 31.9 100.0
Female 3.1 24.1 4.0 43.4 1.2 24.3 100.0
Age group
13–17 8.9 19.9 4.5 36.1 1.8 28.8 100.0
18–24 2.5 21.6 5.2 40.3 1.4 29.1 100.0
25–29 2.9 23.1 5.2 39.9 1.9 27.2 100.0
30–35 3.8 25.4 4.8 37.8 1.4 26.9 100.0
Urban–rural residence
Urban 5.6 20.7 3.1 39.2 2.6 28.9 100.0
Rural 3.8 23.6 5.5 39.8 1.0 26.4 100.0
Informal 1.4 18.8 7.6 32.5 2.1 37.7 100.0
Region
Urban Governorates 6.6 23.7 1.8 37.7 3.2 27.0 100.0
Urban Lower Egypt 4.1 19.2 2.9 41.5 1.3 30.9 100.0
Rural Lower Egypt 5.7 24.4 3.1 39.3 1.1 26.5 100.0
Urban Upper Egypt 0.5 13.3 11.9 32.9 2.6 38.9 100.0
Rural Upper Egypt 1.8 22.6 8.3 41.1 1.0 25.3 100.0
Frontier Governorates 3.0 23.3 1.2 19.5 0.6 52.4 100.0
Educational level
Illiterate 1.1 30.4 4.8 27.5 1.3 34.9 100.0
Can read and write 0.9 25.6 7.4 38.8 5.0 22.3 100.0
Primary 1.2 34.3 5.0 31.2 0.9 27.5 100.0
Preparatory 5.4 27.4 5.4 32.4 1.2 28.2 100.0
General secondary 9.1 14.0 3.4 46.1 1.8 25.7 100.0
Vocational secondary 3.4 23.0 5.7 38.5 1.6 27.9 100.0
Post-secondary institution 4.7 18.4 7.7 42.3 1.9 25.1 100.0
University and above 4.9 12.6 3.6 48.9 1.8 28.1 100.0
Wage work
Waged 4.8 20.7 6.9 37.1 1.9 28.7 100.0
Employer/self-employed 1.9 24.5 6.8 35.8 1.6 29.4 100.0
Unpaid 1.2 31.9 6.2 32.1 0.7 28.0 100.0
Unemployed 1.0 26.6 4.4 40.1 1.2 26.9 100.0
Nonstudent out of labor force 0.9 26.7 3.8 39.6 1.2 27.8 100.0
Student out of labor force 9.3 15.1 4.3 41.2 1.9 28.1 100.0
Wealth quintile
Lowest 2.3 32.3 6.5 25.9 1.3 31.8 100.0
Second 3.3 25.3 7.6 34.5 1.2 28.2 100.0
Middle 4.8 24.3 5.1 39.6 1.7 24.6 100.0
Fourth 4.6 19.1 3.6 41.5 1.3 29.9 100.0
Richest 5.2 12.7 2.6 50.2 2.3 27.0 100.0
Total 4.1 22.2 5.0 38.9 1.6 28.2 100.0
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TABLE A2.2 Exposure	to	sexual	harassment	among	females	aged	13–35,	2014	(%)
AGES 13–35, 2014 AGES 13–29, 2014 AGES 13–29, 2009
Age group
13–17 49.5 49.5 46.4
18–24 44.8 44.8 54.2
25–29 33.3 33.3 46.4
30–35 27.1
Urban–rural residence
Urban 47.7 50.3 61.9
Rural 32.6 35.6 40.9
Informal 61.6 65.0 63.0
Region
Urban Governorates 53.3 56.5 72.1
Urban Lower Egypt 50.1 52.7 63.3
Rural Lower Egypt 32.1 35.1 52.9
Urban Upper Egypt 50.2 52.1 36.4
Rural Upper Egypt 33.6 36.5 27.4
Frontier Governorates 28.5 30.4 37.9
Educational level
Illiterate 22.6 23.5 28.0
Can read and write 20.1 25.9 23.3
Primary 34.5 37.9 41.3
Preparatory 41.4 43.1 54.0
General secondary 50.4 51.2 69.2
Vocational secondary 39.2 42.5 51.9
Post-secondary institution 48.5 51.6 64.2
University and above 48.5 49.3 66.6
Wealth quintile
Lowest 35.3 38.7 32.2
Second 40.2 43.3 44.1
Middle 43.1 46.1 47.5
Fourth 39.1 41.6 58.8
Richest 41.4 43.7 67.8
Total 39.9 42.8 49.7
(N) (5,821) (4,639) (6,819)
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NEVER
1–3 TIMES PER 
WEEK
MORE THAN 3 TIMES 
PER WEEK
Age group
13–17 31.6 53.4 15.1
18–24 34.7 53.1 12.3
25–29 39.5 50.7 9.8
30–35 44.3 47.4 8.2
Gender
Males 33.5 53.9 12.6
Females 40.2 49.2 10.6
Urban–rural residence
Urban 26.7 56.4 16.9
Rural 42.2 48.6 9.2
Informal 33.9 56.1 10.1
Region
Urban Governorates 24.2 56.3 19.5
Urban Lower Egypt 34.2 51.7 14.1
Rural Lower Egypt 39.9 49.7 10.4
Urban Upper Egypt 29.5 62.7 7.8
Rural Upper Egypt 44.2 47.7 8.2
Frontier Governorates 43.6 50.6 5.7
Educational level
Illiterate 56.3 39.4 4.3
Can read and write 43.9 53.3 2.8
Primary 46.7 45.6 7.8
Preparatory 41.0 49.8 9.2
General secondary 23.7 55.3 21.0
Vocational secondary 38.3 52.2 9.5
Post-secondary institution 28.1 55.9 16.0
University and above 24.7 57.6 17.7
Wealth quintile
Lowest 50.9 44.1 5.0
Second 42.4 50.6 7.0
Third 34.3 54.4 11.3
Fourth 32.7 54.3 13.0
Highest 26.3 53.9 19.8
Total 36.8 51.6 11.6
(N) (4,136) (5,534) (1,233)
TABLE A2.3 Percentage	of	youth	aged	13–35	consuming	carbonated	drinks,	by	
background	characteristics,	2014
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 NEVER
1–3 TIMES 
PER WEEK
 MORE THAN 3 TIMES 
PER WEEK
Age group
13–17 53.6 36.4 10.0
18–24 54.3 36.2 9.6
25–29 58.3 35.0 6.7
30–35 63.5 30.5 6.1
Gender
Males 48.3 41.6 10.1
Females 65.4 28.1 6.6
Urban–rural residence
Urban 44.2 43.2 12.6
Rural 63.3 30.4 6.4
Informal 52.8 38.7 8.5
Region
Urban Governorates 38.7 46.0 15.3
Urban Lower Egypt 52.1 37.7 10.2
Rural Lower Egypt 60.3 32.6 7.1
Urban Upper Egypt 55.5 39.4 5.1
Rural Upper Egypt 66.1 28.2 5.7
Frontier Governorates 61.9 31.9 6.2
Educational level
Illiterate 74.5 23.0 2.6
Can read and write 64.8 34.2 1.1
Primary 65.5 28.3 6.2
Preparatory 63.3 29.9 6.8
General secondary 45.9 40.5 13.5
Vocational secondary 59.3 33.7 7.0
Post-secondary institution 47.2 42.5 10.3
University and above 40.8 45.6 13.6
Wealth quintile
Lowest 70.2 24.7 5.2
Second 62.3 32.7 5.0
Third 55.9 35.7 8.4
Fourth 51.0 39.6 9.4
Highest 46.3 40.6 13.1
Total 56.6 35.0 8.4
(N) (6,334) (3,660) (909)
TABLE A2.4 Percentage	of	youth	consuming	fast	food,	by	background	characteristics,	2014	
(ages	13–35)
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TABLE A2.5 Percentage	of	youth	engaged	in	any	daily	physical	activity,	by	background	
characteristics
2014 (AGES 13–35) 2014 (AGES 15–29) 2009 (AGES 15–29)
Age group
13–17 66.8 66.9 82.0
18–24 53.1 53.1 64.7
25–29 48.9 48.9 60.2
30–35 49.0
Gender
Males 67.0 67.8 82.8
Females 40.8 40.8 51.2
Urban–rural residence
Urban 55.3 56.3 69.5
Rural 55.6 55.9 66.0
Informal 42.6 44.4 68.7
Region
Urban Governorates 55.9 57.5 69.5
Urban Lower Egypt 44.6 46.2 73.5
Rural Lower Egypt 57.1 57.9 73.7
Urban Upper Egypt 56.1 56.1 63.2
Rural Upper Egypt 54.3 54.2 56.8
Frontier Governorates 39.4 40.5 59.5
Educational level
Illiterate 44.1 43.8 46.3
Can read and write 49.6 49.3 71.8
Primary 49.6 48.7 74.6
Preparatory 55.9 53.9 75.2
General secondary 65.1 65.8 73.5
Vocational secondary 55.2 56.7 62.5
Post-secondary institution 55.0 56.4 61.7
University and above 53.4 53.5 63.9
Wealth quintile
Lowest 52.6 54.1 63.6
Second 53.6 54.2 63.9
Third 54.0 53.7 69.7
Fourth 55.7 56.2 69.2
Highest 54.9 56.1 70.4
Total 54.2 54.9 67.4
(N) (5,578) (4,480) (7,110)
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SHOCKED/
CRIED/AFRAID HAPPY INDIFFERENT
DIDN’T KNOW 
WHAT TO DO OTHER
DON’T 
KNOW TOTAL
Age group
13–17 52.0 8.8 18.7 20.5 0.0 0.0 100.0
18–24 50.5 9.0 17.4 22.9 0.1 0.0 100.0
25–29 51.2 8.9 18.4 21.4 0.1 0.0 100.0
30–35 52.3 7.3 20.6 19.7 0.1 0.1 100.0
Urban–rural residence
Urban 50.5 9.0 20.3 20.2 0.1 0.0 100.0
Rural 52.4 7.5 17.4 22.6 0.1 0.0 100.0
Informal 47.4 14.5 19.8 18.1 0.0 0.2 100.0
Region 
Urban Governorates 46.7 8.6 25.1 19.6 0.1 0.0 100.0
Urban Lower Egypt 49.8 8.9 19.2 22.0 0.0 0.1 100.0
Rural Lower Egypt 51.4 9.1 18.8 20.8 0.0 0.0 100.0
Urban Upper Egypt 58.1 16.4 9.9 15.6 0.0 0.0 100.0
Rural Upper Egypt 54.0 5.6 15.6 24.6 0.2 0.0 100.0
Frontier Governorates 32.7 15.3 30.2 21.8 0.0 0.0 100.0
Educational level
Illiterate 52.2 8.6 19.8 19.4 0.0 0.1 100.0
Can read and write 50.6 11.7 20.2 17.5 0.0 0.0 100.0
Primary 54.0 7.5 16.6 21.6 0.2 0.0 100.0
Preparatory 54.1 5.8 18.6 21.5 0.0 0.0 100.0
General secondary 52.6 8.2 17.7 21.3 0.2 0.0 100.0
Vocational secondary 51.6 10.0 16.6 21.7 0.2 0.0 100.0
Post-secondary institution 50.2 8.9 13.4 27.6 0.0 0.0 100.0
University and above 46.7 8.8 22.8 21.8 0.0 0.0 100.0
Wage work
Waged 52.5 6.3 25.1 16.2 0.0 0.0 100.0
Employer/self-employee 49.5 3.5 22.7 22.9 1.4 0.0 100.0
Unpaid 55.5 4.1 23.4 17.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Unemployed 48.7 4.9 19.9 26.2 0.4 0.0 100.0
Nonstudent out of labor force 51.6 9.1 17.5 21.8 0.1 0.0 100.0
Student out of labor force 50.5 9.6 18.5 21.4 0.0 0.0 100.0
Wealth quantile 
Lowest 57.4 9.1 14.2 18.9 0.3 0.1 100.0
Second 49.7 8.3 17.7 24.4 0.0 0.0 100.0
Middle 48.5 11.3 18.1 22.0 0.2 0.0 100.0
Fourth 50.2 8.1 20.5 21.3 0.0 0.0 100.0
Richest 51.0 6.7 21.6 20.7 0.0 0.0 100.0
Total 51.3 8.6 18.5 21.5 0.1 0.0 100.0
TABLE A2.6 Reactions	to	menarche	among	females	aged	13–35,	by	background	characteristics	(%)
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 2014 (AGES 13–35) 2014 (AGES 15–29) 2009 (AGES 15–29)
Age group
13–17 34.9 34.7 27.6
18–24 33.7 33.7 28.8
25–29 33.6 33.6 28.7
30–35 35.3
Gender
Males 21.6 21.4 8.1
Females 47.5 47.6 49.9
Urban–rural residence
Urban 40.3 40.1 32.7
Rural 30.2 29.7 25.5
Informal 40.9 41.5 32.6
Region
Urban Governorates 44.8 45.5 34.9
Urban Lower Egypt 39.8 39.3 30.5
Rural Lower Egypt 33.4 32.8 26.4
Urban Upper Egypt 29.7 29.2 29.4
Rural Upper Egypt 26.3 26.2 24.3
Frontier Governorates 47.7 47.8 32.0
Educational level
Illiterate 27.9 26.4 29.5
Can read and write 36.2 34.4 28.1
Primary 31.5 29.3 24.1
Preparatory 32.6 32.2 26.7
General secondary 39.3 39.3 32.8
Vocational secondary 31.7 31.2 27.8
Post-secondary institution 40.5 40.9 32.2
University and above 40.7 40.7 34.4
Wealth quintile
Lowest 26.9 26.3 21.9
Second 29.9 29.6 26.4
Third 31.9 31.2 26.8
Fourth 40.7 40.1 31.3
Highest 40.0 40.3 36.8
Total 34.2 33.9 28.5
(N) (4,047) (3,175) (3,434)
TABLE A2.7	 	Percentage	of	youth	who	discussed	puberty	with	their	parents,	by	
background	characteristics
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TABLE A2.8 Percentage	of	youth	who	knew	of	HIV/AIDS,	by	background	characteristics
 2014 (AGES 13–35) 2014 (AGES 15–29) 2009 (AGES 15–29)
Age group
13–17 59.6 62.1 80.6
18–24 77.2 77.2 87.2
25–29 76.1 76.1 86.4
30–35 76.3
Gender
Males 77.4 77.3 92.0
Females 68.8 69.4 78.7
Urban–rural residence
Urban 80.7 81.2 91.5
Rural 70.3 70.7 81.3
Region
Urban Governorates 86.5 86.5 92.5
Urban Lower Egypt 74.2 74.3 92.1
Rural Lower Egypt 71.9 72.2 83.9
Urban Upper Egypt 63.4 65.4 87.9
Rural Upper Egypt 68.9 69.6 78.5
Frontier Governorates 63.6 64.4 79.3
Educational level
Informal 68.7 68.3 91.0
Illiterate 43.5 41.8 46.0
Can read and write 56.6 53.4 53.4
Primary 58.6 57.0 74.4
Preparatory 57.9 59.2 86.3
General secondary 78.9 78.5 97.3
Vocational secondary 76.7 75.5 92.4
Post-secondary institution 91.3 90.7 97.1
University and above 92.6 92.3 97.8
Wealth quintile
Lowest 61.9 62.6 72.9
Second 69.9 70.5 80.4
Third 72.2 72.4 86.2
Fourth 73.5 73.7 92.7
Highest 85.5 85.3 95.9
Total 73.2 73.6 85.5
(N) (7,923) (6,303) (9,237)
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 2014 (AGES 13–35) 2014 (AGES 15–29) 2009 (AGES 15–29)
Age group
13–17 73.9 74.0 81.8
18–24 79.3 79.3 87.4
25–29 84.1 84.1 92.1
30–35 85.7
Urban–rural residence
Urban 66.3 65.1 75.3
Rural 87.9 87.5 94.4
Informal 74.8 71.9 84.1
Region
Urban Governorates 55.6 53.3 70.5
Urban Lower Egypt 74.1 71.9 80.9
Rural Lower Egypt 84.6 83.6 94.2
Urban Upper Egypt 88.7 87.8 91.4
Rural Upper Egypt 91.6 91.5 94.9
Frontier Governorates 73.7 73.2 69.2
Educational level
Illiterate 91.0 91.4 95.6
Can read and write 84.1 90.8 90.7
Primary 85.9 85.3 91.1
Preparatory 83.0 84.4 85.6
General secondary 66.0 65.9 71.7
Vocational secondary 83.4 82.3 93.1
Post-secondary institution 75.7 72.5 90.9
University and above 71.5 71.4 75.4
Wealth quintile
Lowest 87.2 86.6 95.5
Second 83.5 82.4 95.1
Third 83.2 82.6 94.4
Fourth 78.9 77.7 86.8
Highest 71.3 70.3 62.1
Total 80.5 79.5 87.5
(N) (5,725) (4,375) (5,837)
TABLE A2.9 Percentage	of	circumcised	females,	by	background	characteristics
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 KNEW  
ANY METHOD PILLS IUD
INJECT-
ABLES IMPLANTS CONDOMS
Age group
13–17 34.8 34.0 25.4 21.1 3.3 3.4
18–24 56.0 53.8 46.2 39.8 9.1 9.5
25–29 73.9 69.1 63.1 54.2 14.4 11.5
30–35 85.0 78.2 74.4 61.1 17.0 13.3
Gender
Male 52.0 49.7 40.6 34.7 6.3 13.0
Female 71.5 67.0 62.7 53.0 15.4 5.8
Urban–rural residence
Urban 59.9 56.5 48.2 39.7 9.5 12.7
Rural 63.4 59.7 52.9 45.5 10.7 8.3
Informal 54.5 53.3 51.4 43.7 14.4 7.2
Region
Urban Governorates 61.6 57.4 49.1 37.6 7.6 12.7
Urban Lower Egypt 56.4 54.2 50.6 39.7 11.1 10.2
Rural Lower Egypt 59.6 54.3 50.2 36.8 7.3 7.7
Urban Upper Egypt 54.5 53.9 46.3 48.9 17.2 8.8
Rural Upper Egypt 67.6 65.6 56.1 54.9 14.4 8.8
Frontier Governorates 59.2 56.7 48.1 43.6 11.0 15.6
Educational level
Illiterate 69.1 64.3 57.7 52.7 15.3 4.6
Can read and write 80.1 75.1 62.2 48.9 14.7 7.3
Elementary 59.7 59.7 52.3 42.6 7.5 7.8
Middle 63.1 50.1 43.5 37.2 8.7 6.6
General secondary 54.1 43.4 34.6 26.9 5.1 5.1
Vocational secondary 62.3 58.9 52.1 44.4 10.1 8.7
Post-secondary institution 69.2 66.6 61.1 52.3 15.1 16.8
University and above 64.8 61.8 56.4 47.2 13.6 16.4
Wealth quintile
Lowest 59.0 56.6 46.5 44.0 12.3 6.3
Second 59.4 56.1 49.7 42.6 11.0 9.0
Middle 62.7 58.9 54.7 45.3 10.5 7.9
Fourth 60.0 56.7 49.0 40.2 8.8 9.1
Richest 65.4 61.6 55.9 45.5 10.9 14.1
Total 61.5 58.1 51.4 43.6 10.7 9.5
(N) (10.903) (10,916) (10,916) (10,916) (10,916) (10,916)
TABLE A2.10 Percentage	of	respondents	aged	13–35	who	knew	family	planning	methods	that	
could	delay	or	prevent	pregnancy,	by	background	characteristic
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COMPLETED 
PRIMARY BY  
AGE 13
COMPLETED 
PREPARATORY BY 
AGE 16
COMPLETED 
SECONDARY BY 
AGE 19
COMPLETED  
UNIVERSITY BY 
AGE 23
Gender
Male 87.6 79.2 73.3 23.1
Female 81.0 73.3 64.5 19.3
Age group
<18 93.6 78.6 n/a n/a
18–24 88.3 80.9 72.6 23.4
25–29 78.3 74.1 69.0 22.7
30+ 72.3  66.8 61.0 17.8
Urban–rural residence
Urban 89.4 82.2 75.8 33.6
Rural 81.4 72.5 64.7 14.1
Informal urban areas 87.5 81.9 74.2 25.9
Region 
Urban Governorates 88.9 80.1 72.6 34.0
Urban Lower Egypt 91.6 86.9 80.7 37.1
Rural Lower Egypt 83.6 75.4 69.1 16.1
Urban Upper Egypt 85.1 79.9 74.3 19.2
Rural Upper Egypt 79.6 70.0 60.3 12.1
Frontier Governorates 76.6 69.1 63.2 14.6
Mother's education
Illiterate 76.7 67.2 58.9 11.0
Can read and write 90.8 82.7 77.4 24.3
Primary 92.4 84.4 79.4 27.8
Preparatory 97.2 90.0 88.5 40.2
General secondary 100.0 99.1 95.4 76.5
Vocational secondary and 
post-secondary 99.1 97.1 95.5 57.9
Higher education 99.7 99.0 99.4 88.7
Father's education
Illiterate 71.2 60.5  52.0 7.5
Can read and write 86.7 77.8 70.8 17.9
Primary 89.4 81.2 75.3 19.4
Preparatory 96.2 89.2 81.8 27.9
General secondary 98.9 95.1 88.0 44.4
Vocational secondary and  
post-secondary
97.8 94.4 91.6 44.7
Higher education 99.6 98.7 98.2 75.9
Total 84.4  76.3  69.0 21.2
(N)   (10,907) (10,072) (8,253) (5,654)
TABLE A3.1 School completion rates among all youth, by background characteristics, 2014 (%)
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MALE FEMALE TOTAL
Age group
<18 4.0 3.1 3.5
18–24 5.0 9.6 7.1
25–29 7.9 20.0 13.8
30+ 10.2 26.2 18.7
Urban–rural residence
Urban 3.4 5.0 4.2
Rural 7.7 18.4 13.0
Informal urban areas 6.1 10.2 8.2
Region 
Urban Governorates 2.9 4.0 3.4
Urban Lower Egypt 3.5 5.8 4.7
Rural Lower Egypt 8.2 13.5 10.7
Urban Upper Egypt 7.2 12.0 9.5
Rural Upper Egypt 7.0  22.6  15.0
Frontier Governorates 10.5 26.0 18.0
Mother’s education
Illiterate 10.0 21.2 15.7
Can read and write 2.9 4.3 3.6
Primary 2.2 0.7 1.6
Preparatory 0.5 0.4 0.4
General secondary 0.0  0.0  0.0
Vocational secondary and post-secondary 0.3 0.2 0.3
Higher education 0.0 0.2 0.1
Father’s education
Illiterate 13.3 26.7 20.1
Can read and write 3.2 9.5 6.5
Primary 1.5 5.3 3.2
Preparatory 2.2 2.3 2.3
General secondary 0.0 2.6 1.1
Vocational secondary and post-secondary  1.0  0.8  0.9
Higher education 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 6.3 13.7 9.9
(N) (5,070) (5,837) (10,907)
TABLE A3.2 Percentage of youth who never attended school, by background and gender, 2014
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ATTENDED  
LITERACY CLASSES CANNOT READ CANNOT WRITE
CANNOT DO  
BASIC MATH
Gender
Male 6.1 45.1 45.2 31.0
Female 11.2 51.5 52.1 38.4
Age group
<18 4.0  23.5 23.1 17.3
18–24 6.7  48.3 48.6 35.7
25–29 13.9 66.2 66.8 46.9
30+ 13.8 64.3 65.9 45.7
Urban–rural residence
Urban 8.3 38.9 38.3 26.6
Rural 8.9 52.9 53.5 39.3
Informal urban areas 10.8 40.3 42.4 24.4
Region 
Urban Governorates 9.7 36.9 36.3 20.9
Urban Lower Egypt 7.9 30.7 33.8 28.8
Rural Lower Egypt 7.1 49.9 51.0 37.0
Urban Upper Egypt 7.9 53.2 52.3 34.9
Rural Upper Egypt 10.5 55.1 55.2 41.3
Frontier Governorates 7.1 55.7 55.1 35.0
Mother's education
Illiterate 10.1 55.4 56.1 40.0
Can read and write 5.7 36.7 32.4 25.0
Primary 4.7 29.6 31.8 22.2
Preparatory 1.9 19.1 15.5 14.7
General secondary 0.0 20.7 20.7 20.7
Vocational secondary and post-secondary 4.8 7.8 7.0 5.0
Higher education 8.3 12.5 9.6  4.8
Father's education
Illiterate 9.5 59.0 59.5 42.6
Can read and write 12.0 39.8 40.6 26.9
Primary 9.1 37.3 37.6 27.7
Preparatory 4.7 26.1 28.7 18.7
General secondary 3.5 5.4 8.9 5.4
Vocational secondary and post-secondary 4.3 17.3 15.9 13.4
Higher education 4.5 3.9 4.7 4.7
Education status
None 13.7 92.2 93.0 69.8
Current primary 15.5 41.6 36.7 27.1
Current preparatory 2.9 4.9 3.7 1.8
Attended primary 9.8 59.6 60.3 41.5
Attended preparatory 6.1 14.8 15.5 9.4
Total 6.1 14.8 15.5 9.4
(N) (3,638) (3,638) (3,638) (3,638)
TABLE A3.4 Percentage of youth with less than a secondary education who attended literacy classes, 
cannot read, cannot write, and cannot do basic math, by background characteristics, 2014
Note: Being defined as able to read is a “yes” response to the question on being able to read a letter or newspaper. Being defined as 
able to write is a “yes” response to the question on writing a letter. Being defined as able to do basic math is a “yes” response to the 
question on a simple arithmetic operation (addition or subtraction). 
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TABLE A3.6 Distribution of education level of current students, by background, 2014, percent
CUR-
RENT 
PRIMARY
CURRENT 
PREPARATO-
RY
CURRENT 
VOCATIONAL 
SECONDARY
CURRENT
 GENERAL 
SECOND-
ARY
CURRENT 
ABOVE 
INTERME-
DIATE
CURRENT 
UNIVERSITY 
AND ABOVE TOTAL
Gender
Male 0.6 18.7 31.0 21.8 1.8 26.2 100.0
Female 0.2 18.4 23.9 28.4 2.0 27.1 100.0
Age group
<18 0.6 29.6 33.9 35.0 0.1 0.9 100.0
18–24 0.0 1.5 18.6 9.6 4.9 65.4 100.0
25–29 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.7 96.8 100.0
30+ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
Urban–rural residence
Urban 0.5 15.6 19.2 28.9 2.3 33.4 100.0
Rural 0.4 20.7 33.2 21.8 1.9 22.0 100.0
Informal urban areas 0.0 15.7 24.1 29.1 1.0 30.2 100.0
Region of residence
Urban Governorates 0.8 17.0 18.4 28.9 2.8 32.0 100.0
Urban Lower Egypt 0.0 14.6 20.0 28.4 1.3 35.6 100.0
Rural Lower Egypt 0.2 20.2 30.8 24.5 1.7 22.5 100.0
Urban Upper Egypt 0.0 13.5 24.3 30.3 1.1 30.8 100.0
Rural Upper Egypt 0.6 21.2 36.0 18.7 2.0 21.6 100.0
Frontier Governorates 2.2 21.5 31.5 22.0 0.9 22.0 100.0
Mother's education
Illiterate 0.5 22.7 39.7 16.3 2.0 18.7 100.0
Can read and write 0.0 14.7 35.2 27.4 2.0 20.7 100.0
Primary 0.7 20.8 31.7 16.2 3.1 27.5 100.0
Preparatory 0.8 20.3 33.3 20.0 2.6 22.9 100.0
General secondary 0.0 11.3 20.1 28.6 0.0 40.0 100.0
Vocational secondary 
and post-secondary
0.2 16.2 16.7 34.3 1.5 31.1 100.0
Higher education 0.0 8.9 5.6 40.4 1.2 43.8 100.0
Father's education
Illiterate 0.6 26.5 40.0 14.2 1.2 17.4 100.0
Can read and write 0.9 18.0 34.7 27.1 1.7 17.7 100.0
Primary 0.5 18.1 40.8 15.9 3.5 21.1 100.0
Preparatory 0.9 21.8 36.4 14.8 2.5 23.6 100.0
General secondary 0.0 33.6 26.4 9.9 5.0 25.0 100.0
Vocational secondary 
and post-secondary
0.2 17.2 21.7 31.3 1.8 27.8 100.0
Higher education 0.0 8.4 7.1 38.6 1.4 44.6 100.0
Total 0.4 18.6 27.7 24.9 1.9 26.6 100.0
(N) (11) (537) (800) (734) (54) (734) (2,870)
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REPEATED AT 
PRIMARY LEVEL
REPEATED AT 
PREPARATORY LEVEL
REPEATED AT 
SECONDARY LEVEL
REPEATED AT 
UNIVERSITY LEVEL
Gender
Male 3.9 7.5 5.5 10.1
Female 2.6 5.0 1.9 3.2
Age group
<18 3.5 3.7 0.0 0.0
18–24 3.4 7.2 4.5 5.5
25–29 3.0 6.0 3.4 6.7
30+ 3.2 7.1 3.0 9.4
Urban–rural residence
Urban 2.7 5.1 3.3 6.6
Rural 3.7 7.6 4.6 8.8
Informal urban areas 2.5 2.5 1.4 2.2
Region of residence
Urban Governorates 3.8 5.2 3.7 9.3
Urban Lower Egypt 1.6 2.5 1.2 1.7
Rural Lower Egypt 3.4 5.5 3.1 5.7
Urban Upper Egypt 1.7 6.0 3.8 1.1
Rural Upper Egypt 4.0 10.1 6.6 13.8
Frontier Governorates 2.2 3.0 2.6 1.8
Mother's education
Illiterate 4.3 8.6 4.2 7.7
Can read and write 4.0 6.2 3.1 5.3
Primary 3.7 5.7 6.0 9.0
Preparatory 0.9 5.1 3.2 10.2
General secondary 0.0 0.0 1.5 6.7
Vocational secondary and post-secondary 0.8 2.0 2.5 5.6
Higher education 0.2 0.5 1.6  5.0
Father's education
Illiterate 4.6 8.8 3.8 6.2
Can read and write 4.0 6.5 4.7 5.6
Primary 4.9 9.6 5.5 11.0
Preparatory 2.5 5.7 2.7 17.3
General secondary 2.5 4.0 3.8  2.6
Vocational secondary and post-secondary 1.0 2.7   3.0  6.6
Higher education 0.8 1.8 3.5 4.3
Total 3.3 6.3 3.8 7.0
(N) (9,677) (8,252) (5,733) (1,469)
TABLE A3.8 Grade repetition among all youth, by level and background characteristics, 2014, percent
Note: Based on all youth ever attended that level.
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TABLE A3.9 School facility quality measures, by background of student, 2014, percent
PRIMARY 
IN 
SHIFTS
PREPARA-
TORY IN
 SHIFTS
SECOND-
ARY IN
 SHIFTS
SEATS 
BROKEN
SEATS 
CROWDED
INADE-
QUATE 
LIGHTING
BOARD  
ILLEGI-
BLE
WIN-
DOWS 
BROKEN
INADE-
QUATE 
VENTILA-
TION
Gender
Male 29.3 28.7 26.3 38.8 27.1 24.5 28.6 34.8 21.9
Female 29.8 27.6 29.0 32.6 26.9 23.0 25.6 28.6 22.9
Urban–rural residence
Urban 31.4 26.5 23.1 27.4 21.1 17.9 18.8 24.4 14.7
Rural 29.1 31.7 32.9 41.1 29.9 25.2 29.8 34.4 24.0
Informal urban areas 26.0 13.2 11.8 29.6 27.4 34.5 38.0 40.3 36.9
Region
Urban Governorates 37.5 29.2 25.1 26.6 20.1 15.9 18.0 25.2 14.8
Urban Lower Egypt 30.1 20.4 17.8 35.0 24.5 26.2 29.4 31.9 23.0
Rural Lower Egypt 29.2 32.0 33.5 37.7 29.9 27.0 32.2 37.4 26.1
Urban Upper Egypt 13.4 14.6 14.6 21.4 25.7 28.0 25.7 29.5 27.1
Rural Upper Egypt 29.4 31.8 32.9 45.4 30.2 23.0 27.1 30.9 21.6
Frontier Governorates 13.6 12.6 7.5 22.8 18.5 25.0 25.7 27.2 19.4
Mother's education
Illiterate 31.9 30.2 31.9 39.4 30.3 27.5 30.9 33.2 24.3
Can read and write 28.7 31.6 25.4 40.7 37.3 26.1 29.3 39.1 25.9
Primary 30.1 30.3 30.0 41.7 27.1 25.2 25.3 37.0 20.9
Preparatory 29.4 25.9 23.4 36.8 27.0 21.6 30.8 40.2 18.6
General secondary 27.5 24.9 13.0 11.4 10.5 8.4 10.6 15.7 17.1
Vocational secondary and 
post-secondary
25.9 25.2 21.4 33.2 25.4 22.5 26.1 30.2  22.7
Higher education 16.6 14.9 13.7 19.5 13.6 10.2 12.8 15.5 15.2
Father's education
Illiterate 31.9 30.9 31.1 36.3 32.4 28.1 30.9 32.8 22.7
Can read and write 31.6 28.0 31.5 48.1 31.5 27.4 25.0 37.5 18.6
Primary 31.9 31.4 31.6 45.2 25.5 25.1 28.8 37.2 22.8
Preparatory 31.0 28.7 35.5 33.6 23.9 22.2 26.5 32.1 24.9
General secondary  27.8   26.4 20.2 37.0 31.2 31.9 28.5 38.6 26.1
Vocational secondary and 
post-secondary
27.4 26.4 24.1 35.0 27.5 24.3 28.9 32.4 24.2
Higher education 19.1 19.4 13.9 23.1 16.6 11.7 15.6 19.8 17.1
Total 29.5 28.2 27.5 35.9 27.0 23.8 27.2 31.9 22.3
(N) (9,666) (8,781) (7,262) (2,055) (2,055) (2,055) (2,055) (2,055) (2,055)
Note: Based on all youth who attended that level for whether schools operated in multiple shifts; all other measures based on current students.
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Note: Statistics for current primary students (N=14) were omitted due to small sample size.  
PRIVATE LESSONS GROUP TUTORING
(%) AVERAGE COST, IF 
USING (EGP)
(%) AVERAGE COST, IF 
USING (EGP)
Gender
Male 31.3 307.1 13.1 169.2
Female 44.5 325.5 18.7 202.6
Urban–rural residence
Urban 49.3 402.5 18.8 229.3
Rural 29.5 219.5 15.3 158.7
Informal urban areas 51.1 424.0 8.6 237.6
Region 
Urban Governorates 54.3 447.2 20.2 255.7
Urban Lower Egypt 43.9 391.1 20.6 196.4
Rural Lower Egypt 32.6 205.7 21.1 129.9
Urban Upper Egypt 49.2 330.2 2.7 185.4
Rural Upper Egypt 26.0 237.0 8.6 247.8
Frontier Governorates 32.4 390.8 2.1 191.6
Mother's education
Illiterate 24.5 253.3 10.2 132.1
Can read and write 33.5 241.4 24.3 187.2
Primary 31.0 353.4 17.3 133.0
Preparatory 35.8 267.0 20.6 110.9
General secondary 56.8 351.9 29.9 140.2
Vocational secondary and post-secondary 49.9 302.2 19.6 260.6
Higher education 70.3 481.4 16.7 271.4
Father's education
Illiterate 20.3 234.1 13.3 150.0
Can read and write 29.1 253.1 13.8 169.7
Primary 29.2 319.9 13.8 170.2
Preparatory 34.6 284.3 15.2 115.5
General secondary 32.3 268.2 9.4 88.5
Vocational secondary and post-secondary 48.0 315.0 17.0 216.9
Higher education 60.8 403.5 21.6 239.9
Wealth quintile
Lowest 24.8 218.8 10.0 137.8
Second 32.4 262.9 14.1 184.6
Middle 32.9 242.2 15.7 127.0
Fourth 40.8 320.5 19.8 191.8
Highest 50.1 414.0 17.1 247.6
Education status
Current preparatory 35.2 194.2 18.8 128.0
Current vocational secondary 11.8 239.4 8.8 161.9
Current general  
secondary
67.8 381.3 21.1 244.4
TOTAL 37.4 317.3 15.7 188.1
(N) (2,082) (2,082) (797) (294)
TABLE A3.11 Tutoring prevalence and average costs in Egyptian pounds (EGP), current students in secondary 
or below, 2014
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AMONG THOSE RECEIVING HELP
RECEIVED 
HELP
HELP FROM 
FATHER
HELP FROM 
MOTHER
HELP FROM 
OLDER SIBLINGS
HELP FROM 
OTHER
Gender
Male 12.1 37.8 47.9 39.9 3.9
Female 16.2 33.4 56.2 34.7 3.6
Urban–rural residence
Urban 19.0 34.1 61.8 31.3 4.8
Rural 11.6 37.0 41.8 47.2 2.9
Informal urban areas 13.6 32.2 69.1 5.8 3.4
Region 
Urban Governorates 18.5 30.6 58.8 25.2 3.0
Urban Lower Egypt 22.2 41.5 61.7 24.0 5.3
Rural Lower Egypt 12.7 52.6 51.9 36.4 3.0
Urban Upper Egypt 10.6 22.1 86.3 44.0 7.2
Rural Upper Egypt 10.4 14.3 27.2 62.8 2.8
Frontier Governorates 6.7 42.1 58.4 25.6 15.4
Mother's education
Illiterate 6.9 21.3 20.6 57.6 6.6
Can read and write 12.7 28.0 43.6 54.2 0.0
Primary 11.9 24.6 31.3 62.4 0.0
Preparatory 14.2 29.9 29.1 52.6 19.9
General secondary 30.7 54.3 31.6 18.1 9.4
Vocational secondary and post-secondary 19.2 45.2 71.0 22.9 0.7
Higher education 33.5 37.3 74.1 24.5 2.1
Father's education
Illiterate 5.8 11.5 22.5 61.6 16.4
Can read and write 6.5 40.2 61.0 55.5 0.0
Primary 11.0 11.2 30.4 52.3 2.9
Preparatory 11.0 13.3 44.5 41.2 9.0
General secondary 22.0 56.8 87.1 31.6 0.0
Vocational secondary and post-secondary 16.3 36.0 62.3 31.2 1.7
Higher education 32.5 53.4 56.6 28.2 1.5
Wealth quintile
Lowest 7.1 25.9 20.5 53.5 3.5
Second 11.2 17.5 42.0 45.3 10.3
Middle 8.9 37.7 35.3 35.1 5.6
Fourth 13.1 32.9 52.7 36.8 0.0
Highest 25.6 43.4 66.2 32.1 2.8
Education status
Current preparatory 16.7 34.2 61.2 28.9 2.9
Current vocational secondary 6.6 26.7 42.2 47.5 7.3
Current general secondary 20.0 39.5 51.5 37.8 3.0
TOTAL 14.0 35.4 52.4 37.1 3.7
(N) (2,059) (279) (279) (279) (279)
TABLE A3.12 Percentage receiving help with schoolwork and help source (if help received), current  
students in secondary and below, 2014
Note: Statistics for current primary students (N=14) were omitted due to small sample size.  
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ATTENDED ANY  
ECCE
ATTENDED  
NURSERY
ATTENDED  
KINDERGARTEN
ATTENDED 
OTHER
Gender
Male 23.1 11.7 11.4 0.3
Female 25.1 14.1 11.7 0.5
Age group (in 2014)
<18 34.7 18.0 17.3 0.5
18–24 25.0 12.8 12.6 0.4
25–29 18.8 11.0 8.0 0.3
30+ 16.3 9.1 7.0 0.3
Urban–rural residence
Urban 46.4 23.7 23.8 0.4
Rural 13.8 7.4 6.3 0.4
Informal urban areas 20.6 14.1 7.3 0.1
Region 
Urban Governorates 58.0 31.8 27.8 0.4
Urban Lower Egypt 31.0 17.7 13.5 0.4
Rural Lower Egypt 20.2 12.0 7.9 0.5
Urban Upper Egypt 12.9 2.9 11.1 0.0
Rural Upper Egypt 7.0 2.3 4.6 0.3
Frontier Governorates 15.9 10.9 5.1 0.2
Mother's education
Illiterate 11.8 7.4 4.3 0.2
Can read and write 25.6 12.2 12.4 1.2
Primary 27.2 18.4 9.2 0.5
Preparatory 39.1 26.9 11.6 0.8
General secondary 59.7 31.7 29.8 0.0
Vocational secondary and post-secondary 51.1 23.7 28.7 0.6
Higher education 68.8 21.3 51.1 0.2
Father's education
Illiterate 9.8 6.3 3.4 0.2
Can read and write 17.7 10.5 6.2 0.9
Primary 23.5 16.4 7.1 0.5
Preparatory 32.6 21.5 11.3 0.6
General secondary 48.0 18.8 31.2 0.0
Vocational secondary and post-secondary 40.0 19.9 21.4 0.3
Higher education 56.5 19.7 38.6 0.5
Total 24.1 12.8 11.5 0.4
(N) (10,887) (10,887) (10,887) (10,887)
TABLE A3.13 Early childhood care or education (ECCE) attendance and types, by background 
characteristics of youth, 2014, percent
Note: Based on all youth, but assuming that those who never went to school did not attend ECCE. Multiple types of ECCE possible.
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SPECIALIZATION HAD HANDS-ON EXPERIENCE
INDUS-
TRIAL
COM-
MERCIAL
AGRICUL-
TURAL OTHER
HANDS-
ON EXPE-
RIENCE
RELEVANT 
TO LABOR 
MARKET
PART OF VOC. 
ENHANCE. 
TRAINING
Gender
Male 56.2 27.2 14.6 2.1 51.5 54.3 18.6
Female 32.4 57.4 5.6 4.6 42.5 55.0 16.0
Age group (in 2014)
<18 45.4 40.2 10.1 4.2 47.8 63.3 20.0
18–24 49.1 36.5 11.2 3.3 48.6 57.8 19.5
25–29 41.8 42.9 13.1 2.3 44.5 49.1 13.4
30+ 44.4 46.0 6.3 3.3 49.5 46.9 16.2
Urban–rural residence
Urban 48.7 39.8 6.1 5.4 49.5 61.5 24.7
Rural 45.0 39.5 13.2 2.3 47.4 52.3 14.9
Informal urban areas 43.7 47.0 6.2 3.1 43.8 48.9 14.9
Region
Urban Governorates 49.1 40.4 1.8 8.8 53.7 65.7 30.3
Urban Lower Egypt 53.9 35.6 8.6 1.9 51.4 43.5 17.9
Rural Lower Egypt 51.5 36.3 9.7 2.5 51.9 49.6 14.1
Urban Upper Egypt 35.2 52.5 11.3 1.0 31.3 68.0 11.9
Rural Upper Egypt 36.5 43.9 17.5 2.1 42.0 56.7 15.7
Frontier Governorates 62.7 27.8 7.0 2.5 57.3 44.4 18.4
Mother's education
Illiterate 41.4 44.0 12.2 2.4 44.4 50.8 15.6
Can read and write 54.7 36.9 6.1 2.3 52.3 52.6 14.0
Primary 48.1 37.6 10.4 3.9 53.9 53.6 18.0
Preparatory 60.2 29.1 7.1 3.7 53.3 69.9 26.8
General secondary 43.7 41.8 11.6 2.9 34.8 59.3 16.3
Vocational secondary and post- 
secondary 57.4 30.3 6.0 6.3 54.3 66.2 24.1
Higher education 55.1 25.6 7.9 11.5 61.0 56.0 31.8
Father's education
Illiterate 39.7 46.2 11.8 2.3 43.2 50.5 13.9
Can read and write 43.9 41.1 12.8 2.2 48.1 51.5 15.1
Primary 50.8 34.4 10.8 4.1 51.0 57.4 19.8
Preparatory 51.3 35.0 10.3 3.5 47.0 56.7 16.5
General secondary 48.8 34.6 9.6 6.9 56.5 51.4 27.8
Vocational secondary and post- 
secondary 53.1 36.4 6.7 3.8 52.9 60.0 22.4
Higher education 53.8 28.9 9.3 8.1 55.4 59.5 30.9
Currently employed
No 41.0 47.6 8.3 3.0 44.0 55.1 17.5
Yes 53.3 29.0 14.2 3.4 53.2 53.9 17.3
Total 45.9 40.3 10.6 3.2 47.6 54.5 17.5
(N) (4,342) (4,342) (4,342) (4,342) (4,342) (2,151) (4,342)
TABLE A3.14 Vocational secondary specializations and experiences, by background characteristics, 2014, 
percent
Note: Based on all youth who ever attended vocational secondary.
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SAME 
CITY
CHOSE  
INSTITUTION
PROFESSOR 
DISCUSS 
RELEVANT 
TOPICS
PRO-
FESSOR 
DISCUSS 
CAREER 
OPTIONS
INSTITUTION 
OFFERED 
JOB-SKILLS OR 
EMPLOYMENT 
WORKSHOPS 
FOR FIELD
PROFESSOR 
RESPECTFUL 
WITH STU-
DENTS
HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
PREPARED 
FOR LABOR 
MARKET
Gender
Male 61.5 53.1 42.4 36.9 37.1 66.2 80.5
Female 72.1 54.2 44.6 37.6 35.6 71.0 82.4
Age group
18–24 66.2 54.5 45.1 38.0 37.5 68.7 83.9
25–29 65.2 51.7 39.7 35.6 34.7 67.0 78.5
30+ 69.4 53.1 43.3 37.2 34.5 70.1 78.1
Urban–rural residence
Urban 72.4 56.3 42.3 38.9 35.9 66.0 80.4
Rural 60.6 52.2 47.8 36.6 37.9 70.8 80.2
Informal urban areas 64.5 48.5 31.5 33.1 32.8 68.7 89.3
Region 
Urban Governorates 82.3 58.0 39.8 36.1 34.8 65.5 81.3
Urban Lower Egypt 60.2 53.0 42.2 41.9 40.7 75.7 82.5
Rural Lower Egypt 61.2 54.0 53.2 44.3 43.2 72.8 79.8
Urban Upper Egypt 56.7 46.9 32.3 30.3 20.5 46.5 84.3
Rural Upper Egypt 60.0 49.5 39.7 25.2 30.1 67.8 80.5
Frontier Governorates 43.7 51.9 68.9 65.4 58.5 84.0 91.1
Mother's education 18.4
Illiterate 62.4 47.5 43.3 33.4 34.8 69.0 78.8
Can read and write 57.8 45.7 46.3 37.1 40.4 66.3 67.7
Primary 67.5 50.2 40.9 36.2 34.4 69.9 81.3
Preparatory 68.9 54.9 38.1 35.8 42.6 69.9 83.3
General secondary 76.2 53.2 39.2 34.3 36.0 61.2 80.7
Vocational secondary and 
post-secondary
68.9 55.9 43.5 39.9 36.1 68.5 83.8
Higher education 70.5 68.2 47.5 42.9 38.7 66.8 87.1
Father’s education
Illiterate 60.8 46.1 39.1 30.8 29.5 66.1 78.4
Can read and write 57.1 47.4 52.2 42.9 43.4 79.6 75.1
Primary 77.3 50.7 40.5 35.3 35.6 73.8 81.8
Preparatory 63.0 53.6 41.8 38.4 42.6 72.0 80.4
General secondary 86.2 57.8 32.2 33.2 36.1 64.5 75.0
Vocational secondary and 
post-secondary 65.7 50.8 42.6 35.4 35.0 66.8 79.2
Higher education 68.5 64.4 47.5 43.0 39.6 65.9 88.0
Currently employed
No 65.9 54.5 42.9 36.9 35.7 68.5 81.3
Yes 67.3 52.1 44.4 37.8 37.7 68.3 81.6
Total 66.4 53.6 43.4 37.2 36.4 68.4 81.4
(N) (2,255) (2,255) (2,254) (2,255) (2,255) (2,255) (2,256)
TABLE A3.15 Characteristics and youth’s experiences in higher education, by background characteristics, 
2014, percent
Notes: Age group <18 omitted due to small sample size. Based on all youth who ever attended higher education.
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TABLE A4.1 Labor	force	participation,	unemployment	and	employment,	by	main	background	
characteristics,	youth	aged	15–35,	2014	(%)
LABOR FORCE 
PARTICIPATION
UNEMPLOYMENT
(STANDARD DEFINITION) EMPLOYMENT
MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL
Age group
15–17 21.2 2.7 12.0 4.4 7.1 4.7 20.3 2.5 11.5
18–24 55.0 13.6 35.8 12.3 34.3 16.2 48.2 8.9 30.0
25–29 90.2 21.0 56.3 7.0 32.7 11.7 83.9 14.1 49.7
30+ 95.1 21.9 56.4 3.7 22.1 7.5 91.6 17.0 52.2
Urban–rural residence
Urban 63.5 18.6 42.1 9.8 24.7 12.9 57.3 14.0 36.7
Rural 65.0 13.8 40.0 7.5 31.9 11.6 60.1 9.4 35.3
Informal urban areas 56.6 11.3 33.7 5.4 33.8 10.1 53.6 7.5 30.3
Region
Urban Governorates 65.4 21.2 44.5 10.3 21.8 12.9 58.7 16.5 38.8
Urban Lower Egypt 56.9 14.5 35.8 9.4 31.0 13.8 51.6 10.0 30.9
Rural Lower Egypt 63.8 14.6 40.6 9.7 38.4 14.6 57.6 9.0 34.7
Urban Upper Egypt 60.2 10.0 36.0 4.0 34.2 8.1 57.8 6.6 33.0
Rural Upper Egypt 66.1 13.1 39.2 5.1 25.0 8.5 62.8 9.8 35.9
Frontier Governorates 67.0 10.1 39.4 7.3 39.6 11.3 62.1 6.1 35.0
Education level
Illiterate 80.2 9.3 31.7 2.4 2.9 2.5 78.3 9.0 30.9
Can read and write 94.7 9.0 40.5 1.9 0.0 1.7 92.9 9.0 39.9
Primary 86.8 13.5 55.1 5.3 21.0 7.0 82.2 10.6 51.3
Preparatory 62.5 8.2 33.4 5.7 11.5 6.5 59.0 7.2 31.3
General secondary 19.8 2.3 10.6 7.5 24.1 9.4 18.3 1.8 9.6
Vocational secondary 68.1 13.8 44.2 7.3 37.7 11.5 63.1 8.6 39.1
Post-secondary institute 65.9 31.7 51.3 11.6 46.6 20.8 58.3 16.9 40.6
University and above 57.0 29.5 44.2 14.3 31.0 19.5 48.8 20.4 35.6
Marital status
Never married 53.2 15.2 38.2 10.9 31.5 14.2 47.4 10.4 32.8
Married 95.6 14.6 43.1 3.1 27.4 8.4 92.6 10.6 39.5
Wealth quintiles
Lowest 68.7 13.0 40.7 6.2 22.7 8.8 64.4 10.0 37.1
Second 68.1 13.8 41.5 5.5 24.4 8.6 64.4 10.5 38.0
Middle 65.1 12.7 39.2 9.1 27.5 12.0 59.2 9.2 34.5
Fourth 61.5 14.3 39.1 8.8 41.2 14.4 56.1 8.4 33.5
Highest 57.3 19.8 39.5 10.6 30.1 15.2 51.2 13.8 33.5
Total 63.7 14.9 40.0 8.0 29.5 11.9 58.6 10.5 35.2
(N) (4,941) (5,680) (10,621) (4,941) (5,680) (10,621) (4,941) (5,680) (10,621)
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TABLE A4.2	 Percentage	of	young	people	aged	15–29	reporting	specific	working	conditions,	by	
gender	and	public/private	sector,	2014
 MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
 PUBLIC PRIVATE PUBLIC PRIVATE PUBLIC PRIVATE
Do you experience any of the  
following in your work?      
Harsh treatment from supervisor(s) 6.5 11.8 6.0 9.7 6.3 11.6
Long working hours 14.8 29.2 6.9 21.7 12.4 28.3
Low wage  30.2 38.0 19.9 35.2 27.1 37.7
No annual paid leave 6.0 25.3 4.6 16.3 5.5 24.1
No paid sick leave 4.3 26.0 4.8 19.2 4.4 25.2
No paid maternity leave 7.6 7.9 4.8 10.9 6.1 8.8
Exhaustive workload 20.0 29.1 11.4 29.5 17.4 29.1
Long commute time  14.4 12.8 10.2 11.6 13.1 12.6
Annoyances from colleagues/supervisor  7.5 7.5 3.9 8.9 6.4 7.7
Harassment from colleagues/supervisor  0.0 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6
Annoyances from customers/clients 6.4 12.4 1.2 10.5 4.7 12.2
Harassment from customers/clients  4.2 3.6 0.0 0.4 1.9 2.6
Hazardous work conditions  10.4 14.3 1.1 3.5 7.5 13.0
Harassment during commute  0.9 2.1 1.3 3.8 1.1 2.6
Wage not paid after finishing a task 2.0 6.0 0.0 3.3 1.4 5.7
Wage not specified at the beginning of job 1.4 6.0 0.8 2.7 1.2 5.7
Others 1.6 2.9 0.0 2.7 1.2 2.9
(N) (236) (1,849) (125) (237) (361) (2,086)
TABLE A4.3 	Young	people’s	methods	of	job	search:	Percent	reporting	that	they	used	the	
method,	broad	definition	of	unemployment,	youth	aged	15–29,	2009	and	2014	
 2009 2014
 MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL
Registered in a private office 7.6 6.2 7.1 23.8 15.0 19.9
Registered in a government office  9.4 20.5 13.8 28.9 31.2 29.9
Entered a government job competition 9.4 28.5 17.0 16.0 18.4 17.0
Sent job application 26.5 24.4 25.6 16.7 20.2 18.2
Inquired at work location 22.8 8.4 17.1 14.8 12.8 13.9
Advertised in newspapers 0.8 1.0 0.9 3.4 3.2 3.3
Applied to job advertised in newspapers 11.4 6.2 9.3 a a a
Applied to job advertised in newspapers/on the internet a a a 12.7 11.4 12.1
Registered online in an employment office — — — 5.6 4.3 5.0
Asked friends or relatives for help 40.6 21.0 32.8 32.9 24.6 29.2
Contacted employer 17.7 4.3 12.4 16.0 6.2 11.6
Contacted contractor 4.1 0 2.5 9.2 0.0 5.2
Waited at worker gathering locations 2.7 0 1.6 4.6 0.0 2.6
Searched for private project (land, equipment) 1.6 0.6 1.2 3.8 0.0 2.1
Arranged to get financing for private project  0.7 1.1 0.8 2.3 0.0 1.3
Used land line in any of above methods 47.0 24.1 38.9 8.5 6.4 7.5
Used mobile phone in any of above methods 45.1 20.4 36.3 33.5 15.9 25.7
(N) (381) (330) (711) (331) (300) (631)
a “On the internet” was added to this question for SYPE 2014. 
— = Response option was not available in survey year.
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TABLE A5.1 Long-term migration aspiration rates among youth aged 13–35, 2009 and 2014, percent
13–35 YEARS (2014) 15–29 YEARS (2014) 15–29 YEARS (2009)
MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL
Age group
13–17 19.2 6.8 13.0 — — — — — —
15–17 — — — 20.1 7.4 13.8 33.3 9.5 21.6
18–24 28.1 8.4 19.0 28.1 8.4 19.0 29.3 6.9 18.7
25–29 25.7 7.0 16.6 25.7 7.0 16.6 25.8 4.7 14.6
30–34 20.0 6.9 13.1 — — — — — —
Urban–rural residence
Urban 22.9 7.7 15.7 23.3 8.1 16.2 25.4 8.9 17.3
Rural 26.6 7.0 16.9 28.3 7.3 18.3 30.7 5.3 18.2
Informal urban areas 16.7 9.9 13.3 16.2 9.7 12.9 34.7 9.7 22.0
Region
Urban Governorates 22.0 9.8 16.2 22.3 10.2 16.6 24.3 8.9 16.9
Urban Lower Egypt 23.5 10.0 16.8 22.5 9.9 16.3 31.5 7.9 19.4
Rural Lower Egypt 28.2 5.0 17.1 30.0 5.7 18.9 30.6 5.1 18.2
Urban Upper Egypt 18.0 2.6 10.5 20.2 3.2 12.0 32.1 11.7 21.8
Rural Upper Egypt 24.8 9.0 16.8 26.6 8.8 17.8 31.3 5.6 18.5
Frontier Governorates 20.2 6.0 13.3 18.5 7.2 13.0 17.5 4.5 11.2
Education level
Illiterate 16.5 4.0 8.0 17.2 3.3 8.1 21.0 1.2 5.6
Can read and write 7.1 3.3 4.7 3.5 0.6 1.7 10.9 0.0 4.8
Primary 23.4 4.9 15.3 25.8 5.3 17.2 24.4 5.3 15.6
Preparatory 21.5 4.8 12.5 24.3 4.1 13.5 29.8 6.8 19.3
General secondary 23.2 9.6 16.1 22.2 10.0 15.8 29.1 13.4 22.1
Vocational secondary 25.1 5.9 16.6 26.5 6.0 17.7 31.9 5.8 19.6
Post-secondary institute 19.6 7.8 14.5 20.0 8.2 15.0 28.4 9.9 19.9
University and above 30.0 15.2 23.1 30.3 15.6 23.4 32.5 12.4 22.5
Marital status
Never married 25.1 8.3 18.3 25.5 8.5 18.8 30.9 8.9 22.3
Ever married 22.8 6.6 12.3 26.8 6.7 12.7 19.4 4.1 7.9
Wealth quintile
Lowest 18.7 3.6 11.1 20.1 3.6 12.2 30.4 3.6 17.0
Second 21.8 6.2 14.1 23.8 5.9 15.2 25.9 5.3 15.8
Middle 25.4 8.6 17.0 26.4 8.7 17.6 30.8 5.3 18.8
Fourth 25.1 8.0 17.0 25.8 8.4 17.9 31.1 8.9 20.2
Highest 30.1 10.6 20.8 30.9 11.4 21.7 28.4 11.8 19.9
Employment status
Employment 24.7 10.3 22.6 26.6 11.3 24.6 28.2 10.0 25.6
Unemployment 39.9 10.2 27.3 39.5 9.4 27.4 37.2 15.6 29.4
Nonstudent out of labor force 22.3 7.0 11.8 22.9 7.4 12.8 34.4 3.6 8.1
Student out of labor force 21.0 10.2 15.7 21.7 11.0 16.5 30.0 12.4 22.2
Total 24.5 7.5 16.2 25.8 7.8 17.2 29.4 6.9 18.3
(N) (5,073) (5,843) (10,916) (4,147) (4,476) (8,623) (5,513) (5,328) (10,841)
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MALES FEMALES TOTAL
ARAB 
COUN-
TRIES
WESTERN 
COUN-
TRIES
ANY 
DESTINA-
TION
ARAB 
COUN-
TRIES
WESTERN 
COUN-
TRIES
ANY 
DESTINA-
TION
ARAB 
COUN-
TRIES
WESTERN 
COUN-
TRIES
ANY 
DESTINA-
TION
Age group
15–17 5.2 2.1 7.5 2.1 2.2 4.6 3.6 2.1 6.0
18–24 12.5 2.0 14.6 2.9 1.5 4.5 8.1 1.7 10.0
25–29 13.6 1.0 15.0 2.4 0.4 2.8 8.2 0.7 9.1
Urban–rural residence
Urban 10.1 2.8 13.3 3.8 2.5 6.5 7.1 2.7 10.1
Rural 12.4 1.3 13.7 2.2 0.8 3.1 7.5 1.1 8.7
Informal urban areas 7.9 1.2 9.7 1.6 0.6 2.6 4.7 0.9 6.0
Region
Urban Governorates 9.9 3.3 13.6 5.0 3.1 8.7 7.6 3.2 11.3
Urban Lower Egypt 9.9 2.4 13.1 1.5 1.1 2.6 5.7 1.7 7.9
Rural Lower Egypt 13.4 1.7 15.1 2.0 0.7 2.6 8.1 1.2 9.4
Urban Upper Egypt 9.2 0.8 10.1 2.0 1.3 3.3 5.7 1.1 6.8
Rural Upper Egypt 11.5 0.8 12.5 2.5 1.0 3.6 7.0 0.9 8.1
Frontier Governorates 3.5 0.3 4.3 1.2 0.0 1.2 2.4 0.1 2.8
Education level
Illiterate 6.8 0.4 7.2 1.1 0.0 1.1 3.1 0.1 3.3
Can read and write 12.0 0.0 12.0 1.4 0.0 1.4 5.6 0.0 5.6
Primary 15.2 0.7 16.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.8 0.4 9.4
Preparatory 7.7 1.7 9.8 0.9 0.0 1.0 4.0 0.8 5.1
General secondary 7.1 2.2 9.7 2.1 3.8 6.6 4.5 3.0 8.1
Vocational secondary 12.7 1.2 13.9 1.8 0.6 2.5 8.0 1.0 9.0
Post-secondary institute 14.1 2.1 16.2 7.1 2.7 9.8 11.1 2.4 13.5
University and above 11.4 3.2 15.0 6.3 3.0 9.4 9.0 3.1 12.4
Marital status
Never married 10.6 1.9 12.8 2.9 1.9 5.0 7.5 1.9 9.7
Ever married 14.9 0.4 15.8 2.1 0.4 2.5 5.9 0.4 6.5
Wealth quantile
Lowest 10.8 0.6 12.0 1.5 0.7 2.1 6.3 0.6 7.2
Second 10.5 1.2 11.9 1.7 0.9 2.8 6.3 1.0 7.5
Middle 11.4 1.7 13.1 1.8 1.0 3.1 6.6 1.4 8.1
Fourth 10.7 2.3 13.3 1.8 1.2 3.1 6.6 1.8 8.6
Highest 12.7 2.4 15.4 5.5 2.5 8.2 9.3 2.5 12.0
Employment status
Employment 13.8 1.0 15.1 5.9 1.1 7.0 12.7 1.0 14.0
Unemployment 23.4 4.1 27.9 6.8 2.4 9.2 16.8 3.4 20.4
Nonstudent out of labor force 6.6 2.2 9.1 2.1 1.3 3.5 3.6 1.6 5.4
Student out of labor force 4.4 2.8 7.4 3.9 3.2 7.4 4.2 3.0 7.4
Total 11.3 1.7 13.2 2.6 1.3 4.1 7.1 1.5 8.9
(N) (436) (70) (516) (103) (56) (165) (539) (126) (681)
TABLE A5.2 Short-term	migration	aspiration	rates	among	youth	aged	15–29,	2014,	percent
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MALES FEMALES TOTAL
ARAB  
COUNTRIES
WESTERN 
COUNTRIES
ARAB  
COUNTRIES
WESTERN 
COUNTRIES
ARAB  
COUNTRIES
WESTERN 
COUNTRIES
Age group
15–17 69.4 27.8 44.5 46.9 60.0 35.0
18–24 85.4 13.4 64.9 32.6 81.1 17.5
25–29 90.6 6.5 86.4 13.6 89.9 7.6
Urban–rural residence
Urban 75.9 21.1 57.9 38.9 70.4 26.5
Rural 89.9 9.1 70.7 27.3 86.7 12.2
Informal urban areas 81.7 12.1 61.2 22.4 77.1 14.4
Region
Urban Governorates 73.1 24.2 57.5 35.9 67.4 28.4
Urban Lower Egypt 75.4 18.0 58.6 41.4 72.6 21.9
Rural Lower Egypt 88.2 11.4 74.2 25.8 86.4 13.2
Urban Upper Egypt 91.8 8.2 59.9 40.1 84.4 15.6
Rural Upper Egypt 92.2 6.2 68.0 28.4 86.8 11.1
Frontier Governorates 82.4 6.0 100.0 0.0 86.1 4.7
Education level
Illiterate 94.5 5.5 100.0 0.0 95.7 4.3
Can read and write 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
Primary 93.4 4.4 na na 93.4 4.4
Preparatory 77.9 17.4 88.8 0.0 79.0 15.7
General secondary 72.9 22.1 31.7 58.0 55.2 37.5
Vocational secondary 90.9 8.7 71.9 23.6 88.6 10.5
Post-secondary institute 86.9 13.1 72.6 27.4 82.5 17.5
University and above 75.5 21.2 67.2 32.0 72.5 25.1
Marital status
Never married 83.1 15.3 58.3 38.3 78.0 20.0
Ever married 94.2 2.5 81.8 14.3 90.8 5.7
Wealth quantile
Lowest 90.0 5.2 68.9 31.1 87.0 8.9
Second 88.4 9.9 61.2 31.7 83.5 13.9
Middle 86.8 13.2 58.6 32.6 81.4 16.9
Fourth 80.6 17.2 57.9 39.5 76.9 20.9
Highest 82.7 15.9 67.6 30.6 77.8 20.6
Employment status
Employment 91.4 6.8 84.2 15.8 90.9 7.4
Unemployment 83.9 14.7 74.3 25.7 82.1 16.7
Nonstudent out of labor force 72.9 24.8 58.7 36.6 66.9 29.8
Student out of labor force 60.0 37.9 52.2 43.6 56.2 40.7
Total 85.2 12.9 64.1 32.4 80.6 17.2
(N) (436) (70) (103) (56) (539) (126)
* Respondents (15–29 years) who aspired to migrate in 2014.
TABLE 5.3 Characteristics of short-term migration aspirers (aged 15–29)*, 2014, percent
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MALE FEMALE TOTAL
ARAB 
COUN-
TRIES
WESTERN 
COUN-
TRIES
ANY 
DESTINA-
TION
ARAB 
COUN-
TRIES
WESTERN 
COUN-
TRIES
ANY  
DESTINA-
TION
ARAB  
COUN-
TRIES
WESTERN 
COUN-
TRIES
ANY  
DESTINA-
TION
Age group
13–17 5.1 2.0 7.2 1.7 1.8 3.9 3.4 1.9 5.6
18–24 12.5 2.0 14.6 2.9 1.5 4.5 8.1 1.7 10.0
25–29 13.6 1.0 15.0 2.4 0.4 2.8 8.2 0.7 9.1
30–35 9.2 1.2 10.9 1.6 0.5 2.1 5.2 0.8 6.2
Urban–rural residence
Urban 10.3 2.8 13.7 3.4 2.1 5.7 7.0 2.5 9.9
Rural 11.6 1.1 12.8 2.0 0.7 2.8 6.9 0.9 7.9
Informal urban areas 7.4 1.0 8.8 1.4 0.5 2.2 4.4 0.8 5.5
Region
Urban Governorates 10.3 3.3 14.1 4.5 2.6 7.6 7.5 3.0 11.0
Urban Lower Egypt 9.3 2.3 12.3 1.4 0.9 2.2 5.4 1.6 7.3
Rural Lower Egypt 12.6 1.5 14.1 1.7 0.6 2.2 7.4 1.0 8.5
Urban Upper Egypt 8.9 0.7 9.9 1.6 1.1 2.6 5.4 0.9 6.4
Rural Upper Egypt 10.7 0.7 11.6 2.4 0.9 3.4 6.5 0.8 7.4
Frontier Governorates 3.8 0.2 4.4 1.0 0.0 1.0 2.4 0.1 2.7
Education level
Illiterate 6.1 0.6 6.7 0.8 0.0 0.8 2.5 0.2 2.7
Can read and write 7.7 0.0 7.7 1.6 0.0 1.6 3.8 0.0 3.8
Primary 14.2 0.8 15.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 8.1 0.6 8.8
Preparatory 7.4 1.4 9.3 1.1 0.0 1.2 4.0 0.6 5.0
General secondary 7.1 2.2 9.8 2.0 3.8 6.4 4.4 3.1 8.0
Vocational secondary 11.9 1.0 13.0 1.6 0.6 2.3 7.4 0.8 8.3
Post-secondary institute 14.0 2.5 16.5 6.4 2.2 8.6 10.7 2.4 13.1
University and above 11.5 3.2 15.3 6.0 2.7 8.7 8.9 2.9 12.2
Marital status
Never married 10.4 1.9 12.5 2.7 1.8 4.7 7.3 1.9 9.3
Ever married 12.0 0.7 13.3 1.9 0.3 2.3 5.5 0.5 6.2
Wealth quantile
Lowest 10.3 0.5 11.4 1.2 0.5 1.7 5.7 0.5 6.5
Second 9.6 1.0 10.8 1.9 0.8 2.8 5.8 0.9 6.9
Middle 10.3 1.7 12.0 1.6 0.8 2.7 6.0 1.3 7.4
Fourth 11.0 2.3 13.5 1.6 1.0 2.6 6.5 1.6 8.3
Highest 12.3 2.3 15.0 4.9 2.3 7.3 8.8 2.3 11.3
Employment status
Employment 12.4 1.1 13.7 5.3 0.9 6.2 11.3 1.0 12.7
Unemployment 23.8 3.6 28.1 6.3 2.8 9.1 16.4 3.3 20.0
Nonstudent out of labor force 6.6 2.2 9.0 1.8 1.1 3.0 3.3 1.4 4.9
Student out of labor force 4.3 2.7 7.1 3.5 2.9 6.6 3.9 2.8 6.9
Total 10.8 1.6 12.7 2.3 1.1 3.6 6.7 1.4 8.2
(N) (509) (80) (602) (121) (61) (188) (630) (141) (790)
TABLE A5.4 Short-term migration aspiration rates among youth aged 13–35, 2014, percent
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MALE FEMALE TOTAL
ARAB 
COUNTRIES
WESTERN 
COUNTRIES
ARAB 
COUNTRIES
WESTERN  
COUNTRIES
ARAB 
COUNTRIES
WESTERN  
COUNTRIES
Age group
13–17 70.2 27.2 44.5 46.9 61.1 34.2
18–24 85.4 13.4 64.9 32.6 81.1 17.5
25–29 90.6 6.5 86.4 13.6 89.9 7.6
30–35 90.6 6.5 86.4 13.6 89.9 7.6
Urban–rural residence
Urban 75.2 20.8 59.5 37.7 70.9 25.4
Rural 90.5 8.5 71.6 26.6 87.2 11.6
Informal urban areas 83.2 11.7 63.6 21.0 79.2 13.6
Region
Urban Governorates 73.1 23.3 59.4 34.7 68.6 27.0
Urban Lower Egypt 75.3 19.0 60.9 39.1 73.2 22.0
Rural Lower Egypt 89.0 10.3 74.6 25.4 87.2 12.2
Urban Upper Egypt 90.3 6.9 59.9 40.1 84.2 13.6
Rural Upper Egypt 92.4 6.1 69.5 27.5 87.1 11.1
Frontier Governorates 86.1 4.7 100.0 0.0 88.5 3.9
Education level
Illiterate 91.8 8.2 100.0 0.0 93.5 6.5
Can read and write 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
Primary 92.9 5.4 41.9 58.1 91.9 6.4
Preparatory 79.5 14.9 93.5 0.0 81.3 12.9
General secondary 72.5 22.8 31.0 58.9 55.1 38.0
Vocational secondary 91.5 7.9 70.4 25.6 88.9 10.0
Post-secondary institute 84.7 15.3 74.4 25.6 81.8 18.2
University and above 75.0 21.0 68.8 30.5 73.0 24.1
Marital status
Never married 83.3 15.2 58.2 38.5 78.3 19.9
Ever married 89.9 5.6 82.5 14.6 88.1 7.7
Wealth quantile
Lowest 90.2 4.5 70.5 29.5 87.6 7.7
Second 89.0 9.5 65.6 28.8 84.3 13.4
Middle 85.9 14.1 61.3 30.4 81.5 17.1
Fourth 81.4 16.8 61.4 36.3 78.4 19.7
Highest 81.9 15.3 67.1 31.3 77.4 20.2
Employment status
Employment 90.0 7.7 85.2 14.8 89.6 8.2
Unemployment 84.9 12.8 68.8 31.2 81.7 16.4
Nonstudent out of labor force 73.7 24.2 60.3 35.4 68.1 28.9
Student out of labor force 60.2 37.8 52.2 43.6 56.4 40.5
Total 85.0 12.7 65.5 31.3 80.9 16.6
(N) (509) (80) (121) (61) (630) (141)
TABLE A5.5 Characteristics of short-term migration aspirers (aged 13–35), 2014, percent
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TABLE A5.6 Desired destinations for migration among youth aged 13–35, 2014, percent
RESIDENCE GENDER
URBAN RURAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL
Saudi Arabia 37.6 42.1 42.7 31.1 40.2
Kuwait 14.1 20.7 19.3 13.0 17.9
UAE 11.7 7.1 8.7 10.3 9.0
Libya 2.5 9.5 8.0 1.4 6.6
Qatar 4.1 2.5 2.7 5.0 3.2
Jordan 1.4 4.5 3.4 2.2 3.2
Lebanon 0.7 0.1 0.0 1.7 0.4
Europe 13.3 8.3 8.1 18.7 10.4
Australia/Canada/US 10.6 3.6 5.1 12.1 6.6
(N) (331) (459) (623) (167) (790)
MALE FEMALE TOTAL
URBAN RURAL TOTAL URBAN RURAL TOTAL URBAN RURAL TOTAL
Push factors
No job opportunities available in Egypt 62.7 67.1 65.4 45.0 46.7 45.8 58.0 63.6 61.3
Income in Egypt is lower than abroad 43.5 48.4 46.5 26.0 31.1 28.4 38.9 45.4 42.7
Bad living conditions in Egypt 47.9 52.0 50.4 40.9 37.4 39.3 46.1 49.5 48.0
To escape from family pressures and troubles 4.3 3.6 3.9 10.7 6.5 8.7 6.0 4.1 4.9
Accompany family 0.0 0.8 0.5 5.1 13.3 9.1 1.4 3.0 2.3
To help my family 15.8 18.2 17.3 6.7 9.2 7.9 13.4 16.7 15.3
Don’t know 0.6 0.2 0.4 7.6 1.8 4.8 2.4 0.5 1.3
No opportunities to gain information and 
experience 7.9 0.8 3.6 22.8 10.0 16.7 11.9 2.4 6.4
To earn money 30.6 35.2 33.4 19.3 16.4 17.9 27.6 32.0 30.1
Political and security circumstances in Egypt 8.5 9.5 9.1 12.0 12.4 12.2 9.5 10.0 9.8
Other 1.0 0.6 0.7 7.1 7.6 7.4 2.6 1.8 2.1
(N) (244) (379) (623) (87) (80) (167) (331) (459) (790)
Pull factors
I want to see other countries 9.1 7.9 8.3 34.1 17.8 26.3 15.7 9.6 12.1
I want to live abroad 8.9 5.6 6.9 12.8 9.7 11.3 9.9 6.3 7.8
I have relatives/friends there 5.4 6.3 5.9 8.5 10.8 9.6 6.2 7.1 6.7
I have a job offer there 6.7 5.7 6.1 5.4 0.0 2.8 6.3 4.7 5.4
I can study there 6.8 1.7 3.7 29.3 23.3 26.4 12.7 5.4 8.5
Higher income abroad than in Egypt 73.9 76.0 75.2 46.7 50.8 48.7 66.7 71.6 69.6
To save money for marriage 38.5 49.2 45.0 5.5 6.7 6.1 29.8 41.8 36.8
To improve my knowledge 11.4 3.4 6.6 23.2 21.1 22.2 14.5 6.5 9.9
Family reunion 1.8 0.8 1.2 4.5 10.4 7.4 2.5 2.4 2.5
Other 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.5 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.0 2.2
(N) (244) (379) (623) (87) (80) (167) (331) (459) (790)
TABLE A5.7 Selected reasons* for migration among youth aged 13–35, by gender and residence, 2014**, % 
*Multiple answers allowed. 
**Only respondents (13–35 years) who aspired to migrate.
180
CHAPTER 2   |   CHAPTER 3   |    CHAPTER 4   |   CHAPTER 5   |   CHAPTER 6   |   CHAPTER 7   |   CHAPTER 8   |   CHAPTER 9
SHORT-TERM ASPIRATION RATES LONG-TERM ASPIRATION RATES
MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL
Household owns agricultural land (in rural areas)
Yes 10.0 2.9 6.9 27.0 10.5 19.9
No 14.0 2.8 8.2 26.4 6.0 15.9
(N) in rural areas (3,301) (3,195) (6,496) (3,301) (3,195) (6,496)
Household experiences water shortages
Yes 15.5 3.4 9.4 29.9 5.6 17.7
No 12.2 3.6 8.0 23.6 7.9 16.0
Uncertainty about future
1 (Low) 10.9 2.8 7.2 17.7 3.9 11.4
2 10.6 1.9 6.1 23.1 7.2 14.8
3 11.7 3.7 7.7 23.3 7.5 15.4
4 13.4 4.8 9.2 28.7 9.7 19.3
5 (High) 17.0 3.4 10.8 28.0 7.1 18.6
Do you feel unhappy?
Yes 25.0 6.3 14.1 31.4 6.6 16.9
No 11.6 3.2 7.6 23.9 7.6 16.1
Do you find it difficult to enjoy daily activities?
Yes 19.1 6.5 11.7 32.7 9.7 19.1
No 12.1 3.1 7.8 23.8 7.2 15.9
Are you unable to play a useful part in life?
Yes 24.9 5.5 13.4 37.0 10.5 21.3
No 12.0 3.4 7.9 23.8 7.2 15.9
Do you feel that you are worthless?
Yes 16.2 4.7 9.6 24.3 5.7 13.6
No 12.5 3.5 8.2 24.6 7.6 16.4
Total 12.7 3.6 8.2 24.5 7.5 16.2
(N) (5,582) (5,325) (10,907) (5,582) (5,325) (10,907)
TABLE A5.8  Quality of life in Egypt and migration aspirations by gender among youth aged 13–35, 2014, 
percent
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Relatives abroad 15.8 20.8 18.9 15.1 20.7 17.4 15.4 20.7 18.4
Relatives in Egypt 18.4 16.4 17.1 5.4 4.2 4.9 14.5 15.0 14.8
Egyptian friends abroad 20.7 24.2 22.9 16.4 14.9 15.8 18.8 22.8 21.1
Friends in Egypt 19.9 23.0 21.8 11.3 21.4 15.5 18.4 22.5 20.8
Internet 6.9 2.3 4.0 30.1 20.8 26.3 13.8 4.7 8.5
Governments 0.3 0.8 0.6 0.0 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.6
General reading 3.0 3.5 3.3 4.9 5.8 5.2 3.3 3.9 3.7
Media (TV, radio, newspapers) 13.3 7.7 9.8 15.0 9.1 12.6 13.8 8.1 10.5
Embassies/consulates 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2
Other 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.3 1.5
(N) (236) (394) (630) (84) (57) (141) (331) (459) (790)
TABLE A5.9 Sources of information on destinations among youth aged 13–35, 2014, percent
ARAB COUNTRIES WESTERN COUNTRIES ANY DESTINATION
URBAN RURAL TOTAL URBAN RURAL TOTAL URBAN RURAL TOTAL
TABLE A5.10 Sources of expected help in migrating among youth aged 13–35, 2014, percent
ARAB COUNTRIES WESTERN COUNTRIES ANY DESTINATION 
Relatives abroad 26.4 29.8 26.9
Relatives in Egypt 50.2 56.0 51.1
Egyptian friends abroad 10.4 7.2 9.9
Friends in Egypt 6.7 3.0 6.4
Migration brokers 2.9 0.0 2.3
Consulate 0.3 1.3 0.5
Other 3.0 2.7 2.9
(N) (264) (62) (330)
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TABLE A5.11 Panel analysis: 2009–2014 by gender, short-term aspirations in 2014*, percent
DID NOT HAVE  
SHORT-TERM  
ASPIRATIONS IN 2014
 HAD SHORT-TERM  
ASPIRATIONS IN 
2014 MISSING IN 2014 (N)
Total
Aspired to migrate in 2009 58.1 10.3 31.6 (1,746)
Did not aspire to migrate in 2009 66.7 4.6 28.8 (9,095)
(N) (7,077) (596) (3,168) (10,841)
► Wanted to go to an Arab country in 2009 59.3 10.0 30.7 (1344)
► Wanted to go to a Western country in 2009 53.5 11.4 35.1 (387)
Male
Aspired to migrate in 2009 58.5 12.1 29.4 (1,352)
Did not aspire to migrate in 2009 62.9 9.1 28.1 (3,464)
(N) (2,968) (478) (1,370) (4,816)
► Wanted to go to an Arab country in 2009 59.9 11.5 28.6 (1071)
► Wanted to go to a Western country in 2009 52.6 14.6 32.9 (273)
Female
Aspired to migrate in 2009 56.6 4.3 39.1 (394)
Did not aspire to migrate in 2009 69.0 1.8 29.2 (5,631)
(N) (4,104) (118) (1,798) (6,025)
► Wanted to go to an Arab country in 2009 56.8 4.4 38.8 (274)
► Wanted to go to a Western country in 2009 55.8 3.5 40.7 (113)
* Youth who were between the ages 15–29 when they were first interviewed in 2009.
TABLE A5.12 The revolution and migration plans in 2014 (youth aged 13–35), percent
ALL YOUTH LONG-TERM ASPIRERS SHORT-TERM ASPIRERS
MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL
Do you think the revolution  
changed your decision with respect  
to migration?
Yes, I am now starting to think about 
migration
2.3 1.0 1.7 7.5 3.2 6.5 13.2 10.8 12.7
I am thinking more about migration 3.9 1.5 2.7 11.1 5.4 9.8 20.0 11.1 18.1
I am thinking less about migration 2.4 1.1 1.8 5.2 3.8 4.9 6.0 6.0 6.0
Yes, I am no longer thinking about  
migration
1.9 1.2 1.6 1.3 0.7 1.1 0.1 1.8 0.5
No, the revolution has nothing to do with 
migration
89.4 95.2 92.2 75.0 86.8 77.6 60.7 70.4 62.7
(N) (5,063) (5,832) (10,895) (1,228) (423) (1,651) (602) (186) (788)
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  MALE FEMALE TOTAL
When did you start thinking about migration?
Before Revolution 57.9 63.6 59.1
After Revolution 42.2 36.4 40.9
(N) (622) (167) (789)
Have you taken any steps to migrate or is it just an idea?
Yes, I have started to take steps 11.5 6.8 10.5
No, I have not started to take steps yet 29.2 19.8 27.2
It is just an idea 59.3 73.4 62.3
Has anyone influenced your decision to migrate?
Yes 18.2 15.8 17.7
No 81.8 84.2 82.3
Who has most influenced your decision?
My father abroad 5.8 9.6 6.5
My mother abroad 0.0 2.4 0.4
Other relatives abroad 29.9 10.4 26.2
Egyptian friends abroad 41.9 32.2 40.1
My father in Egypt 5.2 5.3 5.2
My mother in Egypt 0.7 0.0 0.6
Other relatives in Egypt 4.1 12.3 5.7
Friends in Egypt 10.4 10.6 10.5
Foreign spouse 0.4 13.5 2.9
Migration brokers 0.7 0.0 0.6
Current/ex local employer 0.9 0.0 0.7
An educational institution 0.0 3.7 0.7
(N) (110) (26) (136)
* Only youth who aspired answered.
TABLE A5.13 The revolution and short-term migration aspirers (youth aged 13–35)*, 2014, percent
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TABLE A6.1 Median age at marriage among youth aged 25–29 and 30–35, by background characteristics, 
2014
  YOUTH AGED 25–29 YOUTH AGED 30–35
MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL
Region
Urban Governorates 25 21 23 27 21 24
Urban Lower Egypt 25 21 22 26 21 23
Rural Lower Egypt 25 20 22 26 20 22
Urban Upper Egypt 26 21 24 25 21 23
Rural Upper Egypt 24 19 21 25 19 21
Frontier Governorates 24 20 22 25 21 23
Urban–rural residence
Urban 25 21 23 27 21 24
Rural 24 19 21 25 19 21
Informal urban areas 24 21 22 25 20 23
Education level
Illiterate 24 18 19 24 19 20
Can read and write 25 19 20 24 18 18
Primary 24 18 21 25 19 21
Preparatory 24 20 21 22 18 20
General secondary 24 20 22 26 19 24
Vocational secondary 25 20 22 25 20 22
Post-secondary institute 26 20 23 26 23 24
University and above 25 23 24 28 23 26
Employment status
Employed 25 21 24 26 20 25
Unemployed 25 19 21 29 21 23
Out of labor force 25 20 20 25 20 20
Wealth quintile
Lowest 24 19 20 24 19 20
Second 24 20 22 25 20 22
Middle 25 20 21 25 20 22
Fourth 25 20 23 26 20 22
Highest 25 22 24 27 22 24
Marriage cohort
2010–2014 25 23 24 29 28 29
2005–2009 22 19 20 25 23 24
Before 2004 19 17 17 21 19 19
Total 25 20 22 26 20 22
(N) (555) (1,176) (1,731) (646) (1,085) (1,731)
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MALES FEMALES TOTAL
Age group
13–17 0.0 37.1 36.3
18–24 34.3 28.8 29.9
25–29 23.5 27.1 25.7
30+ 26.1 28.1 27.2
Region
Urban Governorates 22.5 17.8 19.7
Urban Lower Egypt 14.5 11.1 12.3
Rural Lower Egypt 16.6 18.4 17.7
Urban Upper Egypt 36.3 42.9 40.1
Rural Upper Egypt 42.3 45.5 44.5
Frontier Governorates 45.6 40.3 42.5
Urban–rural residence
Urban 23.3 21.1 22.0
Rural 27.3 31.6 30.2
Informal urban areas 25.8 20.1 22.2
Education level
Illiterate 29.0 33.0 32.2
Can read and write 42.7 41.5 41.8
Primary 32.8 31.1 31.8
Preparatory 22.0 34.8 31.4
General secondary 22.2 21.0 21.4
Vocational secondary 28.7 27.6 28.0
Post-secondary institute 27.8 17.7 22.1
University and above 16.1 17.3 16.8
Employment status
Employed 25.9 31.2 26.9
Unemployed 22.3 15.4 17.6
Out of labor force 31.6 28.4 28.5
Wealth quintile
Lowest 33.9 37.4 36.3
Second 29.7 32.3 31.4
Middle 28.9 27.2 27.8
Fourth 23.4 25.6 24.8
Highest 18.3 19.6 19.1
Marriage cohort
2010–2014 24.2 25.6 24.9
2005–2009 27.5 29.3 28.7
Before 2004 33.2 30.4 30.8
Total 26.1 28.3 27.4
(N) (366) (954) (1,320)
TABLE A6.2 Prevalence of consanguineous marriage, by background characteristics and 
marriage cohort, youth aged 13–35, 2014
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LIVED WITH OWN 
FAMILY
LIVED WITH 
SPOUSE’S FAMILY
LIVED WITH 
SOMEONE ELSE LIVED ALONE
MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE
Age group
13–17 4.6 33.1 0.0 62.4
18–24 34.8 2.4 9.4 30.8 0.0 0.4 55.8 66.5
25–29 35.9 3.1 11.0 33.3 0.3 0.4 52.8 63.2
30–35 28.3 1.6 12.9 32.1 0.1 0.8 58.7 65.6
Region
Urban Governorates 22.0 4.9 10.7 16.3 0.3 0.5 67.0 78.3
Urban Lower Egypt 13.9 0.8 11.4 11.1 0.0 0.2 74.7 87.9
Rural Lower Egypt 28.7 1.8 12.1 29.6 0.4 0.8 58.8 67.8
Urban Upper Egypt 53.4 0.5 5.8 30.2 0.0 1.2 40.8 68.1
Rural Upper Egypt 43.8 2.8 14.2 49.8 0.0 0.2 42.0 47.2
Frontier Governorates 40.6 2.5 6.7 22.7 0.0 0.7 52.7 74.1
Urban–rural residence
Urban 29.9 3.7 10.2 20.5 0.2 0.3 59.7 75.5
Rural 35.1 2.2 12.8 39.2 0.2 0.5 51.9 58.1
Informal urban areas 18.7 0.6 9.0 9.2 0.0 1.0 72.3 89.2
Education level
Illiterate 48.7 44.4 13.0 0.7 0.5 52.0 37.7 100.0
Can read and write 44.2 1.2 13.3 39.8 0.0 0.0 42.6 59.1
Primary 36.3 2.4 13.7 39.0 0.0 0.7 49.9 57.9
Preparatory 29.9 3.7 13.4 42.6 0.0 0.7 56.7 53.0
General secondary 44.9 2.2 13.5 24.7 0.0 0.0 41.6 73.1
Vocational secondary 31.4 2.0 12.7 29.3 0.2 0.4 55.8 68.3
Post-secondary institute 16.3 1.5 13.3 12.5 0.0 0.0 70.5 86.0
University and above 25.9 2.0 6.5 13.0 0.4 0.4 67.2 84.7
Employment status
Employed 31.0 3.2 12.0 28.7 0.1 0.5 57.0 67.7
Unemployed 53.2 1.1 4.7 26.4 4.6 0.0 37.5 72.5
Out of labor force 40.0 2.4 11.3 32.9 0.0 0.5 48.8 64.2
Wealth quintile
Lowest 43.5 1.9 15.2 48.6 0.3 1.1 41.0 48.4
Second 44.7 3.6 11.1 37.5 0.0 0.3 44.2 58.6
Middle 30.4 2.4 12.2 31.3 0.3 0.6 57.1 65.7
Fourth 24.7 2.2 11.6 28.2 0.4 0.2 63.3 69.4
Highest 22.5 1.9 9.7 17.8 0.0 0.3 67.8 80.1
Total 32.1 2.4 11.7 32.2 0.2 0.5 56.0 64.9
(N) (370) (69) (143) (960) (3) (15) (834) (2,108)
TABLE A6.3 Location of residence at first marriage, by background characteristics and marriage cohort, 
youth aged 13–35, 2014, percent
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TABLE A6.4 How married youth aged 13–35 met their spouse, by background characteristics and 
marriage cohort, 2014, percent
WORK/
SCHOOL NEIGHBORS RELATIVES
PERSONAL 
NETWORKS OTHER
Gender
Male 3.0 31.0 25.8 39.4 0.8
Female 2.5 23.4 28.2 44.5 1.5
Age group
13–17 1.2 25.5 36.3 34.4 2.6
18–24 2.1 25.6 29.9 41.4 1.1
25–29 3.4 26.7 25.5 43.2 1.2
30–35 2.4 25.7 27.1 43.6 1.2
Region
Urban Governorates 5.3 31.2 19.7 43.2 0.7
Urban Lower Egypt 5.0 23.8 12.3 57.8 1.2
Rural Lower Egypt 1.9 30.4 17.6 48.3 1.8
Urban Upper Egypt 2.6 15.0 40.1 41.9 0.4
Rural Upper Egypt 1.5 21.1 44.3 31.9 1.1
Frontier Governorates 1.2 29.9 42.5 26.2 0.2
Urban–rural residence
Urban 5.0 29.1 22.0 43.0 0.9
Rural 1.7 26.2 30.0 40.6 1.5
Informal urban areas 3.5 17.8 22.2 56.2 0.4
Education level
Illiterate 0.9 26.1 32.3 39.3 1.5
Can read and write 0.0 21.3 41.8 34.6 2.4
Primary 1.6 26.4 31.9 38.8 1.4
Preparatory 0.9 24.8 31.5 41.7 1.2
General secondary 1.4 30.5 21.4 46.8 0.0
Vocational secondary 1.8 26.0 27.8 43.2 1.2
Post-secondary institute 5.2 23.7 22.1 49.1 0.0
University and above 8.3 27.3 16.5 46.7 1.3
Employment status
Employed 4.1 28.6 26.6 39.9 0.8
Unemployed 2.0 28.8 17.6 47.9 3.6
Out of labor force 1.7 24.1 28.5 44.3 1.4
Wealth quintile
Lowest 1.6 24.6 36.4 36.0 1.4
Second 1.5 27.7 31.5 38.4 1.0
Middle 2.5 24.6 27.8 44.1 1.0
Fourth 2.9 27.6 24.7 43.5 1.3
Highest 4.4 25.6 18.7 49.8 1.5
Total 2.7 26.1 27.4 42.7 1.2
(N) (117) (1,234) (1,298) (2,011) (60)
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MYSELF ALONE
SOMEONE ELSE 
ALONE
MYSELF AND  
PARENTS JOINTLY
Gender
Male 54.1 14.2 31.7
Female 20.2 37.4 42.4
Age group
13–17 26.3 39.2 34.5
18–24 26.1 34.6 39.4
25–29 32.8 29.0 38.2
30+ 35.5 25.5 39.0
Region
Urban Governorates 50.7 14.1 35.2
Urban Lower Egypt 26.0 29.6 44.4
Rural Lower Egypt 33.8 32.5 33.7
Urban Upper Egypt 18.9 18.0 63.2
Rural Upper Egypt 25.3 35.4 39.4
Frontier Governorates 32.1 32.1 35.8
Urban–rural residence
Urban 43.4 17.3 39.3
Rural 29.8 33.9 36.3
Informal urban areas 20.4 25.8 53.7
Education level
Illiterate 22.8 41.2 36.0
Can read and write 27.8 30.5 41.7
Primary 36.0 30.5 33.6
Preparatory 30.9 33.3 35.8
General secondary 37.9 28.7 33.4
Vocational secondary 30.6 28.0 41.4
Post-secondary institute 36.2 23.5 40.4
University and above 41.8 18.5 39.7
Employment status
Employed 50.5 17.4 32.1
Unemployed 26.1 29.2 44.7
Out of labor force 20.0 37.3 42.8
Wealth quintile
Lowest 25.5 35.1 39.4
Second 30.5 29.7 39.8
Middle 31.8 30.7 37.5
Fourth 35.8 28.1 36.1
Highest 35.7 23.8 40.5
Total 32.1 29.2 38.7
(N) (1,459) (1,443) (1,818)
TABLE A6.5 Married youth aged 13–35 who made the final decision to marry their spouse themselves, by 
background characteristics and marriage cohort, 2014, percent
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TABLE A6.8 Percentage of youth aged 13–35 who talk “often” or “daily” with their spouse on selected 
topics, 2014
PLANS FOR 
THE FUTURE
PROBLEMS 
AT WORK OR 
SCHOOL
HOW 
THINGS ARE 
GOING IN 
YOUR LIFE
CURRENT 
OR FUTURE  
CHILDREN
MARITAL 
SEXUAL  
RELATIONS
Gender
Male 78.7 71.7 86.8 82.3 69.1
Female 71.2 68.1 81.5 79.6 64.8
Age group
13–17 61.9 59.6 75.9 72.8 63.3
18–24 74.7 67.4 82.8 79.1 69.4
25–29 72.7 68.8 84.2 80.9 67.1
30–35 74.9 71.4 83.1 81.2 64.0
Region
Urban Governorates 73.5 72.4 86.2 80.6 66.7
Urban Lower Egypt 87.7 86.6 90.0 88.6 73.5
Rural Lower Egypt 77.6 71.7 85.2 82.8 64.9
Urban Upper Egypt 76.0 69.5 77.5 77.5 73.7
Rural Upper Egypt 64.0 58.6 78.5 75.5 63.6
Frontier Governorates 80.1 78.8 85.6 83.5 71.6
Urban–rural residence
Urban 73.3 71.8 83.7 79.0 66.8
Rural 71.5 65.9 82.2 79.5 64.3
Informal urban areas 91.5 87.5 90.7 91.1 79.0
Education level
Illiterate 63.9 61.3 74.1 73.6 56.3
Can read and write 76.8 69.0 79.8 76.3 61.1
Primary 65.0 62.8 86.2 79.3 63.5
Preparatory 66.7 63.5 81.5 77.3 63.5
General secondary 80.5 72.9 85.4 87.0 75.1
Vocational secondary 76.7 71.0 84.4 82.8 68.5
Post-secondary institute 81.5 76.2 88.5 81.4 65.0
University and above 84.3 79.8 88.4 84.1 74.2
Employment status
Employed 78.7 73.4 86.7 82.4 68.9
Unemployed 78.5 66.5 88.5 84.3 61.6
Out of labor force 70.3 66.8 80.7 79.0 64.9
Wealth quintile
Lowest 61.0 57.2 77.4 72.6 54.9
Second 70.0 65.8 82.5 79.7 66.5
Middle 78.5 73.3 84.0 83.3 70.2
Fourth 78.5 73.6 85.3 83.2 69.2
Highest 79.2 75.1 86.6 82.8 69.3
Total 73.9 69.4 83.4 80.6 66.3
(N) (3,354) (3,182) (3,787) (3,663) (3,023)
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TABLE A6.9 Mean cost of the shabka and total cost of marriage (in EGP), by background 
characteristics and marriage cohort, youth aged 13–35, 2014
SHABKA TOTAL COST OF MARRIAGE
Gender
Male 5,998 33,910
Female 5,582 32,410
Age group
13–17 7,337 35,593
18–24 6,984 36,248
25–29 5,705 33,484
30+ 4,850 30,394
Region
Urban Governorates 4,003 43,942
Urban Lower Egypt 6,192 46,089
Rural Lower Egypt 5,400 39,220
Urban Upper Egypt 5,936 20,447
Rural Upper Egypt 6,859 20,007
Urban–rural residence
Urban 5,023 39,908
Rural 6,042 30,577
Education level
Illiterate 4,678 21,204
Can read and write 3,978 21,284
Primary 4,272 25,063
Preparatory 5,511 30,782
General secondary 6,105 38,876
Vocational secondary 5,561 32,731
Post-secondary institute 6,207 39,860
University and above 8,258 51,444
Employment status
Employed 6,067 33,208
Unemployed 5,614 36,316
Out of labor force 5,504 32,549
Wealth quintile
Lowest 4,294 17,185
Second 5,442 26,060
Middle 4,962 34,189
Fourth 6,087 37,200
Highest 7,487 45,556
Marriage cohort
2010–2014 6,949 38,472
2005–2009 5,075 30,515
Before 2004 3,964 24,853
Total 5,727 33,375
(N) (4,717) (3,685)
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TABLE A6.10 Desired fertility among married and unmarried youth, by background characteristics and marriage 
cohort, 2009 and 2014, percent
NEVER-MARRIED YOUTH CURRENTLY MARRIED YOUTH
AGE 15–29, 
2009
AGE 15–29, 
2014
AGE 13–35, 
2014
AGE 15–29, 
2009
AGE 15–29, 
2014
AGE 13–35, 
2014
Gender 
Male 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.7 3.1 3.2
Female 2.5 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.2
Age group 
13–17 – – 2.9 – – 3.2
15–17 2.6 2.9 – 2.4 3.2 –
18–24 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.8 3.0 3.0
25–29 2.6 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.2
30+ – – 3.0 – – 3.3
Region
Urban Governorates 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.7
Urban Lower Egypt 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.9 3.0
Rural Lower Egypt 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.0
Urban Upper Egypt 2.8 3.2 3.2 2.9 3.5 3.6
Rural Upper Egypt 2.9 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.5 3.6
Frontier Governorates 3.0 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.2 3.2
Urban–rural residence
Urban 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.9 2.9
Rural 2.7 3.1 3.0 2.9 3.2 3.3
Informal urban areas 2.5 2.9 2.9 2.7 3.1 3.1
Education level
Illiterate 2.9 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.4 3.6
Can read and write 2.4 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.3
Primary 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.8 3.3 3.3
Preparatory 2.6 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.2
General secondary 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.1
Vocational secondary 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.7 3.1 3.1
Post-secondary institute 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.7 3.1 3.1
University and above 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.9 2.9
Employment status
Employed 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.7 3.1 3.2
Unemployed 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.9
Out of labor force 2.6 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.2
Wealth quintile
Lowest 2.8 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.4 3.5
Second 2.7 3.1 3.1 2.9 3.3 3.3
Middle 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.2
Fourth 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.6 3.0 3.1
Highest 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.9 2.9
Marriage cohort
2010–2014 – – – – 3.0 3.0
2005–2009 – – – – 3.2 3.2
Before 2004 – – – – 3.5 3.5
Total 2.6 2.9 2.9 2.8 3.1 3.2
(N) (7,258) (5,790) (6,312) (3,394) (2,772) (4,501)
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TABLE A7.1 Youth participation in revolutionary activity since January 25 2011, by type of 
participation and background characteristics, 2014, percent
ANY  
PARTICIPATION
POLITICAL 
ORGANIZING
NEIGHBOR-
HOOD WATCH PROTEST
Gender 
Male 13.1 1.9 11.8 1.7
Female 1.5 0.5 0.5 0.9
Age group
13–17 5.1 0.5 4.2 1.1
18–24 8.0 1.7 6.4 1.5
25–29 8.3 1.5 7.2 1.3
30–35 7.7 0.9 7.0 1.1
Region
Urban Governorates 13.9 2.0 11.3 4.0
Urban Lower Egypt 8.3 2.0 7.2 1.5
Rural Lower Egypt 9.2 1.2 8.4 0.6
Urban Upper Egypt 2.1 0.7 1.4 0.4
Rural Upper Egypt 2.6 0.8 1.7 0.5
Frontier Governorates 2.6 0.4 2.3 0.0
Urban–rural residence
Urban 11.4 1.9 9.3 3.0
Rural 6.0 1.0 5.2 0.6
Informal urban areas 4.0 0.9 3.5 0.9
Education level
Illiterate 2.6 0.3 2.2 0.3
Can read and write 5.7 0.5 5.7 0.0
Primary 6.8 0.1 6.3 0.6
Preparatory 5.1 0.6 4.6 0.7
General secondary 7.5 0.8 6.1 2.0
Vocational secondary 6.9 1.0 6.0 0.9
Post-secondary institute 10.2 2.6 7.4 1.8
University and above 12.2 3.1 9.5 2.9
Marital status
Never married 8.5 1.5 7.0 1.6
Ever married 5.4 0.7 4.9 0.7
Employment status
Employed 12.8 1.8 11.5 1.7
Unemployed 13.6 2.5 11.7 2.5
Out of labor force 4.0 0.8 2.9 1.0
Out of labor force and out of school 1.9 0.5 1.1 0.5
Out of labor force and in school 7.0 1.3 5.4 1.8
Employed
Public wage 12.4 1.8 10.7 1.2
Private wage 12.6 1.8 11.2 1.7
Self-employed 14.9 2.6 14.4 1.7
Nonwage worker 11.7 1.2 10.4 2.0
Wealth quintile
Lowest 3.8 0.4 3.4 0.3
Second 5.7 0.7 4.6 0.9
Middle 6.8 0.9 5.8 1.3
Fourth 9.3 1.4 8.0 1.4
Highest 10.7 2.5 8.7 2.3
Total 7.4 1.2 6.2 1.3
(N) (10,890) (10,890) (10,890) (10,890)
(N who responded “yes”) (744) (123) (617) (136)
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TABLE A7.3 Youth’s reasons for nonparticipation in revolutionary activities, by background characteristics 
(percent, multiple answers allowed), 2014, percent
 
PARENTS’ 
OPPOSITION
WILL NOT MAKE 
A DIFFERENCE
CONFUSED 
IF RIGHT OR 
WRONG
NOT AGAINST 
OLD REGIME OTHER
Gender
Male 28.6 16.8 30.5 19.3 10.5
Female 26.3 14.1 27.7 18.4 18.1
Age group
13-17 35.8 13.3 25.6 16.5 14
18-24 30.1 15.4 29.3 18.2 12.7
25-29 22.6 16.0 29.9 20.5 15.4
30-35 17.0 17.1 31.7 20.9 17.6
Region
Urban Governorates 42.4 12.5 28.3 14.3 6.4
Urban Lower Egypt 34.2 14.9 32.9 11.5 6.9
Rural Lower Egypt 27.4 16.7 28.7 18.6 13.4
Urban Upper Egypt 18.6 17.1 22.7 25.4 20.5
Rural Upper Egypt 18.4 15.4 30.3 23.0 21.2
Frontier Governorates 28.5 15.3 28.5 12.8 17.0
Urban–rural residence
Urban 39.1 12.8 26.6 16.9 8.8
Rural 23.0 16.0 29.5 20.6 17.3
Informal urban areas 21.5 18.7 33.1 13.3 12.9
Education level 
Illiterate 12.9 16.4 28.5 22.3 26.3
Read and write 12.9 21.6 21.8 30.3 17.2
Primary 25.1 17.1 26.4 19.1 18.9
Preparatory 26.5 16.2 27.4 19.2 17.4
General secondary 38.4 10.7 27.4 15.8 11.6
Vocational secondary 24.3 15.7 29.8 21.9 13.0
Post-secondary institute 34.1 13.4 28.4 15.7 12.1
University and above 37.1 15.1 31.5 11.8 8.7
Marital status
Never married 33.1 15.1 27.7 17.7 11.7
Ever married 17.2 15.9 31.5 20.8 19.4
Employment status
Employed 24.5 16.8 30.8 19.9 13.5
Unemployed 27.5 18.8 35.6 15.0 10.1
Out of labor force 28.8 14.4 27.7 18.5 15.2
Out of labor force and out of school 22.0 15.5 28.7 20.2 18.7
Out of labor force and in school 39.2 12.8 26.3 16.0 10.0
Wealth quintile
Lowest 21.2 16.8 30.0 18.2 20.1
Second 21.6 13.8 28.2 22.8 19.4
Middle 26.3 15.7 30.1 18.8 12.6
Fourth 30.9 16.8 28.7 18.3 11.0
Highest 35.8 14.1 28.5 16.2 9.8
Total 27.4 15.4 29.1 18.8 14.5
(N) (10,146) (10,146) (10,146) (10,146) (10,146)
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TABLE A7.4 Youth understanding of the events of January 25, 2011 and June 30, 2013, by selected 
background characteristics and revolutionary activity, 2014, percent
 JANUARY 25, 2011 GOALS JUNE 30, 2013 GOALS
VERY 
CLEAR
SOMEWHAT 
CLEAR
VERY  
UNCLEAR
VERY  
CLEAR
SOMEWHAT 
CLEAR
VERY  
UNCLEAR
Gender 
Male 39.3 45.0 15.8 45.8 41.8 12.4
Female 35.4 45.9 18.7 40.5 43.5 16.0
Region
Urban Governorates 40.3 45.7 14.0 45.8 44.4 9.8
Urban Lower Egypt 44.6 38.8 16.6 55.3 38.8 5.9
Rural Lower Egypt 32.7 49.6 17.6 44.6 43.3 12.0
Urban Upper Egypt 45.0 37.3 17.7 44.7 38.7 16.5
Rural Upper Egypt 36.3 45.4 18.4 35.3 42.6 22.1
Frontier Governorates 24.4 50.1 25.5 33.4 53.4 13.2
Education level
Illiterate 21.9 49.9 28.2 28.6 47.7 23.6
Read and write 27.6 49.1 23.4 43.4 38.1 18.5
Primary 30.4 44.6 25.0 37.5 45.8 16.7
Preparatory 32.7 45.4 21.8 40.1 42.4 17.6
General secondary 40.5 44.7 14.9 42.9 44.4 12.7
Vocational secondary 36.6 47.0 16.3 43.5 43.0 13.5
Post-secondary institute 42.1 49.3 8.6 50.8 41.3 7.9
University and above 50.3 40.3 9.5 52.8 38.0 9.2
Wealth quintile
Lowest 31.0 46.1 22.9 34.7 43.8 21.5
Second 36.5 43.7 19.8 42.0 39.5 18.5
Middle 39.9 43.3 16.8 45.7 42.9 11.4
Fourth 38.3 46.8 15.0 43.6 46.6 9.8
Highest 40.4 47.0 12.6 48.6 40.7 10.7
Youth participation in revolution
No participation 37.3 45.1 17.6 42.5 43.1 14.4
Any participation 38.3 49.6 12.1 52.0 37.3 10.8
Political organizing 58.3 29.2 12.5 56.9 27.4 15.6
Neighborhood watch 34.8 52.7 12.5 50.0 39.5 10.5
Protest 59.6 39.3 1.1 61.2 24.2 14.6
Total 37.4 45.4 17.2 43.2 42.6 14.2
(N) (10,890) (10,889)
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TABLE A7.5 Youth self-reported turnout for elections and referendums from 2011–2012, by background 
characteristics, political participation, and support for January 25 and June 30 (percent)
 
2011  
CONSTI-
TUTION
2011  
PARLIAMENT, 
ROUND 1
2011  
PARLIAMENT, 
ROUND 2
2012  
PRESIDENT, 
ROUND 1
2012  
PRESIDENT, 
ROUND 2
2012  
CONSTI-
TUTION
Gender
Male 58.0 60.6 58.3 70.4 66.1 56.6
Female 47.6 50.6 48.8 59.4 56.5 47.6
Age group
20-24 48.7 51.4 49.5 61.7 57.9 49.0
25-29 55.8 57.7 55.7 67.7 64.0 52.7
30-35 56.1 60.4 58.0 67.1 64.1 57.2
Region
Urban Governorates 60.3 60.0 57.2 68.0 62.3 60.0
Urban Lower Egypt 72.7 71.4 69.9 80.8 80.1 70.1
Rural Lower Egypt 54.2 57.0 54.1 68.3 63.3 53.2
Urban Upper Egypt 47.4 53.0 52.1 61.2 60.6 45.9
Rural Upper Egypt 39.9 45.8 44.5 54.4 51.4 40.3
Frontier Governorates 51.0 52.1 52.5 58.4 58.6 50.1
Urban–rural residence
Urban 56.8 57.5 54.9 68.2 63.5 56.6
Rural 47.4 51.7 49.5 61.6 57.6 47.1
Informal urban areas 73.9 74.2 74.1 76.2 77.8 69.3
Education level
Illiterate 28.0 32.3 30.5 40.8 38.8 29.2
Can read and write 41.8 46.0 40.0 60.3 56.3 41.4
Primary 40.4 44.1 43.4 56.8 53.0 42.0
Preparatory 41.7 45.8 44.9 54.3 51.8 42.8
General secondary 49.0 52.6 48.3 61.1 60.0 46.4
Vocational secondary 53.6 57.0 54.5 66.3 62.4 52.5
Post-secondary institute 70.0 70.0 66.6 75.3 73.4 65.2
University and above 70.0 70.7 69.1 80.1 75.5 68.6
Marital status
Never married 52.6 55.2 52.5 64.8 60.5 51.2
Ever married 53.3 56.3 54.9 65.5 62.5 53.4
Employment status
Employed 60.1 62.3 60.4 72.8 68.6 58.9
Public wage 67.3 68.7 66.3 76.5 73.3 66.3
Private wage 59.8 60.8 59.3 72.8 67.1 57.4
Self-employed 62.0 65.5 63.1 73.0 72.5 62.0
Nonwage worker 40.0 52.0 49.5 63.3 59.8 45.6
Unemployed 62.2 66.8 64.1 75.3 69.2 61.2
Out of labor force 45.6 48.7 46.6 57.1 54.4 45.4
Out of labor force and out of school 43.3 46.7 44.6 54.6 52.0 42.7
Out of labor force and in school 61.3 63.0 59.8 74.0 71.0 64.1
Wealth quintile
Lowest 40.0 44.6 42.3 50.4 48.1 42.4
Second 46.7 49.9 48.6 60.4 57.7 46.2
Middle 52.4 55.3 53.6 66.7 61.4 49.6
Fourth 57.9 59.7 56.3 70.3 66.7 56.8
Highest 64.6 66.5 64.7 74.7 70.7 63.4
Youth participation in revolution
No participation 50.5 53.6 51.6 63.2 59.7 50.0
Any participation 79.8 79.9 77.2 86.5 81.7 77.6
Political organizing 84.3 83.7 78.5 88.6 84.7 76.5
Neighborhood watch 79.8 80.0 77.7 86.8 81.8 77.1
Protest 85.0 79.2 81.1 91.6 85.4 86.0
Youth support for January 25
Did not support 38.2 39.8 38.2 50.4 46.9 34.6
Supported 57.8 61.0 58.8 69.9 66.3 58.0
Youth support for June 30
Supported completely 57.2 60.4 58.7 70.1 66.5 56.7
Supported partially 52.0 54.1 51.3 62.4 58.4 47.8
Did not support 42.3 45.3 43.6 55.6 52.9 47.9
Total 53.0 55.8 53.7 65.1 61.5 52.3
(N) (7,458) (7,458) (7,458) (7,458) (7,458) (7,458)
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TABLE A7.6 Percentage of youth who report never and always voting from 2011–2012, and intention to vote in 
next election, by background characteristics and revolutionary activity
 
% NEVER OR ALWAYS VOTING ACROSS SIX 
ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS
% INTEND TO VOTE IN  
NEXT ELECTION
 NEVER VOTED ALWAYS VOTED YES MAYBE NO
Gender 
Male 23.8 45.4 50.9 43.4 5.7
Female 35.2 37.1 43.4 50.1 6.6
Age group
20-24 32.3 36.7 46.3 47.7 6.1
25-29 27.0 43.7 47.5 46.4 6.2
30-35 27.5 46.0 48.7 45.1 6.2
Region
Urban Governorates 26.5 45.5 50.1 45.2 4.7
Urban Lower Egypt 14.8 59.9 68.3 26.6 5.2
Rural Lower Egypt 26.8 42.4 51.2 42.3 6.4
Urban Upper Egypt 32.4 37.3 39.5 55.6 4.9
Rural Upper Egypt 38.9 30.9 34.4 58.3 7.4
Frontier Governorates 34.0 38.2 44.3 47.5 8.2
Urban–rural residence
Urban 27.3 43.4 47.2 47.6 5.2
Rural 32.6 36.9 43.2 49.9 6.9
Informal urban areas 15.8 61.2 70.8 25.2 4.0
Education level
Illiterate 54.7 20.6 24.7 66.4 8.8
Read and write 31.5 31.2 42.4 49.5 8.1
Primary 37.4 31.5 38.1 53.3 8.6
Preparatory 38.3 32.2 37.0 56.3 6.7
General secondary 32.4 37.5 44.8 49.6 5.6
Vocational secondary 26.9 40.8 48.9 45.8 5.4
Post-secondary institute 17.8 54.3 58.1 38.5 3.4
University and above 16.6 57.5 60.7 33.9 5.4
Marital status
Never married 29.1 40.1 47.6 46.4 6.0
Ever married 29.4 42.8 46.9 46.9 6.2
Employment status
Employed 21.7 48.1 52.8 41.8 5.4
Public wage 19.0 57.0 59.2 32.7 8.1
Private wage 22.2 46.3 50.3 45.4 4.3
Self-employed 19.0 51.4 55.3 38.7 6.0
Nonwage worker 31.4 32.9 51.9 40.8 7.3
Unemployed 18.2 48.5 57.5 39.8 2.7
Out of labor force 37.2 34.7 41.2 51.7 7.1
Out of labor force and out of school 39.4 32.4 39.0 53.9 7.2
Out of labor force and in school 21.8 50.3 56.8 36.3 6.9
Wealth quintile
Lowest 42.1 31.4 35.2 58.3 6.5
Second 33.5 34.9 40.7 52.6 6.7
Middle 28.3 40.3 46.9 47.4 5.7
Fourth 24.0 44.2 53.0 40.6 6.4
Highest 21.0 53.1 57.7 36.9 5.4
Youth participation in revolution
No participation 30.9 39.2 45.6 47.9 6.4
Any participation 10.7 66.1 65.3 31.9 2.7
Political organizing 7.2 67.0 69.7 27.0 3.3
Neighborhood watch 10.6 66.4 65.7 31.9 2.4
Protest 5.5 67.0 74.7 15.9 9.4
Youth support for January 25 
Did not support 42.8 25.2 27.9 64.0 8.1
Supported 24.8 46.7 53.6 40.9 5.5
Youth support for June 30 
Supported completely 24.8 46.2 60.4 35.7 3.9
Supported partially 30.3 37.0 38.2 57.7 4.1
Did not support 40.5 35.9 26.8 56.5 16.7
Total 29.3 41.4 47.3 46.6 6.1
(N) (7,458) (7,458)                    (7,458)
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TABLE A7.7	 Youths’	reasons	for	not	voting	in	each	election	or	referendum,	by	selected	background	
characteristics	and	revolutionary	activity	(age	ineligible	excluded),	percent
  2011 CONSTITUTION 2011 PARLIAMENT 2012 PRESIDENCY
  DON’T 
CARE
RE-
FUSED 
TO VOTE
NO 
VOTING 
CARD OTHER
DON’T 
CARE
RE-
FUSED 
TO VOTE
NO 
VOTING 
CARD OTHER
DON’T 
CARE
RE-
FUSED 
TO VOTE
NO 
VOTING 
CARD OTHER
Gender
Male 66.8 25.1 1.6 6.5 64.1 25.8 2.2 7.9 57.2 31.9 2.6 8.4
Female 73.5 20.7 3.7 2.1 71.4 22.0 3.4 3.2 67.0 26.0 4.1 2.9
Age group
18–24 69.0 22.8 3.4 4.8 65.8 24.2 3.9 6.2 62.5 26.7 4.5 6.3
25–29 70.7 23.7 1.9 3.6 68.4 24.9 1.8 5.0 63.4 29.4 2.1 5.1
30–35 72.4 21.4 2.5 3.7 71.8 21.5 2.3 4.5 61.1 31.7 3.2 4.1
Region
Urban Governorates 60.0 36.8 1.6 1.6 57.1 38.6 2.0 2.4 47.2 47.1 1.9 3.8
Urban Lower Egypt 70.4 18.1 1.1 10.4 74.2 18.6 0.7 6.6 67.7 23.9 1.0 7.3
Rural Lower Egypt 71.5 21.0 1.9 5.7 70.7 19.3 2.3 7.8 59.5 30.6 3.3 6.7
Urban Upper Egypt 81.5 16.8 0.5 1.1 76.3 20.6 2.1 1.0 84.3 12.7 2.6 0.4
Rural Upper Egypt 71.0 20.4 4.9 3.8 67.4 22.4 4.6 5.7 66.7 22.2 5.0 6.2
Frontier Governorates 76.5 19.3 1.9 2.3 74.6 19.9 1.9 3.7 69.7 24.0 2.2 4.1
Education level
Illiterate 77.5 15.8 3.9 2.8 77.2 14.4 4.9 3.5 75.1 17.2 5.5 2.2
Can read and write 83.9 11.9 4.1 0.0 83.2 12.8 4.0 0.0 71.6 19.8 5.4 3.1
Primary 72.8 20.6 2.4 4.2 75.7 17.3 1.9 5.1 67.5 26.0 2.3 4.2
Preparatory 70.5 24.0 3.4 2.1 71.8 21.3 3.6 3.4 63.6 29.2 3.8 3.4
General secondary 67.7 28.2 1.0 3.2 56.5 35.3 3.7 4.6 51.8 40.8 3.9 3.6
Vocational secondary 70.4 22.2 2.7 4.8 66.8 24.6 2.2 6.5 63.0 26.7 2.7 7.7
Post-secondary institute 55.6 37.3 0.0 7.2 55.7 33.8 0.0 10.5 44.5 43.6 0.0 11.9
University and above 61.7 31.0 1.7 5.7 56.3 35.1 2.5 6.1 46.1 45.1 3.6 5.2
Wealth quintile
Lowest 75.2 19.6 2.8 2.5 73.6 21.3 2.2 3.0 72.8 21.3 2.8 3.1
Second 72.3 20.1 3.0 4.6 72.7 20.2 3.0 4.1 68.4 22.7 3.2 5.6
Middle 71.7 23.2 1.7 3.4 66.3 25.4 2.0 6.3 64.4 28.0 2.4 5.2
Fourth 68.8 22.3 4.1 4.7 68.5 20.6 5.5 5.4 55.0 32.2 7.5 5.4
Highest 61.7 30.4 1.8 6.1 56.2 33.2 1.6 9.0 46.1 43.7 1.5 8.6
Total 70.4 22.8 2.7 4.2 68.0 23.8 2.8 5.4 62.5 28.7 3.4 5.4
(N) (3,351) (3,401) (2,800)
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Table A8.2	 Youth	participation	in	groups	and	associations,	by	period	and	background	characteristics,	2009	
and	2014
	
YOUTH AGED 
13–35 IN 2014
YOUTH AGED  
15– 29 IN 2014
YOUTH AGED  
15– 29 IN 2009
Gender
Male 4.1 4.2 6.6
Female 1.5 1.5 3.2
Age group
13–17 3.4 3.3 —
15–17 — — 6.4
18–24 3.1 3.1 4.6
25–29 2.3 2.3 4.3
30+ 2.3 — —
Region
Urban Governorates 5.8 5.8 10.6
Urban Lower Egypt 2.0 2.1 5.6
Rural Lower Egypt 2.5 2.6 3.4
Urban Upper Egypt 3.0 3.4 2.8
Rural Upper Egypt 1.6 1.7 2.7
Frontier Governorates 2.8 2.9 1.9
Urban–rural residence
Urban 5.4 5.5 8.4
Rural 2.1 2.1 3.1
Informal urban areas 0.1 0.1 4.8
Education level
Illiterate 0.0 0.0 0.5
Can	read	and	write 0.0 0.0 10.9
Primary 1.0 1.1 3.4
Preparatory 1.3 0.8 4.4
General	secondary 6.5 6.5 11.9
Vocational	secondary 1.4 1.5 2.0
Post-secondary	institute 4.5 4.7 3.2
University	and	above	 7.0 6.8 13.0
Marital status
Never married 3.6 3.6 6.2
Ever married 1.4 1.2 1.8
Employment status
Employed 3.2 3.2 4.9
Unemployed 5.7 5.9 4.5
Out of labor force 2.4 2.6 5.0
Out of labor force and out of school 0.7 0.7 1.4
Out of labor force and in school 4.9 5.0 9.5
Wealth quintile
Lowest 0.9 0.8 1.7
Second 1.4 1.4 2.0
Middle 1.2 1.3 2.7
Fourth 2.8 3.1 5.0
Highest 7.0 7.0 14.6
Youth participation in revolution
No participation 1.4 1.4 —
Any participation 20.8 21.1 —
Political organizing 37.4 36.8 —
Neighborhood watch 19.3 19.6 —
Protest 35.0 36.7 —
Youth support for January 25
Did not support 1.5 1.5 —
Supported 3.3 3.4 —
Youth support for June 30
Supported completely 2.5 2.7 —
Supported partially 3.2 3.1 —
Did not support 3.2 3.3 —
Total 2.8 2.9 4.9
(N) (10,861) (8,579) (10,976)
(N) who responded “yes” (299) (246) (524)
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TABLE A9.1 Youth	agreement	with	the	statement,	“Educating	boys	is	more	important	than	educating	girls,”	2009	
and	2014,	percent
2009 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 13–35)
AGREE DISAGREE
DON’T 
KNOW AGREE
NEITHER 
AGREE 
NOR DIS-
AGREE
DIS-
AGREE AGREE
NEITHER 
AGREE 
NOR DIS-
AGREE
DIS-
AGREE
Gender
Male 34.9 64.4 0.7 34.2 18.7 47.1 34.9 18.2 46.9
Female 13.4 86.0 0.6 20.8 12.0 67.2 21.4 12.5 66.1
Education level
Illiterate 27.4 70.2 2.4 36.6 21.7 41.8 35.0 21.8 43.2
Can read and write 9.4 73.5 17.1 35.7 33.3 31.0 40.0 22.5 37.5
Primary 30.2 69.0 0.8 38.5 19.0 42.5 38.3 18.8 42.9
Preparatory 26.0 73.4 0.6 34.6 17.1 48.3 33.1 16.4 50.6
General secondary 18.6 81.0 0.4 18.7 12.2 69.1 18.9 11.8 69.3
Vocational secondary 24.3 75.4 0.3 27.8 16.1 56.1 27.7 15.9 56.4
Post-secondary institute 27.9 71.8 0.3 24.6 11.6 63.8 26.0 13.3 60.8
University and above 16.0 83.8 0.2 21.2 11.5 67.3 22.8 11.0 66.3
Region
Urban Governorates 24.5 74.8 0.7 37.3 10.1 52.5 37.9 10.6 51.5
Urban Lower Egypt 12.8 86.3 1.0 21.2 15.2 63.6 23.2 14.4 62.3
Rural Lower Egypt 20.8 78.4 0.8 20.7 18.8 60.5 20.7 18.5 60.9
Urban Upper Egypt 28.8 70.6 0.6 22.5 17.7 59.8 24.5 18.7 56.8
Rural Upper Egypt 32.5 67.0 0.4 32.6 14.5 52.9 32.7 14.3 53.0
Frontier Governorates 23.6 76.4 0.0 41.0 21.1 38.0 41.2 21.0 37.8
Urban–rural residence
Urban 21.9 77.3 0.8 30.5 13.7 55.8 31.7 13.8 54.5
Rural 26.1 73.3 0.6 26.9 16.8 56.4 26.7 16.5 56.7
Informal urban areas 22.5 77.1 0.4 25.5 13.1 61.5 27.8 13.3 58.9
Wealth quintile
Lowest 29.5 69.7 0.9 34.8 18.4 46.8 34.6 18.4 47.1
Second 27.2 72.1 0.7 27.6 16.1 56.3 28.8 16.3 54.8
Middle 25.7 73.8 0.6 27.4 17.2 55.4 28.0 16.9 55.1
Fourth 21.8 77.8 0.4 28.8 14.6 56.7 29.4 14.5 56.1
Highest 17.0 82.1 0.9 22.2 12.2 65.5 22.3 11.8 65.9
Age group
15–17 24.0 75.1 0.9 26.5 13.8 59.7 26.7 14.0 59.4
18–24 25.2 74.2 0.6 27.5 15.8 56.7 27.5 15.8 56.7
25–29 23.2 76.2 0.6 29.5 16.2 54.3 29.5 16.2 54.3
30–35  — — — — — — 30.7 15.0 54.3
Marital status
Never married 26.4 72.9 0.8 28.0 15.7 56.3 28.3 15.6 56.1
Ever married 19.3 80.3 0.4 27.3 15.0 57.7 28.3 15.1 56.7
Employment status
Employed 33.4 66.3 0.4 32.5 17.5 50.0 33.4 16.7 50.0
Unemployed 24.0 75.4 0.6 27.8 11.3 61.0 26.3 12.2 61.5
Out of labor force 19.8 79.4 0.8 25.5 14.8 59.7 25.6 14.9 59.4
Total 24.4 75.0 0.7 27.8 15.5 56.7 28.3 15.4 56.3
(N) (2,491) (8,433) (68) (2,452) (1,313) (4,848) (3,147) (1,670) (6,087)
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TABLE A9.2	 Youth	agreement	with	the	statement,	“When	job	opportunities	are	scarce,	priority	must	go	to	men	
over	women,”	2009	and	2014,	percent
2009 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 13–35)
 
AGREE NEITHER
DIS-
AGREE AGREE
NEITHER 
AGREE NOR 
DISAGREE
DIS-
AGREE AGREE
NEITHER 
AGREE NOR 
DISAGREE
DIS-
AGREE
Gender
Male 92.8 6.3 0.9 68.1 19.2 12.7 68.1 19.1 12.8
Female 80.9 13.6 5.5 52.1 18.7 29.2 53.0 18.7 28.4
Education level
Illiterate 88.3 9.3 2.4 64.7 22.6 12.7 63.1 24.0 12.9
Can read and write 89.7 5.3 5.0 73.9 25.6 0.5 67.9 22.1 10.0
Primary 88.5 9.3 2.2 71.5 16.1 12.4 71.5 15.9 12.6
Preparatory 87.2 9.6 3.3 66.3 18.3 15.4 64.1 18.0 17.9
General secondary 84.4 10.3 5.3 50.8 17.3 31.9 51.8 17.0 31.2
Vocational secondary 88.0 9.9 2.2 61.8 19.4 18.8 62.1 19.1 18.8
Post-secondary institute 90.3 5.9 3.8 59.7 18.3 22.0 61.6 18.3 20.1
University and above 82.9 12.0 5.1 53.0 19.0 28.0 53.6 18.8 27.6
Region
Urban Governorates 86.7 11.0 2.3 66.8 12.4 20.9 67.4 12.2 20.4
Urban Lower Egypt 81.4 12.6 6.0 51.8 21.6 26.6 52.7 20.7 26.6
Rural Lower Egypt 83.1 12.9 4.0 59.0 24.6 16.4 58.9 24.6 16.5
Urban Upper Egypt 90.5 7.0 2.5 44.1 26.0 29.9 45.8 25.8 28.4
Rural Upper Egypt 93.2 4.9 1.9 66.0 13.8 20.2 65.7 14.0 20.4
Frontier Governorates 90.4 7.9 1.8 59.7 24.9 15.4 60.6 25.1 14.3
Urban–rural residence
Urban 86.9 10.3 2.8 61.1 16.5 22.4 62.1 16.0 21.9
Rural 87.7 9.3 3.0 62.5 19.4 18.1 62.2 19.6 18.2
Informal urban areas 83.5 11.5 5.0 45.3 24.0 30.7 47.3 23.2 29.5
Wealth quintile
Lowest 89.9 7.8 2.4 65.3 19.2 15.5 64.9 19.4 15.7
Second 87.9 9.4 2.7 59.9 19.1 21.0 60.5 18.8 20.6
Third 88.4 8.7 2.9 59.4 18.8 21.9 59.7 18.7 21.6
Fourth 85.0 11.6 3.4 61.7 18.5 19.8 62.2 18.4 19.4
Highest 83.5 12.0 4.5 57.0 19.3 23.8 57.0 19.2 23.8
Age group
15–17 86.4 9.7 3.9 58.4 18.1 23.5 57.7 18.5 23.9
18–24 87.1 9.8 3.1 60.4 19.4 20.2 60.4 19.4 20.2
25–29 87.3 10.0 2.7 62.0 19.0 19.0 62.0 19.0 19.0
30–35 — — — — — — 63.3 18.2 18.5
Marital status
Never married 87.4 9.3 3.3 59.5 19.3 21.2 59.3 19.3 21.4
Ever married 86.1 11.2 2.7 62.9 18.2 18.9 63.4 18.1 18.6
Employment status
Employed 91.0 7.3 1.7 66.7 17.6 15.8 66.6 17.5 15.9
Unemployed 86.6 9.5 4.0 65.3 18.1 16.6 63.4 18.2 18.4
Out of labor force 85.0 11.2 3.8 57.0 19.7 23.3 57.2 19.7 23.1
Total 87.0 9.8 3.2 60.4 19.0 20.6 60.7 18.9 20.4
(N) (9,488) (1,127) (374) (5,234) (1,641) (1,738) (6,677) (2,064) (2,163)
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TABLE A9.3	 Youth	responses	to	the	question:	“Do	you	agree	that	women	in	your	family	should	
vote	in	elections	and	referendums?”,	2014,	percent
AGES 18–29 AGES 18–35
  YES NO YES NO
Gender
Male 82.1 17.9 81.9 18.1
Female 81.0 19.0 81.1 19.0
Education level
Illiterate 66.6 33.4 68.6 31.4
Can read and write 63.4 36.6 72.0 28.0
Primary 75.8 24.2 76.2 23.8
Preparatory 73.5 26.5 74.0 26.0
General secondary 84.2 15.8 85.3 14.8
Vocational secondary 81.7 18.3 81.9 18.2
Post-secondary institute 89.2 10.8 88.8 11.2
University and above 90.3 9.7 89.9 10.1
Region
Urban Governorates 85.7 14.3 85.7 14.3
Urban Lower Egypt 90.0 10.0 89.6 10.4
Rural Lower Egypt 85.0 15.0 84.4 15.6
Urban Upper Egypt 78.0 22.0 78.3 21.7
Rural Upper Egypt 73.8 26.2 73.8 26.2
Frontier Governorates 71.6 28.4 70.7 29.3
Urban–rural residence
Urban 83.4 16.6 83.4 16.6
Rural 79.3 20.7 79.1 20.9
Informal urban areas 90.5 9.5 90.0 10.1
Wealth quintile
Lowest 68.9 31.1 69.9 30.1
Second 80.1 19.9 79.4 20.6
Middle 81.8 18.2 81.6 18.4
Fourth 84.9 15.1 85.6 14.4
Highest 89.2 10.8 88.7 11.3
Age group
18–24 81.9 18.1 81.9 18.1
25–29 81.1 19.0 81.1 19.0
30–35  — — 81.1 18.9
Marital status
Never married 81.7 18.3 81.8 18.2
Ever married 81.4 18.6 81.2 18.8
Employment status
Employed 81.9 18.1 82.0 18.1
Unemployed 89.5 10.5 89.4 10.6
Out of labor force 80.6 19.4 80.4 19.7
Total 81.6 18.4 81.5 18.5
(N) (5,428) (1,256) (7,027) (1,646)
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TABLE A9.4	 Youth	agreement	with	the	statement,	“A	girl	must	obey	her	brother,	even	if	he	is	younger,”	2009	and	
2014,	percent
2009 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 13–35)
  AGREE DISAGREE
DON’T 
KNOW AGREE
NEITHER 
AGREE 
NOR DIS-
AGREE
DIS-
AGREE AGREE
NEITHER 
AGREE 
NOR DIS-
AGREE
DIS-
AGREE
Gender
Male 70.6 28.8 0.5 67.5 23.9 8.6 67.5 23.9 8.6
Female 48.7 50.2 1.1 53.1 29.2 17.7 53.9 28.9 17.2
Education level
Illiterate 66.9 30.8 2.4 59.1 31.2 9.7 59.0 31.2 9.8
Can read and write 53.5 29.3 17.1 64.6 27.6 7.7 65.1 27.1 7.7
Primary 64.9 34.2 0.9 70.6 20.5 9.0 70.4 21.1 8.5
Preparatory 61.5 38.0 0.5 65.9 23.2 10.9 66.5 22.4 11.1
General secondary 52.0 46.9 1.1 57.0 28.3 14.8 57.4 28.1 14.6
Vocational secondary 61.6 37.7 0.7 62.2 26.4 11.4 61.8 26.6 11.7
Post-secondary institute 57.5 42.5 0.0 61.1 22.6 16.3 60.1 23.9 16.0
University and above 47.8 51.8 0.4 53.0 28.5 18.4 53.7 28.3 18.1
Region
Urban Governorates 52.5 46.5 1.0 63.9 19.6 16.5 64.0 19.6 16.4
Urban Lower Egypt 51.5 47.4 1.1 53.0 31.1 15.9 54.0 30.0 16.0
Rural Lower Egypt 63.8 35.4 0.8 56.4 31.4 12.1 56.9 31.7 11.4
Urban Upper Egypt 59.5 40.2 0.4 55.7 30.3 14.0 55.8 29.7 14.6
Rural Upper Egypt 65.2 34.4 0.5 67.8 21.9 10.3 67.8 22.0 10.2
Frontier Governorates 61.6 34.1 4.3 53.2 36.1 10.7 54.2 34.4 11.4
Urban–rural residence
Urban 53.4 45.7 0.9 59.8 26.3 13.8 60.5 25.5 14.1
Rural 64.4 34.9 0.7 62.0 26.9 11.2 62.1 27.1 10.8
Informal urban areas 54.5 44.3 1.2 54.5 24.2 21.3 54.6 24.3 21.1
Wealth quintile
Lowest 67.5 31.6 0.9 68.5 21.4 10.1 67.3 22.4 10.3
Second 64.1 35.4 0.5 58.5 30.6 10.9 58.9 29.3 11.8
Middle 62.4 36.7 0.9 60.8 26.8 12.4 61.7 26.8 11.5
Fourth 56.3 43.1 0.6 61.5 24.7 13.8 62.1 24.7 13.2
Highest 47.9 50.8 1.3 55.6 27.9 16.5 55.9 28.0 16.2
Age group
15–17 60.1 39.1 0.8 61.2 24.5 14.3 61.4 24.5 14.1
18–24 60.2 39.0 0.9 59.8 27.0 13.2 59.8 27.0 13.2
25–29 59.3 39.9 0.8 61.5 27.0 11.5 61.5 27.0 11.5
30–35 —  — — — — — 61.9 26.2 12.0
Marital status
Never married 60.9 38.3 0.9 60.1 26.5 13.4 60.0 26.4 13.6
Ever married 57.4 41.9 0.7 62.2 26.2 11.6 62.5 26.3 11.3
Employment status
Employed 67.2 32.5 0.3 66.0 25.0 9.1 65.7 24.6 9.7
Unemployed 63.5 35.7 0.9 66.7 21.0 12.3 65.7 23.5 10.9
Out of labor force 55.8 43.1 1.1 57.5 27.6 14.9 57.8 27.6 14.6
Total 59.9 39.3 0.8 60.6 26.4 12.9 60.9 26.4 12.8
(N) (6,455) (4,421) (116) (5,170) (2,301) (1,142) (6,586) (2,896) (1,422)
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TABLE A9.5	 Youth	agreement	with	the	statement,	“Boys	should	help	with	household	chores	as	much	as	girls	do,”	
2009	and	2014,	percent
2009 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 13–35)
 
AGREE
DIS-
AGREE
DON’T 
KNOW AGREE
NEITHER 
AGREE 
NOR DIS-
AGREE
DIS-
AGREE AGREE
NEITHER 
AGREE 
NOR DIS-
AGREE
DIS-
AGREE
Gender
Males 27.1 72.5 0.5 20.3 28.4 51.3 20.8 28.3 51.0
Females 41.0 57.9 1.1 36.1 32.4 31.6 35.4 32.8 31.8
Education level
Illiterate 34.8 62.8 2.4 21.0 35.9 43.1 22.3 35.4 42.3
Can read and write 23.4 59.5 17.1 33.8 26.0 40.2 26.6 30.4 43.1
Primary 32.4 66.9 0.7 25.1 26.4 48.5 24.9 26.5 48.6
Preparatory 33.9 65.5 0.6 26.4 27.6 46.0 28.8 27.5 43.7
General secondary 36.1 63.5 0.4 34.2 29.2 36.6 33.6 29.0 37.4
Vocational secondary 32.8 66.7 0.5 25.6 31.6 42.9 25.6 31.9 42.6
Post-secondary institute 31.0 69.1 0.0 29.5 26.6 43.9 28.2 29.3 42.5
University and above 36.8 62.3 0.8 32.9 30.0 37.0 33.2 30.1 36.8
Region
Urban Governorates 30.5 68.6 0.9 36.7 22.6 40.6 36.6 22.9 40.5
Urban Lower Egypt 35.9 63.0 1.1 33.2 31.7 35.1 33.7 32.3 34.0
Rural Lower Egypt 35.0 64.0 1.0 25.7 34.3 40.0 25.3 35.0 39.8
Urban Upper Egypt 38.5 61.0 0.5 29.6 33.6 36.7 29.5 33.3 37.3
Rural Upper Egypt 33.2 66.4 0.4 22.4 28.8 48.8 22.9 28.4 48.7
Frontier Governorates 31.5 68.6 0.0 20.4 38.3 41.3 20.2 38.8 41.0
Urban–rural residence
Urban 32.9 66.2 0.9 31.6 28.2 40.2 31.4 28.2 40.5
Rural 34.1 65.2 0.7 24.0 31.7 44.3 24.1 31.9 44.0
Informal urban areas 35.8 63.4 0.8 40.5 27.7 31.8 41.4 28.4 30.2
Wealth quintile
Lowest 33.3 65.9 0.8 24.5 27.1 48.4 24.7 28.0 47.3
Second 32.4 67.2 0.4 24.5 34.5 41.0 24.9 33.3 41.8
Middle 32.9 66.3 0.7 28.4 31.1 40.5 28.8 31.1 40.1
Fourth 35.2 64.1 0.7 28.5 29.2 42.3 28.9 29.7 41.4
Highest 36.0 62.8 1.2 32.1 29.4 38.5 31.6 30.1 38.3
Age group
15–17 35.5 63.8 0.7 29.7 27.5 42.9 30.3 27.7 42.0
18–24 32.9 66.4 0.7 27.4 30.7 41.9 27.4 30.7 41.9
25–29 34.4 64.8 0.9 27.3 31.7 41.1 27.3 31.7 41.1
30–35 —  — — — — — 27.3 31.6 41.2
Marital status
Never married 33.1 66.1 0.7 27.6 29.6 42.9 27.9 29.7 42.4
Ever married 35.8 63.3 0.8 28.6 32.2 39.2 28.0 31.9 40.1
Employment status
Employed 29.1 70.6 0.3 22.1 28.0 49.9 23.0 28.3 48.8
Unemployed 33.0 66.2 0.8 25.7 28.0 46.3 25.5 29.3 45.2
Out of labor force 36.5 62.6 1.0 30.9 31.6 37.6 30.9 31.8 37.3
Total 33.9 65.4 0.8 27.8 30.3 41.9 27.9 30.5 41.6
(N) (3,810) (7,099) (83) (2,412) (2,627) (3,574) (3,058) (3,359) (4,487)
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TABLE A9.6	 Youth	agreement	with	the	statement,	“Only	the	husband	should	decide	how	household	money	is	spent,”	
2009	and	2014,	percent
2009 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 13–35)
 
AGREE DISAGREE
DON’T 
KNOW AGREE
NEITHER 
AGREE 
NOR DIS-
AGREE
DIS-
AGREE AGREE
NEITHER 
AGREE NOR 
DISAGREE
DIS-
AGREE
Gender
Male 60.9 38.7 0.4 55.2 27.9 16.9 55.3 27.8 16.9
Female 37.1 61.6 1.3 38.9 29.5 31.6 39.4 29.3 31.4
Education level
Illiterate 58.0 40.0 2.1 54.3 28.2 17.5 53.6 29.1 17.3
Can read and write 20.0 62.8 17.1 59.3 26.6 14.1 54.8 31.3 13.9
Primary 55.6 43.3 1.2 53.1 29.2 17.7 53.6 29.6 16.8
Preparatory 51.0 48.2 0.8 49.1 28.1 22.8 49.2 27.3 23.5
General secondary 43.6 55.6 0.8 41.0 26.9 32.1 41.6 26.5 31.9
Vocational secondary 48.8 50.7 0.5 50.7 28.7 20.6 49.8 28.3 21.9
Post-secondary institute 42.6 57.4 0.0 49.3 27.0 23.8 48.9 27.4 23.7
University and above 38.4 61.2 0.4 38.1 30.3 31.6 38.8 29.8 31.3
Region
Urban Governorates 41.1 57.5 1.4 47.0 23.9 29.2 46.9 24.2 28.9
Urban Lower Egypt 44.0 55.2 0.8 43.3 32.0 24.7 44.7 30.8 24.5
Rural Lower Egypt 52.7 46.5 0.9 41.7 33.8 24.5 41.9 34.0 24.1
Urban Upper Egypt 49.1 50.5 0.5 48.2 29.1 22.8 48.0 27.1 24.9
Rural Upper Egypt 54.3 45.2 0.4 55.1 24.4 20.5 55.2 24.2 20.6
Frontier Governorates 50.8 48.1 1.1 47.2 36.3 16.5 47.0 37.1 16.0
Urban–rural residence
Urban 42.7 56.0 1.2 45.5 28.6 25.9 45.7 28.3 26.0
Rural 53.4 45.9 0.7 48.3 29.3 22.5 48.2 29.4 22.3
Informal urban areas 46.0 53.4 0.7 48.0 25.1 26.9 48.7 23.3 28.0
Wealth quintile
Lowest 58.1 41.2 0.8 54.5 28.0 17.5 53.8 27.5 18.7
Second 54.4 45.1 0.5 48.5 30.4 21.2 49.4 29.9 20.6
Middle 51.8 47.3 1.0 48.2 28.5 23.4 47.7 28.7 23.6
Fourth 44.7 54.5 0.9 48.0 27.6 24.5 47.8 27.2 25.0
Highest 36.0 62.8 1.2 40.2 28.9 31.0 40.6 29.0 30.4
Age group
15–17 49.8 49.0 1.2 46.4 26.9 26.7 46.7 27.3 26.0
18–24 49.6 49.7 0.8 46.8 29.8 23.4 46.8 29.8 23.4
25–29 48.3 51.0 0.7 49.3 28.1 22.6 49.3 28.1 22.6
30–35 — — — — — — 47.8 27.4 24.8
Marital status
Never married 50.6 48.4 1.0 47.8 28.4 23.8 47.9 28.4 23.8
Ever married 45.9 53.6 0.5 46.5 29.4 24.2 46.8 28.8 24.4
Employment status
Employed 58.6 41.2 0.2 54.7 26.5 18.8 53.4 26.8 19.9
Unemployed 47.3 52.2 0.5 48.9 25.8 25.4 47.5 26.6 25.9
Out of labor force 44.7 54.1 1.2 43.7 30.0 26.3 44.3 29.6 26.1
Total 49.3 49.9 0.9 47.4 28.7 23.9 47.5 28.5 24.0
(N) (5,241) (5,650) (101) (4,014) (2,505) (2,094) (5,082) (3,168) (2,654)
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TABLE A9.7	 Youth	agreement	with	the	statement,	“A	woman	must	obtain	permission	from	her	spouse	before	doing	
anything,”	2009	and	2014,	percent
2009 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 13–35)
  AGREE DISAGREE
DON’T 
KNOW AGREE
NEITHER 
AGREE NOR 
DISAGREE
DIS-
AGREE AGREE
NEITHER 
AGREE NOR 
DISAGREE
DIS-
AGREE
Gender
Male 85.5 14.1 0.4 78.8 16.8 4.5 78.5 17.1 4.4
Female 74.3 24.8 0.9 73.6 18.7 7.6 74.0 18.6 7.4
Education level
Illiterate 81.8 16.1 2.1 76.7 17.8 5.6 76.3 18.6 5.2
Can read and write 73.2 9.7 17.1 68.9 26.9 4.2 70.5 22.7 6.8
Primary 82.0 17.1 0.9 78.6 16.8 4.6 79.4 16.6 4.0
Preparatory 80.0 19.6 0.4 79.6 15.7 4.8 79.1 16.2 4.7
General secondary 76.0 23.5 0.6 74.1 18.5 7.5 74.0 18.3 7.7
Vocational secondary 82.0 17.7 0.3 77.5 17.3 5.3 77.2 17.3 5.6
Post-secondary institute 79.6 20.1 0.3 81.3 14.1 4.6 80.7 15.5 3.8
University and above 74.7 24.9 0.5 71.7 20.0 8.4 71.9 20.1 8.0
Region
Urban Governorates 71.2 27.4 1.4 79.1 14.5 6.4 79.5 14.4 6.1
Urban Lower Egypt 77.4 22.1 0.5 70.6 22.0 7.5 70.2 22.5 7.3
Rural Lower Egypt 82.5 17.0 0.5 73.2 20.5 6.4 73.0 20.8 6.2
Urban Upper Egypt 83.4 16.2 0.5 69.8 21.9 8.3 70.2 21.2 8.6
Rural Upper Egypt 84.5 15.2 0.4 82.2 13.7 4.1 82.2 13.7 4.2
Frontier Governorates 79.8 19.7 0.5 71.6 22.3 6.1 72.3 22.4 5.4
Urban–rural residence
Urban 74.8 24.2 1.1 77.1 17.2 5.8 77.2 17.2 5.7
Rural 83.4 16.2 0.4 77.5 17.2 5.3 77.3 17.5 5.2
Informal urban areas 77.2 22.2 0.6 66.4 22.4 11.2 67.3 21.8 10.9
Wealth quintile
Lowest 85.0 14.2 0.8 80.8 15.6 3.7 80.0 15.8 4.2
Second 82.1 17.6 0.3 75.4 18.9 5.6 76.1 18.8 5.1
Middle 82.5 17.1 0.4 75.7 18.3 6.0 75.3 19.0 5.7
Fourth 79.2 20.3 0.5 74.6 19.0 6.5 75.1 18.6 6.4
Highest 70.1 28.6 1.4 75.7 16.7 7.7 75.3 17.0 7.7
Age group
15–17 79.2 20.2 0.6 77.0 17.5 5.5 76.3 18.1 5.5
18–24 79.8 19.5 0.7 76.5 17.4 6.1 76.5 17.4 6.1
25–29 81.1 18.3 0.7 75.5 18.3 6.2 75.5 18.3 6.2
30–35 — — — — — — 76.9 17.7 5.4
Marital status
Never married 80.3 19.0 0.8 75.6 18.5 5.9 75.4 18.7 6.0
Ever married 79.3 20.4 0.3 78.4 15.5 6.2 78.0 16.3 5.8
Employment status
Employed 83.7 16.1 0.2 79.4 16.9 3.7 78.9 17.1 4.1
Unemployed 83.6 16.3 0.1 77.6 16.7 5.6 76.8 17.9 5.3
Out of labor force 77.8 21.3 0.9 74.7 18.2 7.1 74.8 18.2 7.0
Total 80.0 19.4 0.6 76.3 17.7 6.0 76.3 17.8 5.9
(N) (8,699) (2,215) (78) (6,545) (1,509) (559) (8,292) (1,926) (686)
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TABLE A9.8 Youth	responses	to	the	question,	“Do	you	think	a	woman	has	the	right	to	ask	for	a	separation	
(divorce	or	khul)?”,	2009	and	2014,	percent
2009 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 13–35)
  YES NO YES NO YES NO
Gender
Male 56.9 43.1 62.5 37.5 62.9 37.1
Female 70.8 29.2 81.0 19.0 80.6 19.5
Education level
Illiterate 50.1 49.9 61.2 38.8 62.2 37.8
Can read and write 61.4 38.6 66.1 33.9 67.8 32.3
Primary 58.7 41.3 65.2 34.8 67.0 33.0
Preparatory 62.3 37.7 69.2 30.8 70.0 30.0
General secondary 70.0 30.0 77.1 22.9 77.6 22.4
Vocational secondary 64.4 35.6 69.8 30.2 70.7 29.3
Post-secondary institute 79.0 21.0 76.6 23.5 75.7 24.3
University and above 73.2 26.8 78.1 21.9 77.1 22.9
Region
Urban Governorates 69.3 30.7 73.8 26.2 74.5 25.5
Urban Lower Egypt 66.2 33.8 70.2 29.8 69.3 30.7
Rural Lower Egypt 63.1 36.9 71.4 28.6 71.9 28.1
Urban Upper Egypt 63.5 36.5 65.9 34.2 64.4 35.6
Rural Upper Egypt 59.5 40.5 72.7 27.3 72.9 27.1
Frontier Governorates 50.6 49.4 56.5 43.5 56.6 43.4
Urban–rural residence
Urban 67.4 32.6 71.1 28.9 71.3 28.7
Rural 61.3 38.7 71.7 28.3 72.1 27.9
Informal urban areas 65.7 34.4 69.7 30.3 68.2 31.8
Wealth quintile
Lowest 54.5 45.5 65.6 34.4 66.3 33.8
Second 60.5 39.5 69.9 30.1 70.0 30.0
Middle 64.3 35.8 72.4 27.6 72.2 27.8
Fourth 69.3 30.7 69.4 30.6 69.9 30.1
Highest 70.2 29.8 77.8 22.2 77.8 22.3
Age group
15–17 62.7 37.3 70.1 30.0 70.2 29.8
18–24 63.6 36.4 71.8 28.2 71.8 28.2
25–29 64.7 35.3 71.7 28.3 71.7 28.3
30–35  — — — — 72.3 27.7
Marital status
Never married 63.5 36.5 69.6 30.4 69.6 30.4
Ever married 64.1 36.0 76.2 23.8 75.0 25.0
Employment status
Employed 61.2 38.8 68.0 32.0 68.0 32.0
Unemployed 60.3 39.7 75.5 24.5 74.6 25.4
Out of labor force 65.3 34.7 72.7 27.3 73.2 26.8
Total 63.7 36.3 71.4 28.7 71.5 28.5
(N) (6,993) (3,997) (6,163) (2,450) (7,820) (3,084)
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TABLE A9.9 Youth	perspectives	on	when	requesting	divorce	is	justified	for	women,	2009	and	2014	
  2009 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 13–35)
  YES NO DON’T KNOW YES NO YES NO
If the spouse disrespects her parents
Males 54.3 44.4 1.3 43.8 56.3 43.1 56.9
Females 40.0 59.2 0.9 44.9 55.2 44.1 55.9
Total 46.5 52.4 1.1 44.4 55.7 43.6 56.4
(N) (3,140) (3,777 (76) (2,774) (3,389) (3,461) (4,359)
If the spouse does not listen to her
Males 39.7 59.0 1.3 27.7 72.3 28.1 71.9
Females 31.3 67.7 1.0 34.2 65.8 33.9 66.1
Total 35.1 63.7 1.1 31.2 68.8 31.3 68.7
(N) (2,363) (4,548) (82) (2,032) (4,131) (2,565) (5,255)
The first time her spouse beats her
Males 18.3 81.0 0.7 17.9 82.1 18.5 81.5
Females 24.2 75.2 0.6 25.1 74.9 24.8 75.2
Total 21.5 77.8 0.7 21.8 78.2 22.0 78.0
(N) (1,506) (5,431) (56) (1,353) (4,810) (1,713) (6,107)
If the spouse beats her regularly
Males 79.5 19.9 0.6 69.8 30.2 69.5 30.5
Females 71.2 28.1 0.8 72.7 27.3 72.5 27.5
Total 75.0 24.4 0.7 71.4 28.6 71.2 28.8
(N) (5,169) (1,781) (43) (4,419) (1,744) (5,591) (2,229)
If the spouse does not give her or the children enough money
Males 54.8 44.6 0.6 35.8 64.2 36.3 63.7
Females 40.8 58.2 1.0 36.9 63.1 36.5 63.5
Total 47.2 51.9 0.8 36.4 63.6 36.4 63.6
(N) (3,183) (3,754) (56) (2,271) (3,892) (2,863) (4,957)
If the spouse wants to take her money
Males 70.0 29.6 0.4 54.2 45.8 54.0 46.0
Females 52.2 46.6 1.2 51.7 48.3 51.7 48.3
Total 60.3 38.8 0.9 52.9 47.1 52.7 47.3
(N) (4,096) (2,829) (67) (3,273) (2,890) (4,138) (3,682)
If the spouse “knows” another woman
Males 71.5 27.9 0.6 65.4 34.6 65.0 35.0
Females 77.9 21.1 1.0 72.8 27.2 72.1 27.9
Total 75.0 24.2 0.8 69.4 30.6 68.9 31.1
(N) (5,237) (1,701) (55) (4,338) (1,825) (5,447) (2,373)
If the spouse marries another woman
Males 56.1 43.2 0.7 66.7 33.3 67.1 33.0
Females 79.4 19.1 1.5 81.6 18.5 81.0 19.0
Total 68.8 30.1 1.2 74.8 25.2 74.7 25.3
(N) (4,862) (2,050) (81) (4,723) (1,440) (5,978) (1,842)
If she hates her spouse
Males 86.7 12.7 0.6 76.7 23.3 76.8 23.2
Females 82.0 16.7 1.3 79.2 20.8 79.2 20.8
Total 84.2 14.9 1.0 78.1 21.9 78.2 21.9
(N) (5,798) (1,126) (69) (4,912) (1,251) (6,236) (1,584)
If the spouse cannot have children
Males 42.8 54.1 3.1 49.6 50.4 49.3 50.7
Females 35.9 59.1 5.0 40.7 59.3 40.5 59.5
Total 39.1 56.8 4.1 44.8 55.2 44.5 55.5
(N) (2,647) (4,069) (277) (2,687) (3,476) (3,386) (4,434)
If the spouse suffers from sexual dysfunction
Males 74.7 21.3 4.0 59.5 40.5 59.0 41.0
Females 43.2 48.8 8.0 49.6 50.4 49.5 50.5
Total 57.6 36.2 6.2 54.1 45.9 53.8 46.2
(N) (3,826) (2,742) (425) (3,273) (2,890) (4,126) (3,694)
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TABLE A9.10	 Youth	perspectives	on	when	requesting	divorce	is	justified	for	men,	2009	and	2014
  2009 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 13–35)
 
YES NO
DON’T 
KNOW YES NO YES NO
If his wife does not respect his parents
Males 66.4 32.2 1.5 59.5 40.5 59.5 40.5
Females 46.3 52.4 1.3 49.3 50.7 49.0 51.0
Total 56.6 42.1 1.4 54.6 45.4 54.4 45.6
(N) (5,971) (4,870) (151) (4,783) (3,830) (5,995) (4,909)
If his wife does not obey his orders
Males 63.1 35.5 1.5 51.3 48.7 51.2 48.8
Females 39.9 58.8 1.3 44.2 55.8 44.7 55.3
Total 51.7 46.9 1.4 47.9 52.1 48.0 52.0
(N) (5,401) (5,424) (167) (4,222) (4,391) (5,343) (5,561)
If his wife does not take care of the house
Males 41.1 56.8 2.1 34.7 65.3 35.1 64.9
Females 32.3 66.3 1.4 31.4 68.6 31.8 68.2
Total 36.8 61.4 1.8 33.1 66.9 33.5 66.5
(N) (3,909) (6,864) (219) (2,923) (5,689) (3,711) (7,192)
If his wife does not take care of the children
Males 52.7 45.8 1.5 40.4 59.7 40.7 59.3
Females 38.2 60.1 1.7 37.0 63.0 37.4 62.6
Total 45.6 52.8 1.6 38.7 61.3 39.1 60.9
(N) (4,799) (6,011) (182) (3,413) (5,200) (4,331) (6,573)
If his wife “knows” another man
Males 87.0 12.2 0.8 91.3 8.7 91.2 8.8
Females 82.6 15.9 1.5 90.7 9.4 90.9 9.1
Total 84.9 14.0 1.2 91.0 9.0 91.0 9.0
(N) (9,292) (1,566) (134) (7,820) (793) (9,908) (996)
If his wife refuses to share her salary
Males 22.9 75.4 1.7 16.4 83.6 16.9 83.1
Females 22.5 75.5 2.0 17.6 82.4 17.5 82.5
Total 22.7 75.4 1.8 17.0 83.0 17.2 82.8
(N) (2,462) (8,319) (211) (1,537) (7,076) (1,965) (8,939)
If he hates his wife
Males 82.7 16.4 0.8 70.0 30.0 70.3 29.8
Females 76.2 22.2 1.6 72.4 27.6 72.9 27.1
Total 79.6 19.3 1.2 71.2 28.9 71.5 28.5
(N) (8,588) (2,263) (140) (6,263) (2,350) (7,983) (2,921)
If his wife cannot have children
Males 38.4 59.1 2.5 44.1 55.9 44.0 56.1
Females 36.8 58.4 4.8 41.6 58.4 41.2 58.8
Total 37.6 58.7 3.6 42.9 57.1 42.6 57.4
(N) (4,048) (6,532) (412) (3,664) (4,949) (4,617) (6,287)
If his wife suffers from sexual problems
Males 60.9 35.5 3.7 50.1 49.9 50.1 49.9
Females 42.6 49.1 8.3 47.2 52.8 47.0 53.0
Total 51.9 42.1 5.9 48.7 51.3 48.6 51.4
(N) (5,522) (4,836) (634) (4,180) (4,433) (5,280) (5,624)
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TABLE A9.11 Youth	responses	to	the	question,	“Do	you	think	that	society	perceives	divorced	women	
respectfully?”,	2009	and	2014,	percent
2009 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 13–35)
  YES NO YES NO YES NO
Gender
Male 34.2 65.8 37.1 62.9 37.2 62.8
Female 31.4 68.6 35.4 64.6 35.3 64.8
Education level
Illiterate 28.5 71.5 29.7 70.3 31.3 68.7
Can read and write 0.0 100.0 39.3 60.7 31.6 68.4
Primary 28.6 71.4 30.5 69.5 30.6 69.4
Preparatory 33.2 66.8 32.7 67.3 33.4 66.6
General secondary 37.0 63.0 39.8 60.2 40.2 59.8
Vocational secondary 32.5 67.6 35.4 64.6 34.7 65.4
Post-secondary institute 37.5 62.5 36.0 64.0 39.1 60.9
University and above 37.8 62.2 42.8 57.2 43.9 56.1
Region
Urban Governorates 36.7 63.3 42.7 57.3 43.8 56.2
Urban Lower Egypt 34.1 65.9 29.2 70.9 30.2 69.8
Rural Lower Egypt 34.3 65.7 36.6 63.4 36.1 63.9
Urban Upper Egypt 30.0 70.0 29.4 70.6 28.1 71.9
Rural Upper Egypt 28.2 71.8 37.6 62.4 37.1 62.9
Frontier Governorates 32.3 67.7 22.9 77.1 23.4 76.6
Urban–rural residence
Urban 35.9 64.1 39.1 61.0 40.1 59.9
Rural 31.6 68.5 36.9 63.1 36.4 63.7
Informal urban areas 30.7 69.3 24.1 75.9 24.0 76.0
Wealth quintile
Lowest 28.5 71.5 34.1 65.9 33.9 66.1
Second 30.7 69.4 35.0 65.0 34.0 66.0
Middle 31.7 68.3 31.8 68.2 32.5 67.5
Fourth 35.0 65.0 38.5 61.5 38.4 61.6
Highest 39.0 61.0 40.8 59.2 41.3 58.7
Age group
15–17 33.0 67.0 37.8 62.2 37.7 62.3
18–24 33.3 66.8 35.7 64.3 35.7 64.3
25–29 32.0 68.0 36.1 63.9 36.1 63.9
30–35 — — — — 35.9 64.1
Marital status
Never married 34.1 65.9 36.9 63.1 37.2 62.9
Ever married 29.7 70.3 34.6 65.4 34.6 65.4
Employment status
Employed 33.9 66.1 37.2 62.8 37.5 62.5
Unemployed 38.2 61.8 36.4 63.7 34.7 65.3
Out of labor force 31.8 68.2 35.8 64.2 35.7 64.3
Total 32.9 67.1 36.3 63.7 36.3 63.7
(N) (3,632) (7,357) (3,013) (5,600) (3,797) (7,107)
214
CHAPTER 2   |   CHAPTER 3   |   CHAPTER 4   |    CHAPTER 5   |   CHAPTER 6   |   CHAPTER 7   |   CHAPTER 8   |   CHAPTER 9
TA
B
LE
 A
9
.1
2
	
Yo
u
th
	s
u
p
p
o
rt
	o
f	a
	m
an
’s
	r
ig
h
t	
to
	b
ea
t	
h
is
	w
ife
	in
	c
er
ta
in
	c
o
n
te
xt
s,
	b
y	
ge
n
d
er
,	2
0
0
9
	a
n
d
	2
0
14
A
P
P
R
O
V
E
D
IS
A
P
P
R
O
V
E
M
A
L
E
S
F
E
M
A
L
E
S
T
O
T
A
L
M
A
L
E
S
F
E
M
A
L
E
S
T
O
T
A
L
 
(N
)
%
(N
)
%
(N
)
%
(N
)
%
(N
)
%
(N
)
%
2
0
0
9
, a
ge
s 
15
–
2
9
W
h
en
 s
h
e 
b
u
rn
s 
th
e 
fo
od
(3
6
8
)
7.
9
(3
6
2
)
6
.2
(7
3
0
)
7.
1
(4
,5
3
9
)
9
2
.1
(5
,7
0
2
)
9
3.
8
(1
0
,2
4
1)
9
3.
0
W
h
en
 s
h
e 
n
eg
le
ct
s 
th
e 
ch
ild
re
n
(1
,8
0
1)
3
8
.1
(1
,0
16
)
17
.0
(2
,8
17
)
27
.8
(3
,1
0
6
)
6
1.
9
(5
,0
4
8
)
8
3.
0
(8
,1
5
4
)
72
.2
W
h
en
 s
h
e 
ar
gu
es
 w
it
h
 h
im
(1
,6
4
1)
3
4
.4
(1
,0
2
5
)
16
.2
(2
,6
6
6
)
2
5.
5
(3
,2
6
6
)
6
5.
6
(5
,0
3
9
)
8
3.
8
(8
,3
0
5
)
74
.5
W
h
en
 s
h
e 
ta
lk
s 
to
 o
th
er
 m
en
(4
,0
0
6
)
8
0
.9
(4
,0
12
)
6
6
.7
(8
,0
18
)
74
.0
(9
0
1)
19
.1
(2
,0
5
2
)
3
3.
3
(2
,9
5
3
)
2
6
.0
W
h
en
 s
h
e 
w
as
te
s 
h
is
 m
on
ey
(1
,9
17
)
4
1.
6
(1
,4
8
0
)
24
.1
(3
,3
9
7)
3
3.
0
(2
,9
9
0
)
5
8
.5
(4
,5
8
4
)
75
.9
(7
,5
74
)
6
7.
0
W
h
en
 s
h
e 
re
fu
se
s 
to
 h
av
e 
se
x
(1
,7
8
4
)
37
.6
(2
,0
6
9
)
3
4
.0
(3
,8
5
3
)
3
5.
9
(3
,1
2
3
)
6
2
.4
(3
,9
9
5
)
6
6
.0
(7
,1
18
)
6
4
.2
2
0
14
, a
ge
s 
15
–
2
9
W
h
en
 s
h
e 
b
u
rn
s 
th
e 
fo
od
(4
10
)
10
.0
(3
0
5
)
7.
3
(7
15
)
8
.7
(3
,7
3
0
)
9
0
.0
(4
,1
6
8
)
9
2
.7
(7
,8
9
8
)
9
1.
3
W
h
en
 s
h
e 
n
eg
le
ct
s 
th
e 
ch
ild
re
n
(1
,3
0
4
)
3
2
.6
(1
,0
3
6
)
2
3.
5
(2
,3
4
0
)
2
8
.3
(2
,8
3
6
)
6
7.
4
(3
,4
37
)
76
.5
(6
,2
73
)
71
.7
W
h
en
 s
h
e 
ar
gu
es
 w
it
h
 h
im
(1
,0
0
3
)
2
3.
4
(6
5
4
)
13
.9
(1
,6
57
)
18
.9
(3
,1
37
)
76
.6
(3
,8
19
)
8
6
.1
(6
,9
5
6
)
8
1.
1
W
h
en
 s
h
e 
ta
lk
s 
to
 o
th
er
 m
en
(2
,9
0
3
)
70
.9
(2
,6
18
)
5
8
.4
(5
,5
2
1)
6
4
.9
(1
,2
37
)
2
9.
1
(1
,8
5
5
)
4
1.
6
(3
,0
9
2
)
3
5.
1
W
h
en
 s
h
e 
w
as
te
s 
h
is
 m
on
ey
(1
,1
0
6
)
2
6
.0
(8
8
5
)
19
.2
(1
,9
9
1)
2
2
.8
(3
,0
3
4
)
74
.0
(3
,5
8
8
)
8
0
.8
(6
,6
2
2
)
77
.2
W
h
en
 s
h
e 
re
fu
se
s 
to
 h
av
e 
se
x
(1
,6
5
3
)
4
1.
8
(1
,4
17
)
3
1.
3
(3
,0
70
)
3
6
.8
(2
,4
8
7)
5
8
.2
(3
,0
5
6
)
6
8
.8
(5
,5
4
3
)
6
3.
2
2
0
14
, a
ge
s 
13
–
3
5
W
h
en
 s
h
e 
b
u
rn
s 
th
e 
fo
od
(4
8
6
)
9.
9
(3
77
)
7.
1
(8
6
3
)
8
.5
(4
,5
79
)
9
0
.1
(5
,4
6
2
)
9
2
.9
(1
0
,0
4
1)
9
1.
5
W
h
en
 s
h
e 
n
eg
le
ct
s 
th
e 
ch
ild
re
n
(1
,5
76
)
3
2
.5
(1
,3
5
3
)
2
3.
8
(2
,9
2
9
)
2
8
.2
(3
,4
8
9
)
6
7.
5
(4
,4
8
6
)
76
.2
(7
,9
75
)
71
.8
W
h
en
 s
h
e 
ar
gu
es
 w
it
h
 h
im
(1
,2
11
)
2
3.
3
(8
6
1)
14
.1
(2
,0
72
)
18
.8
(3
,8
5
4
)
76
.7
(4
,9
78
)
8
5.
9
(8
,8
3
2
)
8
1.
2
W
h
en
 s
h
e 
ta
lk
s 
to
 o
th
er
 m
en
(3
,5
17
)
70
.1
(3
,4
0
4
)
5
8
.2
(6
,9
2
1)
6
4
.3
(1
,5
4
8
)
2
9.
9
(2
,4
3
5
)
4
1.
8
(3
,9
8
3
)
3
5.
7
W
h
en
 s
h
e 
w
as
te
s 
h
is
 m
on
ey
(1
,3
4
9
)
2
6
.1
(1
,1
6
4
)
19
.5
(2
,5
13
)
2
2
.9
(3
,7
16
)
73
.9
(4
,6
75
)
8
0
.5
(8
,3
9
1)
77
.1
W
h
en
 s
h
e 
re
fu
se
s 
to
 h
av
e 
se
x
(1
,9
9
8
)
4
1.
4
(1
,8
4
1)
3
1.
5
(3
,8
3
9
)
3
6
.5
(3
,0
6
7)
5
8
.6
(3
,9
9
8
)
6
8
.5
(7
,0
6
5
)
6
3.
5
215
CHAPTER 2   |   CHAPTER 3   |   CHAPTER 4   |    CHAPTER 5   |   CHAPTER 6   |   CHAPTER 7   |   CHAPTER 8   |   CHAPTER 9
TABLE A9.13 Youth	response	to	the	question,	“Do	you	think	that	women	who	are	harassed	in	the	streets	deserve	to	
be	if	they	are	dressed	provocatively?”,	2009	and	2014,	percent
2009 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 15–29) 2014 (AGES 13–35)
  AGREE DISAGREE
DON’T 
KNOW AGREE
NEITHER 
AGREE 
NOR DIS-
AGREE
DIS-
AGREE AGREE
NEITHER 
AGREE 
NOR DIS-
AGREE
DIS-
AGREE
Gender
Male 79.5 20.0 0.5 62.3 15.2 22.5 62.0 15.3 22.7
Female 72.5 26.7 0.8 56.3 14.8 29.0 56.1 15.2 28.8
Education level
Illiterate 77.1 20.8 2.2 65.1 17.0 17.9 62.8 18.4 18.8
Can read and write 61.2 21.7 17.1 52.1 30.4 17.5 56.9 21.9 21.2
Primary 77.1 21.8 1.1 65.6 12.9 21.6 64.5 13.7 21.8
Preparatory 77.4 22.1 0.6 62.1 15.2 22.8 61.0 15.7 23.3
General secondary 71.2 28.3 0.6 57.2 15.9 26.9 57.3 16.1 26.6
Vocational secondary 78.0 21.8 0.1 61.7 13.5 24.8 61.4 13.8 24.8
Post-secondary institute 77.7 22.3 0.0 57.0 16.1 26.9 54.7 18.2 27.1
University and above 70.3 29.1 0.6 50.9 16.3 32.8 51.1 15.8 33.2
Region
Urban Governorates 67.6 31.4 1.0 53.0 12.5 34.6 54.0 12.3 33.7
Urban Lower Egypt 75.8 23.4 0.8 48.8 13.8 37.5 47.8 13.3 38.9
Rural Lower Egypt 77.6 22.0 0.4 57.8 17.9 24.3 57.7 18.4 23.8
Urban Upper Egypt 79.9 19.2 0.9 55.5 15.3 29.2 54.7 15.4 29.9
Rural Upper Egypt 80.5 19.0 0.5 70.3 13.5 16.2 69.7 14.1 16.2
Frontier Governorates 71.9 26.8 1.3 59.5 20.9 19.6 60.2 21.2 18.6
Urban–rural residence
Urban 71.5 27.5 1.0 56.1 14.6 29.3 55.8 14.4 29.8
Rural 78.8 20.7 0.5 63.9 15.8 20.4 63.4 16.4 20.2
Informal urban areas 74.4 24.8 0.8 40.8 11.0 48.2 42.4 10.7 46.9
Wealth quintile
Lowest 79.2 19.8 1.0 64.0 15.7 20.2 62.8 16.6 20.6
Second 79.0 20.6 0.4 60.3 13.7 26.1 59.9 13.9 26.2
Middle 78.6 20.8 0.6 61.6 13.7 24.7 61.7 14.0 24.3
Fourth 74.3 25.2 0.5 57.8 15.1 27.2 57.1 15.7 27.2
Highest 68.0 31.1 0.9 54.8 16.4 28.9 55.1 16.0 28.9
Age group
15–17 75.5 23.7 0.8 59.9 15.0 25.1 59.0 15.8 25.2
18–24 76.5 22.8 0.7 58.7 15.3 26.0 58.7 15.3 26.0
25–29 75.7 23.7 0.6 60.3 14.3 25.3 60.3 14.3 25.3
30–35  — — — — — — 58.5 15.8 25.7
Marital status
Never married 75.5 23.7 0.8 58.4 15.5 26.2 57.8 15.8 26.3
Ever married 77.4 22.3 0.3 62.3 13.5 24.2 61.4 14.2 24.4
Employment status
Employed 78.1 21.7 0.2 63.3 14.4 22.3 63.0 14.7 22.3
Unemployed 76.0 23.4 0.7 59.8 14.7 25.5 58.9 13.9 27.3
Out of labor force 75.0 24.1 0.9 57.5 15.3 27.3 56.9 15.7 27.4
Total percent 76.1 23.3 0.7 59.4 15.0 25.6 59.1 15.3 25.7
(N) (8,278) (2,630) (84) (5,106) (1,295) (2,212) (6,463) (1,666) (2,775)
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Introduction
The accuracy of survey estimates indicates how close 
the estimate is to its corresponding population value. 
The difference between the survey estimate and 
its population value is called the error of the survey 
estimate. The total error results from the two types of 
error, namely the sampling error and nonsampling error. 
The sampling error arises when the whole population is 
represented by a part (sample) of it. All other errors in 
the survey estimate are called nonsampling error which 
may occur for different reasons during implementation 
of the sample survey. These reasons may include 
target population misidentification, questionnaire 
problems, respondents’ bias, processing error, and 
time period bias among others. Sampling error can be 
estimated statistically while it is difficult to measure the 
nonsampling error. 
Sampling error estimation 
Standard error (SE) is usually used to measure the 
sampling error. The standard error is the square 
root of the variance. Standard error calculation is 
straightforward in the case of simple random sample. 
However, since the SYPE data result from a stratified 
multistage sample design, a more complex formula is 
used. The STATA SVY module is used to calculate the 
standard error for key estimates of SYPE 2014. 
Precision measures 
Precision measures of survey data estimates may 
include:
•	 Standard error (described in previous paragraph)
•	 Coefficient of variation
•	 Confidence Interval 
•	 Design effect
Coefficient of variation (CV)
Coefficient of variation is the relative standard error. It 
is calculated as the ratio of the estimate sampling error 
to its value. The reliability of the survey estimates are 
questionable if CV exceeds 20%. 
Confidence interval (CI)
A confidence interval is used to express the 
uncertainty of survey estimates. The sampling 
(standard) error is employed to construct a confidence 
interval of the parameter of interest. A 95% confidence 
interval means that when the same sampling method 
with the same sample size and design is used to select 
different samples and construct a confidence interval 
for each sample, the true population parameter is 
expected to fall within the confidence interval in 95% 
of all samples. 
However, if the lower bound of the confidence interval for 
a positive parameter is negative, it must be considered 
zero. Similarly, whenever the upper bound of a 
confidence interval exceeds 1, it must be considered 1. 
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Design effect (DEFF)
The design effect (deff) measures how much worse 
the given sample design is than a simple random 
sample (SRS) of the same size. The DEFF is defined 
as the ratio of the standard error of the used design 
to the standard error of SRS of the same sample size. 
The DEFF shows how much information is gained (or 
lost) by using the present survey compared to SRS. A 
DEFF value of 2 indicates that a double size of simple 
random sample is needed to get the same amount of 
information obtained by the present sample. A DEFF 
value of 1 indicates that the present sample conveys 
the same amount of information obtained by the SRS. 
Design effect (DEFF) is usually greater than 1. However, 
in some cases DEFF is less than 1, which may be due to 
the presence of outliers and/or small sample size.  
Precision estimates for SYPE 
2014 key indicators
Standard error and other precision measures are 
calculated for several selected SYPE 2014 key 
estimates. The selected indicators, the type of each 
estimate (mean, proportion, rate), and the base 
population are displayed in Table 1. 
For each selected indicator, the indicator estimate 
value (Estimate), its standard error (SE), the 95% 
confidence limits (estimates+/- 2 SE), the coefficient 
of variation (CV=SE/estimate), and the design effect 
are calculated and reported in Tables S1-S39. See 
listing on page 222.
Tables S1–S39 can be  
found online at:
popcouncil.org/SYPE2014
It is worth mentioning here that the stratifying 
variable used for variance estimation is defined as 
the intersection of variables of urban–rural residence 
(urban, rural, informal urban area) and geographic 
region (Urban Governorates, urban Lower Egypt, 
rural Lower Egypt, urban Upper Egypt, rural Upper 
Egypt, and Frontier Governorates). This is the same 
stratification scheme that was followed in designing 
the SYPE sample where an independent sample was 
selected from each of the 10 substrata defined by 
the intersection of the two mentioned variables. The 
purpose of such stratification is to create the most 
possible homogeneous strata with regard to the survey 
variables; hence more precise survey estimates would 
be attained. 
Going through the precision measures tables 
the standard errors for indicators are smaller for 
population then for subpopulation. Table 31 for 
example shows that the standard error for the 
percentage of married male youth in urban residence 
(0.012) is smaller than the SE of the same indicator 
in the urban Upper Egypt (0.029). Consequently, the 
95% CI for the percentage of urban married male 
youth is (0.188, 0.237), which is smaller than the 
corresponding 95% CI for the same indicator in the 
urban Upper Egypt which is (0.184, 0.297).
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TABLE 1    Standard errors for main indicators of SYPE 2014, all Egypt
      DESIGN
TABLE TITLE ESTIMATE SE LOWER UPPER CV (%) EFFECT COUNT
S1 Labor force participation rate (broad definition) 0.420 0.007 0.407 0.434 0.016 2.080 10,881
S2 Labor force participation rate (market LF definition) 0.390 0.007 0.377 0.403 0.017 2.041 10,881
S3 Unemployment rate (broad definition) 0.183 0.009 0.165 0.200 0.049 2.223 4,189
S4 Unemployment rate (market definition) 0.119 0.007 0.105 0.132 0.058 1.728 3,852
S5 Employment-to-population ratio 0.881 0.007 0.868 0.895 0.008 1.728 3,852
S6 Average number of hours worked during reference 
week
46.600 0.511 45.600 47.600 0.011 2.868 3,379
S7 Average total monthly earnings for wage and  
salaried workers in reference 3 months
1,702.883 126.032 1,455.188 1,950.578 0.074 1.308 3,382
S8 Percentage of wage workers 0.760 0.011 0.738 0.781 0.014 2.202 3,379
S9 Percentage working in agriculture 0.185 0.014 0.158 0.212 0.075 4.281 3,372
S10 Percentage working in industry 0.562 0.015 0.533 0.591 0.026 2.924 3,372
S11 Percentage working in services 0.253 0.011 0.231 0.275 0.044 2.203 3,372
S12 Percentage working in private sector 0.836 0.008 0.820 0.852 0.010 1.620 3,380
S13 Percentage of employers and self-employed workers 0.148 0.008 0.133 0.163 0.053 1.621 3,379
S14 Percentage of unpaid family workers 0.092 0.008 0.075 0.108 0.092 2.879 3,379
S15 Proportion of youth dropped out of school 0.187 0.007 0.173 0.200 0.036 3.322 10,916
S16 Proportion aspiring to migrate 0.173 0.007 0.160 0.187 0.040 3.646 10,621
S17 Proportion who have migrated and returned 0.017 0.002 0.013 0.020 0.113 1.872 8,720
S18 Proportion of youth using internet 0.234 0.011 0.211 0.256 0.049 7.920 10,889
S19 Proportion of youth participating in voluntary work 0.031 0.003 0.025 0.037 0.094 3.085 10,890
S20 Proportion of youth participating in a group for 
social work
0.028 0.003 0.022 0.035 0.113 4.050 10,916
S21 Proportion of youth who voted in any election 0.652 0.010 0.632 0.671 0.015 3.866 8,720
S22 Proportion participating in sports club/youth center 0.019 0.003 0.014 0.025 0.144 4.458 10,881
S23 Proportion agreeing that educating boys is more 
important than educating girls
0.283 0.009 0.266 0.301 0.031 4.232 10,904
S24 Proportion agreeing that a woman has the right to 
ask for a divorce
0.715 0.009 0.698 0.732 0.012 4.173 10,904
S25 Proportion agreeing that a man is justified in beating 
his wife when she argues with him
0.188 0.009 0.170 0.206 0.050 6.274 10,904
S26 Disability un-incidence 0.987 0.002 0.984 0.990 0.002 1.989 10,916
S27 Youth free of chronic health conditions (diabetes, 
heart problems, respiratory, and kidney-related 
diseases)
0.755 0.010 0.737 0.774 0.013 5.360 10,916
S28 Percentage of smokers 0.182 0.005 0.171 0.193 0.030 2.163 10,916
S29 Percentage of youth having tried drugs 0.010 0.001 0.007 0.013 0.135 2.043 10,916
S30 Percentage of girls having undergone FGM/C 0.790 0.011 0.768 0.812 0.014 4.464 5,843
S31 Percentage of married youth 0.352 0.007 0.338 0.365 0.020 2.308 10,906
S32 Percentage of married youth who live with their 
parents (extended families) 
0.386 0.014 0.358 0.413 0.036 3.785 4,594
S33 Ideal number of children 3.017 0.027 2.965 3.070 0.009 6.772 10,906
S34 Ideal number of children for married people 3.176 0.032 3.113 3.238 0.010 3.710 4,594
S35 Ideal number of children for unmarried people 3.102 0.056 2.992 3.212 0.018 2.069 1,095
S36 Average age at marriage for males 24.50 0.111 24.329 24.764 0.005 1.529 1,364
S37 Average age at marriage for females 20.00 0.084 19.831 20.162 0.004 2.143 3,237
S38 Percentage of females married before 18 0.213 0.010 0.193 0.232 0.047 1.914 3,236
S39 Proportion of youth playing any kind of sport 0.541 0.012 0.518 0.564 0.021 5.908 10,916
95% CI
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List	of	selected	SYPE	2014	key	indicators	for	sampling	error
TABLE 
NO. TABLE TITLE ESTIMATE POPULATION
S1 Labor force participation rate (broad definition) Rate All youth 15–35 in labor force relaxing search
S2 Labor force participation rate (market LF definition) Rate All youth 15–35 in labor force with search
S3 Unemployment rate (broad definition) Rate Unemployed youth 15–35 in labor force relaxing search
S4 Unemployment rate (market definition) Rate Unemployed youth 15–35 in labor force with search
S5 Employment-to-population ratio Ratio All employed youth 15–35 to all youth population
S6 Average number of hours worked during reference 
weak
Mean Employed youth 15–35
S7 Average total monthly earnings for wage and salaried 
workers in reference 3 months
Mean Employed youth 15–35
S8 Percentage of wage workers Percent Employed workers, youth 15–35
S9 Percentage working in agriculture Percent Youth workers in agriculture 15–35
S10 Percentage working in industry Percent Youth workers in industry 15–35
S11 Percentage working in services Percent Youth workers in services 15–35
S12 Percentage working in private sector Percent Youth workers in private sector 15–35
S13 Percentage of employers and self-employed workers Percent Youth employers and self-employed workers 15–35
S14 Percentage of unpaid family workers Percent Youth unpaid family workers 15–35
S15 Proportion of youth dropped out of school Proportion Young people dropped out of school < age 16
S16 Proportion aspiring to migrate Proportion Youth aspiring to migrate 1–35
S17 Proportion who have migrated and returned Proportion Youth who have migrated and returned 1–35
S18 Proportion of youth using internet Proportion Youth using internet 1–35
S19 Proportion of youth participating in voluntary work Proportion Youth participating in voluntary work 1–35
S20 Proportion of youth participating in a group for social 
work
Proportion Youth participating in a group for social work 1–35
S21 Proportion of youth who voted in any election Proportion Youth who voted in any election 1–35
S22 Proportion participating in sports club/youth center Proportion Youth participating in sports club/youth center 1–35
S23 Proportion agreeing that educating boys is more 
important than educating girls
Proportion All youth 1–35
S24 Proportion agreeing that a woman has the right to ask 
for a divorce 
Proportion All youth 1–35
S25 Proportion agreeing that a man is justified in beating 
his wife when she argues with him
Proportion All youth 1–35
S26 Disability un-incidence Proportion All youth 1–35
S27 Youth free of chronic health conditions (diabetes, heart 
problems, respiratory, and kidney-related diseases)
Proportion All youth 1–35
S28 Percentage of smokers Percent All youth 1–35
S29 Percentage of youth having tried drugs Percent All youth 1–35
S30 Percentage of girls having undergone FGM/C Percent All female youth 1–35
S31 Percentage of married youth Percent Female 15+, male youth 18+
S32 Percentage of married youth live with their parents 
(extended families) 
Percent All currently married youth 1–35
S33 Ideal number of children Mean All youth 15–35
S34 Ideal number of children for married people Mean Currently married youth, female 15+, male youth 18+
S35 Ideal number of children for unmarried people Mean All unmarried youth 1–35
S36 Average age at marriage for males Mean Male married youth 1–35
S37 Average age at marriage for females Mean Female married youth 15–35
S38 Percentage of females married before 18 Percent Ever married female 18+
S39 Proportion playing any kind of sport Proportion All youth 1–35
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